



Refining Child Pornography Law
The legal definition of child pornography is, at best, unclear. In part 
because of this ambiguity and in part because of the nature of the crime 
itself, the prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators, the protection of and 
restitution for victims, and the means for preventing repeat offenses are 
deeply controversial. In an effort to clarify the questions and begin to 
formulate answers, in this volume, experts in law and the social sciences 
examine child pornography law and its consequences. Focusing on the 
roles of language and crime definition, the contributors present a range of 
views about the increasingly visible role child pornography plays in the 
national conversation on child safety, as well as the wisdom of the 
punishment of those who produce, distribute, and possess materials that 
may be considered child pornography.
Carissa Byrne Hessick is Professor of Law at the University of North 
Carolina School of Law.
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The desire to have collections of a large number of photographs of 
children seems to be a common, although not universal, characteristic 
of many pedophiles. Some of this exchange of photographs takes place 
in person, a great deal takes place through the mails, and recently a 
significant amount of the exchange has taken place by the use of 
computer networks through which users of child pornography let each 
other know about materials they desire or have available.
— Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography (1986)
When Attorney General Edwin Meese published his report on pornogra-
phy more than twenty- five years ago, he could not have known how much 
computers and the Internet were going to affect child pornography. Tech-
nological advances have led to a proliferation of child pornography im-
ages. Technology has also wrought significant changes in the detection 
and prosecution of child pornography crimes. Simply put, the past twenty 
years have seen a child pornography revolution.
In the decades since child pornography first came to the attention of the 
American criminal justice system, it has been the subject of many state and 
federal laws and a number of high- profile Supreme Court cases. Child por-
nography is presently the focus of countless media stories, increasingly se-
vere punishment, and some of the biggest modern sentencing controversies.
Despite this sustained attention, the law surrounding child pornogra-
phy is far from settled. Serious questions remain about what types of im-
ages qualify as “child pornography.” The modern trend of increasingly 
harsh criminal sentences for those who possess child pornography has 
met with significant resistance from some judges. And whether there is a 
link between those who view child pornography and sex crimes against 
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children has become a hotly contested issue in the criminal justice com-
munity. In other words, as a matter of language, as a matter of criminal 
sanctions, and as a matter of social policy, child pornography requires fur-
ther study and reflection.
Refining Child Pornography Law: Crime, Language, and Social Conse-
quences adds nuance and depth to the public discussion surrounding child 
pornography. This volume brings together experts in law and related dis-
ciplines who study child pornography law and the consequences of that 
law. Focusing on language and crime definition in the child pornography 
debate, this volume includes chapters representing a number of different 
views about the increasingly visible role child pornography plays in the 
national conversation on child safety, as well as the wisdom of the current 
legal penalties that are imposed on those who produce, distribute, and 
possess child pornography.
Underscoring the importance of language in the child pornography 
debate is the controversy surrounding the term “child pornography.” A 
growing number of academics and activists contend that the term ought 
not be used to refer to sexually explicit images of minors. They argue that 
the term “child pornography” fails to capture the horrible nature of the 
harm suffered by the children who are depicted. As Professor Mary Leary 
notes in her chapter, The Language of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation, 
the term “child pornography” “likely conjures up images of younger look-
ing adults striking provocative poses, as opposed to the reality of an in-
creasingly violent collections of photographs and video depicting younger 
and younger children being violently victimized.”
In using the term “child pornography” both in the title of the book and 
in this introduction, I do not mean to ignore the arguments that Professor 
Leary and others have made about the importance of language nor the pos-
sibility that a term that includes the word “pornography” may lead some to 
misapprehend the nature of the images. Rather, I use the term because it 
continues to be most widely recognized term used to refer to these images.
Before previewing the contents of the book, this introduction will pro-
vide a brief overview of the development of American child pornography 
law. The overview is intended to give readers only a passing familiarity 
with legal developments in this area. More complete and nuanced discus-
sions of the major Supreme Court cases in this area and other legal devel-
opments are provided in the individual chapters.
Child pornography laws are of a relatively recent vintage.1 The first Amer-
ican jurisdiction to prohibit child pornography was California. In 1961 it 
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passed a law prohibiting individuals from using a minor to “prepare[], 
publish[], print[], exhibit[], distribute[], or offer[] to distribute, .  .  . any 
obscene matter.” Any individual who engaged in that prohibited behavior 
was guilty of a misdemeanor and could be fined up to two thousand dol-
lars and imprisoned for up to one year.2 North Dakota passed legislation 
in 1975 that made the production of child pornography a Class C felony.3 
Tennessee enacted a similar prohibition that same year.4 A number of 
other states and the federal government enacted anti- child- pornography 
laws in 1977 and 1978.5
This spate of child pornography legislation appears to have been 
prompted by media reports.6 For example, in 1977, the Chicago Tribune 
ran a series of articles on “child predators.” The series ran on the front page 
for four consecutive days, and it included an article devoted to child por-
nography.7 That same year, one member of Congress noted:
A year ago who had ever heard of child pornography or even imag-
ined that children were being abused in this manner? . . . All of a 
sudden there it was. In newspapers, in Time magazine, on televi-
sion, and, inevitably, on the House floor. The revelations were 
shocking and disgusting. Children, ages 3 to 16, being used, sold, 
traded, photographed for sexual purposes.8
While media reports of exploited children captivated the public and 
lawmakers, these initial child pornography statutes resembled laws crimi-
nalizing obscenity. That is to say, most of the laws prohibiting child por-
nography criminalized the production and distribution of child pornog-
raphy images that were obscene.9 Because obscenity was already widely 
prohibited in American jurisdictions,10 the new child pornography laws 
provided little in the way of added protection for children. The states pre-
sumably wrote their laws in this fashion because they wanted to avoid 
First Amendment problems. Images are ordinarily protected by the free 
speech guarantees of the First Amendment, and legislatures may crimi-
nalize sexualized images of children only when those images are not en-
titled to constitutional protection. Obscenity is a well- established excep-
tion to the First Amendment, and so in limiting their laws against child 
pornography to images that were obscene, the states were able to avoid 
any constitutional questions.
One notable exception to this trend was New York, which adopted a 
statute criminalizing the production and distribution of child pornogra-
phy and a separate statute criminalizing the distribution of obscene mate-
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rial.11 The United States Supreme Court upheld the New York law in New 
York v. Ferber.12 In that opinion, the Supreme Court announced that child 
pornography was entitled to no First Amendment protection and that 
states could criminalize its production and distribution even if the images 
were not obscene. After Ferber was decided in 1982, state and federal laws 
criminalizing the creation, distribution, and possession of child pornog-
raphy proliferated.
In addition to omitting the obscenity requirement, some jurisdictions 
expanded their child pornography laws by prohibiting the possession of 
images.13 For example, Ohio amended its child pornography laws in 1988 
to include private possession.14 Because the Supreme Court had previ-
ously stated that the private possession of obscene materials was protected 
by the First Amendment,15 some believed that laws such as Ohio’s were 
unlikely to survive constitutional challenge.16 But the Supreme Court up-
held Ohio’s law in Osborne v. Ohio.17 The Supreme Court explained that 
although the private possession of other obscene materials was constitu-
tionally protected, child pornography was different because the process of 
creating child pornography harmed the child.
As American states and Congress expanded the scope of their child por-
nography laws, and as enforcement agencies began to target distributors 
and collectors of child pornography, the number of child pornography im-
ages in circulation dropped. The successful identification and prosecution 
of child pornography offenders led many to conclude that the commercial 
circulation of child pornography images had essentially ceased by the early 
1990s.18 But “[j]ust when suppression of the child pornography trade seemed 
within sight, . . . the Internet arrived on the scene.”19
The rise of the Internet, as well as the rapid development of several 
other technologies, allowed for fast, widespread, and anonymous distribu-
tion of child pornography. Before the advent of the Internet, distributing 
child pornography was a time- intensive and expensive undertaking. A 
distributor would have to physically copy an image,20 expend effort to 
identify interested recipients (such as taking out advertisements in porno-
graphic magazines or otherwise actively attempting to meet others inter-
ested in acquiring child pornography), and physically mail or otherwise 
transfer a package to the intended recipient. Because images would sig-
nificantly deteriorate in quality after a few copies, distribution was ex-
tremely limited.
Contrast that situation with distribution in the Internet era: Any indi-
vidual who possesses pornographic images on his or her computer and 
who visits a file- sharing site will “distribute” those images to countless in-
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dividuals,21 even with no affirmative action on his or her part. There is no 
cost associated with duplicating a digital image, and the quality of an im-
age does not noticeably deteriorate, even if it is many copies removed 
from the original image. To obtain images, individuals can search and 
download from websites anonymously. In short, technology facilitates the 
widespread distribution of child pornography.
As the Internet led to increasing availability of child pornography, leg-
islators sharply increased the sentences imposed on child pornography 
offenders. For example, in 1990, federal law punished the possession of 
child pornography by up to ten years in prison.22 In 1996, the maximum 
penalty was increased to fifteen years,23 and it was raised again in 2003 to 
twenty years.24 Many states also dramatically increased their penalties.25
While judges generally, and the Supreme Court in particular, were at 
first supportive of legislative efforts to combat child pornography, they 
have become more skeptical in recent years. For example, in a 2002 deci-
sion, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,26 the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down a federal statute that prohibited virtual child pornography— that is, 
pornographic images created wholly by technological means. More re-
cently, a number of federal judges have refused to impose the severe sen-
tences required by the federal sentencing guidelines for child pornogra-
phy offenders.27 These refusals have not only prompted a number of media 
stories28 but also have led the United States Sentencing Commission to 
suggest that Congress limit sentencing discretion of federal judges.29
The most recent child pornography issue to reach the U.S. Supreme 
Court involved victim restitution. A federal statute requires courts to or-
der defendants convicted of certain crimes, including child pornography 
offenses, to pay the victim “the full amount of the victim’s losses.”30 Doyle 
Randall Paroline pled guilty to possessing a number of child pornography 
images, including two images of a young girl who sought restitution under 
the pseudonym “Amy.” Amy was sexually abused by her uncle when she 
was eight and nine years old, and photographs the uncle took during that 
abuse have been widely distributed on the Internet. Amy has suffered sig-
nificant emotional harm from that distribution, which has required ongo-
ing psychological treatment. When she became an adult, Amy sought 
more than $3 million in restitution from Paroline to compensate her for 
the costs of her ongoing treatment and lost wages.
The issue before the Supreme Court in Paroline v. United States31 was 
the amount of restitution to require from Paroline. The restitution ques-
tion was difficult because the losses Amy suffered were caused not only by 
Paroline, but also by the many other individuals who distributed and pos-
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sessed those images. The Court held that restitution under the federal stat-
ute is appropriate only to the extent the defend ant’s offense proximately 
caused a victim’s losses. But proximate cause is a slippery concept. To say 
that someone’s conduct proximately caused a result is to say not only that 
the conduct actually caused the result, but also that the conduct had a 
“sufficient connection to the result.”32
Causation is especially tricky in child pornography possession cases. 
In an ordinary case, causation does not exist if the loss would not have 
occurred but for the defendant’s actions. But in cases of child pornography 
possession it is difficult to establish that the victim would have suffered 
harm if one particular defendant had not possessed the relevant images. 
For example, thousands of individuals have possessed the images of Amy 
that were created by her uncle; she would presumably have lost the same 
amount of income and required the same amount of treatment if one 
fewer person possessed the images of her. To establish that Paroline played 
any role in causing Amy’s losses, the Court relied on a common law rule 
that allows for a finding of causation where the losses would have occurred 
even if the defendant had not engaged in the particular conduct. The rule 
recognizes a defendant as an actual cause of harm when the cumulative 
effects of multiple actors’ conduct results in the harm. This aggregation 
concept allowed the Court to find that Paroline caused Amy’s losses even 
though she would have suffered those same losses if Paroline had not pos-
sessed the images.
But while the Supreme Court concluded that Paroline was a cause of 
Amy’s losses, it did not give much guidance about how much of her losses 
could be attributed to Paroline under the concept of proximate causation. 
That is to say, while the Court resolved whether Paroline could be held 
responsible for some amount of Amy’s losses, it did not clarify how much. 
The Court said that judges should order restitution in child pornography 
cases “in an amount that comports with the defendant’s relative role in the 
causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses.”33 In making that 
assessment, the Supreme Court suggested that lower courts look to a 
number of factors, including:
the number of past criminal defendants found to have contributed 
to the victim’s general losses; reasonable predictions of the number 
of future offenders likely to be caught and convicted for crimes con-
tributing to the victim’s general losses; any available and reasonably 
reliable estimate of the broader number of offenders involved (most 
of whom will, of course, never be caught or convicted); whether the 
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defendant reproduced or distributed images of the victim; whether 
the defendant had any connection to the initial production of the 
images; how many images of the victim the defendant possessed; 
and other facts relevant to the defendant’s relative causal role.
It also cautioned lower courts against making “trivial restitution orders.”34
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Paroline leaves a number of questions 
unanswered. Most importantly, it fails to provide much guidance to lower 
courts about how to calculate restitution awards— a point made forcefully 
by Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent. Although the Supreme Court’s di-
rections to lower courts are vague, they clearly instruct those courts to 
engage in a comprehensive analysis of the various sources of harm to child 
pornography victims. As a result, we should expect to see restitution cases 
that attempt to assess the relative wrongdoing of child pornography de-
fendants, cases that could enhance the current conversations surrounding 
child pornography crimes.
At present, however, the discussions surrounding child pornography are 
underdeveloped. Although child pornography law is a matter of sustained 
public interest, a number of important issues have remain underexplored. 
For example, there are serious disputes about the relationship between 
child pornography offenders and child sex abuse. While the national dis-
course on child pornography often seems to assume that those who pos-
sess child pornography also pose a physical threat to children, research in 
this area has failed to definitely support that assumption.
It is against this backdrop that the chapters of this book explore the 
language, criminal sanctions, and public policy surrounding child por-
nography crimes. All the important issues surrounding child pornogra-
phy cannot be explored in a single volume. This book does not, for ex-
ample, attempt to settle the ongoing controversy about whether child 
pornography offenders also have sexually abused children. Instead, the 
book focuses on two distinct but related goals. First the book highlights 
the importance of language and legal definitions in child pornography 
law, which, as the first part of the book illustrates, are extremely important 
for both constitutional and policy reasons. Second, the book provides a 
primer on some of the most visible, ongoing controversies in the applica-
tion of child pornography law. While the chapters address a number of 
different topics and include a number of different methodological ap-
proaches, each chapter demonstrates that the crimes associated with child 
pornography are contested and contestable.
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The book begins by exploring the definitional issues associated with 
child pornography crimes. In particular, the first two chapters address con-
stitutional issues associated with child pornography. In chapter 1, The Con-
text and the Content of New York v. Ferber, James Weinstein situates the 
Supreme Court’s child pornography cases within the broader framework of 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. As Professor Wein-
stein notes, at the time the Supreme Court decided New York v. Ferber, its 
free speech cases were overwhelmingly predisposed against exempting en-
tire categories of speech from constitutional protection; instead the Court 
had developed a new framework, in which it asked whether the relevant 
law was a restriction on the content of speech and, if it was, whether that 
restriction satisfied strict scrutiny based on the harm that the speech could 
cause. In deciding the Ferber case, the Court refrained from affirming the 
New York child pornography prohibition based on the harm that such 
speech could cause. Instead, the Court elected to uphold the law based on 
the harm that was done to children during the production of those images. 
This harm, according to the Court, was sufficient to create a categorical 
exception to the First Amendment. While the New York law likely qualified 
as a content restriction, Professor Weinstein stresses the significance of the 
Court’s decision not to analyze the child pornography law under this 
framework. That is to say, the Court did not characterize the New York law 
as a content restriction and then conclude that the state’s interest in pro-
tecting children satisfied strict scrutiny. Professor Weinstein suggests that 
the Court did not take this approach because it might have undermined the 
Court’s new methodology if it were to uphold a law as satisfying strict scru-
tiny. The chapter goes on to describe how, in subsequent child pornogra-
phy decisions, the Court has resisted attempts to broaden the categorical 
free speech exception it created in Ferber. In sum, by evaluating Ferber in 
the broader context of the Supreme Court’s twentieth- century free speech 
cases, Professor Weinstein concludes that Ferber is in many ways a remark-
ably speech- protective decision.
Chapter 2, Setting Definitional Limits for the Child Pornography Excep-
tion, proposes a specific limitation on the definition of child pornography— 
namely, that the child pornography exception to the First Amendment 
include only those images created through the sexual abuse or exploita-
tion of a child. In proposing this limited definition for child pornography, 
the chapter notes that much of the analysis in the Supreme Court’s child 
pornography cases focuses on the harms that children suffer in the pro-
duction of child pornography images. Although the Court also expresses 
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concern over the reputational and privacy harms that child pornography 
victims suffer when the images are later distributed, the chapter concludes 
that those harms, standing alone, should not be sufficient to transform an 
image into child pornography. Changing the definitional limits for the 
child pornography exception to the First Amendment would prevent 
prosecutors from pursuing charges in several categories of cases, includ-
ing so- called “teen sexting” cases, which have garnered significant media 
attention in recent years. The proposed definitional change would also af-
fect morphed and surreptitiously created images, which are often not cre-
ated through either child sex abuse or exploitation.
After examining broad constitutional issues associated with the defini-
tion of child pornography crimes, the book then presents two chapters that 
examine various consequences of the current legal definition. In chapter 3, 
The “Dost Test” in Child Pornography Law: “Trial by Rorschach Test,” Amy 
Adler evaluates the prevailing legal test for assessing when an image that 
depicts a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals” qualifies as child pornogra-
phy. According to Professor Adler, the Dost test poses not only constitu-
tional problems, but also cultural ones. In particular, she argues that Dost is 
vague and arguably overbroad and that the cases decided under Dost seem 
inconsistent with Supreme Court cases in this area. In addition to these 
constitutional concerns, Professor Adler argues that to the extent Dost has 
been interpreted to incorporate the pedophile’s perspective in evaluating 
images, the test invites us to view nonsexual pictures of children through 
the gaze of the pedophile, transforming these images into child pornogra-
phy. As Professor Adler notes, one harm done by child pornography is that 
it changes the way we perceive children; ironically, when Dost requires us 
to take on a “perception of children as sexual objects,” then child pornog-
raphy law changes the way we perceive children.
Despite her criticisms of the Dost test, Professor Adler seems to con-
clude that some similar test may be necessary because the Supreme Court 
has made clear that nudity is not the dividing line between protected 
speech and child pornography, and because a number of federal courts 
have concluded that a picture can be criminalized as “lascivious” even if it 
contains no nudity. What is more, Professor Adler concedes that the un-
predictability and malleability of Dost may be a positive feature of the test; 
a more limited test would mean that some child abusers would go free and 
that some abusive, harmful images would be permitted to circulate. In 
short, her chapter identifies a number of shortcomings with the test and 
leaves the reader to decide whether the costs of Dost outweigh its benefits.
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In chapter 4, The Language of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation, 
Mary Leary contends that many of the common terms used to describe 
child pornography and other forms of child exploitation ought to be re-
vised. She notes that precision and content in language are, as a general 
matter, exceedingly important. In the context of child sex abuse and child 
exploitation, she argues that the conduct and the social reaction are com-
plicated and thus the language used to discuss these issues must be pre-
cise. For example, Professor Leary notes ambiguity surrounding the term 
“child.” Different American jurisdictions use the words “child” or “minor” 
to refer to individuals of varying ages. In the context of child abuse and 
exploitation, she proposes that the term “child” should be universally un-
derstood to refer to all individuals under the age of eighteen. While she 
does not dispute that individuals do (and should) accrue certain legal 
rights before that age, Professor Leary concludes that just as the criminal 
justice system treats all criminal offenders under the age of eighteen dif-
ferently than adults, so too should our understanding of victims as chil-
dren be anchored at the age of eighteen.
In addition to noting certain ambiguous terms, Professor Leary also 
argues that a number of common terms do not sufficiently reflect the true 
nature of victimization. In particular, she criticizes the terms “child por-
nography,” “child prostitution,” and “sexting.” Applying the principle of fair 
labeling, which originated in discussions over how to revise the British 
criminal code, Professor Leary explains in detail why the term “sexually 
abusive images of children” should be used in place of the term “child por-
nography,” as well as why the term “child sex trafficking” should be used in 
place of “child prostitution.” Professor Leary’s discussion of the term “sex-
ting” is especially noteworthy, as she identifies the extremely wide range of 
images to which the media has applied this label, and she notes that the 
conditions under which an image was created vary wildly: some were taken 
with the permission of the subject, some were not; some depict consensual 
sex acts, some depict sexual assaults. Noting that these differences are ex-
ceedingly important, Professor Leary suggests a few different labels for 
these images, including “child- produced sexually abusive images.”
The definitional chapters are followed by a number of chapters that as-
sess the wisdom of current child pornography law and that offer sugges-
tions for improvement. The first three of these chapters tackle the specific 
challenges posed by the current legal treatment of those defendants who 
possess child pornography images. Chapter 5, Questioning the Modern 
Criminal Justice Focus on Child Pornography Possession, criticizes the mod-
ern trend of increasing the criminal justice resources spent to detect, pros-
Revised Pages
Introduction | 11
ecute, and punish those who possess child pornography. It argues that pos-
sessing child pornography is one of the least serious crimes involving the 
sexual abuse of children; for example, those who possess child pornogra-
phy pose less of a threat and cause less harm than those who create or dis-
tribute child pornography, and they are obviously less dangerous and less 
culpable than those who sexually assault children. Drawing an analogy to 
the war on drugs, the chapter explains why focusing criminal justice re-
sources on possession cases not only seems less fair, but also does not seem 
calculated to sensibly reduce the availability of child pornography. After 
criticizing the arguments that are often given in support of enforcement 
techniques that focus on child pornography possessors, the chapter con-
cludes that resources are better spent detecting, prosecuting, and punish-
ing crimes that are more directly tied to sexual abuse and exploitation.
In chapter 6, The Dignitary Harm of Child Pornography— From Produc-
ers to Possessors, Audrey Rogers challenges the traditional categories that 
have been used to distinguish among child pornography defendants. 
American criminal justice systems regularly treat child pornography de-
fendants differently depending on whether they have produced, distrib-
uted, or merely possessed child pornography images. As Professor Rogers 
notes, modern technology has blurred these categories to such an extent 
that it has become difficult to defend different punishment for child por-
nography defendants based on these distinctions. In particular, she argues 
that child pornography possessors— the category of child pornography 
defendants whose criminal punishments are most often criticized as too 
severe— are no longer easily distinguished from those who receive or dis-
tribute child pornography. Professor Rogers’ chapter also documents the 
extensive dignitary harm that child pornography possessors cause to their 
child victims. In so doing, she specifically challenges the claim, which is 
advanced in previous chapters of the volume, that morphed and surrepti-
tiously created images ought not be treated the same as other child por-
nography images.
In chapter 7, Not Just “Kiddie Porn”: The Significant Harms from Child 
Pornography Possession, Paul Cassell, James Marsh, and Jeremy Christian-
sen directly dispute the idea that possessing child pornography is not a 
serious crime— that while those who create (or perhaps distribute) child 
pornography inflict severe harms on their child victims, those who merely 
possess images are not significantly blameworthy. Focusing in particular 
on the argument as it has arisen in the context of restitution for child por-
nography victims, the authors explain why each individual who collects 
and views child pornography causes significant losses for which victims 
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should receive significant compensation. The endless collecting and view-
ing of a victim’s child sex images subjects victims to continuous invasions 
of privacy, producing lasting psychological injury and significant eco-
nomic losses.
The chapter explains in detail why the prevailing view in child pornog-
raphy restitution cases— namely, that the proper way to assess the harm 
caused by a child pornography defendant is to calculate how many defen-
dants have viewed the image, and then to estimate what proportion of the 
victim’s losses are attributable to each defendant— is deeply flawed. As the 
authors note, trying to apportion financial losses among tens of thousands 
of criminals invariably neglects the significant psychological harm each 
crime causes. What is more, this analysis suggests that the larger the num-
ber of criminals who view a victim’s images, the less responsible any par-
ticular criminal is for the harm caused to the victim. Rather than attempt-
ing to quantify the economic harm that is attributable to each defendant, 
the authors argue that each individual defendant should be held jointly 
and severally liable for all the harms child pornography possession causes, 
an argument that they trace to basic principles of tort law, which identify 
all who contribute to a single harm as being responsible for paying com-
pensation for the entire harm.
The final three chapters address the challenges facing those who write 
child pornography laws, those who investigate and prosecute child por-
nography crimes, and those who sentence child pornography defendants. 
The first of these chapters, Challenges in Investigations and Prosecutions of 
Child Pornography Crimes, uses data from the National Juvenile Online 
Victimization Study— the most comprehensive study available on 
Internet- related sex crimes against minors— to explore the growth and 
complexity of child pornography crimes. In particular, the chapter identi-
fies and explores the challenges faced by law enforcement investigators 
and prosecutors of child pornography crimes. As the chapter authors note, 
while law enforcement and prosecutors identify a number of challenges 
they face in detecting and prosecuting child pornography offenders, en-
forcement of child pornography laws has been quite successful. Law en-
forcement is increasingly engaged in proactive investigations of child por-
nography crimes; prosecutors pursue charges in a large number of cases, 
they obtain a high percentage of guilty pleas to child pornography charges, 
and the study identified no cases that ended in acquittal after trial.
Notably, a number of challenges government officials identified were 
related to definitional issues surrounding child pornography. Because 
prosecutors must prove that images fit within particular statutory defini-
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tions of child pornography, the content of those definitions may pose par-
ticular problems, such as whether the child depicted is young enough or 
whether a particular image is graphic or explicit enough to fit the prevail-
ing definition of child pornography. One particular definitional challenge 
that prosecutors face is the burden of showing that an image depicts a real 
child. (This burden is the result of the Supreme Court’s Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition decision, which limited the constitutional category of 
child pornography to exclude virtual or computer- generated images.) The 
chapter notes that prosecutors use multiple methods to meet their various 
definitional burdens under child pornography statutes. The chapter con-
cludes with data on a child pornography definition issue that is still in flux: 
teen sexting. Sexting often falls within states’ legal definitions of child por-
nography, and many jurisdictions have struggled with how to treat those 
cases. The chapter reports data from prosecutors who have worked on 
sexting cases, noting that prosecutors often present minors with a wide 
range of alternative outcomes rather than automatically charging those 
juveniles under the state’s child pornography laws.
The final two chapters focus on the highly visible and hotly contested 
sentencing scheme for federal child pornography offenders. A number 
of federal judges have begun to object to the federal sentencing regime, 
refusing to impose the lengthy sentences, and drawing media attention 
in the process. In chapter 9, A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines for Child Pornography Offenses, Troy Stabenow walks 
readers through the decisions that a federal judge must make when sen-
tencing a typical federal child pornography offender. As Mr. Stabenow’s 
hypothetical sentencing exercise illustrates, the various circumstances 
that the federal sentencing guidelines use to increase punishment for 
child pornography defendants apply in nearly every case. What is more, 
some of the factual findings that will significantly affect a judge’s sen-
tencing decision seem, upon reflection, irrelevant— such as whether a 
defendant viewed child pornography on his computer or on his televi-
sion. The criticisms this chapter raise lie at the heart of the current con-
troversy over federal sentencing for child pornography offenders. And 
by framing his chapter as a hypothetical sentencing decision, Mr. Stabe-
now effectively conveys the frustration that many judges feel when they 
are required to base their sentencing decisions on seemingly arbitrary 
distinctions between defendants.
In chapter 10, Political and Empirical Controversies Threaten the Federal 
Child Pornography Guidelines, Melissa Hamilton frames the federal sen-
tencing controversy as a power struggle between three powerful institu-
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tions: Congress, the federal courts, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 
She notes that the Supreme Court’s 2005 opinion in United States v. Booker, 
which transformed the federal sentencing guidelines from presumptive 
rules into advisory guidelines, has placed the Sentencing Commission at 
the center of a tug of war between Congress and federal judges over federal 
sentencing policy for child pornography offenders. She focuses in particu-
lar on the legal question of whether federal sentences should be based on 
empirical study— a question that has featured prominently in judicial opin-
ions about child pornography sentences and that has resulted in a signifi-
cant divergence of judicial opinion. Dr. Hamilton’s chapter details these 
political and empirical controversies, identifies the differences in ideolo-
gies and legal analysis that fuel these controversies, and provides a wealth 
of information about recent child pornography cases and sentences.
The law and the public discussion surrounding child pornography are 
ever- changing. At the time of writing, the United States Sentencing Com-
mission has asked Congress to revise federal child pornography laws, and 
federal courts are just beginning to grapple with the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Paroline v. United States, which directs judges to award restitu-
tion in child pornography cases by assessing which harms suffered by a 
child pornography victim are attributable to individual possessors of child 
pornography. Another high- profile child pornography case could trigger 
additional legislation at any time.
By bringing together experts in different fields and with different view-
points, this volume aims to influence the legal and policy discussions sur-
rounding child pornography. In particular, it seeks to identify the impor-
tant role that the definition of child pornography plays in those discussions, 
to highlight the uncertainty that has been created by imprecision in the 
language describing and defining child pornography, and to illustrate how 
language and definition are important components in improving the law 
surrounding child pornography. By refining the scope of child pornogra-
phy language and debates, we hope to ensure that child pornography laws 
become more effective at protecting children.
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1 |  The Context and Content of  
New York v. Ferber
James Weinstein
In New York v. Ferber, the United States Supreme Court held that child 
pornography— visual depictions of actual children engaged in explicit 
sexual conduct— was categorically devoid of First Amendment protec-
tion.1 Most of this chapter will be devoted to a detailed discussion of Fer-
ber and its progeny, including Ferber’s revival of a discredited free speech 
methodology and its reliance on a rationale that avoided consideration of 
the effects of child pornography on the viewer. But before focusing di-
rectly on Ferber, it will be useful to locate this decision in the vast expanse 
of the Court’s free speech jurisprudence. So contextualized, Ferber can be 
more accurately evaluated both for its specific holding and for its implica-
tions for free speech generally. In particular, consideration of the larger 
doctrinal background will suggest, surprisingly, that Ferber is in many 
ways a remarkably speech- protective decision.
Doctrinal Context
By 1982, the year Ferber was decided, American free speech doctrine pro-
vided extraordinarily strong protection to speech that vehemently chal-
lenged the status quo. For instance, the Court had a decade earlier upheld 
the right of an antiwar protestor to wear a jacket in public bearing the 
message “Fuck the Draft.”2 But the right of dissent in the United States was 
not always so secure. Just seven years after the First Amendment was rati-
fied, Congress passed the Sedition Act of 1798, which made it a crime to 
publish any “false, scandalous, and malicious writing” with the intent to 
“defame” the government or bring it “into contempt or disrepute” or to 
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excite against the government “the hatred of people of the United States.” 
Several prominent newspaper publishers critical of the Adams adminis-
tration were prosecuted and convicted under this law. Although the Su-
preme Court never had an occasion to rule on the constitutionality of the 
Sedition Act, lower court judges, including Supreme Court justices sitting 
as trial court judges, unanimously upheld its constitutionality.3
It was not until 1919 that the Supreme Court, in Schenck v. United 
States, issued its first significant free speech decision.4 From the perspec-
tive of protecting dissent in a democratic society, this debut was nothing 
short of disastrous. In this decision, which announced the famous “clear 
and present danger” test, and in other cases decided shortly thereafter, the 
Court unanimously upheld convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917 of 
protestors for vehemently condemning American involvement in World 
War I as motivated by capitalist interest.5 One of these decisions upheld 
the conviction of Eugene Debs, the leader of the Socialist Party and presi-
dential candidate, sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment for praising 
fellow socialists convicted of obstructing the draft. In the absence of any 
meaningful restriction on the prosecution of anti- war speech, the govern-
ment prosecuted more than two thousand people under the Espionage 
Act and obtained more than a thousand convictions.6 As a prominent free 
speech commentator would later aptly observe, the Court’s performance 
in World War I Espionage Act cases was “simply wretched.”7
During the next several decades the Court issued some significant 
speech- protective decisions.8 Still, as late as the 1950s it had not yet formu-
lated a doctrine adequate to protect dissent that must be allowed in a free 
and democratic society. For instance, in a now much- reviled 1951 decision, 
the Court upheld the conviction of the leaders of the American Commu-
nist Party for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the United States 
government by teaching material such as The Communist Manifesto.9 It 
would take nearly two more decades for the Court to transform the “clear 
and present danger” test into a truly speech- protective standard. In Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, a 1969 decision that has become a cornerstone of Ameri-
can free speech doctrine and which, as we shall see, sets sharp limits on 
the government’s ability to prohibit child pornography, the Court reversed 
the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader convicted under a state law that 
forbade “advocat[ing] crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of 
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform.”10 In 
doing so, the Court explained that the First Amendment prevents the gov-
ernment from prohibiting “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
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law violation and is likely to incite or produce such action.”11 This test 
provides extraordinarily strong protection for political advocacy: it grants 
absolute immunity to advocacy of law violation short of incitement to 
such conduct, and it immunizes incitement unless the government can 
show that it was likely to lead to imminent lawless conduct.
The importance of Brandenburg in finally providing adequate protec-
tion to speech denouncing particular laws, such as those governing con-
scription or, more generally, to expression vehemently agitating against 
the entire legal system, including the American form of government, can-
not be overestimated. But a grossly underprotective “clear and present 
danger” test that Brandenburg remedied was not the only substantial de-
fect in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. In addition, the meth-
odology utilized by the Court in a seminal 1942 decision created several 
gaping holes in the web of free speech protection. In Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, the Court upheld a disorderly conduct conviction of a Jeho-
vah’s Witness for using so- called “fighting words”— face- to- face in-
sults— in a confrontation with a law enforcement official.12 In the course 
of this holding, the Court observed:
There are certain well- defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, 
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words . . . . It has 
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.13
Unlike speech advocating law violation, which even under the pre- 
Brandenburg reformulation of the “clear and present danger” test was at 
least theoretically protected unless the government could demonstrate the 
necessary imminent danger, the Court here identified certain types of 
speech as categorically devoid of First Amendment protection. This means 
that with respect to lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, or personally insult-
ing speech, the government need not show that the particular instance of 
the speech at issue caused harm; rather, all the government need do to 
punish this speech consistent with the First Amendment was to show that 
it came within the parameters of one of these forlorn categories of expres-
sion. As an abstract matter, such a free speech methodology seems sound, 
for by definition any speech it suppresses has de minimis First Amend-
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ment value and is at the same time manifestly and immediately harmful. 
But as Justice Holmes aptly observed, “The life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience,”14 and experience proved that Chaplinsky’s 
categorical approach impaired valuable expression.
The categorical exclusion of libel vividly demonstrates Holmes’s apho-
rism. In 1960, an Alabama jury had awarded a police commissioner 
$500,000 in damages against the New York Times and several civil rights 
activists, finding libelous an advertisement carried by the paper complain-
ing about police treatment of protestors involved in civil rights demon-
strations led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The finding was based on sev-
eral inaccurate statements in the advertisement, such as that Dr. King had 
been arrested seven times by the Montgomery police for his protest ac-
tivities, when in fact he had been arrested only four times. Because Chap-
linsky had cast libelous statements beyond the ambit of the First Amend-
ment and because these statements were technically libelous at common 
law, there were no First Amendment constraints on the power of the Ala-
bama courts to render an onerous judgment against the defendants in this 
case, including imposing strict liability on the newspaper. In New York 
Times v. Sullivan, the Court reversed this judgment, famously observing 
that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide- open 
and . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”15 In order to give free 
expression adequate “breathing space,” that Court held that public officials 
cannot recover for defamatory statements about their official duty unless 
they can show by clear and convincing evidence that the statements were 
made with “actual malice”— that is, with knowledge that the statements 
were false or with reckless disregard for the truth.16
More generally, the Court in Sullivan and subsequent cases recognized 
the danger that the exclusion of entire categories of speech can pose to free 
expression.17 As a result, the Court did away altogether with some of the 
exceptions to First Amendment coverage that Chaplinsky had recognized 
and greatly narrowed the rest. An example of the Court’s extinguishing an 
exception in its entirety is the case mentioned above, in which the Court 
extended First Amendment coverage to profanity in upholding the right 
of an antiwar protester to use the word “fuck” in public to condemn the 
draft. An example of the narrowing approach is that today only libel of 
private individuals devoid of public concern remains beyond First Amend-
ment coverage.18 Another example, and one that is of particular relevance 
to the government’s ability to suppress child pornography, was a series of 
decisions attempting to define and for the most part narrowing the cate-
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gory of obscenity, culminating in the 1973 in opinion Miller v. California, 
which confined the category of obscenity to “hard core” pornography.19 
Prior to these decisions, government had routinely banned as obscene 
books and films of notable artistic and literary value due to their frank 
discussion or portrayal of sex.20 Similarly, despite Chaplinsky’s suggestion 
of a broader reach, the Court has limited the category of “fighting words” 
to the use of words directed to an individual or a small group of individu-
als in a face- to- face confrontation.21 So it was remarkable that the Court 
in Ferber bucked this trend by adopting the Chaplinsky methodology in 
holding child pornography categorically beyond the protections of the 
First Amendment.
New York Times v. Sullivan and Brandenburg v. Ohio were plainly con-
scious reactions to the failure of doctrine to provide adequate protection 
to dissent during the first half of the twentieth century and before. In par-
ticular, both decisions represent strategic “overprotection” of speech to 
counteract the tendency of prosecutors, juries, and even courts, including 
on occasion even the Supreme Court itself, to overestimate the danger of 
speech that vehemently attacks society’s sacred cows, particularly in times 
of social unrest. But while these two cases provide strong protection to 
government criticism and political protest in two important doctrinal 
areas— defamation of public officials and advocacy of law violation— 
neither establishes a general rule for measuring the validity of speech re-
strictions. The genesis of such an overarching rule is to be found in Chi-
cago Police Department v. Mosley,22 a 1971 case in which the Court 
articulated what was to become the leitmotif of contemporary free speech 
doctrine: the rule against content discrimination.
At issue in Mosley was an ordinance that banned all picketing or dem-
onstrations within 150 feet of schools while in session but exempted 
“peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.” Mosley, who 
had for months prior to the enactment of the ordinance quietly picketed 
outside a Chicago high school carrying a sign accusing the school of prac-
ticing racial discrimination, challenged the ban as violating both the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In invalidating the ordinance, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s opinion 
for the Court observed:
Above all else, the First Amendment means that government has 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content. To permit the continued building of 
our politics and culture, and to assure self- fulfillment for each indi-
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vidual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, 
free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden 
censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity 
because of its content would completely undercut the ‘profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide- open.’23
During the next decade the Court frequently cited Mosley’s condemna-
tion of content regulation,24 and by the time Ferber was decided in 1982, 
the foundation had been laid for the central rule of contemporary free 
speech jurisprudence: content- based speech restrictions are invalid unless 
the government can demonstrate that the restriction in question is “justi-
fied by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve 
that interest.”25 Such “strict scrutiny” imposes “a very exacting and rarely 
satisfied standard” on the government defending a content- based speech 
regulation.26 In sharp contrast, content- neutral regulation of expression— 
such as ordinances regulating the time, place, or manner of speech with-
out regard to its message— are readily upheld.27
the Child Pornography Problem
Having learned a hard lesson from its inadequate protection of free speech 
during the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court by the 
early 1980s had firmly in place a free speech jurisprudence calculated to 
protect the right of Americans to vehemently challenge the status quo 
through offensive, inflammatory, and even dangerous expression. At 
about this same time, however, perhaps in part because of the existence of 
this highly protective free speech jurisprudence, an industry devoted to 
the production and distribution of child pornography was flourishing. 
The legislative response was massive, with the federal government and 
forty- seven states passing laws addressing the problem.28 These laws took 
three basic forms: (1) twelve states prohibited only the production of child 
pornography; (2) fifteen states and the federal government prohibited the 
distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct but 
only if the material also met the Miller standard for obscenity; and (3) 
twenty states, including New York, prohibited distribution of child por-
nography even if it was not legally obscene.29
Despite being part of a production that is photographed or filmed, the 
promotion of sexual activity by children was not considered “speech” for 
Revised Pages
The Context and Content of New York v. Ferber | 25
purposes of the First Amendment, but rather “conduct” constituting seri-
ous child abuse.30 Banning the use of children in the production of por-
nography therefore did not present any substantial free speech problem. 
Similarly, since obscenity is expression beyond the scope of the First 
Amendment, the banning of a particularly harmful type of obscenity also 
did not raise a difficult free speech question. It was only laws that banned 
the distribution of non- obscene child pornography that presented a serious 
First Amendment question. Indeed, it appeared as if the extremely protec-
tive free speech doctrine developed by the Court over the previous several 
decades might well have made laws prohibiting the distribution of child 
pornography unconstitutional. This was the holding of the only two fed-
eral court decisions to address the issue prior to Ferber.31 It was also the 
view of the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York 
state judicial system) in rendering the decision below in the Ferber case 
itself.32
Enacted in 1977, the New York child pornography law made it a felony 
to distribute any motion picture or photograph of a child less than sixteen 
years of age engaged in sexual conduct.33 Paul Ferber, the proprietor of a 
Manhattan bookstore specializing in sexually oriented material, was con-
victed under this law for selling two films “devoted almost exclusively to 
depicting young boys masturbating.”34 The New York Court of Appeals 
found the New York law unconstitutional because it prohibited photo-
graphic images that were not legally obscene.35 In addition, duly reflecting 
the antipathy to content- based speech restrictions expressed in recent Su-
preme Court opinions, the court condemned the law for “discriminat[ing] 
against films and other visual portrayals of nonobscene adolescent sex 
solely on the basis of their content.”36 Demonstrating the tension between 
bans on child pornography and the highly speech- protective doctrine it 
had developed in previous decades, the United States Supreme Court, 
though reversing the Court of Appeals decision, acknowledged that the 
lower court’s position was “not unreasonable in light of our decisions.”37
the Ferber Decision
Justice Byron White began his opinion for the Court by observing that in 
recent years, “the exploitive use of children in the production of pornog-
raphy has become a serious national problem.”38 The challenge for the 
Court was how to permit government sufficient leeway to address this 
problem without undermining the strong protection of free speech the 
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Court had painstakingly constructed during the prior three decades. A 
key component of this bulwark against government suppression of dis-
sent, was, as we have seen, the Court’s intense hostility to content regula-
tion of speech, an attitude that would within a few years be reified into a 
rule forming the cornerstone of contemporary free speech jurisprudence. 
Moreover, motion pictures and photographs had long been considered ex-
pression protected under the First Amendment.39 And, as the Court of 
Appeals noted, New York’s law manifestly discriminated on the basis of 
the content of the photograph or film, targeting material that depicted 
children engaged in sexual conduct. “Serious national problem” that use 
of children in the production of pornography may have been, it would 
have been a large step backwards to the weak speech protection of the first 
part of the century for the Court simply to have invoked this harm as jus-
tifying an exception to its injunction that “[a]bove all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
A crucial though not often enough articulated lesson from the Court’s 
“wretched” performance in applying the “clear and present danger” test to 
antiwar protests during World War I and to speech of Communist Party 
members during the McCarthy era is the counterintuitive precept that 
even serious harm is not sufficient reason to suppress speech connected to 
democratic self- governance.40 As Learned Hand, one of the few judges 
willing to protect speech vehemently denouncing America’s involvement 
in World War I, astutely observed, antiwar speech has the capacity to 
cause grave harm. “Virulent attacks” upon America’s involvement in the 
war, he explained, “enervate public feeling at home . . . and encourage the 
success of the enemies of the United States abroad.” Moreover, joining 
such criticism of the war with condemnation of conscription “tends to 
promote a mutinous and insubordinate temper among the troops.” None-
theless, Hand, in sharp contrast to almost all of his contemporary jurists, 
including the entire Supreme Court, held that such speech should be al-
lowed in a free and democratic society despite the harm it caused.41 Simi-
larly, the expression of virulent racist ideas can cause grievous harm both 
through the psychic injury it can inflict on minorities defamed by such 
speech and through persuading others to discriminate against members 
of these groups. Yet at the time Ferber was before the Court, there were 
strong indications that, like virulent antiwar speech, hate speech too was 
protected by the First Amendment despite the harm it can cause.42 The 
Court would later confirm this view of hate speech.43
Fortunately for both the protection of children and for free speech, the 
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Court in Ferber declined either to mechanically find that the rule against 
content discrimination rendered the New York law unconstitutional or to 
hold that the serious harm associated with child pornography was suffi-
cient to justify an exception to this fundamental precept of free speech 
jurisprudence. Rather, the Court commendably paid careful attention 
both to the free speech values that would likely be impaired by the sup-
pression of child pornography and to the mechanism of the harm this ex-
pression caused.44
The Court emphasized that the free speech value of photographic re-
production of children engaged in “lewd sexual conduct” is “exceedingly 
modest, if not de minimis.”45 In the Court’s view it was unlikely that “vi-
sual depictions of children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting 
their genitals” would often constitute “an important and necessary part” of 
an artistic performance or a scientific or educational work. The Court 
added that if such depictions were thought necessary to the value of these 
works, a person over the age limit but who looked younger could be em-
ployed or, alternatively, that prohibited acts forming the basis of the depic-
tion could be simulated. Finally, the Court was confident that there was no 
“question here of censoring a particular literary theme or portrayal of 
sexual activity.”46 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the only First 
Amendment interest impaired by the law was the ability to render the 
portrayal of sexual activity engaged in by children “somewhat more ‘real-
istic’” by photographing children actually engaged in the sexual activity 
prohibited by the law.47
Having thus assessed the free speech interests impaired by bans on 
child pornography, the Court then turned to the harm caused in the pro-
duction of this material, citing studies that showed, unsurprisingly, that 
the use of children as subjects of pornographic films and photographs “is 
harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.” It 
then observed that “safeguarding the physical and psychological well- 
being” of children is a “compelling” state interest, and in particular, that 
“prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a gov-
ernment objective of surpassing importance.”48 It remained, however, to 
explain why a ban on the distribution of child pornography was required 
to prevent the harm caused by the use of children in the production of such 
material. The Court gave two reasons.
First, the Court noted that because these materials are a “permanent 
record” of the child’s participation in the activity, their distribution exac-
erbates the harm to the child caused by the events recorded in the materi-
als. Second, and more significantly, the Court concluded that the “distri-
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bution network must be closed if the production of material which 
requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.” 
The Court relied on the legislature’s conclusion that it would be “difficult, 
if not impossible” to put an end to the sexual exploitation of children by 
prosecuting only those involved in the production of the movies and pho-
tographs. It noted that although the production of child pornography was 
a “low- profile, clandestine industry,” it required a “visible apparatus” to 
market its wares. Accordingly, it agreed with the conclusion of Congress 
and thirty- five states that the “most expeditious if not the only practical 
method” of preventing children from being sexually abused in the pro-
duction of these films was “to dry up the market” for this material by im-
posing severe criminal penalties on those who distribute it.49
The Court then rejected the argument that New York could accomplish 
this goal by punishing only those who distribute child pornography that is 
legally obscene under the Miller standard. It explained that the criteria for 
legal obscenity do not reflect the state interest in protecting children from 
the harms arising from their use in the production of pornography. Thus, 
the Court pointed out, Miller’s first two requirements, that the work “ap-
peal to the prurient interest of the average person” and be “patently offen-
sive,” have no bearing on whether a child has been physically or psycho-
logically harmed in the production of the work. Similarly irrelevant, the 
Court explained, is the Miller test’s inquiry whether the work, “taken as a 
whole, contains serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 
Judged in its entirety, a work could possess such value yet still embody 
“the hardest core of child pornography,” the production of which was ex-
tremely harmful to a child.50
Having documented both the minimal First Amendment interests im-
paired by the prohibition on the distribution of child pornography and the 
reasons for forbidding such distribution, the Court declared child por-
nography to be “a category outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment.” Such categorical exclusion, the Court explained, is appropriate 
where, as in the case of child pornography, “it may be appropriately gen-
eralized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be 
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at 
stake that no process of case- by- case adjudication is required.”51 Accord-
ingly, in a prosecution for the distribution of child pornography, the gov-
ernment does not have to show that a government interest in suppression 
of the material in that particular case outweighs the First Amendment 
interests of the defendant in its distribution. Relatedly, defendants are not 
able to invoke the First Amendment even if they can show that no signifi-
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cant physiological or psychological harm befell children in the production 
of the particular material they were charged with distributing, or that in 
this instance suppressing the material will not substantially serve the goal 
of preventing harm in the production. Rather, so far as First Amendment 
constraints are concerned, the government need show only that the mate-
rial falls within the category of expression that it declared beyond the pur-
view of the First Amendment.
However, in excluding child pornography from the scope of the First 
Amendment, the Court cautioned that “there are, of course, limits on the 
category of child pornography . . . unprotected by the First Amendment.” It 
noted that the prohibited material must be “adequately defined by the ap-
plicable state law” and similarly that “the category of ‘sexual conduct’” de-
picted in the proscribed material must be “suitably limited and described” 
in the law. But most importantly, the Court held that in light of the “nature 
of the harm to be combated,” the category of child pornography beyond the 
ambit of the First Amendment must be limited to works that “visually de-
pict sexual conduct by children below a specified age.”52 Though emphasiz-
ing that the “test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity stan-
dard enunciated in Miller,” the Court compared the two tests “for the 
purposes of clarity.” It explained that unlike obscenity under the Miller test, 
child pornography need not appeal to “the prurient interest of the average 
person” nor portray sexual conduct in a “patently offensive manner.” And 
in accordance with its previous discussion of why banning only obscene 
material depicting children was not sufficient to combat the harms of child 
pornography, the Court held that in contrast to the requirement for a find-
ing of obscenity, the material at issue in a child pornography prosecution 
“need not be considered as a whole.”53 As a result, the fact that an hour- long 
film contains only a single fifteen- second scene depicting children engaged 
in sexual activity will not save the work from being deemed child pornog-
raphy beyond the scope of the First Amendment.
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the New York law was 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it banned material with “serious lit-
erary, scientific or educational value.” As part of its overall goal of strength-
ening protection of free speech, the Court had developed what had be-
come known as the “overbreadth doctrine,” which permits someone 
whose own speech might have been constitutionally proscribed by a more 
narrowly drawn prohibition to ask a court to invalidate the law in its en-
tirety on the grounds that it sweeps up a substantial amount of protected 
speech.54 The purpose of this doctrine is to prevent a law from chilling the 
exercise of First Amendment rights of those not before the court. Invok-
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ing this doctrine, the New York Court of Appeals found the law under 
which Ferber was charged to be fatally overbroad because it prohibited 
showing and distributing medical or educational materials depicting chil-
dren engaged in sexual activity. The Supreme Court disagreed. It noted, 
first, that it was uncertain how often, if ever, children needed to be used to 
produce pictorial representation in medical or educational material. It 
then added that in any event it was highly doubtful that these arguably 
impermissible applications of the statute amounted to more than “a tiny 
fraction of the material within the statute’s reach.” The Court accordingly 
found that the statute was not “substantially overbroad.”55
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined the opinion of the Court but 
wrote separately to emphasize that the majority opinion did not hold that 
the category of material it identified as beyond the scope of the First 
Amendment contains an exemption for material with “serious literary, 
scientific or educational value.” To the contrary, in her view the majority 
opinion’s focus on the harm to children in the production of child pornog-
raphy suggests that literary, scientific, or educational value is insufficient 
to vest such material with First Amendment protection. Justice O’Connor 
explained, however, that certain visual depictions of children engaged in 
sexual activity, such as those that might appear in medical textbooks or 
“pictures of children engaged in rites widely approved in their cultures, 
such as those that might appear in issues of National Geographic,” might 
not threaten the harms identified by the Court and thus might be pro-
tected by the First Amendment.56
Justice William Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment noting that he agreed with “much of what is 
said in the Court’s opinion.” Justice Brennan, however, took the opposite 
tack than had Justice O’Connor, explaining that prohibition of depictions 
of children engaging in sexual activity that have “serious literary, artistic, 
scientific, or medical value” would violate the First Amendment. Empha-
sizing the Court’s reasoning that child pornography is properly excluded 
from the scope of the First Amendment because such material has “ex-
ceedingly ‘slight social value,’” he observed that the free speech value of 
depictions of children engaged in sexual activity that “are in themselves 
serious contributions to art, literature, or science, is by definition, simply 
not ‘de minimis.’”57
The majority opinion in Ferber is remarkable in two related respects: 
its categorical exclusion of child pornography from First Amendment 
coverage and the type of harm on which the Court relied in holding that 
this material may constitutionally be suppressed. A mainstay of the Court’s 
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free speech jurisprudence in the 1940s and 1950s, the categorical exclusion 
methodology had fallen into disuse, arguably even disrepute, by the time 
Ferber reached the Court. Not only had the Court failed to identify any 
categories of unprotected speech beyond the ones it had specified in Chap-
linsky, the 1941 decision that had originated the categorical exclusion 
methodology, but by the time Ferber was decided, the Court had reversed 
course and extended First Amendment coverage to several categories of 
speech identified in Chaplinsky as unprotected. And subsequent to Fer-
ber’s categorical exclusion of child pornography, the Court has not recog-
nized any other category of speech as beyond the First Amendment’s pur-
view. To the contrary, it has adamantly rebuffed pleas, including by the 
United States, to recognize other categories of unprotected speech.58 The 
Ferber Court’s selective revival of the categorical exclusion approach thus 
cries out for explanation.
One obvious reason for Ferber’s use of this approach is that child por-
nography easily fits Chaplinsky’s criteria of unquestionably harmful ex-
pression whose prohibition would, at most, only minimally impair free 
speech values.59 But while this may constitute a necessary condition for 
invocation of the categorical exclusion approach, the Court’s persistent 
refusal to exclude other categories of speech sharing these criteria shows 
that it is not sufficient to exclude speech from First Amendment cover-
age.60 Interestingly, by the time the Ferber case reached the Court, the 
Chaplinsky categorical exclusion approach had become so antiquated that 
New York quite understandably did not even suggest that the Court add 
child pornography to by then greatly diminished list of speech categori-
cally beyond the purview of the First Amendment. Rather, the state ar-
gued that the ban on child pornography survived “strict scrutiny,” the test 
for content- based restrictions on speech, which required the government 
to demonstrate that the prohibition “furthers a compelling state interest 
and is the least restrictive alternative to achieve that interest.”61
The Court readily acknowledged that protecting children against sex-
ual abuse was a compelling state interest. So why then didn’t it simply 
agree with New York’s argument that the ban on child pornography sur-
vived “strict scrutiny” rather than revive a seemingly defunct and plainly 
problematic free speech methodology? One possibility is that even though 
the test for content- based speech regulations is not an absolute bar against 
such provisions but permits such restrictions if they are the least restric-
tive means to serving a compelling state interest, the Court wanted this 
test to function as a nearly per se rule against content discrimination. Es-
pecially because this crucial feature of modern free speech jurisprudence 
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was still in a relatively early stage of development, the Court may have 
feared that upholding any content- based provision was likely to dilute the 
exacting version of strict scrutiny it intended this test to impose.62 So al-
though use of the categorical exclusion approach presented its own risks 
to the Court’s overarching concern with building a speech- protective First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court may well have thought it preferable 
to revive this methodology for this one occasion than to risk undermining 
a newly laid cornerstone of its free speech jurisprudence.63
This underlying premise of this hypothesis— that the Court intended 
the test applicable to content- based restrictions of speech to be a virtually 
per se rule against such provisions— is consistent with language in Chicago 
Police Department v. Mosley, the progenitor of the rule against content 
discrimination, which condemns such provisions in unqualified terms, 
and more significantly by the fact that today there is only one Supreme 
Court majority opinion that is still good law in which a content- based 
restriction survived strict scrutiny.64 But whether or not the Court con-
sciously made such a calculus, its use of the categorical exclusion method-
ology rather than holding that the ban on child pornography met the 
“strict scrutiny” standard for content- based restrictions on speech was on 
the whole a speech- protective move.
Another speech- protective feature of the Court’s methodology in Fer-
ber is the type of harm on which the Court relied— and, more importantly, 
on which it did not rely— in concluding that the First Amendment did not 
extend to child pornography. In regulating the content of speech, the 
harm that government seeks to avoid almost always flows from the com-
municative impact of the speech, typically the concern that the speech at 
issue will lead the audience to engage in some detrimental conduct, rang-
ing from draft resistance to violence against women to some disfavored 
economic activity.65 In its brief to the Court in Ferber, the state invoked 
just this type of harm, citing studies “suggesting a link between the sale of 
these materials and the commission of sex crimes against children.”66 Sig-
nificantly, however, in discussing the harm of child pornography that jus-
tified excluding such expression from First Amendment coverage, the 
Court eschewed reliance on this communicative- related harm.67 Rather, 
in what has come to be known as the “harm- in- the- production” rationale, 
the Court focused exclusively on another type of harm, also documented 
by the state:68 the physiological and psychological harm arising from “the 
use of children as subjects in pornographic materials.”69
By declining the state’s invitation to rely on harm caused by the audi-
ence’s reaction to child pornography and focusing instead on harm unre-
Revised Pages
The Context and Content of New York v. Ferber | 33
lated to the communicative effect of this material, the Court rendered its 
decision speech- protective in two important respects. First, banning the 
distribution of child pornography on the grounds that it may lead viewers 
to commit sex crimes disrespects the individual autonomy of the viewers 
and thus would have implicated a norm that many believe lies at the heart 
of the First Amendment.70 In addition, a rationale turning on the power of 
speech to influence its audience is applicable to a wide variety of expres-
sion and is thus difficult to cabin. So if the Court had accepted the state’s 
rationale for prohibiting child pornography, it would have created prece-
dent for the suppression of other types of material that studies showed 
might contribute to the audience’s engaging in harmful or even illegal be-
havior, such as pornography that arguably contributes to men’s aggressive 
behavior toward women or racist propaganda that that might well lead to 
discrimination against minorities.71 In contrast, the harm- in- the- 
production rationale is easily confined, for by definition it applies only to 
a limited class of harms resulting from film or photographic production.72
I do not want to overstate Ferber’s speech- protectiveness, for there are 
features of the decision that look in the opposite direction. The primary 
weakness of the categorical exclusion approach is that categories of speech 
that seem in the abstract to encompass only expression of little or no First 
Amendment value in actual operation turn out to include speech that has 
considerable First Amendment value. A related problem is that if the cat-
egory is not defined with adequate precision it can sweep up expression 
that is not in fact harmful. With regard to this latter problem, several com-
mentators have persuasively demonstrated how child pornography laws 
have been applied to material that does not present the harm that justified 
excluding child pornography from the First Amendment’s ambit in the 
first place.73 Since other contributions to this volume discuss this problem 
in detail,74 I will focus instead on another speech- restrictive consequence 
permitted, if not required, by Ferber and one that, moreover, arguably 
trenches on a fundamental free speech interest.
Osborne v. Ohio and Possession of Child Pornography
In 1969, the Court held in Stanley v. Georgia75 that even though obscene 
material was categorically beyond the scope of the First Amendment, it 
was nonetheless unconstitutional for government to criminalize its mere 
possession. “If the First Amendment means anything,” the Court declared 
in an opinion by Justice Marshall, “it means that a State has no business 
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telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or 
what films he may watch. . . . Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at 
the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”76 So 
when Clyde Osborne was arrested and charged under Ohio law for the 
possession of child pornography in his home, his lawyers might have been 
reasonably confident that although Ferber had several years earlier de-
clared child pornography categorically unprotected by the First Amend-
ment, Osborne nonetheless had a right to possess this material in the pri-
vacy of his home.77 Any such confidence, however, was misplaced.
As he had in Ferber, Justice White wrote for the Court in Osborne v. 
Ohio.78 Unlike the unanimous result in Ferber, however, three justices dis-
sented in an opinion by Justice Brennan. White began the majority opin-
ion by reciting Ferber’s assessment that the value of child pornography was 
“exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.” This observation was beside the 
point in two separate respects. First, in making this assessment, the Court 
in Ferber was focusing on the minimal detriment that the inability to use 
children engaged in sexual acts would have on “a literary performance or 
scientific or educational use,” not the affront to individual autonomy and 
privacy interests with which Stanley was concerned. In addition, like child 
pornography, obscenity is beyond the scope of the First Amendment pre-
cisely because of its exceedingly limited First Amendment value. But as 
the Court in Stanley made clear, the right to receive information and ideas 
does not depend on “their social worth.” So it was quite disingenuous for 
Justice White to question whether under Stanley Osborne had any “First 
Amendment interest in viewing and possessing child pornography” and 
then merely to assume only “for the sake of argument” that he did.79
The Court found firmer ground for distinguishing Stanley in observing 
that “the interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed 
the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley.” The Court ac-
curately recounts that in Stanley, Georgia sought to prohibit the private 
possession of obscenity because it was concerned that viewing the material 
would “poison the minds of its viewers.” In contrast, the Court emphasized, 
Ohio did not rely “on a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne’s mind” 
but rather has enacted the ban on possession of child pornography to “pro-
tect the victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a market for the 
exploitative use of children.” And it was “surely reasonable,” the Court con-
tinued, “for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production of 
child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the product.” 
Finally, the Court credited Ohio’s argument that since Ferber was decided, 
“much of the child pornography market has been driven underground; as 
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a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child pornography 
problem by only attacking production and distribution.”80
The Court acknowledged that in Stanley, Georgia had argued that its 
prohibition of the private possession of obscenity was “a necessary inci-
dent to its proscription on obscenity distribution.” Georgia’s argument, 
however, the Court insisted, must be viewed in light of the “weak interests 
asserted by the State in that case”81 and contrasted it with the interest in 
“‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well- being of a minor’” fur-
thered by Ohio’s ban on possession of child pornography, an interest 
which the Court in Ferber declared to be “compelling.”82 In addition, the 
Court noted two “other interests” supporting Ohio’s ban on possession. 
First, as the Court had noted in Ferber, materials produced by child por-
nographers “permanently record the victim’s abuse” and can continue to 
haunt the victim years after the film is made. The ban on possession en-
courages the possessor of these materials to destroy them, thus reducing 
the harm to the victim. Second, “because evidence suggests that pedo-
philes use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activ-
ity,” a law promoting the destruction of this material also serves the inter-
est in protecting children.83
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and John Paul 
Stevens, objected that Ohio had already enacted “a panoply of laws pro-
hibiting the creation, sale, and distribution of child pornography” but had 
not demonstrated why these laws were “inadequate and why the State 
must forbid mere possession [of child pornography] as well.”84 He charac-
terized as “speculat[ive]” the Court’s assumption that, in light of these 
other provisions, outlawing private possession of child pornography will 
decrease the production of child pornography. He added that even if he 
were to accept the Court’s “empirical assumptions,” he would nevertheless 
find its approach foreclosed by Stanley. Brennan noted that in response to 
Georgia’s argument in that case that a ban on possession of obscenity was 
a “necessary incident” to its ban on distribution because of the difficulty of 
proving intent to distribute or in adducing evidence of distribution, the 
Court stated:
We are not convinced that such difficulties exist, but even if they 
did we do not think that they would justify infringement of the in-
dividual’s right to read or observe what he pleases. Because that 
right is so fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty, its re-
striction may not be justified by the need to ease the administration 
of otherwise valid criminal laws.85
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One can fairly fault the dissent with not coming to grips with the ma-
jority’s argument that in light of the far weightier interests government has 
in combating the harm associated child pornography than with obscenity, 
Stanley’s injunction against prohibiting possession “to ease the adminis-
tration” of related laws should not be controlling. More pertinently, the 
dissent fails to explain why the far greater state interests involved in com-
bating the harm in the production of child pornography does not entitle 
the state to correspondingly greater leeway to prohibit possession to com-
bat this upstream harm. Still, the dissent does persuasively demonstrate 
that the First Amendment interest “to read or observe what [one] pleases” 
in the privacy of one’s home is an interest that, far from being “exceedingly 
modest, if not de minimis,” is one that had previously been recognized as 
a fundamental liberty. So Osborne’s holding that this liberty interest may 
be infringed based on a showing considerably shy of conclusive evidence 
that Ohio’s ban on possession of child pornography was strictly necessary 
to combat the harm in production suggests that this interest is not nearly 
as weighty as Stanley declared it to be. And to the extent that Ferber and it 
methodology contributed to the diminution of the status of the liberty 
interest recognized in Stanley, Ferber is in this respect a speech- restrictive 
decision.
the Limits of the Child Pornography exception
There are two related yet conceptually distinct types of limits to the child 
pornography exception: definitional and justificatory. Definitional limits 
are those imposed by the Court’s linguistic formulation of the type of ma-
terial constituting child pornography categorically excluded from First 
Amendment protection. Justificatory limits, which undergird and accord-
ingly should control the definitional limits, are those imposed by the ra-
tionales for the exclusion. In Ferber and its progeny the Court provides 
little in the way of explicit definitional limits on the category of unpro-
tected speech. The most significant definitional limit the Court has pro-
vided, and one it expressly tied to the primary justificatory limit on the 
child pornography exception, is Ferber’s statement that “the nature of the 
harm to be combated requires” the category of child pornography be lim-
ited to works that “visually depict sexual conduct by children.”86 As has 
often been remarked upon, the Court declined to give any explicit defini-
tion of the “sexual conduct” the visual depiction of which is beyond the 
scope of the First Amendment.87 It did, however, implicitly provide a defi-
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nition of at least the core of this conduct by approving New York’s defini-
tion. It signaled that further definition of this conduct, including its outer 
boundaries, should be fleshed out by legislatures in the first instance and 
then by reviewing courts, both paying careful attention, as the Court itself 
did in limiting the child pornography to visual depictions, to the harm- in- 
the- production rationale.88 These laws and decisions and the tests they 
have produced are described in detail in other contributions to this vol-
ume.89 So I will focus here on the guidance, limited and inferential though 
it may be, that the Court has provided about the meaning of “sexual con-
duct” the visual depiction of which may be prohibited under the child 
pornography exception to the First Amendment.
Definitional Limits
In addition to limiting the category of child pornography unprotected by 
the First Amendment to visual depictions of sexual conduct, the Court in 
Ferber announced that any prohibited material of this nature must be “ad-
equately defined by the applicable state law” and, further, that the “the 
category of ‘sexual conduct’” depicted in the proscribed material be “suit-
ably limited and described.” The New York law upheld in Ferber defined 
“sexual conduct” as “actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviant sexual 
intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado- masochistic abuse, or 
lewd exhibition of the genitals.”90 The Court readily held that this provi-
sion defined the forbidden visual depictions of sexual acts with “sufficient 
precision” and “sufficiently describes a category of material the produc-
tion and distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion.” So even though Ferber did not offer explicit guidelines or criteria for 
determining whether visual depictions qualify as “sexual conduct” devoid 
of First Amendment protection, the decision does make clear, for instance, 
that pictures showing children engaged in actual sexual intercourse, mas-
turbating, or lewdly exhibiting their genitals plainly qualify. Ferber thus 
helpfully identifies the core of the category of expression that it held to be 
without First Amendment protection.91 In contrast, Ferber reveals little 
about the outer boundaries of the exception. For example, “though mere 
nudity is undoubtedly insufficient”92 to constitute “sexual conduct” the 
depiction of which is unprotected by the First Amendment, what addi-
tional elements or circumstance render visual depictions of nude children 
beyond the ambit of the First Amendment? This was a question raised but 
not resolved in Massachusetts v. Oakes.93
Douglas Oakes was convicted under a Massachusetts child pornogra-
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phy law for taking topless photographs of his physically mature fourteen- 
year- old stepdaughter, who at the time was attending modeling school. 
The photographs depicted the girl “sitting, lying, and reclining on top of a 
bar, clad only in a red and white striped bikini panty and a red scarf [which 
did] not cover [her] breasts.”94 The Massachusetts law prohibited adults 
from posing minors “in a state of nudity” in photographs or motion pic-
tures and defined nudity to include the uncovered “post- pubertal” female 
breast.95 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated the law as 
unconstitutionally overbroad. The five justices of the United States Su-
preme Court who reached the overbreadth issue divided sharply as to 
whether the law was substantially overbroad.96 Justice Brennan, in an 
opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, objected that by its terms 
the law imposed severe criminal penalties on parents who photographed 
their naked infants or toddlers in the bath or romping on the beach. In 
addition, Brennan faulted the law for criminalizing “nonexploitative” top-
less photographs or films of adolescent girls, for instance, at the pool or on 
a beach where such nudity is permitted, as well as for banning professional 
nude modeling by teenagers not involving sexually explicit conduct. In 
light of such extensive application to protected speech, Brennan found the 
law to be unconstitutionally overbroad.97
Justice Antonin Scalia, in an opinion joined by Justice Harry Blackmun, 
took issue with Brennan’s conclusion that the law was substantially over-
broad. Unlike Brennan, he expressed doubt as to whether nonporno-
graphic, artistic photographs or films of nude children, including those 
depicting topless adolescent minors, constituted expression protected by 
the First Amendment. Rather, since he suspected that most adults would 
not want to be nude models “whatever the intention of the photographer or 
artist, and however unerotic the pose” and because there “is no cause to 
think children are less sensitive,” it was not unreasonable in his view for the 
state to deem the use of even consenting minors as nude models “a form of 
child exploitation.” Indeed, Scalia was not even certain that family photo-
graphs of nude infants or toddlers in the bath or on the beach was pro-
tected expression, though he was willing to assume for the sake of argu-
ment that prohibiting such photographs was unconstitutional “as opposed 
to merely foolish.” Still, given the extent of child pornography in general 
“and of pornographic magazines that use young female models” in particu-
lar, the legitimate scope of the law in his view “vastly exceed[ed]” any un-
constitutional application and therefore was not substantially overbroad.98
The disagreement in Oakes about when depictions of child nudity also 
constitute child pornography unprotected by the First Amendment is no 
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doubt merely a specific manifestation of what were and still are signifi-
cantly different views among the justices about the proper boundaries of 
the child pornography exception. Indeed, Ferber’s remarkable failure to 
provide any explicit definition of child pornography or even guidelines for 
determining what materials fall within this category may well mask such 
disagreement. And just as differences about the definitional limits of child 
pornography came to the fore in Oakes, disagreement about justificatory 
limits of arose when the Court considered a federal ban on “virtual” child 
pornography.
Justificatory Limits: Harm in the Production, “Virtual” Child 
Pornography, and Ashcroft v. Free speech Coalition
An attractive feature of the Court’s decision in Ferber is that it firmly teth-
ered its upholding the ban on child pornography to the prevention of a 
palpable and indisputably serious injury: harm to children in the produc-
tion of pornography, a rationale that eschews any reliance on audience 
reaction to the proscribed expression. This harm- in the- production ratio-
nale has in the decades since Ferber was decided withstood powerful ex-
pansionary pressures that would have greatly distended a less narrowly 
confined and firmly anchored principle. Arguably, the Court extended 
this rationale to its limits in Osborne when it upheld a ban on possession 
in the absence of rigorous proof that the ban would significantly reduce 
harm in the production.99 But when Congress pushed that rationale well 
beyond its breaking point by outlawing computer- generated images of 
children engaged in sexual activity and even the use of adult actors who 
looked like children, the Court pushed back.
As originally enacted and in several subsequent amendments, the fed-
eral ban on child pornography applied only to visual depictions using ac-
tual children.100 In 1996, however, Congress passed the Child Pornogra-
phy Prevention Act (“the CPPA”), which contained as its key provision a 
prohibition on the distribution or possession of “any visual depiction” that 
“is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”101 
By virtue of the “or appears to be” specification, the law applied not just to 
depictions of actual children but also to “virtual” child pornography, in-
cluding computer- generated images of children engaged in sexual activi-
ties, as well as to depictions of adult actors who look like children.102 In 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,103 in an opinion by Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy joined by four other justices, the Court invalidated this provision as 
substantially overbroad.104 At the beginning of its opinion, the Court em-
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phasized that by “prohibiting child pornography that does not depict an 
actual child,” the law “goes beyond” Ferber, which had upheld the suppres-
sion of child pornography because of “the State’s interest in protecting the 
children exploited by the production process.” The Court observed that by 
its literal terms, the statute embraced “a Renaissance painting depicting a 
scene from classical mythology” depicting what “appears to be a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” as well as “Hollywood movies, 
filmed without any child actors,” if an actor “‘appears to be’ a minor engag-
ing” in such conduct. The Court again stressed that these images “do not 
involve, let alone harm, any children in the production process.”105
The Court then considered the severity of the penalties imposed by the 
CPPA, noting that a first offender may be imprisoned for fifteen years and 
that a repeat offender faces a minimum of five years and a maximum of 
thirty years in prison. “With these severe penalties in force,” the Court 
concluded, “few legitimate movie producers or book publishers . . . would 
risk distributing images in or near the uncertain reach of this law.” Having 
noted this potential of the CPPA to prohibit or chill a massive amount of 
speech, the Court then turned to the government’s various justifications 
for prohibiting any visual depiction that “appears to be” a minor engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct. The government offered two arguments tied 
to the harm- in- the- production rationale that the Court adopted in Ferber 
and two additional rationales more generally related to preventing sexual 
abuse of children, all of which the Court rejected.106
With respect to harm in the production, the government argued first 
that eliminating the market for pornography using real children required 
prohibition of virtual images because virtual images are indistinguish-
able from real ones, are part of the same market, and are often exchanged. 
For this reason, the government insisted, virtual images promote traffick-
ing in works in whose production actual children were harmed. The 
Court found the premise of this argument “somewhat implausible.” If vir-
tual images were in fact indistinguishable from pornography using real 
children, the latter images, the Court reasoned, would be driven from the 
market by virtual child pornography because pornographers would not 
risk prosecution by abusing real children if computerized images would 
suffice. In addition, the Court noted that creation of the speech involved 
in Ferber was “itself the crime of child abuse” and that the prohibition of 
that expression deterred the crime by “removing the profit motive.” In 
contrast, with respect to the creation of virtual child pornography pro-
hibited by the CPPA, the Court pointed out that “there is no underlying 
crime at all” to deter.107
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In an additional attempt to tie the ban on virtual pornography to harm 
in the production, the government argued that the existence of virtual 
child pornography makes it difficult to prosecute producers of pornogra-
phy involving real children because experts may have difficulty determin-
ing whether the material in question was made using actual children or 
computer- generated images. Accordingly, the government argued that it 
was necessary to prohibit both kinds of images. The Court firmly rejected 
this argument, retorting that government “may not suppress lawful speech 
as the means to suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does not be-
come unprotected merely because it resembles the latter.” Indeed, the 
Court explained, such an approach “turns the First Amendment upside 
down” and is precisely what the overbreadth doctrine prohibits.108
Perhaps realizing that the Court would likely reject as too tenuous any 
asserted connection between virtual child pornography and harm to ac-
tual children in the production of pornography, the government advanced 
two additional arguments in support of the “appears to be a child” provi-
sion. First, it claimed that the ban on virtual pornography was necessary 
to prevent pedophiles from using this material to seduce children. This 
rationale had a long and checkered history in child pornography litiga-
tion: it was advanced by the state though ignored by the Court in Ferber 
but then relied on by the Court in Osborne as one of two “other” interests 
besides deterring harm in the production that supported a ban on posses-
sion of child pornography involving actual children.109 In Free Speech Co-
alition, however, the Court again switched course and found the interest 
in preventing pedophiles from using child pornography to seduce chil-
dren to be an insufficient reason to ban virtual child pornography. In re-
jecting this rationale, the Court relied on the well- established principle 
that “speech within the rights of adults to hear may not be silenced com-
pletely in an attempt to shield children from it.”110
The government also sought to justify the prohibition against virtual 
child pornography by claiming that it “whets the appetite” of pedophiles, 
thereby leading them to sexually abuse children. The Court also firmly 
rejected this rationale, explaining that “the mere tendency of speech to 
encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it” and that 
the government “cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desir-
ability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.” More specifically, the 
Court found that the rationale offered by the government was inconsistent 
with a cornerstone of its modern free speech jurisprudence, the test it 
carefully crafted in Brandenburg v. Ohio for determining when speech 
constitutes incitement. That decision, the Court explained, allows govern-
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ment to “suppress speech for advocating the use of force or a violation of 
law only if ‘such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.’” The Court 
found that the government here had shown only “a remote connection 
between speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any re-
sulting child abuse.” In the absence of a “significantly stronger, more direct 
connection,” the Court concluded, “the Government may not prohibit 
speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in ille-
gal conduct.” Accordingly, because this and all the reasons proffered by the 
government for prohibiting the large category of expressive activity con-
stituting virtual child pornography had “no justification in [the Court’s] 
precedents or in the law of the First Amendment,” the Court held this key 
provision of the CPPA be overbroad and unconstitutional.111
Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the Court’s 
judgment. In his view the government’s strongest argument was that 
those who possess and disseminate sexually graphic images of actual 
children might raise reasonable doubt as to their guilt by claiming that 
the images are computer generated. But because the government was 
unable to point to a single case in which a defendant had been acquitted 
based on such a defense, he concluded “this speculative interest” was 
insufficient to support the broad scope of the CPPA. He added, though, 
that if technology evolves to such a state where prosecutions of actual 
child pornography are thwarted by such defenses, the government 
should not be foreclosed from enacting an appropriately narrow ban on 
computer- generated child pornography.112
Justice O’Connor filed an opinion concurring in the Court’s judgment 
that the “appears to be . . . of a minor” provision was unconstitutionally 
overbroad to the extent that the prohibition covered sexually graphic im-
ages of adults who look like children.113 Joined in this part of her opinion 
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, however, O’Connor 
dissented from the Court’s judgment to the extent that it held that the 
provision was overbroad as applied to completely computer- generated 
images of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. In her view, the 
ban on computer- generated material survived the strict scrutiny applica-
ble to content- based restrictions. She found that the ban on computer- 
generated images of children engaging in explicit sexual conduct promote 
the nation’s compelling interest in protecting children because these im-
ages “whet the appetite” of child molesters who may use them to seduce 
young children. An even more serious concern, in her view, is that those 
engaged in the production, distribution, or possession of pornography 
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produced with actual children “may evade liability by claiming that the 
images attributed to them are in fact computer- generated.”
O’Connor acknowledged that the language “appears to be . . . of a mi-
nor” seemed not to be “narrowly tailored” to serve these compelling inter-
ests in that it would, for instance, “capture even cartoon- sketches or stat-
ues of children that were sexually suggestive,” images not likely be used to 
seduce children. She therefore interpreted “appears to be . . . of ” to mean 
“virtually indistinguishable from.” In light of this narrowing construction, 
O’Connor found that the ban on computer- generated child pornography 
passed strict scrutiny and was not substantially overbroad.114
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion,115 which Justice 
Scalia joined.116 In his view, the term “sexually explicit conduct” as used in 
CPPA should be narrowly construed to apply only to “hard core” child 
pornography. Under that interpretation, the law would ban only “visual 
depictions of youthful looking adult actors engaged in actual sexual activ-
ity; mere suggestions of sexual activity, such as youthful looking adult ac-
tors squirming under a blanket” would not be prohibited. So construed, 
the CPPA would not reach any material not previously banned by federal 
law other than computer- generated images virtually indistinguishable 
from child pornography using real children.117
Justificatory Limits: The Uncertain Status of the  
“Harm- in- the- Circulation” Rationale
The harm- in- the- production rationale may be the primary justification 
invoked by Court for the exclusion of child pornography from First 
Amendment coverage, but it is not the only justification. In addition, it 
will be recalled, Ferber noted that “the materials produced are a perma-
nent record of the children’s participation [in the making of the materials] 
and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation.”118 And in 
Osborne, the Court invoked this harm- in- the- circulation rationale as a 
reason for upholding the constitutionality of a ban on the possession of 
child pornography. The Court, however, “has not made clear whether the 
harm of circulation, standing alone, is sufficient to justify the [First 
Amendment] exception for child pornography.”119 The Court’s statement 
in Ferber that the harm in the production is “exacerbated” by the circula-
tion of the material suggests that this rationale depends entirely on the 
harm in the production, as does the Court’s observation in the immedi-
ately prior sentence that distribution of the material “is intrinsically re-
lated to the sexual abuse of children” inherent in the making of child por-
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nography.120 However, the Court’s quotation of an authority describing 
the recording of the event to be “an even greater threat to the child victim” 
than sexual abuse121 suggests that the interest in preventing the circulation 
of images of a child engaged in sexual activity is an independent rationale 
for banning the distribution and possession of child pornography.
As Carissa Hessick explains in an insightful recent article122 and in this 
volume,123 whether the harm- in- the- circulation rationale is independent 
from or derivative of the harm- in- the- production justification has impor-
tant consequences for the limits of the child pornography exception. For 
instance, if is it purely derivative, then it would not support categorizing 
as child pornography a “morphed” computer images that “pastes” the face 
of an actual child on the body of an adult involved in sexual conduct.124 
Similarly, the typical case of “sexting” could not be prosecuted as child 
pornography devoid of First Amendment protection.125 In contrast, if the 
harm- in- the- circulation rationale is an independent justification for the 
categorical exclusion of child pornography from First Amendment pro-
tection, then this material is logically eligible for inclusion as child por-
nography. This same definitional issue would also arise with regard to 
photographs surreptitiously taken of young children engaged in sex play 
with no instigation from an adult. Indeed, the question of whether mate-
rial is properly classified as child pornography is presented by any visual 
depiction of actual children engaged in sexual conduct that did not in-
volve child abuse. Since distribution of sexually explicit visual depictions 
of children would often be prohibited by laws other than by bans on child 
pornography, such as by obscenity and invasion of privacy laws, the major 
practical significance of whether such material can be classified as child 
pornography is whether mere possession of such material can be constitu-
tionally prohibited. Another practical consequence is the availability of 
draconian penalties commonly imposed by child pornography laws126 but 
typically not by other laws applicable to distribution of sexually explicit 
visual depiction of children.
Because the Court in Ferber declined to provide a definition of child 
pornography, lower courts and the Court itself in subsequent cases have 
had to rely on the justifications for the child pornography exception in 
order to determine whether material banned by various child pornogra-
phy laws comes within the constitutional definition of child pornography. 
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court helpfully confirmed that the 
harm- in- the- production rationale was the primary justification for the 
categorical exclusion of child pornography for First Amendment protec-
tion, held that the interest in preventing pedophiles from using sexually 
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explicit images of children to seduce minors was not itself a sufficient ra-
tionale for banning such material, and firmly rejected the argument that 
material that “whets the appetite” of child molesters is grounds for ban-
ning these images. However, the Court has yet to squarely decide whether 
its reference in Ferber to the harm resulting from the existence of a perma-
nent record of the child participating in sexual conduct is a justification 
independent of the harm- in- the- production rationale or merely an aspect 
of it. The uncertain status of this harm- in- the- circulation rationale in turn 
creates uncertainty as to the definition and the limits of the child pornog-
raphy exception.
Conclusion
From its dismal failure to protect speech in the first part of the twentieth 
century the Court learned the critical importance of formulating precise, 
cabinable rationales for upholding restrictions on expression. This is par-
ticularly true of restrictions targeting speech in media essential to the for-
mation of public opinion or for artistic expression such as books, maga-
zines, newspapers, or film. From suppression of antiwar speech, to banning 
of literary masterpieces, to libel awards against newspapers for speech 
critical of official conduct, experience had shown the dire consequences of 
failing to articulate narrow and confineable rationales for upholding 
content- based speech restrictions. The harm- in- the- production rationale 
invoked by the Court as the primary and arguably the only sufficient jus-
tification for suppression of child pornography has, as we have seen, re-
mained closely confined despite attempts by Congress and state legisla-
tures to expand the scope of the material prohibited by child pornography 
laws. There have, it is true, been problematic applications of child pornog-
raphy laws upheld by the lower courts. Significantly, however, these cases 
usually involve justifications other than the harm- in- the- production ra-
tionale, such as harm in the circulation.127
The harm- in- the- production rationale has, moreover, not only has 
proved confineable in its application to sexually oriented material depict-
ing children, but it also has resisted appropriation as a rationale for cate-
gorical exclusion of other types of speech from First Amendment protec-
tion. In 1999, Congress enacted a law prohibiting the commercial creation, 
sale, or possession of visual or auditory depictions of animal cruelty.128 In 
defending this law, the government urged the Court to find such depic-
tions categorically devoid of First Amendment protection, and in support 
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of this position invoked among other arguments Ferber’s harm- in- the- 
production rationale.129 In invalidating this law as unconstitutionally 
overbroad, the Court firmly rejected the contention that this expression 
was categorically devoid of First Amendment protection.130
Upholding a content- based restriction aimed at crucial media for po-
litical or artistic expression such as photographs and film is fraught with 
danger not just from the restriction at hand but from the precedent the 
decision sets for the suppression of a wider variety of speech. Cognizant of 
this danger, the Court in Ferber and in subsequent child pornography de-
cisions has for the most part done a commendable job of upholding sup-
pression of photographs and film whose production involves “a most seri-
ous crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people,”131 
while at the same time maintaining First Amendment doctrine staunchly 
protective of expression essential to a free and democratic society.
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490 (1949)). The “integral part of an illegal activity” rationale for stripping speech of 
constitutional protection has, however, been aptly criticized as “indeterminate, danger-
ous, and inconsistent with more recent cases.” Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Gen-
erally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation- Altering Utterances,” and 
the Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1285 (2005). Accord, Schauer, supra note 
29 at 300 (suggesting that the Court’s giving this justification “little more than en passant 
mention . . . is best explained by the logical flaws” of the rationale.)
 50. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
 51. Id. at 763– 64.
 52. Id. at 764.
 53. Id. at 764– 65. In contrast, the Court stated that under the obscenity laws “crimi-
nal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter” and noted that 
the New York law “expressly includes a scienter requirement.” Subsequently and more 
specifically, the Court explained in United States v. X- Citment Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 
(1994), that a “statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the 
performers would raise serious constitutional doubts.” Consequently, the Court read 
into the federal ban on the distribution of child pornography a requirement that the 
defendant know that material contained sexually explicit images of minors.
 54. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
 55. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773– 74.
 56. Id. at 774– 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
 57. Id. at 775– 77 (Brennan, J., concurring).
 58. See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (rejecting the claim that 
violent videogames directed to children are categorically without First Amendment pro-
tection); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (rejecting the claim that visual 
depictions of animal cruelty are categorically without First Amendment protection).
 59. Also, as discussed above, under the categorical exclusion approach it is not open 
to a defendant to argue that no harm befell children in the production of the particular 
material as it might be under a strict scrutiny analysis. In this way, categorical exclusion 
of child pornography makes prosecution of child pornography cases somewhat easier 
than under a strict scrutiny standard.
 60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
 61. See Brief and Appendices for Petitioner at 30, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 
(1982) (No. 81– 55).
 62. Additionally, although protecting children from sexual abuse is plainly a compel-
ling state interest, the Court may have had some doubt that prohibiting distribution of 
the material was the “least restrictive alternative” available to the state to prevent this 
harm.
 63. This hypothesis is similar to Frederick Schauer’s suggestion that the Court used a 
categorization approach in Ferber to avoid diluting the Brandenburg test. See Schauer, 
supra note 29 at 314.
 64. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
 65. See e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (draft resistance); Am. Book-
sellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d. 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (violence against women); Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (increased use of 
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electricity). The other type of audience- related harm that the government often invokes 
to justify content- based speech restriction is preventing offense to the audience. See, e.g., 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
 66. Brief and Appendices for Petitioner at 33, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) 
(No. 81-55).
 67. The state also cited evidence that “materials showing children engaged in sexual 
conduct are sold to adults who use the materials to convince other children to engage in 
similar conduct.” Id. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252– 54 (2002), 
the Court specifically rejected each of these rationales as sufficient grounds for banning 
virtual child pornography. Previously, however, in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 
(1989), though relying primarily on the harm- in- the- production rationale, the Court 
mentioned the use of child pornography to convince children to engage in similar con-
duct as an added reason why banning the possession of pornography did not violate the 
First Amendment. Both of these cases are discussed below.
 68. Brief and Appendix for Petitioner at 32– 33, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 
(1982) (No. 81-55).
 69. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. Indeed, because the harm- in- the- production rationale 
foreswears any reliance on the communicative impact of the material, this justification 
for the ban on the distribution of pornography can be fairly characterized as content 
neutral. Still, because the description of the proscribed material is based on its content, 
the Court correctly classified the law as content based. Cf. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
475 U.S. 41, 47– 49 (1986) (because a zoning regulation restricting the places in which 
theaters showing “adult” films could be located was “justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech,” the Court classified this time, place, or manner regula-
tion as content neutral even though the “ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult 
films differently from other kinds of theaters”). In addition, though the harm- in- the- 
production rationale itself does not turn on the communicative impact of the speech, 
the subsidiary argument that the material creates a “permanent record” of child abuse 
that exacerbates that harm does depend on the communicative impact of the material. 
Unlike the other two communicative- related justifications offered by the state, however 
(which the Court ignored), the “permanent record” rationale does not implicate any 
significant free speech values. Nonetheless, it is technically a content- based justification, 
which is an additional reason why the Court properly did not try to classify the New 
York law as content neutral.
 70. E.g., C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 Const. Comment 251 (2011).
 71. There are, of course, those who believe that such expression should indeed be 
suppressed for precisely these reasons. E.g., Catherine A. Mackinnon, Only Words 
(1995) (arguing for the suppression of pornography); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response 
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989) (arguing for 
suppression of racist speech). While in my view such restrictions would be contrary to 
core First Amendment values, see James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Pornography, and 
the Radical Attack on Free Speech Doctrine (1999), the merits of the regulation of 
hate speech and pornography is beside the point that it was speech- protective for the 
Court in Ferber to have eschewed a rationale that would have created a basis for the sup-
pression of such material.
 72. The Court further limited this rationale by emphasizing both that the state had a 
“compelling” interest in preventing the harm to children caused in the production and 
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that the distribution of child pornography must be prohibited in order to effectively 
combat the harm in the production.
 73. See, e.g., Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921, 947– 48 
(2001) (hereafter “Inverting”); Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 
Colum. L. Rev. 209, 238– 40 (2001) (hereafter “The Perverse Law”); Carissa Byrne Hes-
sick, The Limits of Child Pornography, 98 Ind. L.J. 1437 (2014).
 74. See chapter 2, Carissa Byrne Hessick, Setting Definitional Limits for the Child 
Pornography Exception; chapter 3, Amy Adler, The “Dost Test” in Child Pornography 
Law: “Trial by Rorschach Test.”
 75. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
 76. Id. at 565.
 77. See Brief for Appellant at 46– 51, Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (No. 88- 
5986).
 78. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
 79. Id. at 108– 109. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Justice White did not 
join the majority opinion in Stanley, but instead joined a concurring opinion that rested 
exclusively on Fourth Amendment grounds for reversing the conviction. See Stanley, 
394 U.S. at 565.
 80. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110– 11.
 81. Id. at 110 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761– 62). The Court in Osborne does not 
specify what these “weak interests” consisted of beyond the interest in preventing ob-
scenity from “poisoning the mind of the viewer,” which in light of the Court’s condem-
nation as “paternalistic” suggest that this interest is not merely weak but constitutionally 
impermissible. The Court in Stanley, however, lists preventing obscenity from falling 
into the hands of children and offending the sensibilities of unwilling viewers as addi-
tional reasons for outlawing its distribution. See 394 U.S. at 567; see also Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59 (1973) (ban on the distribution of obscenity protects 
“the tone of society”).
 82. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756– 58).
 83. Id. at 111.
 84. Id. at 141– 42 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In light of his full- throated endorsement of 
Stanley’s principles in this dissent, it is interesting to note that Justice Brennan, like Jus-
tice White, had not joined Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Stanley. Justice Stevens 
had not yet joined the Court at the time Stanley was decided.
 85. Justice Brennan also denied that the two “other interests” were adequate grounds 
to sustain the ban on possession. With respect to the interest in encouraging destruction 
of the “permanen[t] record” of the child’s abuse, he found the law was not “narrowly 
tailored to this end” because there was “no requirement that the State show that the child 
was abused in the production of the materials or even that the child knew that a photo-
graph was taken.” Id. at 143, n.18. With regards to the argument that pedophiles use 
child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity, Brennan first noted that 
the evidence on which the Court relied showed that pedophiles used adult as well as 
child pornography for this purpose. More fundamentally, he objected that this rationale 
“ignores fundamental principles of our First Amendment jurisprudence.” He pointed 
out that if even if “obscene material could be proved to create a . . . danger of illegal be-
havior, it would not follow that the expression should be suppressed. Rather, the basic 
principles of a system of freedom of expression would require that society deal directly 
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with the . . . action and leave the expression alone.” Id. (quoting T. Emerson, The System 
of Freedom of Expression 494 (1970)).
 86. While theoretically this might include a painting or drawing of actual children 
engaged in sexual conduct, in “almost every imaginable case this will be a photographic 
portrayal.” Schauer, supra note 29 at 294.
 87. Id.; Adler, Inverting, supra note 73 at 936– 37; Hessick, supra note 73 at 19. The 
only express statement the Court made about the meaning of “sexual conduct” is that 
unlike under the Miller test for obscenity it need not “appeal to the prurient interest of 
the average person” or be portrayed in “patently offensive manner.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 
764.
 88. For a criticism of this strategy see Adler, The Perverse Law, supra note 73, at 235 
(arguing that this approach has led to “a sense of boundlessness in child pornography 
law”); see also Hessick, supra note 73 (describing failure of state legislatures and lower 
courts to limit restrictions to underlying rationales of the child pornography exception).
 89. See supra note 74.
 90. New York Penal Law, § 263.00(3).
 91. Ferber also confirms that statutes limited to the prohibition of those visual depic-
tions of activities within New York’s definition of “sexual conduct” will not be vulnerable 
to attack for substantial overbreadth.
 92. Schauer, supra note 29 at 295. Indeed, though not focusing in this part of its opin-
ion on the question of photographs of nude children, the Court in Ferber acknowledged 
that “nudity, without more is protected expression.” 458 at 765, n.18 (citing Erznoznik v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975)).
 93. 491 U.S. 576 (1989).
 94. Id. at 580.
 95. Mass. Gen. Laws § 272:31 (1986). The law provided that it was a defense to pros-
ecution if the child was posed in a state of nudity “for a bona fide scientific or medical 
purpose, or for an educational or cultural purpose for a bona fide school, museum or 
library.”
 96. After the Supreme Court had agreed to review the case, the Massachusetts legis-
lature amended the law to require that the posing of nude children to be done with 
“lascivious intent.” Oakes, 491 U.S. at 483. Justice O’Connor, in an opinion joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Anthony Kennedy, held that this amend-
ment rendered the overbreadth challenge moot. Id. at 581– 84. Justice Antonin Scalia, in 
an opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, disagreed that 
the amendment rendered the overbreadth claim moot. Id. at 585– 88 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). However, since Scalia and Black-
mun thought the law was not unconstitutionally overbroad, they concurred in the judg-
ment of O’Connor’s plurality opinion vacating the decision of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts. Id. at 588– 90.
 97. Id. at 590– 99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
 98. Id. at 588– 90 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). This was particularly true in Scalia’s view since the scope of the statute was nar-
rowed by the availability of the defense that the material was produced for scientific, 
medical, and educational purposes. See supra note 95. The statute at issue in Osborne v. 
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), discussed above in text, also broadly banned visual depic-
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tions of minors “in a state of nudity” subject to an exception similar to the defense pro-
vided by the Massachusetts law. A majority of the Court in Osborne summarily rebuffed 
an overbreadth claim because the Ohio Supreme Court had construed the ban to apply 
only when the nudity constituted “a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the 
genitals.” Id. at 113. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, disagreed, 
finding the limiting construction ambiguous and in any event not sufficient to cure what 
was in his view the statute’s substantial overbreadth. Id. at 126– 39 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
 99. Supporting the view that a ban on possession approached the limits of the harm- 
in- the- production rationale is that the Court felt it necessary to invoke an additional 
rationale— use of child pornography by pedophiles to seduce children. See supra text 
accompanying note 83.
 100. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994 ed.).
 101. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B). The statute specified that “visual depiction” included “any 
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer- generated image or picture.” 
Id. It defined “sexually explicit conduct” as “actual or simulated-   .  .  . sexual inter-
course . . . bestiality; . . . masturbation; . . . sadistic or masochistic abuse; or . . . lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2).
 102. The law also prohibited the possession or distribution of images of actual children 
not engaged in sexual conduct altered or “morphed” to appear to be engaging in such 
conduct. Section 2256(8)(C). This provision, however, was not challenged in this case.
 103. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
 104. Justices Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer joined 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. Justice O’Connor, joined in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, 
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed 
a dissenting opinion, which Justice Scalia joined except for the paragraph discussing 
legislative history.
 105. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241.
 106. Id. at 244.
 107. Id. at 254.
 108. Id. at 255. The Court further held that this problem was not cured by the avail-
ability of an affirmative defense by those charged with nonpossessory offenses that ma-
terials were produced using only adults and were not otherwise distributed in a manner 
conveying the impression that they depicted real children. Noting that imposing on a 
defendant the burden of proving his speech is not unlawful raises “serious constitutional 
difficulties,” the Court declined to decide this difficult question because the defense was 
in any event “incomplete and insufficient” in not applying to possessory offenses. Id. at 
255– 56.
 109. See supra note 67 and text accompanying note 83.
 110. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 252 (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 
492 U.S. 115 (1989)). Curiously, in rejecting the sufficiency of this rationale the Court 
makes no attempt to distinguish Osborne’s reliance on it. In an earlier section of the 
opinion, however, in rebuffing the government’s argument that virtual child pornogra-
phy can be constitutionally banned because it is “virtually indistinguishable” from por-
nography depicting actual children, the Court explained that although Osborne “noted 
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the State’s interest in preventing child pornography from being used as an aid in the 
solicitation of minors,” that decision “did not suggest that, absent this concern, other 
governmental interests would suffice.” 535 U.S. at 250.
 111. Id. at 253– 54. The Court also struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad the 
CPPA’s pandering provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D), which prohibited depictions of 
sexually explicit material “advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in 
such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual de-
piction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” even if in fact the material did 
not contain images of children.
 112. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
 113. Id. at 260– 61 (O’Connor, J., concurring). O’Connor also agreed that the pander-
ing provision was unconstitutionally overbroad.
 114. Id. at 263– 64.
 115. Id. at 267– 68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
 116. Except for the discussion of the legislative history.
 117. Id. at 268. Rehnquist also argued that the pandering provision could be narrowly 
construed to avoid constitutional difficulties. Id. at 271– 73. In response to the Court’s 
holding in Free Speech Coalition, Congress enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies and 
Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (“PROTECT”) Act of 2003, 117 
Stat. 650. Section 503 of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B), replaces the pandering 
provision struck down in Free Speech Coalition with a narrower pandering prohibition. 
In United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008), the Court, in a 7- 2 decision, upheld 
this provision against a claim of substantial overbreadth. Another provision of the PRO-
TECT Act, § 502, 18 USC § 2256(8)(B), prohibits receiving, distributing, or possessing 
any “digital image, computer image, or computer- generated image that is, or is indistin-
guishable from,” an image of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. This 
prohibition is subject to an affirmative defense that that the image in question is of an 
adult or did not involve an actual minor. Cf. United States v. Peel, 595 F.3d 763, 770– 71 
(7th Cir. 2010) (recognizing affirmative defense under § 2256(8)(B) where pornography 
was made with adult rather than child models but declining to extend it to case where 
legally created pornography was subsequently criminalized). For a discussion and criti-
cism of this provision, see Rosalind E. Bell, Note, Reconciling the PROTECT Act with the 
First Amendment, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1878 (2012). A third provision of the Act, § 504, 18 
U.S.C. § 1466A, outlaws any sexually explicit visual depiction of minors, including a 
cartoon, sculpture, or painting, that is either obscene, 1466A(a)(1) and (b)(1), or “is, or 
appears to be, of a minor engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or 
sexual intercourse, including genital- genital, oral- genital, anal- genital, or oral- anal, 
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex” and “lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2). Since obscenity is 
categorically without First Amendment protection, the first part of this provision would 
appear to be constitutional since it applies only to legally obscene material. The second 
part of this prohibition, however, seems to include material that is neither obscene nor 
involves the depiction of actual children and thus is likely unconstitutional. See United 
States v. Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005– 07 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (finding 1466A(a)(2) 
and (b)(2) unconstitutionally overbroad); see also United States v. Dean, 635 F.3d 1200, 
1204– 08 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that § 1466A(a)(2) undoubtedly criminalizes some 
protected speech, but holding that it is not substantially overbroad). Finally, § 504 may 
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be unconstitutional to the extent it criminalizes mere possession of obscene material. 18 
U.S.C. § 1466A(b). But see Handley, supra, 564 F. Supp. at 1001 (holding the right to 
possess obscene material in the privacy of one’s home recognized in Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (see supra text accompanying notes 75– 76), does not extend to 
material that has moved in interstate commerce); United States v. Mees, No. 
4:09- cr- 00145- ERW, 2009 WL 1657420, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 10, 2009) (unpublished) 
(same).
 118. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
 119. Hessick, supra note 73, at 8.
 120. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
 121. Id., n.16 (quoting Shouvlin, Preventing Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model 
Act, 17 Wake Forest L. Rev. 535, 545 (1981)).
 122. Hessick, supra note 73, at 27– 31.
 123. Chapter 2, Carissa Byrne Hessick, Setting Definitional Limits for the Child Pornog-
raphy Exception.
 124. Hessick, supra note 123, at 71. As discussed above at note 102, a provision of the 
CPPA bans such material. Because this provision was not challenged in Free Speech Co-
alition, however, the Court did not rule on its constitutionality.
 125. Hessick, supra note 123, at 70–71.
 126. Thus Hessick notes that “a federal defendant found guilty of possessing twenty 
images of child pornography will receive a longer prison sentence than federal defen-
dants who committed arson, burglary, robbery, or sexual abuse of a minor.” Hessick, 
supra note 73, at 1438.
 127. The Court, however, can be fairly faulted for not making clear in Ferber that this 
is not a justification independent of the harm in production.
 128. 18 U.S.C. § 48. Specifically, the law applied to depictions “in which a living animal 
is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed,” if the conduct de-
picted violates federal or state law where “the creation, sale, or possession takes place.” 
The law contained an exemption for “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, 
journalistic, historical, or artistic value.”
 129. “[A]s the Court recognized with respect to child pornography, permitting the 
distribution of these materials encourages the very unlawful acts they record. The com-
mercial market for depictions of animal cruelty ‘provide[s] an economic motive for’ 
production of these materials— and the abuse that is inherent in this production.” Brief 
of Appellant- Petitioner at 36, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08– 769) 
(quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766). The government primarily relied on Ferber, however, 
not for its use of the harm- in- the- production rationale but rather for the decision’s 
methodology in finding child pornography categorically unprotected because “‘the evil 
to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake’ 
that the entire category may be prohibited.” Id. at 12, quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763– 64. 
The Court in Stevens distinguished Ferber by explaining that the Court in Ferber had 
relied on the compelling interest in protecting children from sexual abuse as well as the 
de minimis First Amendment value of using actual children to create the material at is-
sue in that case. Id. at 471. In addition, the Court emphasized that Ferber found that the 
market for child pornography was “intrinsically related” to the underlying abuse and 
was therefore “an integral part” of an illegal activity, 559 U.S. at 471, which would not be 
the case with respect to a substantial amount of expression prohibited by the law, such 
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as hunting magazines and videos. Id. at 481. Having thus rebuffed the government’s reli-
ance on Ferber as grounds for categorically excluding depictions of animal cruelty from 
the First Amendment, the Court evidently did not feel it necessary to respond specifi-
cally to the government’s harm- in- the- production argument.
 130. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468– 72.
 131. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).
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2 |  Setting Definitional Limits for the  
Child Pornography Exception
Carissa Byrne Hessick
Although the First Amendment ordinarily protects the creation, distribu-
tion, and possession of visual images, those protections do not apply to 
child pornography. But in exempting child pornography from First 
Amendment protection, the Supreme Court has failed to clearly define 
child pornography as a category of speech. Providing a precise definition 
of the child pornography exception to the First Amendment has become 
increasingly important because, in recent years, prosecutors across the 
country have used child pornography laws expansively to reach broader 
and broader sets of behavior.
Most visibly, some prosecutors have elected to charge teenagers with 
child pornography offenses for creating and sharing sexually explicit im-
ages of themselves— a practice that is often referred to as “sexting.”1 For 
example, when school district officials in Pennsylvania discovered photo-
graphs of “scantily clad, semi- nude and nude teenage girls” on several stu-
dents’ cell phones, the officials turned the photographs over to the local 
district attorney. The district attorney threatened to prosecute the minors 
depicted in the photographs and the minors who possessed the cell phones 
on which the images were stored with possession and/or dissemination of 
child pornography.2
Prosecutors have also filed charges in cases where adults have used 
technology to alter innocent images of children to make them appear sex-
ually explicit. For example, prosecutors convicted a defendant on child 
pornography charges based on photographs that he had taken of children 
playing on the beach. Although the prosecutors conceded that the pic-
tures the defendant had originally taken were not improper, they success-
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fully argued that the defendant’s subsequent “cropping” of those photo-
graphs to focus on the children’s genitalia transformed the images into 
illegal child pornography.3 Similarly, prosecutors obtained a child por-
nography conviction of a man based on his creation of morphed computer 
images. That is to say, the man digitally superimposed the faces of minor 
females from nonpornographic photographs onto images of adult females 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.4 Unlike sexting prosecutions, these 
cases involving alterations of innocent images have not received signifi-
cant media attention, nor have these prosecutions been the subject of 
much criticism.5
There is an important similarity between these image alteration cases 
and the sexting cases: namely, that no children were harmed in the cre-
ation of the images. The idea that child pornography could be defined to 
include images that were created without harming children should give us 
pause. That is because the harm suffered by children in the creation of 
child pornography is one of the major reasons that judges and other pub-
lic officials have offered to justify the exemption of child pornography 
from ordinary First Amendment protections. That harm is also what has 
driven up the punishments associated with child pornography crimes. 
When the state prosecutes and punishes people based on images that were 
created without harming children and instead based only on the content 
of the image, then child pornography law ceases to be a source of protec-
tion for children. Instead the law becomes a method of policing the ac-
ceptability of individuals’ sexual fantasies.
This chapter makes the case for limiting the definition of child 
pornography— and by extension the child pornography exception to the 
First Amendment— to those images created through the sexual abuse or 
exploitation of a child. In making that case, the chapter considers and rejects 
another definition found in cases and academic literature: a definition cre-
ated to minimize the harm caused to children by the circulation of images.
The chapter begins by noting that the Supreme Court created the child 
pornography exception to the First Amendment in order to protect chil-
dren against two harms: the harm of creation and the harm of circulation. 
It then explains why limiting the definition of child pornography to im-
ages created through the sexual abuse or exploitation of a child is the best 
way to prevent unique harms to children without intruding on the First 
Amendment. The chapter concludes by briefly outlining how this more 
limited definition would restrict child pornography prosecutions in a 
number of different situations.
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Child Pornography’s Harm to Children,  
As Viewed by the supreme Court
Ordinarily, the First Amendment protects sexually explicit speech and 
images. But there are some exceptions. The amendment does not protect 
images that are “obscene,”6 although it does protect the private possession 
of obscene pornographic images.7 Beginning with its 1982 decision in New 
York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court recognized a new categorical exception 
to the First Amendment: child pornography. Since that time, the Court 
has decided a series of cases developing and refining that exception.
Although the Court has not provided a clear definition of child por-
nography, the Court has consistently invoked two concerns in these cases: 
(1) the state’s interest in preventing harm to children inflicted during the 
creation of the images, and (2) the state’s interest in preventing harm to 
children caused by the circulation of the images. According to the Court, 
the first of these interests is sufficient to prohibit creating, distributing, 
and possessing child pornography. But the Court has yet to decide whether 
the harm of circulation, standing alone, is enough to justify the exception 
for child pornography.
New York v. Ferber
Much of the Court’s guidance regarding the limits of child pornography 
can be drawn from the case that first recognized the First Amendment 
exception for child pornography, New York v. Ferber.8 Paul Ferber, a book-
store owner, had been convicted under a New York statute that prohibited 
the knowing promotion of a sexual performance by a child under the age 
of sixteen.9 Ferber was convicted for selling two films “depicting two 
young boys masturbating.”10 Ferber argued that the film was protected by 
the First Amendment because a jury had found that the films were not 
obscene. The Court rejected the argument, concluding that child pornog-
raphy falls outside the First Amendment regardless whether it is obscene.
The Court identified the two major harms to children caused by child 
pornography: the harm of creation and the harm of circulation. The first 
harm is the physical and psychological harm that a child experiences in the 
process of creating child pornography. In discussing this harm of creation, 
the Ferber Court stressed that creating child pornography involved “exploi-
tation”11 and often involved “sexual molestation” of children by adults.12
The importance of protecting children from the sexual exploitation 
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and abuse of creation can be seen throughout the opinion. For example, 
the Court framed the harms of child pornography in terms of an “intrinsic 
relationship” between the distribution of child pornography and child sex 
exploitation and abuse. This relationship led the Court to conclude that 
the only effective way to end the harm of creation was to shut down the 
distribution network of child pornography.13
The harm of creation also led the Court to reject the argument that the 
child pornography exception should be limited to images that are obscene. 
The Court observed that whether an image is obscene does not necessarily 
indicate “whether a child has been physically or psychologically harmed 
in the production of the work,” whether an image “required the sexual 
exploitation of a child for its production.”14
The second harm identified in Ferber is the harm children suffer by 
the circulation of pornographic images. The Court noted that “the mate-
rials produced are a permanent record of the children’s participation [in 
sexual activity] and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circula-
tion.”15 The Court suggested this interest was as important as, if not more 
important, than the interest in preventing sexual abuse and exploitation 
during creation.16
osborne v. ohio
The Supreme Court’s next child pornography case, Osborne v. Ohio, also 
highlighted both the harm of creation and the harm of circulation.17 Os-
borne had been convicted under a state statute that prohibited the private 
possession of child pornography.18 Osborne argued that the statute was 
unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Stanley v. Georgia.19 Stanley had struck down a state law outlawing the 
private possession of obscene material— that is, pornography that did not 
depict children.
The Supreme Court rejected Osborne’s argument. As in Ferber, the 
Court explained that the process of creating child pornography harmed 
the child. It also explained that prohibiting possession would dry up the 
market, which would result in fewer images being created and thus less 
sexual exploitation and abuse of children.20 In addition to the harm of 
creation, the Court discussed the harm caused by circulation.21 It ex-
plained that prohibiting private possession would “encourage[] possessors 
of these materials to destroy them.”22
In the Court’s view, the interest in preventing these harms to children 
justified different treatment for private possession of child pornography 
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and private possession of obscenity. The Court explained that the state has 
only “weak interests” in prohibiting the private possession of ordinary ob-
scenity, but that the interests of the State in prohibiting child pornography 
are much stronger.23
The Osborne Court also identified a third harm that was not mentioned 
in Ferber. It stated that prohibiting possession of child pornography could 
help to protect future victims of child sex abuse, not just those children 
depicted in child pornography. The Court based this conclusion on 
sources suggesting that “pedophiles use child pornography to seduce 
other children into sexual activity.”24 This new argument in favor of the 
exemption of child pornography from First Amendment protection was 
significant because it suggested that the compelling interest in protecting 
children is not limited to the abuse and exploitation in the creation of such 
images; it also includes the abuse and exploitation can also arise at a later 
date from the mere existence of such images.
Ashcroft v. Free speech Coalition
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,25 the Supreme Court made clear that 
either the harm of creation or the harm of circulation must exist in order 
to trigger the First Amendment exception. It also indicated that the harm 
of creation— that is, the sexual exploitation and abuse of children to pro-
duce child pornography— plays a principal role in its child pornography 
doctrine. Ashcroft involved a First Amendment challenge to the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, which outlawed virtual child 
pornography— that is, pornographic images created wholly by technolog-
ical means— and any other “visual depiction” that “is, or appears to be, of 
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”26 The Court concluded 
that the statute was unconstitutional, explaining that virtual child pornog-
raphy fell outside the constitutional category of child pornography.
In so holding, the Ashcroft Court explicitly rejected the new harm 
identified in Osborne— protecting future victims of child sex abuse, not 
just those children victimized by the creation of child pornography— as a 
government interest that outweighed the individual interests at stake.27 
The Ashcroft Court also left no doubt that the harm of creation is the 
touchstone of its child pornography doctrine. It noted that its analysis in 
previous cases about state interests outweighing private interests “was 
based on how [an image] was made, not on what it communicated.”28 
Thus, Ashcroft leaves no doubt that the harm of creation, standing alone, is 
sufficient to overcome the individual interests at stake.
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At the same time, however, Ashcroft did not resolve whether the harm 
of circulation, standing alone, justifies the child pornography exception. 
The harm of circulation arose in the Court’s discussion of computer mor-
phing, which is the process of creating sexually explicit images of children 
by “alter[ing] innocent pictures of real children so that the children appear 
to be engaged in sexual activity.”29 Because the litigants had not challenged 
the portion of the statute prohibiting morphed computer images, the 
Court explicitly declined to address whether such images fell within the 
category of child pornography. The Court did, however, note that morphed 
images “implicate the interests of real children and are in that sense closer 
to the images in Ferber.”30 A child who is the subject of a morphed com-
puter image cannot demonstrate that he or she suffered the harm of sex 
abuse or exploitation in the creation of the image. He or she could, how-
ever, suffer mental or emotional anguish from the knowledge or fear that 
such images have been circulated. By declining to address this section of 
the law, and by noting that those images were “closer” to the images in 
Ferber than were virtual images, the Court left open the possibility that the 
harm of circulation, standing alone, might be sufficient to deprive an im-
age of First Amendment protection.
Ashcroft does not tell us whether child pornography includes any 
sexually explicit depiction of real children, or only those sexually ex-
plicit images created through exploiting or abusing children. To be sure, 
parts of the opinion describe child pornography as any sexually explicit 
images produced using real children.31 But, at other times, the opinion 
describes child pornography as those images created by harming (i.e., 
sexually exploiting or abusing) children in the production of the im-
ages.32 Indeed, the opinion sometimes uses these alternative descrip-
tions in the same sentence.33
Ashcroft did, however, establish that either the harm of creation or the 
harm of circulation is a necessary component of its child pornography 
definition. Where neither harm exists— such as when youthful looking 
adult actors are used or when an image is created by purely technological 
means— then the First Amendment still applies.
Paroline v. United states
The Supreme Court’s most recent child pornography case, Paroline v. 
United States, involved victim restitution.34 The particular question at 
issue in Paroline was how much restitution a child pornography pos-
sessor had to pay a victim of child pornography under a federal restitu-
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tion statute. In deciding that question, the Court observed that a num-
ber of individuals were responsible for the harm to the victim— the 
person who created the images, the people who distributed the images, 
and the people who viewed the images. And because the restitution stat-
ute required child pornography defendants to pay restitution for only 
the amount of damages for which they were responsible, the Supreme 
Court had to analyze what amount of harm is attributable to an indi-
vidual child pornography possessor.
Paroline was one of many individuals who possessed the victim’s im-
age, which made him a relatively minor cause of harm to the victim. The 
Court noted this fact in its analysis, and it also observed that he, as a mere 
possessor of child pornography, caused far less harm that the individuals 
who created and distributed the image.35 In making this observation, the 
Court appears to confirm that the harm of creation is far worse than the 
harm of viewing an image at a later date— that is, the harm of circulation. 
At the same time, however, the Court confirmed that it does not perceive 
the harm of circulation to be negligible. It instructed district courts to use 
their discretion when applying the criteria the Court set forth for calculat-
ing restitution to ensure that possessors are not required to pay only “triv-
ial restitution.”36
Proposing a New Definition of Child Pornography
Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether the harm of circu-
lation, standing alone, justifies the child pornography exception, many 
lower courts have held that the harm of circulation is significant enough 
to warrant exempting sexually explicit images from First Amendment 
protection. These courts have permitted child pornography prosecutions 
to proceed even when an image was created without any harm to children.
I believe that these courts have gone too far. The First Amendment 
ought to protect a visual depiction of a child unless the child suffered sex-
ual abuse or exploitation in the creation of the image. Only when an image 
is created under circumstances that harm a child is the harm significant 
enough to justify exempting an image from First Amendment protection. 
To understand why the harm of circulation, standing alone, should be in-
sufficient, it is first necessary to fully develop a definition of child pornog-
raphy based on the harm at creation. This section articulates such a defini-
tion, making it easier to understand why that harm is much graver than 
the harms associated with circulation, as well as to understand why a 
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definition that includes all sexual images whose circulation could harm a 
child is inappropriate.
Given that I am proposing that we limit child pornography to the pri-
mary harm it inflicts on children, one might ask why it is necessary to limit 
the definition of child pornography at all. I think it is important to limit the 
child pornography definition because child pornography is a categorical 
exception to the First Amendment. As Professor Weinstein tells us in chap-
ter 1, categorical exceptions to the Free Speech Clause were already disfa-
vored when Ferber was decided, and the Supreme Court has refused to 
recognize any new categorical exceptions since.37 If the state were free to 
punish categories of speech whenever it perceived the speech as harmful, 
then we should expect to see a proliferation of criminal laws aimed at 
speech. In light of this, the child pornography exception is, in my opinion, 
best justified on grounds that make child pornography entirely different 
than other categories of speech. Sexual harm to children fits that bill.
My Proposed Definition
I propose that child pornography be defined to include only those images 
that were created through the sexual exploitation or abuse of children. 
Sexual exploitation or abuse contains two distinct components: (1) sexual 
activity and (2) the circumstance that renders that activity exploitative or 
abusive. Child pornography laws define sexual activity to include sexual 
molestation— that is, so- called “contact offenses” where there is physical, 
sexual contact between a minor and an adult. Contact offenses include 
both forcible contact (i.e., sexual assaults) and nonforcible contact to 
which a minor cannot legally consent. Many child pornography laws also 
define the sexual activity to include certain activity where there is no con-
tact between the victim and another person, such as bestiality, masturba-
tion, and at least some depictions of child nudity. As Amy Adler notes in 
chapter 3, the law has struggled in developing a standard that distinguishes 
between those instances of child nudity that constitute sexual activity and 
those that do not.38 I do not take up that challenge here. Instead I adopt 
this common legislative definition of sexual activity for my proposed defi-
nition with the knowledge that it does not satisfactorily distinguish among 
images of child nudity.
The circumstance that renders an activity exploitative or abusive is 
more difficult to define than sexual activity. I propose that abuse and ex-
ploitation include force, coercion, or lack of consent. Some have defined 
the term “exploitation” to include any situation where a child could suffer 
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emotional injury39 or where the audience derives sexual gratification40 
These alternative definitions assess the abusive or exploitative circum-
stances after the fact— that is, after the image has already been created and 
is being viewed. In my definition, the exploitation or abuse must occur at 
the same time the image is created. If the sexual gratification of the viewer 
is our only criteria, then it could include wholly innocent images— such as 
pictures from the Sears catalog— which are apparently considered sexu-
ally titillating by some individuals.41 And if emotional injury were the only 
criteria, then it could include, for example, written descriptions rather 
than visual depictions— which Ferber explicitly rejected.42
What is more, in my definition the exploitation or abuse must exist 
independently of the actual filming or photographing itself. That is to say, 
the mere fact that an image was created is not enough to demonstrate that 
the child in the image was abused or exploited. One must demonstrate 
that the child would have been abused or exploited even if no image had 
been captured— for example, because he or she had been subject to sexual 
contact or because he or she engaged in noncontact sexual activity that 
was not the product of his or her own free will.
It is important to note that my definition of the term “exploitation” is 
narrower than its common usage. Exploitation is a broad term, generally 
defined as “taking advantage of something” or “taking unjust advantage of 
another for one’s own benefit.”43 This broad common understanding of the 
term has doubtlessly led many to define sexual exploitation to include any 
sexual depiction of a child. In adopting a more narrow definition of 
exploitation— the presence of an abusive condition such as force, coer-
cion, or lack of consent— I am attempting to define exploitation in a man-
ner that meaningfully distinguishes between adults and children. It is im-
portant to distinguish between children and adults when defining child 
pornography, because the legal classification of an image has dramatically 
different consequences depending on whether the person depicted is a 
child or an adult.
In sum, my definition of child pornography includes only those images 
created through sexual exploitation or abuse. Sexual exploitation or abuse 
is defined to include (a) sexual contact or noncontact sexual activity, 
which is (b) the result of force, coercion, or lack of consent. Of course, 
because children are legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity, one 
might argue that lack of consent does not place any meaningful limits on 
the term sexual exploitation or abuse. That is not accurate.
The phrase “lack of consent” suggests at least two limitations. First, it 
limits abuse or exploitation to situations involving another participant in 
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addition to the minor depicted. The concept of consent assumes two ac-
tors: the person seeking consent and the person giving consent. Thus, it is 
best to understand a noncontact instance of sexual exploitation or abuse 
as a minor engaging in sexual activity at the prompting of another indi-
vidual (e.g., based on a request or a threat).
Second, framing exploitation as a question of consent excludes a num-
ber of contact and noncontact activities by minors above the age of con-
sent. Although child pornography laws prohibit images of minors below 
the age of eighteen, most American jurisdictions set the age of consent for 
sexual activity below that age.44 Images that depict sexual activity of mi-
nors above the age of consent do not depict exploitation or abuse, as de-
fined in this chapter, unless the image depicts forcible sexual contact or if 
it was the product of coercion. Without physical force or coercion, images 
depicting minors above the age of consent are not the product of exploita-
tion or abuse and thus ought not be deemed child pornography.
Comparing the Harm of Creation to the Harm of Circulation
In addition to the harm of sexual exploitation and abuse in the creation of 
images, the harm most often discussed in the child pornography cases and 
academic literature is the harm of circulation.45 The harm of circulation is 
often characterized as a “continuing harm,” because the images “perma-
nently record the victim’s abuse” and “haunt[] the children in years to 
come.”46 There is ample evidence that this harm can have lasting effects on 
child pornography victims, necessitating years of therapy and negatively 
affecting their ability to work and socialize.47
The harm of circulation is distinct from the harm of creation. The harm 
of creation is the harm suffered by the child depicted at the time the image 
is created. The child suffers that harm because she is exploited or abused, 
and she suffers that harm independently from the creation of the image. Put 
differently, a child who is sexually assaulted or a child who is seduced into 
removing her clothes and posing in a sexually explicit manner is harmed 
regardless whether the moment is captured by a photograph.
In contrast, the harm of circulation is the reputational and privacy 
harm suffered by the child when the image is viewed at a later time. As the 
Ferber Court tells us, the distribution of child pornography “violates ‘the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’”48 The fact 
that a child was sexually assaulted is a highly private matter. What a child 
looks like without her clothes is also highly personal. A child whose sexual 
exploitation or abuse was captured on film or in a photograph has her 
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privacy violated each time that image is viewed by another individual, 
much as the publication of a defamatory statement causes harm each time 
it is published.
If child pornography were defined to include any sexually explicit im-
age that causes harm through circulation, that definition would presume 
not only that the harm inflicted on a child at the time of creation is exac-
erbated by the existence of the image, but also that a child suffers signifi-
cant harm even if the child suffered no abuse or exploitation in the cre-
ation of the image. For example, a minor who creates a sexually suggestive 
image of herself, without any prompting or suggestion by a third party, 
could nonetheless suffer harm if that image were subsequently distributed 
to others.49 The important question is whether the harms associated with 
circulation are unique and severe enough that the image should not be 
protected by the First Amendment. I do not believe they are. Others dis-
agree with me; they believe that any depiction of sexual activity that in-
volves a real child should be classified as child pornography, even if the 
image was created without exploitation or abuse.50
A definition that limits child pornography to images created through 
sexual exploitation or abuse is sensible because it limits child pornography 
according to the principal harm of such images. Although circulating a sex-
ually explicit image of a child that was created without exploitation or abuse 
can result in harm to that child, the harm of circulation is both lesser than 
and derivative of the harm of the sexual exploitation and abuse in creating 
child pornography images. Therefore, the harm of circulation, standing 
alone, should be insufficient to classify an image as child pornography.
The relative severity of the harm of creation and the harm of circula-
tion is apparent from a simple thought experiment: Given the choice be-
tween suffering a sexual assault or having a convincing but fraudulent 
pornographic image of oneself being assaulted circulated (i.e., an image 
created through digital manipulation), it is inconceivable that a person 
would chose the sexual assault. The reputational and psychological harm 
caused by the circulation of the image is significantly less than the physical 
and psychological harm caused by a sexual assault.
Of course, not all child pornography is the product of sexual assault. A 
person who, for example, convinces a child to remove her clothing and pose 
for photographs has not sexually assaulted the child. That individual has, 
however, sexually abused the child.51 It is more difficult to construct a 
thought experiment for an adult involving a fraudulent pornographic image 
and an image created through noncontact sexual abuse. That is because it is 
more difficult to imagine a situation where a sexually explicit image of an 
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adult has been created without an assault— that is, without force or threat of 
force— but under circumstances that are considered abusive. To return to 
the previous example, if one adult convinced another adult to remove her 
clothing and pose for photographs, we would generally conclude that the 
resulting pictures were the result of a consensual encounter rather than an 
abusive situation. And although the subsequent nonconsensual distribution 
of those images would likely result in many of the harms associated with 
circulation of child pornography images, the subsequent distribution would 
not render the creation of those images abusive.
Perhaps if the individual who took the photograph took advantage of a 
position of power— such as a supervisor who requests that a subordinate 
employee remove her clothes and who makes an explicit or implicit threat 
that the adult will lose her job if she does not comply— then we might say 
that those photographs were the product of an abusive situation. The re-
sult of the modified thought experiment is not nearly as certain: While I 
do not doubt that most everyone would choose to have a convincing but 
fraudulent pornographic image of oneself circulated rather than suffering 
a sexual assault, some might elect to remove their clothing under abusive 
circumstances rather than have the fraudulent photograph circulated.
But even if some of us might prefer the momentary humiliation of be-
ing coerced to remove our clothing for a supervisor over the ongoing em-
barrassment of the dissemination of a fraudulent image, that personal 
preference is not supported by substantive law. American criminal justice 
systems routinely punish sex offenses generally (and the sexual abuse of 
children specifically) far more severely than crimes that protect against 
privacy and reputational harm.52 Indeed, even those who have recently 
advocated the criminalization of so- called revenge porn— sexually ex-
plicit images of adults that have been distributed without consent53— have 
sought criminal penalties that pale in comparison to the penalties im-
posed for child sex abuse.54 There are a number of reasons that law assigns 
different penalties for different crimes, but one of the main reasons is dif-
ferences in the seriousness of the crime. Thus, the relatively lenient penal-
ties associated with crimes that protect against privacy and reputational 
harm are a reflection of the fact that they cause relatively less harm and 
that child sex abuse causes more harm to its victims.
The harm of circulation is not only less severe than the harm of cre-
ation, it is also derivative. This is illustrated by the fact that the harm- of- 
circulation argument is ordinarily framed as a concern that images re-
mind victims of the abuse they suffered,55 not the possibility that a person 
might be mistakenly identified as a child abuse victim.
Indeed, most of the arguments about the harmfulness of child pornog-
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raphy consist essentially of second- order arguments about the harm of 
child sex abuse. Those arguments include the idea that punishment is nec-
essary either to stop the production of the pornographic materials56 or it 
is necessary to prevent the consumers of child pornography (who are as-
sumed to be sexually attracted to children) from sexually assaulting chil-
dren later in time.57 These discussions of the prohibition of circulation in 
terms of preventing the harms associated with creation confirm that sex-
ual abuse and exploitation are the primary concerns of child pornography.
In addition to the fact that the harm of circulation is both less severe 
than and derivative of the harm of creation, the harm of circulation is both 
too broad and too narrow to use as the basis of a definition for child por-
nography. It is too broad because a definition based only on reputational 
harm would not be limited to “visual depictions” of minors engaged in 
sexual activity. If a written account of the sexual abuse of a child identified 
an actual minor— by name or physical description— that account would 
also cause reputational or emotional harm. Reputational and emotional 
harm also occur upon the disclosure of facts surrounding all sexual activ-
ity, not simply those that are abusive or exploitative.58
A definition based on the harm of circulation would also be too nar-
row because many child pornography prosecutions could not be justified 
on the basis of that harm. Children who are depicted but not identifiable— 
for example because their faces are not included in the image— do not 
suffer the reputational or privacy harm associated with circulation. Yet 
there is little doubt that such pictures fall within the core of what has tra-
ditionally been considered child pornography.
Prosecutions for private possession also cannot be justified based on 
the harm of circulation. The harm of circulation supports the prohibition 
of the production and distribution of child pornography because, as with 
defamatory statements, every distribution of a child pornography image 
causes new emotional and reputational harm to the child depicted.59 But 
the harm of circulation is not present in cases involving only private pos-
session. The private possession of child pornography causes no new pri-
vacy or reputational harm to the victim, just as a person repeating a de-
famatory statement in an empty room causes no new reputational harm. 
One could argue, of course, that the private possessor poses a risk of new 
reputational harm because he or should could distribute the image in the 
future. But if the mere risk of harm to children were enough to remove 
First Amendment protection, then significant amounts of speech would 
be in peril. That is why, for example, ordinary First Amendment principles 
protect even those individuals advocating force or violence unless their 
speech “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
70 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
is likely to incite or produce such action.”60 It is also why, in the child por-
nography context, the Supreme Court held that virtual child pornography 
cannot be prohibited even though it might result in certain thoughts or 
impulses in viewers; instead there must be a more direct connection be-
tween those images and the sexual abuse of children.61
Of course, one could respond to the objection that this definition is too 
narrow by noting that a child pornography definition need not be based 
exclusively on the harm in circulation. Child pornography could be de-
fined as an image that causes harm in creation or in circulation. Indeed, 
the Court’s repeated references to both the harm of creation and the harm 
of circulation could be read as endorsing such an alternative definition. 
But that dual definition sweeps too broadly because it extends the defini-
tion of child pornography beyond any salient differences between adults 
and children. First Amendment doctrine treats pornographic images very 
differently depending on whether those images depict adults or children. 
Adults and children do not have significantly different privacy or reputa-
tional concerns; they do, however, have very different concerns in the con-
text of sexual activity.
Imagine, for example, a thirteen- year- old girl and a thirty- year- old 
woman who live in the same house across the street from a peeping Tom. 
The peeping Tom secretly watches the thirteen- year- old and the thirty- 
year- old through binoculars while they shower. Both the thirteen- year- 
old and the thirty- year- old have suffered a privacy invasion, and that harm 
is no different based on their age. Now imagine that instead of simply 
watching the thirteen- year- old and the thirty- year- old while they are in 
the shower, the peeping Tom decides to ask them to take off their clothes 
in front of him and pose for photos. If the thirteen- year- old agrees, she has 
been sexually exploited. If the thirty- year- old agrees, we would not say 
that she has suffered the same harm, even if she later regrets that decision. 
Imagine the same scenario, but without the camera. Again, we would say 
that the thirteen- year- old suffered a more significant harm than the thirty- 
year- old. The distinction here is not the reputational harm; it is the ability 
to consent to sexual activity and the inherent vulnerability of children in 
sexual situations.
the Practical effect of a Limited Definition
One can easily see how sexting cases fall outside the proposed definition. 
Consider the following example: In 2009, a fourteen- year- old New Jersey 
girl posted nude pictures of herself on MySpace.com.62 She did so because 
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she wanted her boyfriend to see them. News accounts indicate that the girl 
posed for and created the photos without prompting by a third party, and 
so the photographs do not appear to have been created under circum-
stances that rendered that activity exploitative or abusive. And even if the 
girl was too young to consent to sexual activity, the concept of consent 
(like any agreement) assumes two actors: the person seeking consent and 
the person giving consent. As explained above, a noncontact instance of 
sexual exploitation or abuse arises only when a minor engages in sexual 
activity because of a threat, request, or encouragement by another indi-
vidual. It was the girl’s own idea to take these photos, thus there was no 
exploitation or abuse.
Teen sexting is not the only category of cases in which prosecutors 
have obtained child pornography convictions for images that are neither 
the product of child sex abuse nor child sex exploitation. Prosecutors have 
also successfully prosecuted individuals based on images that are the re-
sult of computer morphing,63 images that depict an adolescent above the 
age of consent,64 and images that were created through surreptitious film-
ing.65 In none of these categories of cases would my proposed definition 
permit prosecution of those individuals for child pornography crimes.
When innocent images— i.e., images no one would claim are child por-
nography, such as images of a fully clothed child riding a bicycle— are al-
tered to make it appear as though children are naked or engaged in a sex 
act, no child is sexually exploited or abused. Thus those images would fall 
outside the proposed definition.66
The limited definition would also prevent prosecutions in cases involv-
ing images that depict a minor above the age of consent. Although federal 
law (and many state laws) set the age of consent for sexual activity below 
eighteen, most child pornography laws, including the federal laws, crimi-
nalize sexually explicit images of an individual under the age of eighteen. 
If the adolescent depicted in an image is above the age of consent, and if 
there is no indication that the sexual activity in which he or she engaged 
was the product of force or coercion, then the minor did not suffer abuse 
or exploitation. Criminalizing pornographic images of adolescents who 
are above the age of consent but below the age of eighteen does not further 
the state’s interest in preventing exploitation and abuse. It only furthers 
the lesser and derivative interest in protecting those adolescents from the 
reputational harms associated with circulation.
Finally, the limited definition would also prevent prosecutions in cases 
involving images that are the result of surreptitious filming or photo-
graphing. Under the proposed definition, the manner in which an image 
is produced is essential in assessing whether it is appropriately classified as 
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child pornography.67 A case involving surreptitious photographing or 
filming is a case in which an image depicts a minor engaging in sexual 
activity and that image was created without the minor’s knowledge and 
without the producer’s manipulation of the minor’s activities.
One might argue that these children have been exploited because these 
images were created without the children’s consent. As noted above, lack of 
consent is one feature of sexual exploitation. If a child is photographed or 
filmed without her knowledge, then the image was necessarily created 
without her consent. But under my proposed definition, the lack of consent 
must be related not only to the creation of the image, but also to the activity 
depicted. Sexual exploitation would exist if, for example, an adult requested 
or encouraged a boy to masturbate in front of him and then filmed the boy 
without his knowledge.68 That factual scenario would fall within the pro-
posed definition because the producer would have manipulated the victim 
into engaging in sexual activity— activity to which the boy could not con-
sent. In contrast, where the producer acts as “a sort of ‘peeping Tom’ catch-
ing children at intimate moments and exposing them for the world to 
see,”69 the resulting image is not a record of abuse or exploitation.70
Excluding images from the definition of child pornography does not 
mean that individuals may create those images with impunity. That is be-
cause First Amendment protection is not absolute. There is no doubt, for 
example, that a child who is surreptitiously filmed while showering or 
masturbating has suffered a serious invasion of privacy. In recognition of 
this harm, some jurisdictions criminalize so- called “video voyeurism,” 
which includes surreptitious photographing or filming both children and 
adults.71 Similarly, many jurisdictions recognize the invasion of privacy 
tort, which would allow victims to recover damages when such a surrepti-
tious image is created.72 But an invasion of privacy is a harm that is differ-
ent in kind from sexual abuse or exploitation. And the First Amendment 
analysis surrounding invasions of privacy is different in kind than the 
analysis involving child pornography.73 Thus it is more appropriate to ad-
dress cases of surreptitious filming or photographing of children using 
laws designed for that harm rather than child pornography laws.
Concluding thoughts
Providing meaningful limits on child pornography is important not only 
because of the occasional prosecutorial abuse that makes headlines— such 
as teen sexting cases— but also because child pornography laws are in-
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tended to combat child sex abuse.74 Judges repeatedly state that they are 
putting child pornography offenders in prison to protect children,75 and 
law enforcement tout their child pornography arrests and convictions as 
success in their efforts to prevent child sex abuse.76 Looking at the Su-
preme Court’s child pornography cases, there is little doubt that the First 
Amendment leeway legislators and law enforcement have enjoyed with 
respect to child pornography is founded on the compelling interest of pro-
tecting children from child sex abuse and exploitation.
In bringing child pornography charges based on images that were cre-
ated without sexual abuse or exploitation, prosecutors have shifted child 
pornography laws away from protecting children from this unique harm. 
Prosecuting individuals for images that are created without abusing or ex-
ploiting a child transforms child pornography law into a system for en-
forcing popular morality— specifically, popular disgust at the sexualiza-
tion of children77— rather than a system for protecting children.
Limiting the definition of child pornography to those images created 
through the sexual abuse or exploitation of a child ensures that child por-
nography laws are directed at the unique harms to children caused by ex-
ploitation and abuse. A definition based on the harm of circulation does 
not focus on the unique harm to children; the privacy and reputational 
harms caused by circulation are no different for adults than for children. 
Reputational and privacy concerns not only fail to distinguish between 
children and adults, but they also fail to distinguish child pornography 
from several other categories of speech.
Limiting the definition of child pornography to those images created 
through the sexual exploitation or abuse of children ensures that law en-
forcement resources are directed only at those images that are the product 
of unique harms to children caused by sexual exploitation and abuse. And 
it also ensures that the severe penalties associated with child pornography 
are imposed only on those offenders whose conduct contributed to the 
sexual exploitation or abuse of children, whether as creators, distributors, 
or downstream consumers.
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3 | The “Dost Test” in Child Pornography Law
“Trial by Rorschach Test”1
Amy Adler
This chapter considers a pivotal but deeply problematic aspect of the defi-
nition of “child pornography”: the six factor “Dost test.”2 Although never 
considered by the Supreme Court, the Dost test, developed by a California 
district court, has become a key feature of child pornography law, adopted 
by virtually all state and lower federal courts as part of the definition of 
child pornography. Despite the near universal adherence to Dost, how-
ever, I argue that deep and unrecognized problems plague the test. 
Through a close reading of decisions applying the Dost factors, I show that 
these cases reveal startling uncertainties at the core of the test. Ultimately, 
these uncertainties pose severe and unrecognized First Amendment prob-
lems. In the final analysis, I argue that the Dost test poses not only consti-
tutional problems, but also cultural ones. By requiring the viewer to evalu-
ate suspected photos using the perspective of a pedophile, the test 
inadvertently replicates the very sexualized view of children that child 
pornography law seeks to fight.
Section I of this chapter sets forth an overview of child pornography 
law from the First Amendment perspective. Here I discuss the rationale 
for excluding child pornography from free speech protection: the harm 
caused to children in the production of the material. I also sketch the Su-
preme Court’s definition of the constitutional bounds of the category and 
summarize the recent case law. Section II introduces the Dost test and 
explores both that test’s remarkable predominance as well as the myriad 
disagreements it has generated in the lower courts. Dost governs a grow-
ing realm of proscribed child pornography: images that do not show chil-
dren engaging in any sort of sexual conduct, but instead depict children in 
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a way that may be perceived as “lascivious” by the viewer. My focus will be 
on two major controversies surrounding the test: (1) its fundamental un-
predictability and (2) the debate over whether child pornography in this 
realm should be judged from the viewpoint of the average person or the 
pedophilic voyeur. As I will show, the current state of the law is surpris-
ingly contested and complex. Section III evaluates the damage done by 
Dost. Here I show that Dost poses not only a significant threat of vague-
ness and overbreadth, but also a more fundamental First Amendment 
problem: In my view, many cases decided under Dost may be unconstitu-
tional in light of Supreme Court precedent. Finally, I turn to the cultural 
risk of Dost: the test, designed to protect children from sexual abuse, may 
unwittingly further the sexualization of children that it fights.
I. Child Pornography Law and the First Amendment:  
An overview
In 1982, a unanimous Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber3 decided that 
“child pornography” was a new category of speech without constitutional 
protection.4 Since Ferber, child pornography law has emerged as a complex, 
rapidly growing, and deeply anomalous area of First Amendment jurispru-
dence. The Ferber Court had encountered a novel First Amendment prob-
lem: whether nonobscene5 sexual depictions of children— speech not falling 
into any previously defined First Amendment exception— could be consti-
tutionally restricted. The Court’s answer was yes. “Child pornography”— 
which has come to be defined as “visual depictions” of “sexual conduct in-
volving a minor”6— thus joined a small and motley band of categories of 
expression that are excluded from constitutional protection by reason of 
their content. The Court has not created a new category since.7
Below I give an overview of the Court’s rationale for banning child 
pornography from First Amendment protection and a brief introduction 
to the constitutional definition of child pornography. This sets the stage 
for section II, in which I explore the case law to illustrate the disconnect 
between the rationale for constitutional exclusion and the rapidly expand-
ing definition of “child pornography.” As I will show, this disconnect has 
grown considerably since the Court created child pornography law as a 
body of First Amendment law more than thirty years ago. Ultimately, this 
growing criminalization of material unconnected to the constitutional ra-
tionale for prohibiting child pornography means that a significant swath 
of recent cases may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
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A. Rationale for Categorical Exclusion: Production Harm
Although the Supreme Court in Ferber announced five reasons that sup-
ported the exclusion of child pornography from First Amendment protec-
tion,8 the fundamental focus of these rationales was this: child pornography 
must be prohibited because of the grievous harm done to children in the 
production of the material.9 They key to the Court’s reasoning was that the 
production of child pornography requires an act of child sexual abuse.10
Focusing on the trauma of child sexual abuse, the Ferber Court thus 
framed the issue as whether “a child has been physically or psychologically 
harmed in the production of the” material.11 The Court wrote that the 
purpose of child pornography law was “to prevent the abuse of children 
who are made to engage in sexual conduct.”12 The opinion repeatedly em-
phasized the unspeakable harm caused to children who are abused in or-
der to produce child pornography.13 And once the abuse had occurred in 
the production of the images, the circulation of the resulting pictures 
compounded the harm by “haunting” the victims, forcing them to relive 
their molestation.14 The Court concluded that because it was so difficult to 
prosecute the “low- profile, clandestine industry” of pornography produc-
tion, the “most expeditious if not the only practical method of law en-
forcement” was to punish the speech that resulted from the underlying 
crime.15 In short, the Court banned child pornography images because 
they were “intrinsically related” to the criminal child sexual abuse that was 
required to produce them.16
This urgent rationale behind child pornography law— to protect real 
children from abuse— explains why the Court’s jurisprudence in this area 
departs so dramatically from obscenity law: obscenity law is premised on 
the worthlessness of certain expression,17 whereas child pornography law 
excludes speech because of the horrible crime from which it stems. Thus, 
unlike obscenity law, child pornography law makes no exception for works 
of “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.”18 As the Court 
explained, even if a work possesses serious value, that “bears no connec-
tion to whether or not a child has been harmed in the production of the 
work.”19 Unlike obscenity law, child pornography law does not require us 
to evaluate works as a whole. And unlike obscenity law, child pornography 
law allows for the prosecution of mere possession, as opposed to distribu-
tion or production, of a suspect picture.20 (Possession prosecutions have 
escalated dramatically since the early days of child pornography law be-
cause digital technology, unavailable then, has made it all too easy for per-
petrators to download huge troves of images.)21 As the Court explained, 
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the underlying crime of child sexual abuse entitles the states to “greater 
leeway in the regulation” of child pornography than of obscenity.22 This 
compelling rationale justifies the departure from traditional First Amend-
ment strictures that child pornography law permits.
The Supreme Court’s 2002 opinion in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coali-
tion23 underscored that production harm is the key to understanding child 
pornography law. Ashcroft struck down as overbroad the “virtual child 
pornography” provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 
1996 (“CPPA”).24 These provisions treated virtual child pornography— 
computer- generated materials produced without using any actual chil-
dren— as if it were “real” child pornography. In holding these provisions 
unconstitutional, the Court found that these virtual child pornography 
images should not be legally proscribed under the category of “child 
pornography”— even though they were potentially indistinguishable in 
appearance— because virtual images lacked the distinguishing feature of 
child pornography: the abuse of children in the production of the mate-
rial. Virtual child pornography can still be prosecuted as obscenity, as can 
textual pornography describing child abuse.25 But these materials may not 
be prosecuted as child pornography and thus are exempt from the par-
ticularly harsh legal rules that have grown up around that doctrine.
The concept of production harm was pivotal to the Ashcroft Court’s 
reasoning. The Court emphasized that Congress’ prohibition on virtual 
child pornography was unconstitutional because it “does not depend at all 
on how the image is produced.”26 At another point the Court wrote that the 
law was overbroad because it targeted images that “do not involve, let 
alone harm, any children in the production process.”27 The Court explained 
that Congress’ rationales for banning the material were constitutionally 
invalid because under those rationales, “harm flows from the content of 
the images, not from the means of their production.”28 As the Court con-
cluded, “Ferber’s judgment about child pornography was based upon how 
it was made, not on what it communicated.”29 The case reaffirmed that 
“where the speech is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it 
does not fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.”30 In short, 
the Court made clear that “[t]he production of the work, not its content, 
was the target” of Ferber.31
In removing virtual child pornography from the category of real child 
pornography, the Court still acknowledged that virtual child pornography 
can be dangerous. Not only is virtual child pornography repugnant, but it 
might also be used by pedophiles to groom future victims. Indeed, it 
might “whet the appetites of pedophiles” and thus embolden them to 
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commit crimes against children.32 Nonetheless, the Ashcroft opinion (in 
line with other First Amendment cases) made clear that all of these rea-
sons are insufficient as a matter of constitutional law to criminalize 
speech.33 The Court repeatedly emphasized the distinction— as I had ar-
gued it should34— between criminal acts that occurred as a result of how 
people reacted to or used the material and criminal acts that were essential 
to produce the material in the first place. Only the latter could be the basis 
for criminalizing the material itself.35 As the Court explained, “[t]he pro-
duction of the work, not its content, was the target” of Ferber.36
In spite of the unqualified clarity of the Ashcroft decision, it left unset-
tled a number of pressing issues. Most prominently, Ashcroft did not ad-
dress the legal status of morphed images— those that use digital technol-
ogy to modify existing images to make it appear (falsely) that an identifiable 
child were engaging in sexual conduct. Like the virtual child pornography 
images in Ashcroft, such morphed photos are not the product of actual 
abuse. But unlike fully virtual images, morphed images cause harm to a 
real, identifiable child. Does harm that is caused by how a child is repre-
sented still count as harm for purposes of child pornography law, which 
has always depended on harm in production as its central rationale? The 
question of whether such images should be proscribable under the rubric 
of child pornography law is in my view unsettled.37 Significant dignitary 
harms to our most vulnerable members of society are at stake. But so far, 
and in spite of a few court decisions to the contrary, I believe it is an open 
constitutional question whether child pornography law or some other 
body of law is the appropriate legal framework to address these concerns.
There are further open questions about the constitutional limits of 
child pornography law. These questions are multiplying for two reasons: 
one, changes in digital technology allow for new methods of creating im-
ages that, like morphed images, do not require production abuse; and two, 
lower courts have expanded the definition of child pornography since Fer-
ber and Ashcroft in a way that makes the category less and less connected 
to the problem child abuse as the Supreme Court envisioned. I turn to the 
expanded definition below.
B. Defining Child Pornography: An Overview
Federal law defines “child pornography” as “visual depictions” of “sexual 
conduct involving a minor.”38 A minor is anyone under age eighteen.39 The 
emphasis on visual depictions, which includes only photographic or filmic 
images made using real children (as opposed to drawings or textual de-
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scriptions which do not record actual abuse) has remained largely un-
changed since Ferber, where the Court approved New York’s statutory 
definition of the “child pornography.” In line with Ferber, federal law de-
fines “sexually explicit conduct” as “(A) sexual intercourse . . . ; (B) bestial-
ity; (C) masturbation; (D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (E) lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.”40
The creation of this latter category— “lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals”— as part of the class of prohibited “sexually explicit conduct” in-
troduced the most problematic aspect of defining child pornography. De-
termining whether a photo depicts a child being raped, for example, would 
appear to be a relatively straightforward (albeit repugnant) inquiry. But 
what exactly constitutes “lascivious exhibition of the genitals”? How does 
it differ from an innocent photograph of a naked child, such as a family 
photograph of a child in the bathtub? How does it differ from photographs 
used in mass market advertising, a realm that increasingly relies on highly 
sexualized images of teens?
The interpretive problems surrounding this category of “lascivious ex-
hibition of the genitals” are compounded because the Court has made 
clear that nudity is not the dividing line between protected speech and 
child pornography. Indeed, the Ferber Court emphasized that child “nu-
dity, without more is protected expression.”41 Conversely, and surprisingly, 
a picture can be criminalized as “lascivious” even if it contains no nudity. 
Although the Supreme Court has never directly approved this interpreta-
tion, several influential circuit court opinions have held that a picture can 
be a lascivious exhibition of a child’s genitals— and thus child 
pornography— even if the child’s genitals are not discernible and even if 
the child is wearing clothes.42
Further complicating the inquiry is that no identifiable sexual conduct 
is required in order for a photograph to constitute a “lascivious display of 
the genitals” and thus child pornography. This is peculiar, given that las-
civious exhibition is included as one subcategory of the general category 
of “sexually explicit conduct” that the child pornography statute prohibits. 
How can an image with no sexual conduct be deemed “sexually explicit 
conduct”? For reasons we will see, it is common for the government to 
pursue images that “certainly [contain] no sexual activity” as a prosecutor 
conceded in a recent and successful case.43 As the Eighth Circuit recently 
made clear, “even images of children acting innocently can be considered 
lascivious if they are intended to be sexual.”44
Thus an image may be categorized as a criminal lascivious exhibition 
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of the genitals and a type of “sexually explicit conduct” even if it contains 
no display of the genitals and no sexual conduct. As a result, the meaning 
of the term “lascivious” has acquired great constitutional and practical im-
port. For a defendant, the boundaries of this term mark the distinction 
between freedom and jail. Yet other than to assert that lasciviousness and 
nudity are not identical, the Supreme Court has offered no guidance on 
the question of what constitutes a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals” or 
what differentiates such an image from constitutionally protected images 
of children, nude or otherwise. In the absence of any guidance, lower 
courts have been busily filling the gap left open by the Supreme Court. The 
result is a growing and troubling body of case law.
II. the Dost test
The leading case on the meaning of “lascivious exhibition” is United States 
v. Dost, a 1986 California federal district court case that announced a six- 
part test for analyzing images.45 Although courts routinely criticize the 
“Dost test,” it is the reigning— and indeed the only— definition of “lascivi-
ous exhibition” in child pornography law. Virtually all state and federal 
courts follow the Dost test; even those courts that criticize the test apply it 
nonetheless.46 As the Second Circuit recently stated in a case applying 
Dost, the factors may be “imperfect” and “cannot bear the fully analytical 
weight that has at times been placed on them,” but “they have not been 
much improved upon.”47
The Dost test identifies six factors that are relevant to the determina-
tion of whether a picture constitutes a “lascivious exhibition”:
 (1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child’s 
genitalia or pubic area;
 (2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, 
i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with sexual activity;
 (3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose or in inappro-
priate attire, considering the age of the child;
 (4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude;
 (5) whether the visual depiction suggests coyness or willingness to 
engage in sexual activity;
 (6)  whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a 
sexual response in the viewer.48
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The test does not require that all factors be met to find that a depiction is 
a lascivious exhibition, nor are the factors meant to be exhaustive.49
When I first wrote about the Dost test more than a decade ago, I argued 
that it had produced a profoundly incoherent and troubling body of case 
law.50 In the years since, the case law has grown considerably and the prob-
lems have multiplied. I analyze some of the most salient problems below.
A. The Test’s Fundamental Malleability
Although the Dost test is nearly universally accepted, there are “myriad 
disputes” swirling around it.51 Perhaps the most fundamental problem is 
that the Dost test is extraordinarily malleable. One judge, dissenting in a 
recent case, compared the defendant’s conviction under the Dost factors as 
“trial by Rorschach test.”52 One could consider this malleability of Dost 
either a feature or a bug of the test. Viewed as a feature, one could praise 
the test for its adaptability to a wide range of fact patterns and individual 
photographs. Viewed as a bug, one could questions the test for its unpre-
dictability and its manipulability, problems of special concern for defen-
dants accused of the heinous crime of child sexual abuse, who are likely to 
be regarded with disgust and outrage by juries.
The malleable quality of the Dost test stems from several sources. First, 
it is unclear how many Dost factors must be met for a photograph to be 
seen as lascivious. No court demands that all six factors be present. But is 
there a minimum number of factors that must be met in order to desig-
nate an image “child pornography”? There is no agreement on this ques-
tion. The Tenth Circuit suggested that if a jury found merely one of the six 
factors satisfied, it would suffice to criminalize a photograph as child por-
nography.53 The Third Circuit, noting the general rule that all six factors 
need not be met, held that at least more than one factor was required, 
suggesting a possible minimum of two.54
Second, the application of each factor can be remarkably subjective.55 
For example, Judge Kozinski, sitting by designation in a district court case, 
dismissed the Dost factors as so “malleable and subjective in their applica-
tion” that the test was simply “not helpful.”56 As an example, Judge Kozin-
ski noted that the prosecutors in that case had argued that photos showing 
girls in an “open shirt and socks, or wearing open robes in a public area 
such as the beach” met the third Dost factor, which asks whether a child is 
wearing “inappropriate attire.” The government argued that “shirts or 
robes are [no] less sexually provocative than garters and high heels; it’s a 
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matter of taste.”57 Under this view, normal children’s clothes such as shirts 
or robes become sexually inappropriate because such attire could appeal 
to the “taste” of a pedophile voyeur.
In my view, each factor of the Dost test has the potential for subjective 
and unpredictable application. Consider, for example, the second factor of 
the test, which probes whether the setting is “sexually suggestive.” In a 
First Circuit case, the government argued, unsuccessfully (and in my view 
quite startlingly) that a beach was a sexually suggestive setting because 
“many honeymoons are planned around beach locations.”58 A newly 
emerging question that has divided courts is whether a bathroom is a sex-
ually suggestive setting. The question arises with surprising frequency be-
cause of an alarming trend revealed by the case law: as the fact patterns of 
recent cases show, offenders frequently hide cameras in bathrooms to cap-
ture images of children or teenagers undressing. Such intrusion upon the 
privacy of children is abhorrent and deeply disturbing. But the question 
raised by the cases is this: are images of children engaged in such mun-
dane private conduct as showering and changing or using the toilet to be 
considered lascivious and sexual for purposes of the law? The Tenth Cir-
cuit has held that a bathroom is a sexually suggestive setting under the 
second factor because “showers and bathtubs are frequent hosts to fantasy 
sexual encounters as portrayed on television and film. It is potentially as 
much of a setting for fantasy sexual activity as an adult’s playroom.”59 In 
contrast, an Oklahoma district court found that a bathroom is “not neces-
sarily a sexually suggestive location.”60
Or consider a recent Massachusetts case in which the Court applied 
the third Dost factor to a photo of a girl on the beach.61 The government 
argued that the girl was in a “sexually suggestive” pose under the third 
Dost factor because the position of her left hand suggested that she was 
“about to touch herself . . . or masturbate.” The dissent interpreted the girl’s 
hand placement as showing nothing more than a child playing on the 
beach and about to dig into the sand.62 What looked to the government 
like abuse and pornography appeared to the dissent to be a vacation pho-
tograph of a girl happily playing on a seashore.
The highly subjective nature of the factors suggests the need for inter-
pretive guidelines that will allow juries and courts to reliably divide pro-
tected speech from abusive criminal pornography. As I will explore in the 
following section, however, courts are deeply divided about what these 
interpretive guidelines should be. These divisions highlight and exacer-
bate the deep uncertainties that plague the Dost test.
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B. The Pedophile’s Perspective and The Dost Factors
Courts disagree about several key interpretive issues surrounding the Dost 
test. In this section, I address two of the most prominent subjects of dis-
agreement. First, courts have disagreed about whether lasciviousness 
should be evaluated by an objective standard, or whether we should imag-
ine a pedophile voyeur’s subjective desires in determining whether a pic-
ture of a child qualifies as lascivious. Second, courts are divided about 
whether determinations about a picture’s lasciviousness should be based 
on the four corners of the picture, or on extraneous evidence about how 
the picture was used.
1. Is the Test Objective or Subjective?
In deciding if a picture contains a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals,” a 
threshold question presents itself: does “lascivious” describe the child de-
picted, the photographer, or the viewer? In the Knox case, Solicitor General 
Drew Days had argued that the term “lascivious” must mean that the child 
depicted is “lasciviously engaging in sexual conduct (as distinguished from 
lasciviousness on the part of the photographer or consumer).”63 Otherwise, 
Days reasoned, there is no child “sexual conduct,” which is what child por-
nography law combats. The Court in Ferber had been clear: “the nature of 
the harm to be combated requires that the . . . offense be limited to works 
that visually depict sexual conduct by children.”64
But courts have routinely rejected that argument, insisting that because 
children are innocent victims, they obviously cannot behave in a lascivious 
manner. Rather, as the Ninth Circuit explained in the case affirming Dost, 
“lasciviousness is not a characteristic of the child photographed but of the 
exhibition” set up for the photographer and pedophilic viewers.65
Because the sexual content of a photograph cannot be found in the ac-
tions of the child pictured, it must be apparent in some other way to the 
viewer. But the contentious and crucial question is: which viewer? A “nor-
mal” viewer would not find any photograph of a child sexually appealing, 
while a pedophile viewer could have a lascivious reaction to even the most 
banal and innocent photographs of children.
Therefore the question of which viewer, the “normal or the pedophile” 
becomes determinative of a depiction’s criminality. As I have argued else-
where, it is relevant to the application of each and every Dost factor.66 But 
the major debate about this issue has emerged in courts’ analyses of the 
sixth factor of the test, which asks “whether the photograph is intended or 
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designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.” Courts have split on this 
fundamental question: Whose perspective matters here, the normal 
viewer or the pedophile viewer? Is the Dost test objective or subjective? It 
is because of this uncertainty that courts routinely term the sixth factor 
“the most confusing and contentious” of the Dost factors.
a. Subjective
Dost itself had suggested a rule that many but not all courts follow: the 
proper inquiry into whether a photograph is “intended . . . to elicit a sexual 
response in the viewer” should be into the subjective response of a pedo-
phile viewer rather than the average viewer.67 The Ninth, Sixth, and Sec-
ond Circuits, for example, have explicitly endorsed this view.68 As the 
Ninth Circuit explained, we must evaluate the lasciviousness of the pho-
tographer and an “audience that consists of himself or like- minded pedo-
philes.”69 We must focus on the photographer’s “peculiar lust.”70 This focus 
on a deviant’s reaction is dramatically different from obscenity law, which, 
for all its complications, at least rests on the viewpoint of the “average 
person” in asking whether the material “appeals to the prurient interest” 
or is “patently offensive.”71
b. Objective
Some courts, however, express wariness about the dangers of the subjec-
tive approach and have argued instead that images must be analyzed ob-
jectively. The Eighth Circuit, although it appears recently to have moved 
toward a subjective standard,72 formerly followed an objective standard, 
which it described as follows: “the relevant factual inquiry  .  .  . is not 
whether the pictures in issue appealed or were intended to appeal to [the 
defendant’s] sexual interests but whether, on their face, they appear to be of 
a sexual character.”73 In defending the objective approach, the First Circuit 
warned that under the subjective approach, “a sexual deviant’s quirks 
could turn a Sears catalog into pornography.”74 Similarly, a district court 
in Hawaii recently cautioned that assessing a photograph from the subjec-
tive perspective of a pedophile viewer “would support a finding of child 
pornography in almost all cases.”75
As Judge Higgenbotham wrote, concurring in a recent case, further 
problems present themselves with the subjective approach depending on 
whether we focus on the photographer’s subjective reaction or on the re-
action of the consumer of the images: “A pedophile may be aroused by 
photos of children at a bus stop wearing winter coats, but these are not 
pornographic. Conversely, a photographer may be guilty of child pornog-
92 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
raphy even though he is not aroused by the photos he produces purely for 
financial gain.”76 And the subjective approach has a more fundamental 
flaw: it departs so completely from the statutory language. As the judge 
wrote, “The statute does not suggest that the definition of pornography is 
contingent upon what arouses the defendant, especially if the defendant is 
aroused by objectively asexual images.”77 As I will show in section III, the 
problem is not merely that the analysis departs from the statutory lan-
guage. It also departs from the constitutional basis of child pornography 
law as articulated by the Supreme Court.
2. Four Corners or Extrinsic Evidence?
There is yet another complication to this analysis that only deepens the 
reliance on the pedophile’s perspective under Dost.78 Courts have once 
again divided on a question of great import under the sixth factor: should 
the “intended effect” of a picture for purposes of the sixth factor be based 
on the four corners of the image, or should we interpret the image in light 
of extrinsic evidence about a defendant’s predilections? This inquiry over-
laps with but is not identical to the subjective/objective inquiry described 
above. Most courts that take a subjective approach do allow such evidence, 
but differ on what should and should not be considered relevant. Con-
versely, most courts that take an objective approach to Dost ignore extrin-
sic evidence. Nonetheless, some courts purport to take an objective ap-
proach yet admit evidence of the defendant’s predilections. In doing so, 
these courts push further toward an interpretation of Dost in which the 
pedophile’s perspective becomes determinative.
The First Circuit has been the most vocal in support of the four corners 
approach. As a court explained, “the focus should be on the objective cri-
teria of the photograph’s design.”79 Another First Circuit decision had 
held, “We must . . . look at the photograph rather than the viewer.”80 Under 
this view, the intended effect of a picture must be evident in the picture 
itself. Evidence about how the defendant used the picture is irrelevant.
More frequently, however, courts allow extrinsic evidence about the 
creator or possessor of an image to assess whether the intended effect of a 
picture should be seen as sexual. In my view, this inquiry threatens to con-
vert what seem to be innocent pictures into child pornography based on 
little more than the identity of a defendant. Consider a recent Eighth Cir-
cuit case from 2012.81 There the defendant had hidden a camera to make 
“secretly filmed” footage of a girl undressing to take a shower. Presumably 
the contents of the video— though obviously not the circumstances of its 
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making— were innocent and quotidian; it depicted nothing more than a 
girl getting ready to shower. What the defendant did to take the picture is 
repugnant. Most video voyeurism statutes would also make such behavior 
criminal.82 But putting aside for a moment his abhorrent and presumably 
criminal invasion of the girl’s dignity and privacy, is it right to call the video 
of her getting undressed sexual “child pornography”? The Eighth Circuit 
acknowledged that the material captured on video did not involve any 
“sexual activity.” But it interpreted the images as sexual because the defen-
dant was discovered to possess an extensive collection of other child por-
nography. In this scenario, a nonsexual image of a girl (taken by repugnant 
means) becomes sexual and contraband by association.83
Some courts have made the inquiry all the more confusing because 
they purport to take an objective approach to the sixth factor, but none-
theless allow extrinsic evidence of the defendant’s intent. For example, in 
a recent Eighth Circuit decision involving a coach who used a hidden 
camera to secretly take images of fifteen- to- seventeen- year- old girls 
weighing themselves on a locker room scale, the court used what it called 
an objective standard but also looked at extrinsic evidence beyond the 
four corners of the image.84 The court explicitly stated that the standard 
given to the jury was an objective one, focusing only on whether the im-
ages “appear to be of a sexual character.”85 Objectively speaking there 
would seem to be nothing inherently sexual about images of girls weigh-
ing themselves on a scale. Yet the images were indeed sexual to the defen-
dant because he said so. When asked why he took the pictures the defen-
dant replied that “[his] pervertedness got the best of [him].” Based on this 
extrinsic evidence, the Court found the images were sexual even under a 
purportedly objective inquiry.86 In doing so, I think the court transformed 
an objective inquiry into a subjective one. This marks another way in 
which the pedophile’s perspective once again becomes determinative of 
whether an image is child pornography.
III. the Damage Done by Dost
In spite of the problems detailed above, there are still many reasons we 
may want to retain the Dost test. First, as the Second Circuit remarked, 
although the test has many shortcomings, no court has found a better al-
ternative; the factors have “not been much improved upon.”87 But in my 
view, the most compelling argument that could be made in favor of retain-
ing Dost is this: Dost is extremely capacious and to limit it (and the cate-
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gory of lascivious exhibition that it delineates) would mean that some 
child abusers would go free and that some abusive, harmful images would 
be free to circulate. In short, it seems fair to argue that if we are going to 
err, there are strong reasons to err on the side of protecting more victims. 
(That said, it is possible that in some cases, other areas of law could achieve 
the same or similar goals: obscenity laws, video voyeurism laws, and pri-
vacy laws might provide alternative to child pornography law.)
In what follows I set forth the countervailing arguments and make the 
case for reconsidering the Dost test. I present three sets of harms caused by 
the test. I leave it for another day to evaluate whether these costs I present 
are sufficient to outweigh the benefits of Dost.
A. First Amendment Harms
1. Vagueness and Overbreadth
First, from my discussion above it should be clear that the Dost test raises 
a number of First Amendment concerns. Most fundamentally, the test is 
unpredictable and vague in its application and presents risks of over-
breadth. In its attempt to ban lascivious pictures of children, it also threat-
ens to send innocent people to jail and to ban valuable speech (such as 
family photographs of children, nude or clothed) that ought to be pro-
tected. The Court has made clear that the consequences of unpredictabil-
ity and vagueness in the First Amendment context are severe because of 
the chilling effect they produce. As I have argued previously, Dost threat-
ens to chill pictures of children that we might value and that deserve First 
Amendment protection.88
2. Dost May Be Unconstitutional Under the  
First Amendment as Interpreted by Ferber and Ashcroft
There is a second and deeper First Amendment problem with Dost: Some 
of the prosecutions currently proceeding under the test may be unconsti-
tutional under the Ferber rationales as underscored by Ashcroft. It is sim-
ply not clear whether the harm done to children in cases of surreptitious 
filming, for example, entails the kind of production harm that Ferber and 
Ashcroft require before an image can be characterized as child pornogra-
phy. Such images may implicate other rationales detailed in Ferber and not 
present in Ashcroft, such as the need to protect a child from being 
“haunted” by traumatic images. (This issue was not implicated in Ashcroft 
because it addressed only the issue of virtual child pornography which by 
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definition does not depict real children). But the kinds of images I am 
discussing here, such as those produced through surreptitious filming, are 
traumatic not at the time they are produced, when a child is simply going 
through the rituals of her daily routine; instead they become traumatic 
once the child learns she has been recorded and viewed in a sexual man-
ner. As I suggested in my discussion of morphing above, it is in my view 
an open constitutional question whether such harm standing alone would 
suffice to deem an image “child pornography” as a constitutional matter.89 
The Court’s jurisprudence is simply unclear on this point and there are 
significant reasons to suspect that the kind of harm caused by these im-
ages is simply too far afield from the abuse- in- production harm that is the 
foundation of child pornography law. As the Court has made clear, child 
pornography law was designed “to prevent the abuse of children who are 
made to engage in sexual conduct.”90 Although the Ashcroft case did not 
involve the interests of actual children and may be distinguishable, it 
nonetheless reaffirmed that “where the speech is [not] the product of sex-
ual abuse” it is protected by the First Amendment.91 If child pornography 
law is inapplicable, as I suspect it may be to the kind of pictures I am con-
sidering, other avenues of law— such as privacy or video voyeurism stat-
utes92 for example— may be possible ways to prohibit these abuses while 
better conforming to the demands of the First Amendment.
Furthermore, to the extent Dost has been interpreted to incorporate 
the pedophile’s perspective in evaluating images, it raises a further First 
Amendment concern: it threatens to turn child pornography law into a 
thought crime. Once our criminalization of speech depends on the pedo-
phile’s imagined response to an image rather than any harm in produc-
tion, we have begun to police thoughts and fantasy, not actions. The harm 
of the pictures no longer turns on what happened to the child. It now oc-
curs in the possibility of seeing a picture in a certain way, in how someone 
might perceive the child. The determination of whether a picture is child 
pornography has grown increasingly bound up in our projections of 
whether these pictures will permit pedophiles to fantasize about them. 
Thus, child pornography law has begun to police speech based on how 
people may respond to it. This is in direct contravention of traditional 
First Amendment tenets.93
B. Practical Concerns: Dilution of the  
Category of Child Pornography
The expansive reading of Dost detailed above may cause another harm. 
Including images of normal child activity within the category of child por-
96 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
nography because of the pedophile’s perspective may dilute the category 
itself. Such dilution is worrisome because it could detract from the true 
horror that the category was designed to police, a horror that has only 
escalated in recent years. The prevalence of child pornography has in-
creased dramatically because of digital and technological advances, which 
have made it far easier than it once was for offenders to produce and dis-
tribute child pornography and to evade detection as they do so. As a re-
sult, child pornography images, according to the government, have be-
come not only more prevalent but also much more disturbingly hard core. 
For example, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales spoke in 2006 in dra-
matic and graphic terms about the growing threat: “I have seen pictures of 
older men forcing naked young girls to have anal sex. There are videos on 
the Internet of very young daughters forced to have intercourse and oral 
sex with their fathers. . . . There are images of graphic sexual and physical 
abuse of innocent children, even babies.”94
This is a horrifying development. Does it make sense to lump photo-
graphs of teenagers taking showers into the same category as pictures of 
children being raped? This admixture might threaten to dilute the cate-
gory of child pornography and in doing so to detract from and even po-
tentially trivialize the terrible horror it protects against. Such dilution may 
also divert prosecutorial resources away from pursuing the most extreme 
cases of abuse.
C. The Final Cost of Dost Is Cultural Not Constitutional
As detailed above, Dost’s purview has expanded to cover an increasing 
range of images that do not involve any sexual conduct, images that are 
objectively asexual but become sexual when viewed from the perspective 
of the pedophile. As a result, the pedophilic gaze has become central to 
how many, if not most, courts interpret Dost.95 It is relevant in the test’s 
premise as well as in its application. First, the obligation to see the world 
from the eyes of a pedophile arises from the basic assumption underlying 
Dost. The process begins once we accept that prohibited depictions of 
“sexually explicit conduct” by children can include pictures in which there 
is no overt sexual conduct. The law presumes that pictures harbor secrets, 
that judicial tests must guide us in our seeing, and that we need factors 
and guidelines to see the “truth” of a picture. As a court explained, Dost 
rests on the notion that a photograph contains “subtleties which the jury 
must study.”96 That even a clothed child can be engaging in lascivious ex-
hibition of his genitals only makes the process more urgent and more dif-
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ficult. Once the law acknowledges that pedophiles like many pictures of 
children and that clothed children can be sexy children, then we have to 
redouble our efforts and to doubt our instinctive ways of seeing.
The mechanisms of applying the Dost test usher us step by step into a 
pedophilic world. As discussed above, many courts follow the suggestion 
of the Dost court and interpret the sixth factor of the test subjectively, 
through the lens of a pedophile voyeur. But it is not only this factor of the 
Dost test that requires us to take on the perspective of the pedophile. The 
application of each Dost factor demands a heightened awareness of the 
erotic appeal of children. We must search out whether the child’s genitals 
are the focal point of the picture, whether the pubic area is prominent, if 
the child is in a setting normally associated with sex, if the child conveys 
an erotic acquiescence in his gaze, or if there is some suggestion of his 
“coyness or willingness to engage in sexual activity.” If a videotape depicts 
a clothed child dancing in a public park, we must look closer. For example, 
in Knox the court asked whether the children depicted were innocently 
dancing in the park or if they were “gyrating in a fashion indicative of 
adult sexual relations?”97
Consider how Dost itself explained the scrutiny necessary to deter-
mine whether a picture suggests “sexual coyness or a willingness to engage 
in sexual activity.” The court described a photograph of a ten- year- old girl 
sitting naked on the beach:
Her pelvic area appears to be slightly raised or hyperextended and 
her legs are spread apart. Her right leg is fully extended at a slight 
outward angle. Her left leg is bent at the knee and extends almost 
perpendicularly away from the body. Her pubic area is completely 
exposed not obscured by any shadow or body part.98
The court then analyzes whether such a photograph is lascivious— in par-
ticular whether the girl expresses a sexual “willingness.” The court con-
cludes that the girl does seem sexually inviting. Why? Although “nothing 
else” about the child’s attitude conveys this, the court nonetheless con-
cludes that the girl’s “open legs do imply such a willingness [to engage in 
sexual activity].”99
Or consider the argument made to the Supreme Court in Knox by 
amici:
Because lasciviousness should be examined in the context of pedo-
phile voyeurs, this Court should view visual images of young girls 
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in playgrounds, schools and swimming pools as would a pedophile. 
Pedophiles associate these settings with children, who to pedo-
philes are highly sexualized objects. It therefore follows as a matter 
of course that viewing videocassettes of young girls in these settings 
permits the pedophiles to fantasize about sexual encounters with 
them.
This argument exhorts the Court to see children as “highly sexualized 
objects.” The Third Circuit seems to have accepted this argument when the 
Knox case was remanded to it from the Supreme Court. In examining the 
videotapes of clothed girls, the court found significant that “[n]early all of 
these scenes were shot in an outdoor playground or park setting where 
children are normally found.”100 This aspect of the videotapes— that they 
were filmed in a setting where “children are normally found”— became 
one of the details that the court specifically, though not exclusively, relied 
on in concluding that the material in question qualified under Dost as 
child pornography that “would appeal to the lascivious interest of an audi-
ence of pedophiles.”101 According to this logic, a place “where children are 
normally found” is now suspiciously erotic.
But what does it do to children to protect them by looking at them as 
a pedophile would, to linger over depictions of their genitals? And what 
does it do to us as adults to ask these questions when we look at pictures 
of children? As we expand our gaze and bend it to the will of the Dost 
test, do we run the risk of transforming the way we see children? It is my 
view that the expanded reach of the test has unwittingly contributed to a 
world in which we increasingly look at normal images of children 
through a sexual lens. As everything becomes potential child pornogra-
phy in the eyes of Dost— clothed children, coy children, children in set-
tings where children are found— perhaps everything really does become 
pornographic.
Congress passed the 1996 Child Pornography Prevention Act in part 
because it feared that child pornography was changing our view of chil-
dren. Congress found, “The sexualization and eroticization of minors 
through any form of child pornographic images has a deleterious effect 
on all children by encouraging a societal perception of children as sex-
ual objects . . .”102 Although it is an unconstitutional basis on which to 
ban speech, the fundamental insight of Congress was fair: one harm 
done by child pornography is that it changes the way we perceive chil-
dren. What Congress failed to see is that child pornography law itself 
has also done that. Even more directly than child pornography, child 
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pornography law, as it has expanded under Dost, explicitly requires us to 
take on a “perception of children as sexual objects,” to see, for a moment, 
as a pedophile does.
Conclusion
As prosecutions of child pornography offenders continue to rise, the Dost 
test reigns over an expanded and constitutionally uncertain terrain. The 
test has vexed courts. It raises significant, unresolved, and remarkably un-
theorized First Amendment questions. Scholars have paid it no attention.
So far the Supreme Court has not considered Dost. In the absence of 
guidance from the Court, lower courts have been busily expanding the 
test, and they have done so in a way that I believe raises serious constitu-
tional concerns. Quite simply, lower courts frequently interpret Dost to 
criminalize speech that does not implicate the rationales that the Supreme 
Court has so far relied on to justify the exclusion of “child pornography” 
from First Amendment protection. Dost in its application has thus be-
come divorced from the Court’s foundational assumptions of why we may 
ban child pornography consistent with the First Amendment. Many con-
victions obtained under the test may therefore be of doubtful constitu-
tional validity, at least to the extent that they proceed under the rubric of 
child pornography law as the Supreme Court has so far envisioned it.
Ultimately, I have suggested that Dost poses not only constitutional but 
cultural problems. Courts increasingly interpret the test in a way that in-
vites us to view objectively nonsexual pictures of children through the 
gaze of the pedophile, transforming these images into “child pornogra-
phy.” As such, the Dost test, meant to protect children from sexual preda-
tion, may unwittingly contribute to the sexualization of children that it 
fights.
Notes
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(1942).
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v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
 2. Child pornography is “intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in 
at least two ways. First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the 
child’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circula-
tion. Second, the distribution network for child pornography must be closed” 
in order to control the production of child pornography. Id. at 759 (citations 
omitted). The Court went on to explain that the production of child pornog-
raphy is a “low- profile clandestine industry” and that the “most expeditious 
if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the 
market for this material” by punishing its use. Id. at 760.
 3. The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic mo-
tive for and are thus an integral part of the production of child pornography. 
Id. at 761 (citations omitted).
 4. The possibility that there would be any material of value that would be pro-
hibited under the category of child pornography is “exceedingly modest, if 
not de minimis.” Id. at 762.
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ment law and is therefore appropriate in this instance. Id. at 763– 64.
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gaged in [the] production” of child pornography. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. Indeed, the 
Court framed the issue as whether “a child has been physically or psychologically 
harmed in the production of the work.” Id. at 765. The first three rationales address this 
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 11. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
 12. Id. at 753.
 13. Id. at 759.
 14. Id.
 15. Id. at 760. In addition to this fundamental rationale, the Court articulated other 
reasons why child pornography could be categorically excluded from First Amendment 
protection. First, the Court noted the state’s “compelling” interest in “safeguarding the 
physical and psychological well- being of a minor.” Id. at 756– 57. Second, the Court 
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Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 (describing “intrinsic[] relation[ship] of child pornography and 
child abuse”). In Ferber, the Court approvingly quoted one scholar who categorized 
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dren: A Model Act, 17 Wake Forest L. Rev. 535, 545 (1981)); see also William A. Stan-
meyer, The Seduction of Society 88 (1984) (“Child pornography is the worst form of 
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of abuse— the sexual use of a child. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10. The recording of the act 
also becomes a collateral violation against the child’s dignity. The circulation of the pic-
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a recording, the pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the original 
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misdeed took place.”) (quoting Shouvlin, supra, at 545). The Court wrote that “the ma-
terials produced are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to 
the child is exacerbated by their circulation.” Id. at 759 (emphasis added). The Court 
went on to explain that the production of child pornography is a “low- profile clandes-
tine industry” and that the “most expeditious if not the only practical method of law 
enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material” by punishing its use. Id. at 
760.
 17. This is the fundamental principle of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the 
Court’s first modern obscenity decision, in which it held that “obscenity” was a category 
of expression that lacked First Amendment protection.
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pornography case in which serious value was raised as a defense, the Court’s dicta in 
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doctrine of “substantial overbreadth.” Id. at 766– 74. Nonetheless, the concurring opin-
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bers of the court at the time of the 9- 0 decision. For example, Justice O’Connor wrote to 
emphasize that artistic value was irrelevant to the harm of child abuse that child pornog-
raphy law sought to eradicate. “[A] 12- year- old child photographed while masturbating 
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tional, and mental harm.” Id. at 774– 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice 
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ship to one another: “[T]he Court’s assumption of harm to the child resulting from the 
permanent record and circulation of the child’s participation lacks much of its force 
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concurring) (citations omitted).
 19. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
 20. In Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), the Court extended the reach of child 
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cannot prohibit mere possession of obscene material). Cf. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (“The 
State does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne’s mind. Rather, Ohio 
has enacted [its law prohibiting possession of child pornography] in order to protect the 
victims of child pornography. . . .”).
 21. Chapter 2, Carissa Byrne Hessick, Setting Definitional Limits for the Child Por-
nography Exception; Amy M. Adler, All Porn All the Time, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 695 (2007).
 22. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756.
 23. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
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 24. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq. The Court struck down Section 2256(8)(B), which prohib-
ited “any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer 
or computer- generated image or picture” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct.” It also struck down Section 2256(8)(D), which defined 
child pornography to include any sexually explicit image that was “advertised, pro-
moted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impres-
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 25. See The “Protect Act” (Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Ex-
ploitation of Children Today Act of 2003), Pub. L. No. 108– 21, § 504, 117 Stat. 650, 678 
(2003) (regarding “Obscene Child Pornography”); see also Theresa “Darklady” Reed, 
Child Torture Sex Stories Earn PA Woman Federal Obscenity Charges, YNOT (Sept. 27, 
2006, 3:09 PM), http://www.ynot.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=
news_article&sid=16172&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 (describing prosecution of 
purely textual website involving stories of child sexual abuse); United States v. Whorley, 
550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that cartoons depicting minors in sexually explicit 
conduct could be obscene).
 26. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241 (emphasis added).
 27. Id. (emphasis added).
 28. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
 29. Id. at 250– 51 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 
289 (2008) (“[T]he child- protection rationale for speech restriction does not apply to 
materials produced without children.”).
 30. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added).
 31. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
 32. Id. at 253.
 33. Id.; see also Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) 
(striking down California law regulating “patently offensive” video games).
 34. Amy M. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921, 990– 91 
(2001).
 35. Thus the Court specifically rejected the government’s argument that virtual child 
pornography should be banned because it “whets the appetites of pedophiles.” Ashcroft, 
535 U.S. at 253. The Court wrote that the “mere tendency of speech to encourage unlaw-
ful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it. . . . the Government may not prohibit 
speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal conduct.” Id. 
Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the material could be banned be-
cause it can be used to seduce children. Here the Court wrote, “The evil in question de-
pends upon the actor’s unlawful conduct, conduct defined as criminal quite apart from 
any link to the speech in question.” Id. at 252.
 36. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249.
 37. I consider the law to be unsettled even though several courts have decided that 
morphed images should constitute child pornography. See, e.g., United States v. Hotaling 
634 F.3d 725, 729 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2005). Cf. 
Doe v. Boland, 630 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2011). In my view, this position is potentially 
wrong under Ferber and Ashcroft and requires clarification by the Supreme Court. The 
Court deliberately avoided the question of morphed images in Ashcroft.
 38. See supra note 6.
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1).
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 40. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)- (E). Congress adopted this definition from Ferber but 
changed the word “lewd” to “lascivious” in order to clarify the distinction between child 
pornography law and obscenity law, in which the word “lewd” is a term of art. Child 
Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984); see also United States v. 
Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 830– 32 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (discussing the Act).
 41. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 n.18 (citations omitted).
 42. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994); accord United States v. Helton, 
302 F. App’x. 842, 847 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding videotape defendant recorded of an 
eleven- year- old girl wearing opaque underpants qualified as child pornography because 
of the way it was framed); United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding 
nude images of minors with pixel boxes covering their genitals are still lascivious within 
the meaning of the federal child pornography statute, noting it is an easier determina-
tion than Knox); United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 790 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
“reasonable jury could conclude that the exhibition of pubic area was lascivious” in 
“beach scenes [of] girls wearing swimsuit bottoms”); People v. Spurlock, 114 Cal. App. 
4th 1122, 1127 (2003) (holding child pornography and child exploitation statutes could 
apply to image depicting topless fifteen- year- old girl in her underwear with her legs 
spread); People v. Kongs, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1741, 1755– 56 (1994) (following Knox, find-
ing photographs that zoomed in on girls’ pubic area were lascivious even though the 
girls were wearing underwear); Cf. U.S. v. McGlothlin, 391 Fed. App’x 542 (7th Cir. 
2010) (finding probable cause existed regarding photographs of clothed boy in innocent 
activity, but photographs focused on pubic area).
 43. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 322– 23 (2012) (Milkey, J., dis-
senting). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Thus, even images 
of children acting innocently can be considered lascivious if they are intended to be 
sexual.”).
 44. United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 440 (8th Cir. 2011).
 45. 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986) aff ’d sub nom United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 
1239 (9th Cir. 1987). Dost has been relied on by virtually all circuits that have considered 
it. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2008); Knox, 32 F.3d at 747 
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 244– 46 (10th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming use of factors without spe-
cifically citing Dost); United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (empha-
sizing that factors are “neither comprehensive nor necessarily applicable in every situa-
tion”); United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 789 (8th Cir. 1999) (“We find helpful the six 
criteria” in Dost); U.S. v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2009) (“This Court, in line 
with other Circuit courts, has applied a six factor test for ‘lasciviousness,’ as set forth in 
[Dost].”) Numerous district courts have followed Dost, as have state courts. See, e.g., 
Nebraska v. Saulsbury, 498 N.W.2d 338 (Neb. 1993).
 46. For cases directly criticizing Dost, see United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 
1085 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (criticizing Dost test as “highly malleable and subjective”); United 
States v. Frabizio, 459 F.3d 80, 90 (1st Cir. 2006) (questioning whether Dost factors are 
overly generous to defendant and noting that they are not the “equivalent of the statu-
tory standard of ‘lascivious exhibition’”). Cf. Craft v. State, 252 Ga. App. 834 (2001) (not 
using Dost test because Court found it was not relevant to Georgia statute). For cases 
applying the Dost factors but noting criticism or emphasizing their limited utility, see, 
e.g., United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 686 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Dost factors are neither 
exclusive nor conclusive but operate merely as a ‘starting point’”); United States v. 
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Campbell, 81 F. App’x 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2003) (Dost factors “not exhaustive” but “pro-
vide a framework for analyzing” image).
For positive statements about the Dost test, see, e.g., Villard, 885 F.2d at 122 (“[T]he 
Dost factors provide specific, sensible meaning to the term ‘lascivious,’ a term which is 
less than crystal clear.”).
 47. United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d at 252; see also Com. v. Sullivan, 82 Mass. App. 
Ct. 293, 318 (2012) (discussing Rivera) (“Rather than treating the Dost factors as provid-
ing the overarching doctrinal framework under which lewdness issues should be ana-
lyzed, it makes far more sense to treat them as helpful considerations.”).
 48. Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 831.
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d at 789.
 50. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 34.
 51. United States v. Frabizio 459 F. 3d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 2006).
 52. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 320 (2012) (Milkey, J., dissent-
ing).
 53. The Court wrote, “We do not hold that more than one Dost factor must be pres-
ent.” United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 245 n.6 (10th Cir. 1989).
 54. United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Although more than 
one factor must be present in order to establish ‘lasciviousness,’ all six factors need not 
be present.”). A recent case concluded that the Second Circuit imposes no minimum 
number of Dost factors be present for an image to constitute child pornography. United 
States v. Goodale, 831 F. Supp. 2d 804, 810 (D. Vt. 2011) (citations omitted).
 55. For one example of how easily manipulated the first factor of the test is, see State 
v. Vander Logt, 583 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Wis. App. 1998), where the court considered a 
picture of defendant lying in bed with two sixteen- year- old girls. The court noted that 
although “neither of the girls [were] naked below the waist,” the picture still constituted 
a “lewd exhibition of the victims’ genitals.” Id. Because the adult defendant was nude, the 
court concluded “the exhibition of [the defendant’s] naked genitals necessarily draws 
attention to the genitals of the semi- nude females in bed with him,” and thus constituted 
a “lewd exhibition of the victims’ genitals.” Id. For a view that child pornography law 
should not apply to images of female breasts, see United States v. Gleich, 397 F.3d 608, 
614 (8th Cir. 2005).
 56. United States v. Hill, 322 F.Supp.2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2004), aff ’d 459 F.3d 966 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (“Although we appreciate the district court’s careful analysis and critique of 
Dost, we do not think it necessary to adopt a new test or to deny the utility of Dost in the 
context of this case. The Dost factors can be a starting point for judges.”).
 57. Id. at 1085.
 58. United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1999).
 59. United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Goodale, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 810.
 60. United States v. Helton, CR- 07- 70- T, 2007 WL 1674196 (W.D. Okla. June 7, 2007) 
aff ’d, 302 Fed. App’x 842 (10th Cir. 2008).
 61. The photograph was not taken by the defendant. Instead he had downloaded it 
from a Flickr- type Russian photo- sharing site that included “a lot of vacation photo-
graphs.” Id.
 62. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 320 (Mass. 2012) (Milkey, J., 
dissenting).
 63. Brief for the United States at 9, Knox, 32 F.3d 733 (No. 92- 1183).
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 64. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
 65. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F. 2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1987). Courts have wa-
vered on the question of whether the focus must be on the consumer, the photographer, 
or both. This question is crucial since there is not necessarily any correspondence be-
tween the photographer’s intent and the consumer’s use of a photograph.
 66. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 34.
 67. See Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832 (The question is whether the image is “designed to 
elicit a sexual response in the viewer, albeit perhaps not the ‘average viewer,’ but perhaps 
in the pedophile viewer.”).
 68. For examples of decisions focusing on the subjective view of the pedophile voy-
eur, see, e.g., United States v. Goodale, 2:11- CR- 37, 2012 WL 733874 (D. Vt. Mar. 6, 2012) 
(finding that the defendant who surreptitiously filmed victim in a bathroom had “com-
posed the images to elicit a sexual response for himself ”); United States v. Rivera, 546 
F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2008) (examining defendant’s intent in creating images); United 
States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 682 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1133 (2010) 
(“We, like our sister circuits, have adopted a test that considers whether a visual depic-
tion is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. The use of the word 
‘intended’ seems to establish that the subjective intent of the photographer is relevant.”) 
(citations and quotations omitted); Perkins v. Texas, 394 S.W.3d 203, 209 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2012) (jurors’ “common sense” could allow them to conclude that these images of 16 
year old girl dressing and undressing surreptitiously filmed by hidden camera in bath-
room were created to appeal to deviant and voyeuristic interests of viewer”).
 69. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F. 2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
 70. Id. (emphasis added).
 71. This standard of the “average” or “normal” person began in Roth, 354 U.S. at 489– 
90 and has persisted in obscenity law. But see Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 
(1966) (in case involving homosexual pornography, adjusting “prurient appeal” prong 
of obscenity test to focus on appeal to a “clearly defined deviant [sic] sexual group”).
 72. United States v. Ward, 686 F.3d 879 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that even though 
video of girl getting out of the shower is not “overtly sexual activity,” it is child pornog-
raphy because defendant “composed the images in order to elicit a sexual response in a 
viewer— himself ” (quoting U.S. v. Rivera, 546 F.3d at 250)). Perhaps the confusion that 
seems to characterize the Eighth Circuit’s approach may be explained by its conflation of 
the objective/subjective inquiry with the overlapping but analytically separate issue of 
extrinsic evidence, discussed infra.
 73. United States v Wallenfang, 568 F.3d 649, 658 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted); see also People v. Lamborn, 785 N.E.2d 350, 355– 56 (Ill. 1999) (re-
jecting inquiry into “whether defendant was aroused by the photographs”); Tennessee v. 
Whitlock, E2010- 00602- CCA- R3CD, 2011 WL 2184966 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 
2011) (In refusing to inquire into the subjective response of defendant who appeared to 
attain sexual pleasure from filming children swimming in an apartment complex pool, 
the Court held that “however creepy the defendant’s behavior was” the images he pro-
duced showed nothing more than “children engaging in normal, everyday behavior.”); 
United States v. Steen, 634 F.3d 822, 829 (5th Cir. 2011) (Higgenbotham, J., concurring) 
(“Congress did not make production of child pornography turn on whether the maker 
or viewer of an image was sexually aroused, and this Dost factor encourages both judges 
and juries to improperly consider a non- statutory element.”).
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 74. Amirault, 173 F.3d at 34. Some courts that adhere to the subjective standard re-
spond that these criticisms of the subjective approach can be diminished by recognizing 
a distinction between production and possession cases. See Rivera, 546 F.3d at 252 (“The 
sixth Dost factor is not easily adapted to a possession case.”); see also United States v. 
Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 688 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We think the sixth Dost factor  .  .  . is of 
particular utility where, as is the case here, the criminal conduct at issue relates to a de-
fendant’s role in the production of the exploitative images under review, and not merely 
the possession of illicit materials.”) (emphasis in original).
 75. United States v. McCarty, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1101 n.11 (D. Haw. 2009).
 76. Steen, 634 F.3d at 829 (5th Cir. 2011) (Higgenbotham, J., concurring).
 77. Id. at 829– 30.
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Frabizio 459 F. 3d 80, 89 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The issue of the 
four corners rule, and even of what it means, has not been decided by this Circuit, and 
we do not decide it here. The issue is complicated, and there are arguments going differ-
ent ways.”).
 79. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28 (finding photograph of young naked girl on beach did not 
contain a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals”).
 80. United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d at 126.
 81. United States v. Ward, 686 F.3d 879, 883– 84 (8th Cir. 2012).
 82. See infra note 92 (federal video voyeurism statute).
 83. Nonetheless, there is still a significant argument in favor of categorizing the im-
ages involved in Ward as child pornography. This is because the defendant took a further 
step beyond using a hidden camera to secretly film his victim: he also physically posi-
tioned her for the hidden camera. This kind of posing of the victim, even if it results in 
images that do not seem objectively sexual, may still implicate the harm in production 
rationale of Ferber.
For cases that also rely on extrinsic evidence to criminalize material, see United 
States v. Goodale, 2:11- CR- 37, 2012 WL 733874 (D. Vt. Mar. 6, 2012) (Images of a seventeen- 
year- old in the bathroom were lascivious because defendant “admitted to masturbating 
to the videos, confessed his sexual desires for [the victim], and culled particular still 
frames from the videos to make a separate collection of his favorite images.”); see also 
United States v. Muscemi, 307 Fed. App’x 473 (allowing defendant’s statements about 
photographs including “his belief that those photographs would sexually arouse him” to 
inform jury’s view of whether photographs were lascivious).
The Sixth Circuit has taken what is termed a “hybrid” approach to this inquiry. In 
United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 683 (6th Cir. 2009), the Court applied what it called 
a “limited context” test that permits consideration of the context in which the images 
were taken, but limits the consideration of contextual evidence to the circumstances 
directly related to the taking of the images. Thus, other evidence, such as a defendant’s 
possession of other child pornography, would not be admitted.
 84. United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 440 (8th Cir. 2011).
 85. Id. (“The jury was carefully instructed that it was not to decide ‘whether the pic-
tures appealed, or were intended to appeal, to the defendant’s sexual interests, only 
whether they appear to be of a sexual character.’”).
 86. Id. For a case that raises similar concerns about blending an objective inquiry 
with extrinsic evidence, see United States v. Russell, 662 F. 3d 831, 843 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“Although the primary focus in evaluating the legality of the charged photographs must 
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be on the images themselves . . . the cases reveal that the intent and motive of the pho-
tographer can be a relevant consideration in evaluating those images.”).
 87. Rivera, 546 F.3d at 252. The Court summarized its use of the Dost test by writing, 
“Rather than treating the Dost factors as providing the overarching doctrinal framework 
under which lewdness issues should be analyzed, it makes far more sense to treat them 
as helpful considerations.” Id.
 88. See generally Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 34.
 89. See supra note 37.
 90. Ferber, 458 U.S at 753 (emphasis added).
 91. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added).
 92. See, e.g., Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1801.
 93. My discussion of the Ashcroft case, supra, should clarify that these tenets still ex-
tend to child pornography law. Dost is thus in tension with Ashcroft. See also chapter 1, 
James Weinstein, The Context and Content of New York v. Ferber, for discussion of Fer-
ber’s avoidance of this route.
 94. Terry Freidan, Gonzales Gives Child Porn ‘Wake- Up Call’, CNN (Apr. 20, 2006, 
4:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/04/20/gonzales.porn/.
 95. The argument that follows draws upon my previous work. See Amy M. Adler, The 
Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 209 (2001).
 96. Villard, 885 F.2d at 811.
 97. Knox, 32 F.3d at 747.
 98. Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 833.
 99. Id.
 100. Knox, 32 F.3d at 747.
 101. Id.
 102. Pub. L. No. 110- 358, title I, section 102(11)(A).
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4 |  The Language of Child Sexual Abuse  
and Exploitation
Mary Graw Leary
Language matters. Words matter. Labels, pedantic as they can be, matter. 
They matter because they convey not only meaning, but also tone, signifi-
cance, and content. This is particularly true in the law, where definitions 
can represent the difference between a crime and a legal act, and where the 
wording of jury instructions can be the difference between acquittal and 
conviction. The need for precision takes on even more significance for 
subjects that implicate but are not exclusively limited to the law, such as 
child exploitation. The importance of such topics extends beyond the law, 
into fields such as medicine, social work, and juvenile development.
For child abuse and exploitation, precise language can help convey the 
particular gravity of harms against children and the seriousness with 
which society addresses such crimes. Unfortunately, however, this preci-
sion is absent from much of the modern discourse regarding these harms. 
Terminology surrounding child abuse and exploitation is often first pro-
duced by the media, which values sensational language to capture the 
viewer or reader over precise language. These terms can also be shaped by 
interest groups whose agendas do not include accurately labeling victim-
ization. Such language then migrates not only into national policy dia-
logues but into discourse regarding crimes, laws, and legal sanctions. Here 
imprecision causes confusion and risks creating unintended legal and so-
cietal consequences.
This chapter explores some of the language of child exploitation and 
examines the implications of inadequate terminology across disciplines. 
Building on the work of other scholars, this chapter calls for an adoption 
and expansion of the “fair labeling” principle in the cross- disciplinary 
field of child abuse and exploitation. This chapter advocates for a two- 
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pronged approach to the language of child abuse and exploitation. First, it 
seeks to import the fair labeling principle to child abuse and exploitation. 
Second, it calls for an expansion of this principle beyond its narrow use in 
statutory labels, but to the multidisciplinary landscape of child sexual 
abuse and exploitation. More generally, it calls for a more thoughtful ap-
proach to the labels used in this cross- disciplinary field to enhance preci-
sion. It therefore recommends using terms such as child sex trafficking 
victims, sexually abusive images of children, child- produced sexually abu-
sive images of children, and first- and third- party traffickers.
Embracing the principle of fair labeling and applying it beyond the law 
to the terminology surrounding child sexual abuse and exploitation is a 
critical step for both improved dialogue and more effective responses. 
This approach is more than semantics. Society is struggling with these is-
sues. This struggle is all the more difficult when terms are not used univer-
sally or those that are used have multiple meanings or are imprecise. Im-
precise definitions of problems lead to solutions to perceived victimizations, 
but perhaps not victimizations as they actually exist. More precise de-
scriptions of victimization leads to more precise responses, the effect of 
which should be more accurate prevention messaging and societal re-
sponses when prevention fails.
I. the Value of Precise Language
The need for language that clearly and precisely describes occurrences is 
not unique to child abuse and exploitation. A necessity for precision exists 
in many disciplines. At times this requirement is practical and at other 
times more conceptual. The following examples illustrate the value of pre-
cise language across disciplines.
In medicine, for example, accurate language is essential on a practical 
level. Imprecision in diagnosis may lead to incorrect treatment and disas-
trous outcomes. Medical professionals must speak with complete exacti-
tude in complex matters such as naming the disease or injury, but also in 
more simple matters such as directing procedures to exact bodily location 
in need of care. There is also a more nuanced reason for exactitude in 
medicine: the need for informed patients. Doctor- patient communication 
must be precise, as it is the basis from which patients may make life- 
altering decisions. Medical professionals must choose their words care-
fully to avoid fear and panic, but also to convey seriousness and risk. A 
successful response to a medical emergency begins with a clear and shared 
understanding of the ailment by all parties.
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A similar requirement to speak precisely and to choose words with 
special care exists in politics and government. The reasons for this are not 
only practical but value- laden as well. For example, in 2013 when the 
Egyptian military removed an unpopular but elected president from 
power, the executive branch of the United States government condemned 
the action in every manner short of labeling it a “coup d’état.” The reason 
for stopping short of this label was quite practical. If the United States had 
deemed this event a military coup d’état, then Section 7008 of the Con-
solidated Appropriations Act of 2012 would have been triggered, which 
would have limited current foreign aid to this heavily relied upon ally.1 
Therefore, notwithstanding appearances, the executive branch tried to 
avoid a label that would trigger a statutory effect. Others both within the 
legislative branch and outside the government argued that the Egyptian 
military indeed engaged in a coup d’état and its actions should be labeled 
as such. They asserted that rather than giving the action an inaccurate la-
bel, it should be labeled accurately and the government response— 
whether applying the sanctions or amending the sanction regime— should 
be aimed at reality and not an inaccurate image of events.
Precise and accurate labels can also be critical in communicating social 
norms. This is exemplified in debates over language such as “ethnic cleans-
ing” or “genocide.” Genocide is a powerful and emotive term evoking im-
ages of the most depraved and systemic actions. It is also a label that car-
ries with it specific components and consequences under international 
law. The definition of genocide advanced by the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide explicitly contains 
both a mental element (the intent to destroy in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial, or religious group) and a physical element (killing, 
causing serious bodily and mental harm, inflicting destructive life condi-
tions, preventing births, or forcibly transferring children).2 This label, 
therefore, conveys both the gravity of the offense as well as the mental 
state of the offender.3 If a genocide occurs, then signatory nations to the 
Convention are in theory obligated to prevent and punish the acts.4 In ad-
dition to this practical effect, labeling certain killings “genocide” sends a 
clear international message of the horrible and inexcusable nature of the 
acts, as well as the message that those who committed the acts did so with 
an intent to destroy a specific group. The definition of genocide, however, 
includes only four types of victim groups (national, ethnic, racial, or reli-
gious). The term “genocide,” therefore, arguably communicates a value 
judgment regarding which groups are worthy of special protections.5 The 
narrow definition, and the implicit judgment it communicates, has led 
some scholars to argue for an expansion of the word genocide to include 
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more groups (such as political or gendered groups) as targets of genocide. 
In so doing they often make both practical and normative arguments. Ex-
panding the definition would result in more international responses to 
such atrocities as well as universal condemnation of them. Normatively, 
these scholars assert that other labels fail to convey the seriousness of the 
conduct, the specific mental state of the offenders against a specific group, 
or the proper identity of the victim group necessary for the crime to be 
labeled genocide. Others oppose expansion of the term, arguing that blur-
ring distinctions between genocide and other more generalized interna-
tional crimes creates confusion and risks unsustainably triggering an in-
ternational response for every conflict. As a result of this definitional 
disagreement, when atrocities occur, the international community cannot 
always agree whether to label such acts “ethnic cleansing,” “genocide,” or 
some other crime against humanity.6
The same definitional disputes and risks of imprecision exist domesti-
cally. For example, significant debate exists surrounding the use of the la-
bel “hate crime.” This label is meant to distinguish certain crimes as moti-
vated by prejudice. There is a lack of agreement regarding when the label 
“hate crime” is appropriate. Some believe the label should apply exclu-
sively when the offender was motivated to select a victim based solely on 
the victim’s race or other impermissible characteristic. Others assert that 
it should be used not to differentiate between offenders’ motives, but in-
stead to address the harm experienced by the victims.7 Therefore, some 
have argued that the term should be used less often to avoid weakening its 
meaning and significance. Others have called for an expansion of the cat-
egory of hate crimes to include a broader group of victims including fe-
male rape victims. Those who argue for the label to be used more often 
note that the term “hate crime” carries with it a certain stigma and that 
failure to use the label for all crimes motivated by prejudice minimizes the 
damage caused to the victims by the criminal activity.8
A. Labels Provide Insight
As a general matter, how a society refers to victimization provides impor-
tant insight into the prevailing societal views of that behavior. How a soci-
ety refers to conduct (criminal or not) may indicate whether the behavior 
is normalized, glorified, or condemned. For example, labeling the use of 
physical force to discipline a child as “corporal punishment” suggests an 
action by a parent or guardian within his or her authority to punish. Be-
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cause most would agree that punishment is a necessary component of 
raising a child, this descriptive term suggests nothing nefarious. Labeling 
that same action “child abuse” evokes an entirely different understanding 
of the appropriateness of the force.
In addition to conveying a message about the appropriateness of an ac-
tion, language can also serve as evidence of a shift of social concern and 
values. For example, a generation ago instances of physical abuse of a child 
or an elderly person were referred to as “assaults”— a term no different than 
what is used to label unlawful use of force against all persons. Today several 
states have specific crimes labeled “child abuse” or “elder abuse.”9 This new 
statutory language signifies a modern social awareness of these specific 
harms, as well as a legal shift that followed that change in social perception. 
Conversely, sometimes the law leads the national narrative. Acts such as 
the Violence Against Women Act not only changed the law but also shifted 
the general understanding of intimate partner violence and other forms of 
harm committed toward women because they are women. It made clear 
that this type of interaction is a form of violence and nothing else: not love, 
not a relationship gone out of control, not a temporary loss of judgment, 
but simply violence. Consequently, domestic violence has come out of the 
shadows as more victims are reporting the crime, more police are respond-
ing, and more victims are receiving services.10
B. Legal Insight
Because the manner in which a society refers to victimization can affect 
public perception of that victimization, special care should be taken to 
select the appropriate words to refer to crime and the harms those crimes 
cause. It is not enough to label a particular activity illegal. Rather, crimes 
must be understood within a wider setting of societal norms and political 
realities. They should also be described in such a way as to convey the seri-
ous nature of those activities. Ensuring that everyone understands the 
gravity of an act or crime and the specific harms caused by that action is 
more than just semantics. Such labels can also affect how society will tar-
get efforts to prevent those crimes or how it will target a response. Having 
a complete understanding of the victimization will inform a society’s sub-
stantive approach to potentially harmful conduct.11 For example, under-
standing “domestic disputes” as intimate partner violence is an important 
critical step to responding to a previously misunderstood victimization.
Assessing whether a term or a definition is sufficiently descriptive— 
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that is, not only whether the term is accurate but also whether it fully 
captures the seriousness of a crime and the harm it causes— must take 
account of how terms are used in ordinary language. To the extent that an 
otherwise descriptive term has become a euphemism in colloquial discus-
sions, using that term as part of the public discourse on crime and victim-
ization can minimize harms caused, normalize them, or even glorify 
them.12 For example, much has been written about the mainstreaming of 
the term “pimp.” The term “pimp” was first used to refer to an individual 
who uses manipulation, threats, or intimidation to control and force vic-
tims of prostitution to sell sex and then profits from that income.13 Yet the 
term has been co- opted by elements of popular culture to depict a lifestyle 
which is to be exulted, not criminalized.14 Thus the term’s use in colloquial 
conversation minimizes the actual violence and harm inflicted by one 
who violently controls victims and forces them into commercial sex.
Labels minimizing the perceived harm appear often with media cover-
age of sensational cases. For example, this occurred regarding the case of 
Roman Polanski, a rape case in which he pled guilty to drugging and rap-
ing a thirteen- year- old- girl when he was forty- seven years old. Notwith-
standing these facts, the case has since been referred to as a “sex scandal” 
as opposed to a sexual assault.15 Similarly, when Jerry Sandusky was ac-
cused of raping multiple boys over several years, the media reframed it as 
the “Sandusky scandal.”16 When the media refers to a child abuse case or 
sexual assault as a “sex scandal” as opposed to a “sexual assault,” such la-
bels fail to appropriately describe the sexual violence experienced by the 
victim, as well as the rights and dignity of the victim.17
The principle function of labeling, then, is expression. The label ad-
dresses both the offender and the larger community, stigmatizing the of-
fender for his culpable conduct and conveying the nature of his transgres-
sion to the public. It expresses society’s revulsion to the violation of 
important norms and values.18 Descriptors for child sexual abuse must 
convey the nature of these victimizations, and precise labels are critical to 
capture the gravity of the offense and condemnation of the perpetrator.
II. Labels in Criminal Victimization Discourse
A. Criminal Victimization Has a Particular Need for 
Sufficiently Descriptive Language
While precise language and definitions are important in many disciplines, 
they are particularly important when describing criminal victimization. 
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This is true not only for the labels given to the crimes themselves, but also 
for the corollary terms used surrounding criminal victimization. Crimes 
garner discussion. Modern criminal law encompasses many other disci-
plines including medicine, social work, and mental health. All these corol-
lary discussions, as well as those originating in the law, must be precise.
An effective criminal justice system must not only achieve justice, but 
society must also perceive it to be a just system. Language plays an impor-
tant role in this respect. Because a criminal conviction, as Henry Hart 
suggests, reflects the “solemn pronouncement” of the moral condemna-
tion of society, the language surrounding a criminal act takes on added 
importance.19 The language used as a label for each offense can convey 
meaning: “The unique labels associated with different crimes express 
varying degrees of social condemnation for the conduct.”20 Therefore, 
when crimes are poorly described or labeled, this may reflect, or affect, 
society’s reaction to the conduct.21
Consequently, the language of criminal behavior must be sufficiently 
descriptive to be effective. To be adequately descriptive the language used 
in general criminal discourse, and the language that labels crimes more 
specifically, should convey both the nature of the crime and the appropri-
ate level of social condemnation to it. The nature of the harm encompasses 
not only the injury but the mental state of the offender. Language that is 
not sufficiently descriptive can thwart the goals of criminal law and soci-
etal systems in a variety of ways. Too general or sanitized descriptors can 
minimize a harm or normalize it. Inflammatory language can miss the 
mark and condemn behaviors outside the culpable behavior. Criminal 
victimization is often very complex. Labels that are too general can en-
compass activities that are quite diverse from each other and that demand 
different treatment. Labels too precise can lead to loopholes for escaping 
liability. The words of criminal victimization, therefore, must be thor-
oughly considered.
On a practical level, statutes— the written laws themselves— require 
precision, because antecedent events can trigger legal sanctions. For ex-
ample, labeling a child sold for sex as a victim of a “severe form of traffick-
ing” triggers access to government services.22 Labeling that same child a 
“juvenile prostitute” triggers access to juvenile detention. Therefore, the 
choice of label determines how future events will unfold.
This extends not only to the titles of specific crimes, but to general 
criminal legislation as well. Some scholars note the troubling trend of la-
beling legislation for the purpose of sensationalizing it to ensure its pas-
sage.23 For example, a large criminal bill addressing various forms of 
crimes against children was labeled the PROTECT Act of 2013 for “Pros-
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ecutorial Remedy and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today.” This trend continues today with bills proposed with titles, such as 
Big Oil Welfare Repeal Act of 2013 (HR 1426), Reducing Barack Obama’s 
Unsustainable Deficit Act (HR 3140 2009), or Stop the FEDS Act (HR 118) 
(112th Cong) (Stop the Federal Exchanges from Destroying States Act). 
Such labels sacrifice precision for dramatics. Uelman convincingly chal-
lenges the use of those hyperbolic labels that disguise “the criminal justice 
system’s complexity behind simplistic labels that actually impedes in our 
quest for justice.”24 The purpose of legislation is to respond and rectify a 
social problem. Imprecise and dramatic language does not further societal 
understanding of the problem or appropriate responses.
B. The Fair Labeling Principle
Some criminal law scholars have called for the adoption of what Andrew 
Ashworth articulated as a “fair labeling” principle. This principle focuses 
on the need for criminal labels to fairly represent the nature and magni-
tude of the defendant’s criminal conduct.25 Originally conceived of to ad-
dress reforms of the English criminal law, the fair labeling principle re-
quires a conscious effort to ensure that a label describing criminal conduct 
precisely reflects both its wrongfulness and its severity:
A proper label reflects both the essence and the totality of the crim-
inal conduct at issue. It is an amalgam of the interest invaded 
(bodily integrity or property interests), the gravity of the harm 
(taking of human life or destroying a shed), the mechanism of in-
jury (stealing vs. swindling or arson vs. vandalism) and the offend-
er’s mental state. . . .26
That is to say, a label ought to explain the culpability of the defendant and 
the harmfulness of his actions.27
Adoption of the fair labeling principle facilitates a stronger social and 
criminal justice system. It has both descriptive and normative qualities. In 
a descriptive sense, it pushes the language of sexual victimization to suf-
ficiently describe all the victimizing conduct. This is not limited to preci-
sion regarding the statutory name for the crime, but demands precision in 
describing any relevant surrounding conduct. In addition to precision, 
while not explicitly a component of fair labeling, this language must also 
indicate the level of condemnation by society. Such an approach not only 
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increases understanding but also can reflect the complexities of criminal 
events and work toward more targeted and responsive initiatives within 
the criminal justice system.
There are two fundamental aspects of fair labeling: description and 
fairness. The descriptive component of fair labeling contains at least two 
subfeatures. The label of the offense must (1) sufficiently describe the con-
duct and (2) sufficiently reflect the “social harm” of that conduct.28 This 
latter element requires the label to communicate the judgment of soci-
ety.29 Labels serve both a “symbolic” and “declaratory” function to “sym-
bolize the degree of condemnation that should be attributed to the of-
fender and signals to society how that particular offense should be 
regarded.”30 This condemnation and description should be intelligible to 
the general public.31 For example, “assault” is technically accurate, but “el-
der abuse” more precisely conveys the particular offense and the specific 
enhanced condemnation of victimization of the vulnerable.
Labels must also be fair. This fairness is to the defendant, the victim, 
and the public. For the defendant, the label must precisely reflect the na-
ture of conduct. For the victim, the label should indicate the way in which 
the victim was wronged and how he is affected by the wrongdoing.32 Both 
of these are linked to fairness to the public. If the label of a crime is neutral 
regarding the gravity of the conduct, it is fair to neither the offender nor 
the victim, because the true nature of the conduct will not be shared with 
the general public.33 The public must be able to understand from the label 
the nature of the transgression.34
III. the Language of Child Abuse and exploitation
The fair labeling principle arose in Britain regarding a discussion of revis-
ing the English criminal laws. Ashworth and others invoked it as a prin-
cipled method for the code to be reworked. This chapter advocates adopt-
ing this approach more broadly than statutory language. The 
afore mentioned components of fair labeling would provide clarity and 
precision to many fields, including child abuse and exploitation. This 
chapter proposes consciously utilizing fair labeling for all aspects of child 
abuse and exploitation, not just criminal code terms. This is a multidisci-
plinary field, and clarity across disciplines in the media is needed.
In child sexual abuse and exploitation, language and labels are used 
inconsistently and inaccurately, resulting in a lack of fairness to the defen-
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dants, victims, and public. Not only do shortcomings exist in formal legal 
terms, but the terminology in public discussion is also insufficiently de-
scriptive. Because the media is a main source of public information on 
criminal issues, the manner in which it uses problematic terms to describe 
crimes of child exploitation and abuse can contribute to the harms caused 
by the insufficiently descriptive terms discussed above.35
Within criminal law, nowhere is the need for accurate language as 
great as in the area of child abuse and exploitation. The United Nations 
NGO group for the Convention of the Rights of the Child (the “UN NGO 
CRC”) recognized that the need for fair, agreed- upon terms was more 
than symbolic.36 It discussed the tangible effects of failure when it noted 
that “unless we have clear and agreed definitions in relation to sexual 
harm against children, the data collected, the strategic response designed, 
the legislation implemented, and the protection interventions will most 
likely be impaired.”37 Accurate language is demanded at all phases of a 
criminal occurrence because without it, information gathered to more 
fully comprehend the victimization would be tainted. Phrased another 
way, the conclusions drawn from that data will be incorrect. The necessary 
response to the data will be misguided, and the prevention messaging 
sourced from that data will miss its mark entirely. This describes a crimi-
nal justice system which fails at all levels: investigation, response, and pre-
vention. Those demanding accurate and consistent language underscore 
that effective collaboration from diverse stakeholders requires an agreed- 
upon understanding of the harms children experience and the distinction 
between different forms of abuse and exploitation.
For example, reference to all offenders against children as “child preda-
tors” is problematic. It evokes an image of an animalistic stranger waiting 
to violently kidnap an innocent child. In reality, most offenders are known 
to their victims and patiently groom him or her into harm. This label, 
however, can lead to prevention messaging aimed at a small minority of 
offenders, thus missing the opportunity to prevent more common abuses.38
Achieving fair labeling principles regarding child sexual abuse and ex-
ploitation is particularly complex. Child sexual abuse and exploitation can 
take many diverse forms, including intrafamilial abuse, child sex traffick-
ing, production of sexually abusive images of children, and a number of 
other crimes. This section will address some reasons why fair labeling 
principles have yet to be achieved in these cases, and it will also discuss 
some of the results of the current insufficiently descriptive state of lan-
guage in child sexual abuse and exploitation.
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A. Causes of Mislabeling
Child sexual abuse and exploitation is an umbrella term for numerous 
distinct forms of victimization. On the one hand, the breadth of the vic-
timization is profound. Its victims include a cross- section of children; one 
out of five girls and one out of twenty boys experience a sexual abuse event 
prior to their eighteenth birthday, and one out of seven youths is proposi-
tioned by a stranger online.39 On the other hand, these types of victimiza-
tions have many subforms. Effective responses to each of these subforms 
require clear comprehension of the forms of victimization. In addition to 
the breadth of this problem, many obstacles exist that impair the under-
standing of these victimizations.
1. Social Silences
These victimizations are aptly described as occurring “in the shadows.” 
However, certain other forces are at play in keeping the victimization se-
cretive as well. These obstacles lead to underreporting or prevention of 
these cases from coming into the light, being accurately understood, and 
informing public policy.40 Similarly, the secretive nature of the acts thwarts 
the effort to use precise language to describe all the distinct subcategories 
of child sexual abuse and exploitation.
Although these victimizations are significant, most people do not 
know the realities of many forms of child victimization, have not been 
trafficked, do not join peer- to- peer networks to trade sexually abusive im-
ages of children, or sexually assault others. Therefore, most people will 
need accurate information about the nature of these victimizations to un-
derstand them. However, due to the secretive nature of these forms of vic-
timization, this information is not readily available. Thus labels are at-
tached to aspects of it that are inadequate because not enough is known to 
make them more precise.
This secretive nature, therefore, can be a compounding cause of impre-
cise labeling. Labels are often put in place by the media. Then, when the 
public hears labels or terms, it brings its own perceptions, often inaccurate 
due to the lack of data available, to the issue. In this way the public can be 
misled by imprecise terms with ambiguous meanings or attribute impre-
cise labels to misunderstood victimization.
The silence is not only in the failure to openly discuss child sexual 
abuse and exploitation. It is also in the failure to report it. This allows for 
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not only increased victimization, but also for hiding it more easily. Of-
fenders often target marginalized victims who possess some vulnerability. 
Offenders with direct access to victims or their caregivers often can groom 
their victims not only to abuse or exploit them, but also to keep their si-
lence after an abusive event or during an ongoing period of victimiza-
tion.41 These offenders target vulnerable victims and further groom care-
givers, family members, and others for not only access to children but to 
prime them to disbelieve the child should a report be made.42 Therefore, 
obtaining information about the details of the offense, how it is commit-
ted, and the experience of the victims is more challenging to accomplish.
An example of this interface between a lack of information and an im-
precise label could be the labeling of sexually abusive images of children as 
“child porn” or “child pornography,” which likely is caused by unfamiliar-
ity of the actual content and fuels the misinformation about the content. 
The process begins with the premise that most people are not traders in 
these images nor have they been victimized in this way. They hear, how-
ever, these images labeled with such terms as “child porn” or “kiddie porn.” 
To the layperson, “child porn” or “kiddie porn” do not convey the serious 
nature of the material; instead they are slang terms. Slang terms are by 
definition a “flippant, irreverent, or indecorous” form of language, not to 
be used in reference to images of exploitation and abuse.43 Yet these terms 
are used by journalists,44 scholars,45 and even Supreme Court Justices.46 
“Child pornography,” although certainly less problematic than “child 
porn,” likely conjures up images of younger looking adults striking pro-
vocative poses, as opposed to the reality of an increasingly violent collec-
tions of photographs and video depicting younger and younger children 
being violently victimized.47 Consequently, the public’s impression of its 
content is influenced by such labels and is inaccurate.
Although one might argue that since the public has such a negative 
reaction to “child pornography,” there is no confusion as to its under-
standing of the content of this material. This argument is flawed for a 
number of reasons. As a threshold matter, it is hard to imagine any person 
questioned about his or her views of child pornography answering any-
thing that suggests tolerance. Second, concluding that such a response in-
dicates that the public understands the content of this material because 
society is troubled by its existence is unwarranted. Many people when 
they hear terms such as “substance abuse,” “child neglect,” or others are 
disturbed by the concepts, but that does not mean they fully appreciate the 
experience of it. The reality is that most people do not trade in sexually 
abusive images of children. Most people have, however, been exposed to 
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adult pornography.48 Pornography, which is not obscene, can be legal. 
While the Supreme Court has described such material as including “adap-
tation” (as in writing or painting) of “licentiousness or lewdness: a por-
trayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement,”49 neither it 
nor any court of appeals has defined it.50 Similarly, pornography is a legal 
industry in the United States with its own trade association and paid “per-
formers,” individuals who consent to staging sexual acts.51 Accordingly, it 
is fair to conclude that adult pornography conveys a consensual and inten-
tionally produced aspect to it, which is designed to entice and entertain. 
This is not the material traded among child pornography traders.
The “[t]ypical child pornography possessed and distributed by federal 
child pornography offenders today depict prepubescent children engag-
ing in graphic sex acts, often with adult men,” and half of the images depict 
children under six years old.52 The National Center for Missing and Ex-
ploited Children (“NCMEC”) reports that 76 percent of known victims of 
sexually abusive images of children are prepubescent and 10 percent are 
infants and toddlers.53 Of the most frequently traded series of known vic-
tims, 84 percent of the series contained images depicting oral copulation, 
76 percent contained images depicting anal and/or vaginal penetration, 52 
percent contained images depicting the use of foreign objects or sexual 
devices, and 44 percent contained images depicting bondage and/or sado-
masochism.54 More than 81 percent of the sexually abusive images of chil-
dren analyzed by the Internet Watch Foundation in 2012 involve victims 
less than ten years old, and more than half showed sexual activity between 
adults and children, including rape and sexual torture.55 Therefore, put-
ting together the words “child” (someone unable to consent to sexual ac-
tivity or exploitation) and “pornography” (consensually produced erotic 
entertainment) is at best imprecise but more likely misleading. At best, 
while people no doubt are uncomfortable with the idea of trading these 
images, they are ignorant of its content, and the phrase “child pornogra-
phy” does nothing to communicate it accurately or with precision. At 
worst, child pornography causes people to associate the content with their 
previously held understanding of pornography, thus leaving room for the 
incorrect view that the images are similar to adult pornography with con-
senting subjects— a legal impossibility.
Again, it is helpful to turn to trends in judicial sentencing to under-
score the lack of understanding of the label of “child pornography.” An 
active debate exists regarding the federal sentencing guidelines for child 
pornography offenders. Indeed many, including the Department of Jus-
tice, agree that the Sentencing Commission should revisit and update the 
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guidelines to reflect the modern methods by which offenders are collect-
ing these images, so the guidelines can “better calibrate the severity and 
culpability of defendants’ criminal conduct.”56 That debate is outside the 
scope of this chapter. The lighter sentences being imposed by some judges 
cannot be entirely explained by a dispute with the federal sentencing 
guidelines, and similarly light sentences exist on the state level when no 
similar dispute exists.57 Some observations of sentencing practices illus-
trate a fundamental lack of understanding of the harm the images cause 
and the gravity of the offense. Among child pornography offenders— 
producers, distributors, and possessors— possessors, while serious offend-
ers, are likely regarded as the least egregious. Moreover, within this group 
of possessors, any sentencing court must consider many factors, including 
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character-
istics of the defendant to craft an appropriate sentence.58
Nonetheless, many sentences reflect a lack of understanding of child 
pornography for what it is. As noted by Hamilton and Rogers, trial courts 
have characterized the active collection of sexually abusive images of chil-
dren as a result of “depression,” as due to the “ease and addictive quality of 
internet searching,” “passive,” “harmless,” the product of “boredom and 
stupidity,” an outlet for attention, and some offenders as “upstanding” or 
“mainstays” in the community.59 Some judges have characterized the de-
fendants as the victims of harsh sentences, even analogizing their prosecu-
tion to witchcraft trials.60 While some courts have rejected such character-
izations of these defendants as “a terrible divergence between appearance 
and reality,”61 these misconceptions of the images’ contents and the vic-
timization felt by its subjects speak to the inadequacy of that label criti-
cized by researchers and scholars.62
The Guardian recently noted announced its refusal to use such terms: 
“‘[C]hild pornography, child porn, and kiddie porn’ are not acceptable 
terms. The use of such language acts to legitimize images which are not 
pornography, rather, they are permanent records of children being sexu-
ally exploited.”63 “Child pornography” undermines the victimization be-
cause the term suggests a relationship to pornography— conduct that may 
be legal, whose subject is voluntarily participating in, and whose subject is 
capable of consenting to the conduct.
The fact of the matter is that sexual abuse and exploitation are complex 
behaviors. Attempting to define its parameters as clearly as possible “must 
not result in minimizing the focus on all specifics and the significance 
those factors play.”64 It is, however, essential to accurately describe these 
behaviors.
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2. Social Forces
There are a number of social forces that obfuscate the occurrence or the 
severity of child sexual abuse and exploitation beyond the aforementioned 
silence. These include social messages, financial influences, and character-
istics of perpetrators.
The devastating trauma of child sexual abuse and exploitation exists in 
a world replete with social messages endorsing sexual objectification of 
children.65 This is distinct from sexuality of teens or emerging adults— a 
natural part of development and maturity. This is the specific objectifica-
tion suggesting that children are sex objects for sexual use by adults.66 
These messages are not without social effect. Sending such messages af-
fects both victims and offenders. Sending the message that children are 
commodities to be used and objectified contributes to injuring victims by 
laying the groundwork for grooming.67 It also affects offenders by validat-
ing the abusive and exploitative inclinations of offenders and normalizes 
some forms of objectification.
A second social force contributing to obfuscating reality could be the 
profit generated from many commercial aspects of child sexual abuse and 
exploitation. The severity of the child sexual victimization can be clouded 
due to the financial immensity of the industry. The role that so- called “le-
gitimate businesses” play in some of these crimes, such as production of 
sexually abusive images of children and sex trafficking, can blur the vic-
timization. The child exploitation and human trafficking industries are 
estimated to be valued in the billions of dollars in revenue per year.68 These 
profits go not only to traffickers but also to the ancillary businesses that 
facilitate the victimization. For example, some advertisers, hotels, and cab 
drivers can profit from sex trafficking.69 Similarly, prior to the develop-
ment of the Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography, some finan-
cial institutions were profiting from the trading of sexually abusive images 
of children.70 Anonymous alternative currencies, such as Bitcoin, are val-
ued by these same offenders.71 When the line between legitimate business 
and criminal conduct is blurred, this relationship (a) strengthens the 
criminal entrepreneur by infusing the illegal activity with capital and (b) 
normalizes the criminal acts by legitimizing certain aspects.
The fact that many offenders do not conform to commonly held, if not 
accurate, criminal stereotypes may also cloud the frequency and harmful-
ness of child sexual abuse and exploitation. For example, possessors of 
sexually abusive images of children are reported to be overwhelmingly 
Caucasian males, a majority of whom are higher educated and more often 
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employed than criminal defendants of other races.72 Although much has 
been written regarding sentencing ranges authorized by the federal sen-
tencing guidelines for nonproduction offenders, federal judges often treat 
this group of defendants more leniently than other groups of offenders. 
Relative to the sentencing guidelines, judges impose lighter sentences on 
possessors of sexually abusive images of children than many other groups 
of federal offenders.73 Four out of five such possessors benefit from this 
practice used by prosecutors or judges to limit their sentencing exposure.74
These sentencing practices disproportionately benefit a group of of-
fenders who are more white, more wealthy, and more educated than other 
offenders. It also sends a message to the public that conflicts with the ex-
perience articulated by the victims: that the possession of sexually abusive 
images of children is a serious offense that victimizes those children.75 The 
Department of Justice has argued that federal judges and the media em-
phasize the outward appearance of those who trade in sexually abusive 
images of children rather than the seriousness of their crimes.76 One rea-
son for this divergence could be the reality that child pornography offend-
ers as a group resemble the demographics of the bench, more so than 
other segments of offenders. Hamilton notes that many judges describe 
offenders “in ways that conceptualized them as ordinary, even upstanding 
men (there were few female defendants) whose only flaw appeared to be 
an interest in child pornography.”77 As will be discussed below, this con-
ceptualization of child pornography trading as a “flaw” risks using an of-
fender’s social status as an educated, higher- income, Caucasian males to 
divorce the offender from the harm caused to victims of his crime.
B. Effects of Mislabeling
1. Confusion
Mislabeling affects the manner in which society conceptualizes child sex-
ual abuse and exploitation. How society conceptualizes a crime directly 
frames society’s efforts to respond and prevent further victimization. Dis-
tinct words are often used to describe child sexual abuse or exploitation. 
Those words have different connotations, and using the words inter-
changeably can cause confusion.78 If the abuse and exploitation is labeled 
with insufficiently descriptive terms, then the response is likely to be mis-
placed as well. This confusion can lead to minimization or even normal-
ization of harmful behavior.
For example, identifying a child involved in “pimp- controlled” com-
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mercial sex acts as a “juvenile prostitute” evokes one image of the child. 
Identifying him or her as a “victim of child sex trafficking” evokes an en-
tirely different image. While the first term connotes only the illegality of 
exchanging money for sex, the second term explicitly identifies the child 
as a victim, and it suggests the more widespread nature of the sex traffick-
ing industry.
2. Alarmism or Underreaction
The effects of mislabeling extend far beyond confusion. It also can lead to 
alarmism or underreaction; neither response allows society to correctly 
assess a social problem. For example, national attention to teen “sexting” 
accelerated after the release of initial anecdotal or survey- based claims 
regarding the frequency of the behavior. Unfortunately, the media applied 
the label “sexting” imprecisely, using it to refer to a wide range of activities 
including, on one end of the spectrum, sexually explicit texts, nude pic-
tures, sexually explicit pictures, and, on the other end of the spectrum, the 
recording of sexual assaults.79 The resulting claim that a large percentage 
of the youth population was producing pictures caused great alarm among 
various segments of the media. An overly general use of an undefined 
term drove this alarmist reaction and resulted in an incorrect and over-
simplified conclusion.80
Conversely, some labels contribute to minimizing or normalizing 
other forms of exploitation. An example of this is outlined by a prostitu-
tion researcher:
Sexual exploitation as strip club prostitution has been reframed as 
sexual expression and freedom to express one’s sensuality by dancing. 
Brothels are referred to as short- time hotels, massage parlors, saunas, 
health clubs, or sexual encounter establishments. Older men who 
buy teenagers for sex in Seoul call prostitution compensated dating. 
In Tokyo prostitution is described as assisted intercourse.81
Although referencing adult prostitution, the example speaks to a concerted 
effort to relabel a form of exploitation and reconceptualize it as legitimate.
The National Academy of Sciences discussed the inconsistent use of 
terms in sex trafficking and child sexual exploitation and noted that 
“clarity and consistency in the use of these key terms are vital for a vari-
ety of purposes, including developing an in- depth understanding of 
these crimes; conducting, evaluating, and comparing relevant research; 
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and developing appropriate laws, policies, and programs aimed at pre-
venting, identifying, and responding to these abuses of children.”82 Only 
by truly understanding the facets of the exploitation can stakeholders 
form effective policies targeting actual aspects of it instead of exagger-
ated or nonexistent problems. Similarly, reframing illegal behavior in a 
way that legitimizes it may have similar effects. Regarding the aforemen-
tioned panic over teen “sexting,” inconsistent use of the term to refer to 
many different types of images and behaviors led to somewhat of a panic 
in the general population. Many understood the term to refer to self- 
produced sexually abusive images, while some media reports used the 
term to include less troubling behavior, such as teens sending sexually 
explicit text messages. This confusion in terminology likely led many 
people to overestimate the number of children creating sexually explicit 
images of themselves, which in turn aided in creating a panic that ex-
ploded until later research indicated the behavior was far from norma-
tive.83 Furthermore, the use of this same inconsistent term failed to call 
attention to the significant subproblem of those who forward or distrib-
ute images of others.84 In short, the term “sexting” tended to confuse an 
already poorly understood phenomenon.85
3. Legal Implications
Another effect of insufficiently descriptive labels concerns the legal impli-
cations of certain labels: labels matter as they relate to statutes. If an action 
meets a legal definition, it can fall within the proscriptions of a criminal 
statute. For example, “child sex tourism” is understood by most stakehold-
ers to occur when an individual travels from one place to another and 
engages in sexual acts with children. But because of confusion in the field 
of exactly what triggers sanctions for this behavior, clarification must be 
made. The UN NGO CRC felt the need to explicitly clarify that this behav-
ior is not limited to the person who travels with the purpose of having sex 
with a child (preferential child sex offenders), but also applies to the trav-
eler who forms the intent while on location (situational child sex offend-
ers).86 Without this change a group of offenders were unintentionally ex-
cluded from laws targeting them. Such confusion results from an 
inadequate label. Therefore, descriptive labels of activity must be consis-
tent with statutory definitions so when the infractions are measured, there 
is a common understanding of the significance of the actions and the data 
collected about them.
The UN NGO CRC outline why this definitional clarity matters. Ulti-
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mately, the goal of society is to limit and end child sexual abuse and ex-
ploitation. The first step to achieving this goal is articulating a clear and 
precise understanding of the victimization and all its nuances. Based on 
that understanding, society can develop prevention programs and multi-
disciplinary responses when prevention fails. The success or failure of 
these ventures turns on whether that conceptualization is precise and ac-
curate. As the UN CRC NGO noted, “unless we have clear and agreed 
definitions in relation to sexual harm against children the data collected, 
the strategic responses designed, the legislation implemented, and the 
protection interventions developed will most likely be impaired.”87 This 
same NGO group understood that the importance of shared understand-
ing in specific terminology was cross- disciplinary. Effective counteraction 
by society, both in prevention and disruption, requires that all sectors of 
society fully understand the realities of the complex sexual harm.88
The consequences of mislabeling are not limited to negatively affecting 
prevention efforts or law enforcement but extend to the courtroom as 
well. If behaviors are mislabeled, crimes insufficiently defined, or the lan-
guage surrounding child sexual abuse and exploitation inconsistent and 
insufficient, then an incomplete picture of the actions develops. If that lack 
of a complete picture sanitizes the crime, as in the crime labeled “child 
pornography,” courts and society undervalue these matters. As discussed 
above, judicial commentary and sentences for nonproduction child sexual 
abuse images offenses depart from the sentencing guidelines at a higher 
rate than any other crime.89 The language of many trial courts reflects a 
viewpoint that sees nonproduction child pornography offenses are less se-
rious crimes.
Consider United States v. Reingold, a case in which the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s sentence.90 The district court 
failed to apply the mandatory minimum sentence for distribution of child 
pornography to a defendant who not only pled guilty to the charge of dis-
tribution, but also admitted to hands- on sexually offending his minor 
half- sister.91 The Second Circuit reiterated to the district court that the 
distribution of child sexual abuse images is “a serious crime that threatens 
real and frequently violent harm to vulnerable victims.”92 This point ap-
peared lost on the district court, which actually described the defendant’s 
distribution as “mere peer- to- peer file sharing.”93 Similarly, a district court 
judge in United States v. Campbell initially acknowledged that such images 
harm children, but stated that the images he observed in this case, in 
which apparently trafficked girls from Eastern Europe (ages thirteen to 
fifteen) were depicted in a sexually explicit manner, were “relatively 
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tame.”94 The district court judge reasoned that the girls were not prepubes-
cent or engaged in sexual penetration with an adult. Although less severe 
than a filmed sexual assault, the lack of penetration of two girls who are 
exploited is not “tame.” Again, such a view of the sexually explicit images 
suggests a conceptualization consistent with the voluntary or consensual 
aspect often attributed to adult pornography. Such descriptions reflect the 
concerns articulated by the prominent NGO Save the Children when ad-
dressing revisions to the Council of Europe’s definitional scheme: “The 
term ‘child pornography’ undermines the seriousness of the offence be-
cause it associates child abuse with conduct which, while pornographic, 
may be legal in an adult environment. ‘Child pornography’ always in-
volves sexual abuse and exploitation of a child, and therefore constitutes 
evidence of a crime committed against a child.”95 Because the label “child 
pornography” can create such an association, it should be eliminated.
IV. Fair Labeling in Child sexual Abuse and exploitation
It is within this cauldron of victimization, conflicting social messaging, 
normalization, and cultural confusion that the language of child sexual 
abuse and exploitation becomes clouded. Distinctions between appro-
priate and inappropriate behaviors become blurred. Distinct activities 
become grouped together under general terms. This can have two 
equally unappealing effects. First, activities can be overgeneralized and 
minimize the victimization. For example, the term “commercial sexual 
exploitation of children” has been criticized as being too sanitized, fail-
ing to capture the violence often inflicted and failing to focus on the 
child.96 Second, terms can become too inflammatory. The term “sexual 
predator” has been used to refer to a broad range of persons who com-
mit sexual offenses equating disparate behaviors, such as indecent expo-
sure and aggravated rape.97
As discussed in the previous sections, there is a need for fair labeling in 
the dialogue of child sexual abuse and exploitation. More is needed, how-
ever, than accurate labeling of relevant statutes. Because child sexual abuse 
and exploitation affects so many other disciplines, this effort must tran-
scend simple statutory labels and include clear definitions within the aca-
demic, professional, and child abuse communities. What follows is a dis-
cussion of terms that have been particularly problematic. Employing the 
fair labeling principle to these concepts justifies the elimination of certain 
terms and the adoption of those proposed terms.
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A. “Child”
The term “child” does not have a universally understood meaning. Within 
the United States, different jurisdictions define “child” or “minor” to in-
clude individuals of different ages. Moreover, within a given jurisdiction, 
an individual can be a “child” for one purpose, such as voting, but an adult 
for other purposes, such as marriage. Most but not all federal statutes treat 
a person less than eighteen years old as a minor, but this is not universal.98 
Internationally, when childhood begins and ends varies among countries 
and cultures. Some nations allow an individual to marry as young as thir-
teen years of age for girls or labor for children of all ages, while other 
countries limit complete legal adulthood until eighteen years of age.
This state of confusion exists notwithstanding the fact that several in-
fluential international documents define “children” as people who have 
not yet attained the age of eighteen. The Convention of the Rights of the 
Child, Palermo Protocol, and ILO # 182 all agree that people under the age 
of eighteen should be thought of as children.99 The UN NGO CRC finds 
the deviation from this universal rule “deeply concerning,” and “walking 
away from a straight commitment that determines all children to be any-
one aged under [eighteen] years has seriously increased the vulnerability 
of children to violence and exploitation.”100
In the context of child sexual abuse and exploitation, the term “child” 
should be understood to include all people under the age of eighteen. Sup-
port for this understanding can be found in several recent Supreme Court 
decisions. For more than a decade, many in the juvenile justice field advo-
cated for a distinctly different treatment of youthful offenders under the 
age of eighteen. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the death penalty 
was unconstitutional when applied to an offender who had not reached 
eighteen years of age. The Court expanded this reasoning in Graham v. 
Florida, which prohibited states from sentencing such juveniles convicted 
of nonhomicide crimes to incarceration for life without the possibility of 
parole. This logic was further affirmed in Miller v. Alabama, which found 
unconstitutional the mandatory sentencing of life without parole for juve-
niles convicted of any crime. These cases outlined three “general differ-
ences between juveniles under [eighteen] and adults.”101 These differences 
formed the basis of understanding the “diminished capacity” of a minor, 
including (1) a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsi-
bility, (2) a heightened susceptibility to negative influences and outside 
pressures, and (3) the fact that the character of a juvenile is “more transi-
tory” and “less fixed” than that of an adult.102 The Court based this conclu-
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sion on the emerging evidence of the juvenile brain, which does not reach 
full formation until between the ages of twenty- one to twenty- five.103 Last 
to form are the sections of the brain that address risk assessment, impulse 
control, and judgment. Therefore, the Court reasoned that the person un-
der eighteen should be recognized as one with a somewhat diminished 
capacity that will be eliminated with growth and maturity.
Categorically, the law understands that child offenders under eighteen 
years old have different brain functionality than adults. It should do the 
same for victims, as research suggests that the juveniles, not only juvenile 
offenders, differ from adults in their neurological, intellectual, emotional, 
and psychosocial development.104 This means that juvenile victims have 
the same limits regarding judgment, impulse control, and risk taking and 
thus demand increased protection. Juveniles also are uniquely vulnerable 
to victimization, and the effects of victimization on children are com-
pounded and enduring. Research specifically regarding victimization in-
dicates that the devastating effects of experiencing victimization as a child 
can be magnified due to the still developing brain of a juvenile. Maltreat-
ment “is considered more detrimental if it occurs during childhood and 
adolescence.”105 Victims of child sexual abuse and exploitation can experi-
ence “a substantial range of psychological problems . . . throughout [their] 
lives  .  .  . [including] depression, anxiety, psychosis, posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), guilt, fear, sexual dysfunction, substance abuse, and act-
ing out.”106 Victimization not only has long- term psychological and devel-
opmental effects when it occurs as this vulnerable age, but permanent 
neural development can be affected.107
Because of the increased vulnerability and increased harm experienced 
by juvenile victims, the laws implicating criminal victimization should 
consistently recognized as children those under eighteen years of age. This 
recognition of brain development would alleviate any suggestions of “con-
sent” of victims to exploitation or abuse, underscore the vulnerabilities of 
children’s undeveloped minds often exploited by offenders, and put into 
context the devastating impact of trauma on children.
Having a universal term for children is not to say that children have no 
rights vis- à- vis adults. Nor is it to say that there must be one universal age 
for all legal issues regarding children that applies to education, medical 
care, emancipation, and voting. It should, however, be uniform within 
specific fields, such as the field of child sexual abuse and exploitation. 
Therefore, in criminal law just as child offenders under the age of eighteen 
must be treated as distinct from adults due to their brain development, so 
too should victims under eighteen. Failure to do so creates a structure in 
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which juvenile offenders are held less culpable for their actions but 
victims— who possess the same characteristics— are viewed as adults with 
completely formed and matured intellect and self- possession.
The fair labeling principle supports this label. Consistent with inter-
national law and Supreme Court jurisprudence, victims under eighteen 
years of age should be considered children in a legal sense. This “goes to 
the heart of societal interpretations regarding the way in which a child is 
perceived. . . . Within communities if a child is seen as no different than 
an adult things such as child marriage and child pornography become 
acceptable.”108
B. “Sexually Abusive Images of Children”
The dominant American term for “sexually abusive images of children” is 
“child pornography.” The latter term is understood generally to refer to 
“representations of a child engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual ac-
tivities or representation of sexual parts of a child, the dominant charac-
teristic of which is depiction for a sexual purpose.”109 In the United States, 
this term is often defined as images of actual children engaged in “sexually 
explicit conduct.” Sexually explicit conduct in most jurisdictions is spe-
cifically defined as including “actual or simulated— (i) sexual intercourse, 
including genital- genital, oral- genital, anal- genital, or oral- anal, whether 
between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturba-
tion; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of any person.”110
These activities are severe, so the international and domestic commu-
nities have moved away from the use of “child pornography” to label such 
egregious images. They have adopted various terms, such as “child sexual 
abuse images,”111 “child abuse material,”112 “child abuse imagery,”113 or 
“sexually exploitive material.”114 They have done so because they have rec-
ognized that the term “child pornography” “does not accurately reflect its 
content, and implicitly implies consensual activity.”115 Many researchers 
have followed suit, noting that “[m]any professionals working in the area 
have expressed the belief that such terminology [“child pornography”] al-
lows us to distance ourselves from the true nature of the material. A pre-
ferred term is abuse images.”116 The term “child sexual abuse images” is 
being used increasingly in both the courts117 and state statutes.118 The mi-
gration from the term “child pornography” is attributable to the growing 
recognition that images of child sexual abuse are not younger versions of 
adult pornography.119 Rather, the term is often more accurately described 
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as “crime scene photos,” which document the sexual abuse of a child120 
either by memorializing the sexual contact or by filming or photograph-
ing the child in such a context.
This more enlightened and descriptive label is also grounded in the 
recognition that the sexual abuse occurs not only in the production of the 
images, but also in the many additional harms the victim suffers from the 
creation of the images. The UN NGO CRC has compiled a partial list of 
the harms caused by these images: (1) the harm children suffer in produc-
tion of the images; (2) the harm children suffer when the images are cop-
ied and/or circulated; (3) the harm suffered when possessors continue to 
exploit the children by their consumption of the images; (4) the harm pos-
session causes children by maintaining the demand for the images; (5) the 
harm caused by the images’ role in normalizing sexual abuse of children; 
(6) the harm caused by using the images to groom other victims; (7) the 
harm caused when such images are used to blackmail, intimidate, or co-
erce children; and (8) the harm caused by trading such images, which 
“works to rationalize and establish a sexual desire for children in the pub-
lic realm.”121 These images harm children in a variety of profound ways.
Although the organizations that monitor sexually abusive images of 
children have all recorded that such images are becoming increasingly 
violent and are containing images of younger and younger children, it is 
true that the content of such images is not uniform. The legal definition 
includes images as severe as masochism and bestiality, and it also includes 
lascivious displays of genitals. This has led a minority group to object to 
the term “child abuse images,” arguing that not all images depict abuse.
There are two flaws with this argument. First, it conflates “abuse” with 
“assault,” incorrectly suggesting that a child must be assaulted for an image 
to meet the definition of child pornography or child abuse images. Sec-
ond, it fails to understand what has been made clear by the law, courts, 
and research: the child in the image is abused and exploited both during 
the production and after the creation of the filmed or photographed “sex-
ually explicit” event conduct.”122
Children need not be assaulted on film in order to be victims of child 
pornography or sexually abusive images.123 These images are defined by 
content. If an image depicts a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct, 
then the image is child pornography or a sexually abusive image of a child. 
The images themselves are harmful and that is one of the social harms the 
laws attempt to address. In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court first 
recognized this harm and held the First Amendment does not protect 
child pornography.124 It did not extend First Amendment protection to 
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child pornography not because of the assault suffered in production, but 
rather because any children photographed in the sexually explicit context 
suffered “psychological, emotional and mental harm.”125 The Ferber Court 
listed five reasons for its holding, including the psychological harm result-
ing from the creation of a “permanent record” of the children’s “participa-
tion” in the images.126
In other words, the Court has always understood that the pictures 
themselves are harmful to children.127 This was later underscored in Os-
borne v. Ohio, when the Court noted the psychological harm of children 
from the “continued existence” of the images.128 Similarly, in dicta the 
Court has since indicated that even morphed images implicate the inter-
ests of real children and “[were] closer” to the images in Ferber, while 
virtual images, those with no actual children to be psychologically harmed, 
are not.129
Much of the confusion around the term “child sexual abuse images” 
focuses on the word “abuse.” Although the images need not depict an as-
sault to be abusive, one could still argue that the use of the word “abuse” 
suggests the images do have to display an assault to meet the definition. By 
using the noun “abuse,” this label could lead to such confusion. But label-
ing the images as only “exploitive” is underinclusive, as a significant por-
tion of the images traded depict assaults. The more precise word is per-
haps not “abuse,” because as used in this context, “abuse” is meant to 
describe the image itself, not necessarily what actually occurred in produc-
tion. As such, the more precise label would be the adjective “abusive,” not 
the noun “abuse.” Therefore, the most precise label that sufficiently en-
compasses the harm caused by the images and their content is “sexually 
abusive images of children.”
Fair labeling requires that these images be referred to as “sexually abu-
sive images of children.” This label more precisely describes the content 
and harm of the images. Furthermore, the term eliminates confusion be-
tween these materials and adult pornography. Finally, it remains a more 
precise description as to whether or not physical assault is committed in 
production. It is abundantly clear in the courts and the international com-
munity that these images harm children in many ways beyond harm in 
production, and this label indicates as much.
C. “Child Sex Trafficking”
Child sex trafficking is a form of organized child abuse.130 The language 
surrounding prostitution has often been contentious for a number of rea-
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sons. A small but vocal group of activists support legitimizing prostitu-
tion. The sharp difference in views of commercial sex is reflected by a split 
between those who label prostitution as “sex work” and those who reject 
such a label. Regardless of the debate over adult prostitution, this label 
clearly has no place regarding children, who are unable to consent to ex-
ploitation. To label children caught up in sex trafficking as “sex workers” 
suggests that they are engaged in labor rather than suffering as victims. As 
others have noted, “when prostitution is defined as labor, the predatory, 
pedophiliac purchase of a human being by a john becomes a banal busi-
ness transaction . . . the sexism, racism, and violent degradation of prosti-
tution fade from sight.”131
Many use the term “child prostitution.” While that term is preferable to 
the term “sex worker,” it is also problematic because it suggests equiva-
lence between a child and an adult prostitute. Ordinarily, when an adult 
has sexual contact with a child, society recognizes that as child sexual 
abuse, and society recognizes the child as a victim. When money is ex-
changed, however, some perceive the child not as a victim but as a crimi-
nal. The phrase “child prostitute” has several flaws.
First, implicating the child as a criminal evokes the applicable frame-
work of adult prostitution. It conveys that the child who is victimized is 
actually a willing participant in his or her exploitation.132 This connection 
is inaccurate because it fails to reflect the reality of both children and com-
mercial sex. The child is the victim because children are not capable of 
giving legal or, given what is known about the brain research, intellectual, 
consent to prostitution. Second, many children are driven to sex acts not 
only by force and coercion, but also by the need for survival. This “survival 
sex” occurs when a child engages in sexual contact or exploitation in ex-
change for a human need such as food, clothing, or shelter.133 Such a child 
takes no freely chosen course but has had his or her economic vulnerabil-
ity exploited further. Third, regarding commercial sexual exploitation, 
this concept of adult prostitution suggesting complicity in criminality is 
itself problematic. It reflects “an antiquated view that prostitution is a cho-
sen profession,” when in fact a majority of prostitutes are “pimp con-
trolled.”134 The social assumptions surrounding prostitution are also prob-
lematic because child victims of prostitution can then be assumed to be 
adult- like:
[T]hese constructions, on their own, fail to make it clear that chil-
dren cannot be expected to make an informed choice to prostitute 
themselves.  .  .  . These terms do not adequately express the child’s 
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experience of force, exploitation, and physical and psychological 
harm inflicted through their engagement in prostitution.135
Finally, the term does not merely suggest the child is a criminal, but a 
particular kind of criminal “unworthy of sympathy because they engage in 
conduct perceived to be degrading and objectionable.”136
Because of these concerns about the term “child prostitution,” the fair 
labeling principle indicates that “child sex trafficking victim” should be 
used to reference this form of victimization. Such a label conveys both the 
gravity of the harm and the condemnation of society.
Concerns about language within the context of child sex trafficking are 
not limited to victims. The transformation of the understanding of prosti-
tution of minors to child sex trafficking appropriately readjusts the focus 
from the child to the offender. Both “purchasers” and “sellers” are perpe-
trators of child sex trafficking, but neither term adequately label the role 
played by the offender.
Traditionally, the term “pimp” refers to a person who controls the child 
and obtains profits from her exploitation.137 While originally a technical 
term, it has moved into the mainstream vernacular and has been given a 
glamorous quality signifying money and power. Yet, far from being glam-
orous, “pimp controlled prostitution is characterized by extreme violence 
to break victims and establish total dominance over them.”138 Because 
“pimp” has become associated with glamor instead with this violence, it 
has become an inappropriate label for a human trafficker. Fair labeling 
would suggest that such individuals be referred to as “traffickers.”
Even more confusion exists regarding purchasers of children for sex. A 
“purchaser” of a child for sex has been given many labels: customer, client, 
or john. Such terms, while not necessarily glorifying, are indeed sanitizing 
and inaccurate. The terms “customer” or “client” are insufficient because 
they merely reaffirm the commercial nature of the exchange but eliminate 
from the description the exploitation. “John” simply is an innocuous label 
for the purchase of a victimized person by another. In fact, under the 
TVPA, one who obtains a child for a commercial sex act is a trafficker.139
Although both “purchaser” and “seller” of children for sex are “traffick-
ers,” they can play very different roles in the crime of child sex trafficking, 
and equating the terms by giving them the same label seems to violate fair 
labeling. A main feature of the fair labeling principle is to have the lan-
guage encompass both the severity of the crime as well as a mental state of 
the wrongdoing. Therefore, distinctions need be made between these two 
forms of traffickers. Thus, “third- party trafficker” has been recommended 
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to replace the term “pimp.” This denotes that a third party is facilitating 
the purchase of a human being and profiting from the action. However, a 
third party is not necessary for trafficking to take place.140 When one ob-
tains or entices a child into a commercial sex act, one engages in human 
trafficking as a first party. In such a case the purchaser could be labeled a 
“first- party trafficker.”
Although these suggested labels are more precise that “pimp” and 
“purchaser,” they suffer from another attribute: they sanitize the reality. 
Such terms are improvements, but they still have limitations: namely, they 
require explanation. Some use the term “sex purchaser” to more vividly 
elucidate the nature of purchaser’s actions, but this label conveys the im-
pression that the trafficker is purchasing only sex when, in reality, he is 
purchasing a person. Therefore, the label somewhat depersonalizes a very 
personal form of victimization, equating it almost with arms or narcotics 
trafficking. Therefore the most appropriate, if not ideal, labels are “first- 
party sex trafficker” for purchasers and “third- party sex traffickers” for 
“pimps.” These terms more precisely describe the activity and convey what 
is being trafficked, placing the activity squarely within the realm of human 
trafficking.
D. “Sexting”— “Child- Produced Child Pornography”— 
“Sexualized Images of Children”
In the mid- 2000s, when mobile technology became more advanced and 
widely available, some children began taking sexualized pictures of them-
selves and other children and some children distributed them. The con-
tent of the images and the circumstances surrounding the production of 
these images were very diverse. Some of these pictures were sexual but not 
explicit, while others were graphic and met the legal definition of child 
pornography, that is, they were visual depictions of a child or children 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Some of these pictures were of the 
person taking the picture, some were not. Some of the pictures were taken 
with the permission of the subject, some were not. Some of the pictures 
were taken of a consensual sexual act, while others were essentially videos 
or still images of a sexual assault. Some of these pictures were taken with-
out any coercion; others were the product of a range of coercive tactics 
from peer pressure to blackmail to threats.141
Despite significant distinctions in these images— differences in the 
content of the images and differences in the role that juveniles played in 
creating these images— a number of media outlets decided to label all 
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these diverse activities with one all- encompassing and glorifying label: 
“sexting.”142 This term is problematic for several reasons, including its 
overgeneralization, imprecision, and glorification of an act which, because 
of the perpetuity of the images, can cause “uniquely pernicious harm.”143
The term “sexting” does not conform to the fair labeling principle. In 
particular, it fails to distinguish images both in terms of content and the 
circumstances surrounding their production. The content of an image 
provides important information about the legal status of that image, most 
importantly whether it depicts sexually explicit conduct and, therefore, 
falls within the legal definition of child pornography or sexually abusive 
images of children. The circumstances surrounding its creation convey 
important information about the mental state of the individual who cre-
ated or distributed the image or important information about the level of 
harm caused by the image. Images that meet the definition of child por-
nography or sexually abusive images of children should retain a label that 
indicates that fact.
That is not to say that the images’ producers should always be prose-
cuted. Rather, that determination should be made on a separate basis.144 
Several images that do not meet the legal definition should be labeled as 
“sexualized images of children.” What is clear is that if there is an adult 
involved at all in the production, either in the grooming for its production 
or the taking of the images, these are not child- produced images but are 
the products of a sexually abusive or exploitive act by an adult with the 
child as a victim.
In recent years, some efforts have been made to define these acts more 
precisely. For example, Wolak and Finkelhor have used the label “youth- 
produced sexual images” and have made further distinctions between im-
ages, labeling some images “aggravated images” and others “experimental 
images.” The label “aggravated images” refers to images that possess a 
criminal or abusive aspect, such as the involvement of adults, the presence 
of extortion, or the distribution of these images without the subject’s 
knowledge. The label “experimental images” applies only to pictures taken 
by the subject and sent to an established partner or the target of a roman-
tic interest.145
The typology suggested by Wolak and Finkelhor is consistent with the 
author’s previous writing in this area. In the first law review article on the 
subject, the author suggested the term “self- produced” or “child- produced 
child pornography” for those images that meet the legal definition of child 
pornography, but called for a detailed system called “structured prosecu-
torial discretion in a multidisciplinary context” to distinguish those youths 
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whose actions do not deserve a legal response from those engaging in co-
ercive or malicious actions.146 However, in light of the aforementioned 
discussion surrounding “abuse,” “child- produced sexually abusive images 
of children” may be more accurate.147
These efforts are positive movements toward fair labeling. They do not 
overgeneralize and they capture the harm caused. For images that meet 
the definition of child pornography, or sexually abusive images of chil-
dren, child- produced sexually abusive images “more accurately describes 
the conduct of concern because ‘sexting’ may encompass material that 
fails to meet the narrower legal definitions of child pornography.”148
Conclusion
The fair labeling principle furthers the idea that labels play a significant 
role in the law. It requires that labels of criminal wrongdoing communi-
cate the gravity of the offense, the mental state of the offender, and the 
harm experienced by the victim. This principle can play an important role 
in the realm of child sexual abuse and exploitation. Given the complicated 
nature of this conduct and society’s reaction to it, careful and precise la-
bels are needed. Therefore, stakeholders should endeavor to ensure that 
the labels in this field reflect the true nature of the victimization. Conse-
quently, prevention efforts and responsive programs will become more ef-
fective as they target more specific conduct and harm.
Notes
 1. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112- 74, § 7008, 125 Stat. 786, 
1195–96 (2011).
 2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art II, 
Dec. 9, 1948, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81- 1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
 3. David Nersessian, Comparative Approaches to Punishing Hate: The Intersection of 
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 43 Stan. J. of Int’l L. 221, 221 (2007).
 4. Faustin Ntoubandi, When to Act: A State’s Obligations & Responsibilities Regarding 
Genocide, The Sentinel Project (June 14, 2013), http://thesentinelproject.org/when-
to-act-a-states-obligations-and-responsibilities-regarding-genocide/.
 5. Nersessian, supra note 3, at 221– 22.
 6. Linnea Manoshow, Comment, Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: Why the Distinc-
tion? A Discussion in the Context of the Atrocities Occurring in the Southern Sudan, 35 
Cal. W. Int’l. L.J. 303, 304, 309 (2005).
 7. James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Hate Crimes: A Critical Perspective, 22 
Crime & Just. 1, 30– 32 (1997).
Revised Pages
The Language of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation | 139
 8. Jacobs & Potter, supra note 7, at 30; Kathryn Carny, Note, Rape: The Paradigmatic 
Hate Crime, 75 St. John’s L. Rev. 315, 340 (2001).
 9. E.g., Ala. Code § 38– 9E- 4 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014– 09) (elder abuse 
and neglect); 13 Cal. Penal Code §368 (West 2004) (crimes against elder adults); S.C. 
Code Ann. §16- 3- 85 (2003) (homicide by child abuse); Utah Code Ann. §76- 5- 208 
(LexisNexis 2008) (child abuse homicide).
 10. White House Fact Sheet: The Violence Against Women Act, White House, www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/vawa_factsheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) 
(documenting improvements made since passage of VAWA); Senate Judiciary Comm. 
Majority Staff, Why the Violence against Women Act Matters (2012) available 
at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/042612VAWA-WhyVAWAMatters-
OnePager.pdf (same).
 11. Subgroup Against the Exploitation of Children, NGO Group for the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, Semantics or Substance? Towards a Shared 
Understanding of Terminology Referring to the Sexual Abuse and Exploita-
tion of Children 89 (2005).
 12. Lisa Thompson, Preferred Terminology for Sex Trafficking and Prostitution, 39 
Soc. Work & Christianity 481, 482 (2012).
 13. Toko Serita, In Our Own Backyards: The Need for a Coordinated Judicial Response 
to Human Trafficking, 36 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 635, 641 n.41 (2012).
 14. Id. at 642.
 15. E.g., Mary Elizabeth Williams, Polanski’s Victim Is Not a “Sex Scandal Teen,” Sa-
lon (Oct. 10, 2012, 12:20 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/10/10/polanskis_victim_
isnt_a_sex_scandal_teen/.
 16. See Jerry Sandusky Scandal, Centre Daily Times, www.centredaily.com/san 
dusky-scandal (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
 17. Thompson, supra note 12, at 482.
 18. Nersessian, supra note 3, at 224.
 19. Henry Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 405 
(1958).
 20. Nersessian, supra note 3, at 225.
 21. Id. at 224.
 22. 28 CFR § 1100.27 (2011).
 23. Gerald Uelman, Victim Rights in California, 8 St. John’s J. Legal Comment. 197 
(1972).
 24. Id. at 199.
 25. Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 86 (7th ed. 2013); James 
Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 Mod. L. Rev. 218, 237– 39 
(2008); Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling’s Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization Without 
Incarceration, 44 U.S.F. L. Rev. 459, 467 (2010).
 26. Nersessian, supra note 3, at 255– 56.
 27. Dennis Baker, Complicity, Proportionality, and the Serious Crime Act, 14 New 
Crim. L. Rev. 403, 405 (2011).
 28. Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 571, 578 
(2011).
 29. Chalmers & Leverick, supra note 25, at 226, 240.
 30. Id. at 226.
140 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
 31. Id.
 32. Barry Mitchell, Multiple Wrongdoing and Offense Structure: A Plea for Consistency 
and Fair Labelling, 63 Mod. L. Rev. 393, 399 (2001).
 33. Chalmers & Leverick, supra note 25, at 225 (2008) (quoting Jeremy Horder, Re-
thinking Non- fatal Offenses Against the Person, 14 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 335, 351 
(1994)).
 34. A. P. Simester & G. R. Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine 45 (2d 
ed. 2003).
 35. Chalmers & Leverick, supra note 25, at 226.
 36. Subgroup Against the Exploitation of Children, supra note 11, at 7.
 37. Id.
 38. David Finkelhor, Five Myths About Missing Children, Wash. Post, May 12, 2013, 
at B3.
 39. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Child Maltreatment 22 (2011); Janis 
Wolak, et al., Online Victimization of Youth: Five Years Later, 1– 2 (2006); Child 
Sexual Abuse Services, Nat’l Center for Victims of Crime, www.victimsofcrime.org/
media/reporting-on-child-sexual-abuse/child-sexual-abuse-statistics (last visited Feb. 
26, 2014).
 40. Serita, supra note 13, at 639.
 41. James H. Farrow, Psychological Context Leading Juveniles to Prostitu-
tion and Sexual Exploitation, Media, Legal and Social Aspects of Child Sexual 
Exploitation 337– 41 (2005).
 42. Ken Lanning, Child Molesters: A Behavioral Analysis 27 (5th ed. 2010).
 43. Mary Graw Leary, Worth a Few Appalled Words, Legal Times, Dec. 17, 2007.
 44. E.g., Karen Duffin, New Frontiers in Child Porn Law, On the Media (January 24, 
2014), http://www.onthemedia.org/story/new-frontiers-child-porn-law/; Jessica 
Gresko, Ex Teacher Writes Judge Overseeing Child Porn Case, Huffington Post (Feb. 
25, 2014, 2:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20140225/us-teacher-
child-pornography/?utm_hp_ref=politics&ir=politics; Supreme Court to Decide on 
Child Porn Victim Restitution, N.Y. Daily News (Jan. 20, 2014, 10:11 AM), http://www.
nydailynews.com/news/politics/supreme-court-decide-child-porn-victim-restitution-
article-1.1585302.
 45. Craig Bradley, With Narrow Reading of Child Porn Law, Court Dodges a Dilemma, 
Trial Mag. Aug. 2008, at 52; Russell Weaver, Speech & Technology, 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 
703, 704, 715 (2006); David L. Hudson, Reflecting on the Virtual Child Porn Decision, 36 
J. Marsh. L. Rev. 211 (2002).
 46. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 44, 20, 25, United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 
285 (2007) (No. 06- 694) (statements of Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Souter).
 47. Human Trafficking: Organized Crime and the Multi- Billion Dollar Sale of People, 
UNODC (July 19, 2012), www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/July/human-traf 
ficking-oranigzed-crime-sale-of-people.html.
 48. Jason S. Carroll, et al., Generation XXX, Pornography Acceptance and Use Among 
Emerging Adults, 23 J. Adolescent Res. 6, 7 (2008).
 49. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 n.2 (1973).
 50. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263– 65 (3rd Cir. 2001).
 51. Free Speech Coalition, Inc., www.freespeechcoalition.org (last visited Feb. 26, 
2014).
Revised Pages
The Language of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation | 141
 52. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses vi, 86– 87 
(2012) [hereinafter Child Pornography Report].
 53. Id. at 89.
 54. Testimony of Michelle Collins, Vice President, Exploited Children Div. & Assis-
tant to the President of Nat’l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children, to the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission, at 5 (February 15, 2012).
 55. Internet Watch Foundation, Internet Watch Foundation Annual & Char-
ity Report 11 (2011).
 56. Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy and Legislation, Dep’t of 
Justice, to Hon. William K. Sessions, III, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n at 6 (June 28, 2010).
 57. Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 Pace L. Rev. 847, 851 
(2008).
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
 59. Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: Empirical 
Validity of Political Rhetoric, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 545, 562– 67 (2011); Rogers, supra 
note 57, at 848– 52; see also United States v. Grinbergs, No. 8:05CR232, 2008 WL 419 
1145, at *2, *11 (D. Neb. Sept. 8, 2008).
 60. United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 533 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied, 558 U.S. 827 (2009).
 61. United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 251 (3rd Cir. 2007).
 62. E.g. Paul Cassell, James Marsh, & Jeremy Christiansen, The Case for Full Restitu-
tion for Child Pornography Victims, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 61 (2013); Rogers, supra note 
57.
 63. Chris Elliot, Open Door: Why the Term ‘Child Porn’ Should Not Be Used, The 
Guardian (June 5, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jun/06/
open-door-term-child-porn (quoting Internet Watch Foundation).
 64. Subgroup Against the Exploitation of Children, supra note 11, at 58.
 65. Am. Psychological Assoc., Report of the APA Task Force on the Sexual-
ization of Girls (2010).
 66. Id. at 2.
 67. Grooming Dynamic, Nat’l Ctr. for Victims of Crime, http://www.victimsof 
crime.org/media/reporting-on-child-sexual-abuse/grooming-dynamic-of-csa (last vis-
ited Feb. 26, 2014).
 68. Joseph Bova Conti & William Carson, An Investigation of Victim Dynamics in 
Prostitutes and Incarcerated Pedophiles, in Medical Legal and Social Science As-
pects of Child Sexual Exploitation 728– 29 (Sharon Cooper et al. ed., 2005).
 69. Anna Williams Shavers, Human Trafficking, The Rule of Law, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 9 S.C. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 39, 84– 85 (2012).
 70. Ron Scherer, A Siege on the Child- Porn Market, Christian Science Monitor 
(March 16, 2006), http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0316/p01s03-ussc.html.
 71. Timothy Lee, Here’s How Bitcoin Charmed Washington, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 
2013, 2:52 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/21/
heres-how-bitcoin-charmed-washington/.
 72. Child Pornography Report, supra note 52, at 232; U.S. Sentencing Comm’n , 
2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl. 4, 8 (2013). This is not dis-
similar from the federal bench, which is also overwhelmingly Caucasian and majority 
male as well. Russell Wheeler, Governance Studies at Brookings, The Changing 
142 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
Face of the Federal Judiciary app. at 11 tbl. 1 (2009); Jonathan Stubbs, A Demo-
graphic Snapshot of the Federal Judiciary: A Case for Change, NAACA News, Feb. 2011, at 
4.
 73. Child Pornography Report, supra note 52, at ii, 224; U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 
Report of the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentenc-
ing 3, 68 (2012) [hereinafter Booker Report].
 74. Child Pornography Report, supra note 52, at 225.
 75. Testimony of Michelle Collins, supra note 54, at 5.
 76. Alexandra Gelber, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Response to “A Reluctant Rebel-
lion” 8 (July 1, 2009).
 77. Hamilton, supra note 59, at 561.
 78. Subgroup Against the Exploitation of Children, supra note 11, at 6.
 79. Mary Graw Leary, Sexting or Self- Produced Child Pornography— The Dialog Con-
tinues: Structured Prosecutorial Discretional in a Multidisciplinary Context, 17 Va. J. Soc. 
Pol’y & Law 487, 505 (2009); Andrew Harris et al., Dep’t of Justice, Building a 
Prevention Framework to Address Teen “Sexting” Behaviors 3 (2013).
 80. Harris, supra note 79, at 3.
 81. Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, and Cultural Amnesia: What We Must Not 
Know in Order To Keep the Business of Sexual Exploitation Running Smoothly, 18 Yale 
J.L. & Feminism 109, 132 (2006).
 82. Ellen Wright Clayton, et al., Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Academs., Con-
fronting Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors in the United States 401 
(2013).
 83. Abigail Judge, “‘Sexting’ Among Adolescents: Psychological and Legal Perspectives, 
20 Harv. Rev. Psychiatry 86, 89 (2012).
 84. Harris, supra note 79, at 3.
 85. Judge, supra note 83, at 87.
 86. Subgroup Against the Exploitation of Children, supra note 11, at 18– 19.
 87. Id. at 7.
 88. Id. at 56– 57.
 89. Child Pornography Report, supra note 52, at ii, 224; Booker Report, supra 
note 73, at 3, 68.
 90. United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2013).
 91. Id. at 206– 8.
 92. Id. at 217.
 93. United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 510 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) reversed sub nom. 
United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2013).
 94. 738 F. Supp. 960, 962 (D. Neb. 2010).
 95. Save the Children, Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: Proposal for a 
New EU Legal Framework 5 (2009).
 96. Subgroup Against the Exploitation of Children, supra note 11, at 58.
 97. Lanning, supra note 42, at 112; Linnea Smith, et al., Commercial Sexual Exploita-
tion of Children in Advertising, in Medical, Legal and Social Aspects of Child Sex-
ual Exploitation, supra note 68, at 25– 59.
 98. Mary Graw Leary, Death to Child Erotica: How Mislabeling the Evidence Can Risk 
Inaccuracy in the Courtroom, 16 Cardozo J. L. and Gender 1, 8 n. 40– 41 (2009).
Revised Pages
The Language of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation | 143
 99. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women & Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime, art. 3(d), adopted Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2237 
U.N.T.S. 319; Convention of the Rights of the Child, art. 1, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3; International Labour Organization (no. 182) Convention Concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, art. 2, ad-
opted June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161.
 100. Subgroup Against the Exploitation of Children, supra note 12, at 62.
 101. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2008); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
 102. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 89 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring) (citing Roper, 
543 U.S. at 569– 71).
 103. Given this research, some have criticized the cutoff age of eighteen as too low. 
Presumably, the Court accepted eighteen because the research supports at a minimum, 
the previously adopted, if not universal age of eighteen as the latest possible age between 
childhood and adulthood. While arguments could be made for older ages, such would 
be a position outside any previously adopted legal conceptualization of children.
 104. Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, 
and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 793, 811– 817 (2005).
 105. Joan Reid and Christopher Sullivan, A Latent Class Typology of Juvenile Victims 
and Exploration of Risk Factors and Outcomes of Victimization, Criminal Justice and 
Behavior (2009).
 106. Eileen Vizard, Practitioner Review: The Victims and Juvenile Perpetrators of Child 
Sexual Abuse— Assessment and Intervention. Journal of Child Psychology and Psy-
chiatry 54: 503– 15 (2013). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcpp.12047.
 107. Id.
 108. Subgroup Against the Exploitation of Children, supra note 11, 62.
 109. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, art. 2(c), adopted May 25, 2000, 
2171 U.N.T.S. 227.
 110. 18 U.S.C. 2256(2)(a) (2012).
 111. E.g., Wolak, et al. supra note 39.
 112. Mary Aiken et al., Child Abuse Material and the Internet: Cyberpsychol-
ogy of Online Child Related Sex Offending 2 (2011).
 113. Google uses this term when warning a user that his search may lead to question-
able images. Protecting Children from Sexual Abuse, Google, www.google.com/landing/
protectchildren/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
 114. People v. Renander, 151 P.3d 657, 661 (Colo. App. 2006).
 115. Aiken, supra note 112, at 2.
 116. Ethel Quayle & Max Taylor, Child Pornography: An Internet Crime 
(2003); Janis Wolak, David Finkelhor & Kimberly J. Mitchell, Nat’l Ctr. For Miss-
ing & Exploited Children, Child- pornography Possessors Arrested in 
Internet- Related Crimes: Findings from the National Juvenile Online Victim-
ization Study vii n.1 (2005).
 117. See, e.g., United State v. Aguirre, 448 F. App’x 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Christman, 607 F.3d 1110,1113 (6th Cir. 2010); State v. Barger, 247 P.3d 309, 
310 (Or. 2011); State v. Hess, 178 N.C. App. 742 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
144 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
 118. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.145c(o) (West 2000); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
649- A:3- b (2009).
 119. Int’l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children, Child Pornography: 
Model Legislation & Global Review 7 (6th ed. 2010).
 120. Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 1981 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 112th Cong. 68 (2011) (statement of Ernie Allen, President and CEO, National 
Center for Missing & Exploited Children).
 121. Subgroup Against the Exploitation of Children, supra note 11, at 27– 28.
 122. Save the Children, supra note 95, at 5.
 123. Id.
 124. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
 125. Id. at 756– 58; Id. at 774– 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
 126. Id. at 759 (majority opinion).
 127. Leary, supra note 79, at 523– 27.
 128. 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
 129. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241– 42 (2002).
 130. Clayton, et al., supra note 82, at xi.
 131. Farley, supra note 81, at 111– 12.
 132. Clayton, et al., supra note 82, at 34.
 133. Id. at 402.
 134. Serita, supra note 13, at 642– 43; Press Release, N.Y. State United Court Sys., NY 
Judiciary Launches Nations First Statewide Human Trafficking Intervention Initiative 
(Sept. 25, 2013) available at http://www.nycourts.gov/press/PR13_11.pdf.
 135. Subgroup Against the Exploitation of Children, supra note 11, at 14.
 136. Serita, supra note 13, at 658.
 137. See id. at 641.
 138. Clayton, et al., supra note 82, at 643.
 139. 22 U.S.C. § 7802 (2012).
 140. United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2013).
 141. Leary, supra note 79 at 492– 93; Nat’l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren, Position Paper on Sexting (2010).
 142. Id.; Judge, supra note 83, at 87.
 143. Judge, supra note 83, at 89.
 144. Leary, supra note 79.
 145. Janis Wolak and David Finkelhor, Crimes Against Children Research 
Ctr., Sexting: A Typology 3 (2011).
 146. Leary, supra note 79, at 488.
 147. Id.
 148. Susan Hanley Duncan, A Legal Response Is Necessary for Self- Produced Child Por-
nography: A Legislator’s Checklist for Drafting a Bill, 89 Or. L. Rev. 645, 648 (2010).
Revised Pages
Part II (A) |  Refining Child 
Pornography Law




5 |  Questioning the Modern Criminal Justice 
Focus on Child Pornography Possession
Carissa Byrne Hessick
Recent years have seen a significant increase in the number of prosecu-
tions for possessing child pornography, as well as an increase in the crim-
inal penalties for that crime. The decisions to increase the number of pros-
ecutions and the length of sentences are, at bottom, decisions to invest 
more criminal justice resources in the detection, prosecution, and punish-
ment of those who possess child pornography. Although these decisions 
are often touted as decisions that protect children, this chapter questions 
whether the American criminal justice system ought to prioritize child 
pornography possession over other crimes in the fight to eliminate child 
sexual abuse and exploitation.
Instead of being a critical tool to protect children, the focus on posses-
sion crimes may be evidence that current law and law enforcement prac-
tices are misdirecting criminal justice resources. In focusing resources on 
those who possess child pornography instead of other crimes against chil-
dren, many American jurisdictions do not sufficiently take into account 
that possessing child pornography is one of the least serious crimes in-
volving the sexual abuse of children. The prevailing focus on child por-
nography possession may have the unintended consequence of leaving 
children less safe than a system that spends fewer resources on detecting, 
prosecuting, and punishing those who possess child pornography.
The chapter begins by identifying the modern criminal justice focus on 
child pornography possession. It then explains why those who possess 
child pornography pose less of a threat and cause less harm than those 
who create or distribute child pornography. In doing so, it questions the 
arguments that are generally given in support of the focus on child por-
nography possessors. Drawing an analogy to the war on drugs, the chapter 
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explains why focusing criminal justice resources on possession cases not 
only seems less fair but also does not seem calculated to sensibly reduce 
the availability of child pornography.
The chapter concludes by setting forth the unintended consequences of 
a criminal justice strategy that targets possessors of child pornography. It 
explains that the strategy creates incentives for law enforcement to spend 
fewer resources on cases involving direct sexual abuse of children. By 
cloaking child pornography cases in the rhetoric of protecting children, the 
strategy prevents the public from being able to accurately assess whether 
the focus on possession is an effective method for protecting children.
A. the High Number of Prosecutions and  
Penalties for Possession
As a general matter, the number of child pornography prosecutions has 
increased in recent years.1 And within the category of child pornography 
offenses, the number of possession cases far exceeds the number of pro-
duction or distribution cases. In the federal system, for example, the num-
ber of defendants sentenced and a breakdown of the proportions is shown 
in table 1.2 In addition to increasing the number of prosecutions for pos-
sessing child pornography, many American jurisdictions have signifi-
cantly increased the criminal penalties associated with possessing child 
pornography.3 For example, in 1990 federal law punished the possession 
of child pornography by up to ten years of imprisonment.4 In 1996, the 
maximum penalty was increased to fifteen years.5 In 2003 a mandatory 
minimum five- year sentence was added and the statutory maximum sen-
tence was raised from fifteen years to twenty.6 One recent report notes that 
TABLE 1. Federal Child Pornography Offenders

















% of CP 
cases in 
2011
Production 238 20.7% 292 20.2% 481 22.3%
Distribution 450 39.1% 385 26.7% 618 28.7%
Possession 463 40.2% 765 53.1% 1,061 49.1%
 Total 1,151  1,442  2,160  
aThe distribution of offenders into the categories of “possession” and “distribution” was accom-
plished by categorizing those offenders who were sentenced only for “simple receipt” as possessors 
rather than distributors. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, The History of the Child Pornog-
raphy Guidelines 48 (2009).
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the average sentence for child pornography defendants increased by 350 
percent in the ten years from 1997 to 2007.7
The federal government is not alone in increasing the penalties for 
possession. Thirty states have increased the penalties available for posses-
sion of child pornography since criminalizing it, and four states have in-
creased the penalties for possession of child pornography multiple times 
in the last twenty years.8
Some of the state sentencing increases have been particularly dramatic. 
For example, in 1995 Montana increased the maximum penalty for pos-
sessing child pornography from six months to ten years in prison.9 And in 
2003 Georgia reclassified possession of child pornography from a misde-
meanor to a felony with a mandatory minimum sentence of five years im-
prisonment and a maximum sentence of twenty years.10
In some jurisdictions, sentencing severity can be traced to statutory 
schemes that treat the possession of child pornography as equivalent to 
other child pornography crimes. For example, Arizona, Kansas, Missis-
sippi, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah all punish the possession of 
child pornography as harshly as they do the production of child pornog-
raphy.11 In other words, these jurisdictions punish those who abuse or 
exploit children to create child pornography the same amount as those 
who merely possess it. Arkansas, Louisiana, and the federal government 
punish possession of child pornography as harshly as distribution.12
Although some states explicitly equate the seriousness of possessing 
child pornography with the seriousness of producing or distributing child 
pornography, not all lengthy possession sentences can be traced to a con-
scious legislative choice. The fact that some child pornography possession 
defendants receive long sentences is attributable to the piling on of various 
sentencing enhancements. Most notably, a number of jurisdictions in-
crease sentences based on the number of images a child pornography of-
fender possesses,13 and several states treat each image possessed as a sepa-
rate criminal offense.14
Charging and plea bargaining practices also contribute to possession 
defendants receiving lengthy sentences. There is evidence that many defen-
dants convicted of possession end up serving significantly longer sentences 
than defendants who sexually abused children. For example, an Arizona 
defendant was sentenced to two hundred years’ imprisonment for the pos-
session of child pornography; the sentence was the result of a statutory 
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years15 in connection with a statu-
tory mandate that requires a consecutive sentence for each image pos-
sessed.16 (The defendant was charged with possessing twenty images.)17 
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The same Arizona state sentencing regime that sent a defendant to jail for 
two hundred years for possession also imposed a fifteen- year sentence on 
another defendant who twice molested a six- year- old girl; imposed a 
twenty- two- month sentence on a priest who molested an altar boy; and 
imposed a one- year sentence on a man who kidnapped and sexually as-
saulted a fourteen- year- old girl who was selling candy door to door.18
The Arizona case is not an isolated example. Troy Stabenow’s recent 
study of federal sentencing practices documents that a typical possessor of 
child pornography will receive a significantly longer sentence under the 
federal sentencing guidelines than will a defendant who engages in re-
peated sex with a twelve- year- old girl.19
In sum, those who possess child pornography are currently subject to 
high levels of enforcement and punishment. Certain jurisdictions explic-
itly classify child pornography possessors as deserving the same punish-
ment as those who produce or distribute child pornography. And even in 
those jurisdictions that do not explicitly provide for similar treatment, 
defendants charged with possession will sometimes serve longer sentences 
than defendants charged with creation or distribution of child pornogra-
phy because of statutory enhancements and plea bargaining practices. 
Those plea bargaining practices also sometimes result in sentences for 
child pornography possession that are longer than sentences for sexually 
abusing a child.
B. examining the Relative seriousness of Possession
That some jurisdictions classify child pornography possessors the same as 
producers or distributors reflects a legislative determination that posses-
sion is as serious as producing or distributing child pornography. And 
when child pornography possessors spend more time in prison than those 
who sexually abuse children, it suggests that child pornography offenders 
are more deserving of punishment than child molesters. Both of these 
conclusions are difficult to accept.
It may be useful to draw analogy to drug policy to understand why 
these conclusions about child pornography possession are troubling. In 
the late 1980s, the federal government changed its enforcement strategy 
with respect to illegal drugs, focusing not only on drug traffickers, but also 
on drug users.20 The decision to target users has since been subject to sig-
nificant criticism; in particular, critics question why resources are being 
used to arrest and incarcerate possessors and low- level dealers rather than 
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focusing on trafficking “kingpins.”21 Focusing on drug possessors rather 
than major suppliers is inefficient because the money used to detect, ar-
rest, and imprison a possessor results only in getting one “customer” off 
the street, rather than disrupting a supply chain to many customers.22 Per-
haps because of this criticism, state and federal governments occasionally 
protest that they rarely target low- level drug users for prosecution.23
In contrast, the states and the Department of Justice have vigorously 
defended their strategy of prosecuting and imprisoning child pornography 
possessors.24 Government officials have offered a number of reasons why 
aggressive enforcement and severe punishment are appropriate in child 
pornography possession cases. Each of those reasons is addressed below.
Before discussing these three arguments in favor of targeting child 
pornography possessors, it is worth noting that the analogy between child 
pornography possessors and drug possessors is far from perfect. One ob-
vious difference is that drugs can be produced, distributed, and consumed 
without harm to anyone except the consumer. The violence associated 
with the drug trade is a result of the illegal status of drugs, not an inherent 
aspect of the drugs themselves. In contrast, child pornography is created 
through the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child. Because the salient 
harms associated with drugs are internalized by drug possessors but the 
harms associated with creating child pornography are not internalized by 
possessors, one might argue that the arguments against pursuing a law 
enforcement strategy against drug possessors are not persuasive in the 
child pornography context.
The lack of external harm caused by drug possessors is certainly a good 
reason for punishing child pornography offenders more harshly than drug 
offenders. But it does not suggest that many of the criticisms about the 
incarceration of drug possessors and low- level dealers do not apply to 
child pornography crimes. In both the drug and the child pornography 
context, focusing on possessors and low- level distributors is not only less 
effective than targeting trafficking “kingpins,” but it also fails to target 
those individuals who are more blameworthy— that is to say, those who 
have committed a more serious crime.
Now let us turn to the major arguments that law enforcement has of-
fered in defense of their policies of actively targeting child pornography 
offenders: (1) that focusing on possession helps dry up the market for 
child pornography, which will ultimately reduce the creation of such im-
ages; (2) that child pornography possessors pose a significant risk of mo-
lesting children, and thus focusing on their arrest and prosecution will 
help protect children; and (3) that because child pornography possession 
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is as serious or worse than other child exploitation crimes, it is appropriate 
to focus significant law enforcement resources on possession cases.
1. The Market Theory
The first reason for aggressive enforcement against possessors is that they 
drive the market for the creation of child pornography.25 If people did not 
want to view these images, so the argument goes, there would be no incen-
tive for other individuals to create these images and the market for these 
images would dry up. And because the creation of child pornography in-
volves the sexual exploitation or abuse of children, those individuals who 
possess child pornography are arguably responsible for the abuse and ex-
ploitation of the children in the images. Essentially, this market theory 
argument is a claim that targeting child pornography possessors is an ef-
fective way to end the creation and distribution of child pornography. 
More fundamentally, the market theory argument rests on the assumption 
that creation and distribution are the more serious crimes, and that the 
focus on possession offenders is not justified simply in order to end pos-
session itself, but rather to stop production and distribution.
There is significant reason to doubt the market theory argument. In 
particular, the market theory is problematic because the so- called child 
pornography market does not function as a commercial market. Many 
individuals who create and distribute child pornography do not make a 
profit, but instead appear to be motivated by a desire for status.26 Because 
those who produce child pornography are not motivated by economic 
gain, the standard market theory that eliminating demand will eventually 
reduce the supply does not necessarily apply. Indeed, those who champion 
the market theory do not rely on any empirical evidence that arresting and 
prosecuting possessors has affected the production of child pornography; 
instead they simply rely on the logical appeal of the standard economic 
argument.27
2. Possessors Have Molested or Will Molest Children
Another argument often raised in favor of targeting child pornography 
possessors is that the possessors themselves pose a risk to children. The 
risk is sometimes framed as “inflaming” those who look at the images, 
making them more likely to molest a child in the future.28 Sometimes the 
risk is framed as an argument that those who possess child pornography 
have already molested children, but that those crimes have gone unde-
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tected.29 A recent Department of Justice memorandum, for example, 
stated that the lack of previous convictions for possession offenders often 
“hides years of systemic criminal behavior. The defendants simply had 
never been caught— the anonymous nature of internet- based crimes and 
the silent and secret nature of sex crimes in general (particularly with a 
vulnerable population such as children) protect defendants from detec-
tion by law enforcement whether they are collectors or molesters.”30
Like the market theory, the risk theory rests on shaky ground. A num-
ber of critics have explained in detail that the supposed risk posed by child 
pornography possessors to children is not supported by reliable evi-
dence.31 In justifying lengthy punishments for child pornography possess-
ors, legislators, courts, prosecutors, and interest groups regularly rely on 
two studies from the Butner Federal Prison.32 The Butner studies rely on 
self- reporting by inmates incarcerated for various crimes, including child 
pornography possession. Based on admissions made by the inmates, the 
studies report that most of the child pornography offenders had also com-
mitted sexual assaults, and that they, on average, victimized large numbers 
of individuals.33 It is not surprising that government officials regularly rely 
on the Butner studies to justify the modern criminal justice focus on pos-
sessors. That is because these studies suggest that it is much more likely 
that someone convicted of child pornography possession also molested a 
child than do other studies of child pornography offenders.34
But there are significant reasons to doubt whether the Butner studies 
actually demonstrate that child pornography possessors pose a risk of mo-
lesting children.35 A recent article in the New Yorker magazine reports that 
the inmates participating in the Butner studies were under significant pres-
sure to admit to having sexually assaulted numerous victims, and that a 
number of inmates have since stated that their self- reports were fabri-
cated.36 Notably, one of the Butner study authors has expressed concern 
that the results of the study have been “misused” to support a claim that the 
majority of child pornography offenders are also child molesters, a claim 
that the author characterizes as “not supported by the scientific evidence.”37
In addition to the Butner studies, government officials repeatedly rely 
on the “general view” among law enforcement that “possessors of child 
pornography are invariably actual or potential child sex abusers.”38 A re-
cent memorandum from the Department of Justice stated that “you can 
talk to any prosecutor or investigator in this area and they will tell you in 
no uncertain terms that with frightening frequency, investigations of of-
fenders for possession, receipt or distribution offenses ultimately uncover 
evidence that the offender was also abusing children.”39
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There are reasons to be skeptical of these general impressions from law 
enforcement about the link between child pornography possession and 
child molestation. A 2005 study of child pornography possession investiga-
tions revealed that in 84 percent of cases investigators did not detect either 
child sex abuse or attempted child sex abuse.40 One might wonder why law 
enforcement’s general impressions diverge from the social science evi-
dence; perhaps it is because situations involving both child pornography 
possession and child molestation are more salient to law enforcement than 
situations involving possession alone. That is to say, officers are more likely 
to recall situations involving possession and molestation and thus overesti-
mate the frequency with which it occurs. The difference between these gen-
eral impressions and the actual rate of possessors engaging in abuse may 
also be attributable to the fact that officers may have “strong suspicions” 
about whether a possessor is also victimizing children but are unable to 
locate evidence to support those suspicions.41
3. Possession Is as Bad As or Worse Than Abuse
The third argument in favor of focusing criminal justice resources on child 
pornography possessors is that child pornography possession is as serious 
as or worse than other child exploitation crimes. Unlike the market theory 
argument and the risk argument, this argument does not target criminal 
justice resources at possession cases as a way to indirectly reduce the cre-
ation of child pornography, nor as a way to prevent child molestation. In-
stead this argument justifies the focus on child pornography possession on 
its own terms, often by repeating statements from victims that suggest that 
those who possess child pornography images inflict greater harm on them 
than did the people who created the images.42 A recent memorandum from 
the Department of Justice’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, for 
example, quoted one child pornography victim as saying, “I’m more upset 
about the pictures on the Internet than I am about what [the defendant] 
did to me physically.” It quoted another as saying “thinking about all those 
sick perverts viewing my body being ravished and hurt like that makes me 
feel like I was raped by each and every one of them.”43
That some victims of child pornography believe that the viewing of 
child pornography is more harmful than the sexual abuse they suffered 
when the images were created is a powerful, emotional argument in favor 
of focusing child pornography resources on child pornography posses-
sion, even at the expense of pursuing those who create and distribute such 
images. After all, criminal justice resources should be focused on the most 
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serious crimes, and the amount of harm a crime inflicts on the victim is a 
primary measure of serious a crime is.
But we should hesitate before we allow the statements of these victims 
to dictate criminal justice policy. For one thing, the harm of child pornog-
raphy possession described by the victims is often framed in terms of the 
psychological harm to the victim that these images have been widely cir-
culated and viewed by many individuals.44 If it is the widespread circula-
tion that harms child pornography victims the most, then instead of tar-
geting possessors it would be more effective to target those who distribute 
these images to large numbers of individuals.45
For another, although individual victims may perceive the crime of 
child pornography possession as being equivalent to or worse than child 
sex abuse, that does not appear to be a widely held belief. As noted above, 
there are several jurisdictions that classify the possession of child pornog-
raphy as deserving the same punishment as the creation of child pornogra-
phy. But those jurisdictions are outliers. Most states classify the creation 
and distribution of child pornography as more serious crimes than posses-
sion. And many states treat the sexual assault of a child as one of the most 
serious crimes possible. Indeed, although the Supreme Court has since de-
clared the practice unconstitutional, a number of states historically im-
posed the death penalty for the rape of a child.46 Although these criminal 
laws are the result of representative governments rather than public refer-
enda, they are much more reliable indicators of the public perception of 
crime seriousness than are statements by an individual crime victim.
Finally, this argument may have the unintended consequence of per-
petuating the underreporting of sex crimes. That is because the harm of 
child pornography is often described as exacerbating the harm to victims 
of child sex abuse because the images of that abuse may haunt them for 
years to come.47 There is little doubt that having images of sexual abuse 
circulated and viewed by others is a serious invasion of privacy and an af-
front to personal dignity; Paul G. Cassell, James R. Marsh, and Jeremy M. 
Christiansen detail the lasting and serious harms associated with repeated 
viewings of child pornography in chapter 7. But the idea that these images 
haunt their child victims may ultimately reinforce the pernicious secrecy 
associated with child sex abuse. Child sex abuse victims are often subject 
to repeated abuse at the hands of their abusers. The abuse continues be-
cause offenders are able to manipulate their victims into keeping the abuse 
secret.48 The claim that viewing child pornography causes more harm to 
the victims than the sexual abuse when the images were created taps into 
this pernicious culture of secrecy by perpetuating the idea that allowing 
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others to see pictures of the abuse— that is, revealing the secret of the 
abuse— is as bad as or worse than the abuse itself.49
C. Unintended Consequences of targeting Possessors
Just as targeting drug users is not the most effective way to combat illegal 
drugs, focusing criminal justice resources on child pornography possess-
ors is not the best way to protect children from sexual abuse and stop the 
proliferation of child pornography. Aside from concerns about efficiency, 
there are two additional arguments that counsel against focusing law en-
forcement resources on the possession of child pornography. First, be-
cause child pornography possession is easier to detect and to prosecute 
than child sex abuse, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices 
may already have disproportionately strong incentives to devote more en-
ergy to child pornography cases than to child sex abuse cases. Second, 
because the modern rhetoric surrounding the criminalization and pun-
ishment of child pornography crimes conflates child pornography posses-
sion and child sex abuse, the public may not be able to accurately assess 
how law enforcement is focusing its resources, that is, whether they are 
spending sufficient time and attention on child molestation cases as com-
pared to child pornography cases.
1. Ease of Enforcement and Prosecution
There are a number of reasons that child sex abuse cases are more difficult 
to prosecute than possession of child pornography cases. First, child mo-
lestation is, as a general matter, difficult to detect.50 Law enforcement of-
fices largely rely on reports from individuals to pursue sex abuse cases.51 
There is significant evidence that sex abuse cases are underreported,52 of-
ten because offenders threaten their victims into silence.53 In contrast, law 
enforcement can detect those who possess child pornography by tracing 
IP addresses of those who visit pornographic sites or by engaging in sting 
operations.54 In other words, law enforcement need not wait for victims or 
third parties to report a child pornography crime, but instead they can 
proactively seek and identify child pornography offenders.
Second, once child sex abuse is detected, there are evidentiary prob-
lems associated with pursuing many child molestation cases. Lack of 
physical evidence, problems with the credibility of child witnesses, or the 
unwillingness of the victim’s family to have their child suffer through the 
Revised Pages
Questioning the Modern Criminal Justice Focus on Possession | 157
trauma of a trial may convince a prosecutor either to offer a favorable plea 
bargain or even to dismiss the case altogether.55 Similar issues rarely arise 
in possession cases because, once law enforcement obtains a warrant and 
seizes an offender’s computer, the prosecution essentially has all the evi-
dence it needs to obtain a conviction. Prosecutors in child pornography 
possession cases need not worry about victim credibility or about a vic-
tim’s willingness to testify.
Because child pornography crimes are easier to detect and easier to 
prosecute, police and prosecutors have an incentive to devote more re-
sources to child pornography cases than to child molestation cases. Put 
simply, pursuing child pornography crime results in “more bang” for the 
law enforcement “buck.”56 While it is difficult to prove that these incen-
tives are actually resulting in law enforcement’s prioritizing child pornog-
raphy cases over child sex abuse cases, the fact that child pornography 
arrests have increased so dramatically in recent years may be evidence of 
such incentives.57 This is especially troubling because the number of child 
pornography offenses appears to be much lower than other sex offenses 
involving children.58 Thus, focusing on child pornography possession 
may result not only in the prioritization of less serious crime (child por-
nography possession), it may also result in too few resources for the more 
commonly committed crime (child sex abuse).
2. The Role of Public Opinion
One might think that law enforcement’s incentives to prioritize child por-
nography cases would be overcome by public pressure to combat child 
molestation. That is because ease of enforcement is not the only issue that 
the public cares about; they also care about preventing and punishing 
more serious crimes. For example, while it may be far easier to prosecute 
traffic and parking violations than murder, public opinion would not per-
mit law enforcement to prioritize traffic tickets above a murder investiga-
tion. Similarly, we would expect that public opinion would keep law en-
forcement from pursuing less serious child pornography cases at the 
expense of pursuing more serious child sex abuse cases.
Although public opinion ordinarily ensures that more serious crime 
receives significant law enforcement resources, there is reason to doubt 
that this is the case with child pornography. The current reporting meth-
ods for child pornography prosecutions may mislead the public into over-
estimating law enforcement’s success combating child sex abuse. The pub-
lic may believe that law enforcement is devoting a lot of resources to 
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combating child sex abuse because reports about enforcement in this area 
often use the ambiguous term “child sexual exploitation.” That term en-
compasses a wide range of activities, from the possession of child pornog-
raphy to the sexual molestation of children.59 Reporting arrest and pros-
ecution statistics using the term “exploitation” obscures whether the 
offenses at issue are contact offenses, such as molestation, or noncontact 
offenses, such as the possession of child pornography. Examples of this 
ambiguity can be seen in reports from both federal and state agencies.60
Law enforcement creates further ambiguity when they refer to child 
pornography possessors as “predators” or “pedophiles.”61 Because those 
terms are generally understood to refer to individuals who molest chil-
dren, the public might misunderstand such statements as reports about 
child molesters, rather than child pornography offenders.
If reporting methods and statements by law enforcement mislead the 
public into believing that the arrest and prosecution rates associated with 
child pornography possession are instead associated with child molesta-
tion, then public opinion will not act as a counterbalance to law enforce-
ment incentives to pursue the easy child pornography cases. If the public 
were aware of law enforcement’s relatively low success rate in detecting 
and prosecuting child sex abuse, then there would likely be political pres-
sure on law enforcement to develop more effective techniques to detect 
and prevent those crimes. But if successes in child pornography cases are 
portrayed as successes in child sexual abuse cases, then such political 
pressure will never develop.
D. Conclusion
A large amount of criminal justice resources are currently focused on ar-
resting, prosecuting, and punishing those who possess child pornography. 
Although campaigns against possession crimes have been criticized in 
other contexts— most notably in the war on drugs— government actors 
have been quick to defend the current policies of aggressive enforcement 
and severe punishment for child pornography possessors. But the argu-
ments in favor of those policies are significantly flawed.
I do not mean to question whether the possession of child pornogra-
phy ought to be illegal.62 Because the creation of child pornography re-
quires the sexual exploitation or abuse of children, there is ample reason 
to prohibit individuals from acquiring those images. My complaint is with 
the amount of criminal justices resources that are being focused on the 
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possession of child pornography, as compared to the resources focused on 
the creation of child pornography, the widespread distribution of child 
pornography, and the many instances of child sex abuse that do not result 
in the creation of child pornography. Some legal regimes explicitly state 
that possessing child pornography ought to receive the same punishment 
as producing or distributing child pornography. And in other legal re-
gimes, statutory sentencing enhancements and plea bargaining practices 
result in defendants who possess child pornography receiving longer sen-
tences than defendants who sexually molest a child.
The physical, sexual abuse of a child, the creation of child pornography, 
and the distribution of child pornography are all more serious crimes than 
the possession of child pornography. Modern American criminal law and 
the focus of modern criminal justice resources should reflect that reality.
Notes
 1. For data on the increase in federal cases, see Bureau of Justice Statistics, Fed-
eral Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation Offenders, 2006 at 1 (2007) (report-
ing that the number of federal child pornography cases rose from 169 in 1994 to 2,539 
in 2006). State prosecutions have also increased. Compare Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2001 at 5 (2002) (reporting that 30 percent of 
state prosecutors’ offices prosecuted cases involving the transmission of child pornogra-
phy in the previous twelve months) with Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prosecutors 
in State Courts, 2005 at 5, tbl. 6 (2006) (reporting that 67 percent of state prosecutors’ 
offices prosecuted cases involving the transmission of child pornography in the previous 
twelve months).
 2. This table was created from data reported in the following sources: U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission, Use of Guidelines and Specific Offense Characteristics Fiscal 
Year 2011, at 40– 42; U.S. Sentencing Commission, Use of Guidelines and Specific 
Offense Characteristics Fiscal Year 2007, at 35– 37; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
Use of Guidelines and Specific Offense Characteristics Fiscal Year 2005, at 34– 
36. Some percentages do not add to 100 percent because of rounding.
 3. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child 
Sex Abuse, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 853, 856– 64 (2011) (documenting the modern trend of 
increasing criminal penalties for child pornography possession).
 4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1990).
 5. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 208, § 121(5), 
110 Stat. 3009- 26, 3009- 30, invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 
(2002).
 6. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108- 21, §  103(a)(1)(B)(i), 117 Stat. 650, 652 
(2003) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)). The maximum penalty was in-
creased from fifteen to twenty years for “receiving” child pornography. The legislation 
also increased the maximum penalty for possession from five to ten years. PROTECT 
Act § 103(a)(1)(C)(i). Because receipt is a necessary component for possession, it is the 
160 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
twenty- year maximum penalty that represents the true exposure for offenders who pos-
sess child pornography.
 7. Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, A.B.A. J., June 2009.
 8. Hessick, supra note 3, at 857– 59 (collecting sources).
 9. H.R. 161, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1995) (codified as amended at Mont. Code 
Ann. § 45- 5- 625(2)(c) (2009)).
 10. H.R. 462, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003) (codified at Ga. Code Ann. § 
16- 12- 100 (2003)).
 11. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §  13- 3553 (2010); Kan. Stat. Ann. §  21- 3516(c) (2007); 
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97- 5- 33, 97- 5- 35 (2006); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1021.2 (2002); S.D. 
Codified Laws § 22- 24A- 3 (2006); Utah Code Ann. § 76- 5a- 3 (2010). Wyoming treats 
subsequent child pornography possession offenses the same as subsequent convictions 
for manufacture or distribution of child pornography, though it distinguishes between 
possession and manufacture and distribution for first offenses. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6- 4- 303(d), (e) (2009).
 12. Ark. Code. Ann. § 5- 27- 602 (2006); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:81.1(A)(2), (E)(3) 
(2004).
The federal statutory scheme is complicated. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2006) prohibits 
four distinct categories of conduct: (1) transporting or shipping child pornography in 
interstate or foreign commerce; (2) receiving or distributing child pornography that has 
been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; (3) selling, or 
possessing with intent to sell, child pornography that has been mailed or shipped in in-
terstate or foreign commerce; and (4) knowingly possessing child pornography that has 
moved in interstate or foreign commerce. The statute appears to treat simple possession 
less harshly than other conduct, as it is punishable by a maximum sentence of ten years 
with no mandatory minimum, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), while the other three categories 
are punishable by a minimum sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of twenty 
years, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). But in reality most possessors of child pornography are 
subject to the five- to twenty- year sentence for “receiving” because most child pornog-
raphy is found on the Internet and it “is generally necessary to receive pornography in 
order to possess it.” United States v. Sudyka, No. 8:07CR383, 2008 WL 1766765, at *8 (D. 
Neb. Apr. 14, 2008).
 13. For example, Connecticut differentiates between various degrees of possession 
based on the number of images an offender possesses. See Conn. Gen. Stats. § 53a- 196f 
(possessing child pornography in the third degree; Class D felony; fewer than twenty 
images; minimum one year imprisonment); Conn. Gen. Stats. § 53a- 196e (possessing 
child pornography in the second degree; Class C felony; between twenty and forty- nine 
images; minimum two years imprisonment); Conn. Gen. Stats. § 53a- 196d (possessing 
child pornography in the first degree; Class B felony; fifty or more images; minimum five 
years imprisonment). And the federal sentencing scheme also provides for sentencing 
increases based on the number of images possessed. USSG §2G2.2(b)(7).
 14. Alaska Stat. §11.61.127(c); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13- 3551(11), - 3553(A)(2); Fl. 
Stat. Ann. § 827.071(5); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 17- 1003(b), (d); Utah Code Ann. § 76- 
5a- 3(3).
 15. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13- 705(D) (2010) (possession of child pornography that 
depicts a minor under the age of fifteen is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 
ten years’ imprisonment). The state provides the same penalties for possession of child 
Revised Pages
Questioning the Modern Criminal Justice Focus on Possession | 161
pornography as it does for “molestation of a child, commercial sexual exploitation of a 
minor, . . . aggravated luring a minor for sexual exploitation, child abuse [and] kidnap-
ping” of a child. Id.; State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006).
 16. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13- 705(M) (2010) (“The sentence imposed on a person . . . 
shall be consecutive to any other sentence imposed on the person at any time. . . .”).
 17. Berger, 134 P.3d at 379.
 18. Supplemental Brief for Appellant, State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006) (No. 
CR- 05- 0101), 2006 WL 1002320 at *1– 2.
 19. Troy Stabenow, Fed. Pub. Defender Office, Deconstructing the Myth of 
Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed Progression of the Child Pornography 
Guidelines 26– 29 (rev. ed. 2009), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/childpornju 
lyrevision.pdf.
 20. See Mark C. Donovan, Taking Aim: Target Populations and the Wars on 
AIDS and Drugs 36 (2001); Michael Schecter, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture 
Laws, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1151, 1151 n.2 (1990).
 21. See, e.g., The Sentencing Project, Disparity By Geography: The War on 
Drugs in America’s Cities 31 (2008); Michèle Alexandre, Sex, Drugs, Rock & Roll and 
Moral Dirigisme: Toward a Reformation of Drug and Prostitution Regulations, 78 UMKC 
L. Rev. 101, 108 (2009); Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal 
Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 Chap. L. Rev. 555, 579 (2010).
 22. See Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug 
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 651, 698 (2002).
 23. E.g., Kreit, supra note 21, at 579 (noting that the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy has made it a point to emphasize that the federal government rarely targets drug 
users); Arizona Sentencing Report, Top 5 Myths About Arizona’s Sentencing Laws, 
available at http://azsentencing.org/component/content/article/35-services/112-top-
myths-about-arizona-sentencing-laws#myth3 (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) (“Fewer than 
100 of the roughly 40,000 inmates in our prison system are there for possessing drugs— 
and most of these convicts pled their cases down from more serious offenses. All other 
drug offenders in our prisons are there for narcotics trafficking, a serious crime with 
enormous economic and societal costs.”).
 24. See Alexandra Gelber, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Response to “A Reluctant Re-
bellion” (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/downloads/Reluc 
tantRebellionResponse.pdf; Daisy Flores, Why Arizona Is Tough on Child Pornography, 
Arizona Sentencing Report, available at http://azsentencing.org/issues/118-arizona-
is-tough-on-child-pornography (last visited Sept. 9, 2013).
 25. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990); see also Suzanne Ost, Child 
Pornography and Sexual Grooming: Legal and Societal Responses 114– 15 
(2009) (collecting sources making this argument).
 26. See Philip Jenkins, Beyond Tolerance: Child Pornography on the Inter-
net 91 (2001); Ost, supra note 25, at 113.
 27. See Ost, supra note 25, at 116.
 28. E.g., Gelber, supra note 24, at 4 (“[W]hat is the point of any pornography if not 
to stoke the fires of sexual desire.”); see also Hessick, supra note 3, at 871– 72 (collecting 
sources making this argument).
 29. See Hessick, supra note 3, at 882 (collecting sources making this argument).
 30. Gelber, supra note 24, at 6.
162 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
 31. See, e.g., Ost, supra note 25, at 108– 13; Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography 
Crusade and Its Net- Widening Effect, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1679, 1694– 1716 (2012); Hes-
sick, supra note 3, at 873– 80, 882– 86; Neil Malamuth & Mark Huppin, Drawing the Line 
on Virtual Child Pornography: Bringing the Law in Line with the Research Evidence, 31 
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 773 (2007); Michael C. Seto & Angela W. Eke, The Criminal 
Histories and Later Offending of Child Pornography Offenders, 17 Sexual Abuse 201 
(2005).
 32. See Hamilton, supra note 31, at 1699– 1703 (collecting numerous examples of how 
these studies have been used to justify the modern criminal justice focus on child por-
nography possession as protecting children from child sex abuse). For two specific ex-
amples of such justifications, see Gelber, supra note 24, at 6; Flores, supra note 24.
 33. The first study reported that 76 percent of offenders had molested children, with 
an average of 30.5 victims per offender; the second reported that 85 percent of offenders 
had molested children, with an average of 13.56 victims per offender. See Andres E. 
Hernandez, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Self- Reported Contact Sexual Offenses by 
Participants in the Federal Bureau of Prison’s Sex Offender Treatment Pro-
gram: Implications for Internet Sex Offenders (2000), available at http://www.
ccoso.org/library articles/Hernandez et al ATSA 2000.pdf; Michael L. Bourke & Andres 
E. Hernandez, The “Butner Study” Redux: A Report on the Incidence of Hands- On Child 
Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. Fam. Violence 183 (2009).
 34. See Rachel Aviv, The Science of Sex Abuse, The New Yorker (Jan. 14, 2013); Mi-
chael C. Seto, et al., Contact Sexual Offending By Men Arrested for Child Pornography 
Offenses, 23 Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment 124 (2011).
 35. See Hamilton, supra note 31, at 1703– 10 (cataloging a serious of shortcomings 
with the study).
 36. See Aviv, supra note 34.
 37. Andres E. Hernandez, Psychological and Behavioral Characteristics of 
Child Pornography Offenders in Treatment 4– 5 (2009), available at http:// www.
iprc.unc.edu/G8/Hernandez_position_paper_Global_Symposium.pdf.
 38. Ost, supra note 25, at 111 (collecting sources).
 39. Gelber, supra note 24, at 7.
 40. Janis Wolak et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Child- 
Pornography Possessors Arrested in Internet- Related Crimes: Findings From 
the National Juvenile Online Victimization Study 17 (2005), available at http://
www.missingkids. com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf.
 41. See id.
 42. See Hessick, supra note 3, at 866 (collecting sources making this argument).
 43. Gelber, supra note 24, at 3.
 44. E.g., Gelber, supra note 24, at 3, 18; Paul G. Cassell, James Marsh, and Jeremy M. 
Christiansen, The Case for Full Restitution for Child Pornography Victims, 82 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 61, 70– 71 (2013).
 45. Cf. United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 991– 92 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that in 
the context of restitution, unlike a distributor of child pornography, it is unclear what 
harm a child pornography possessor inflicts on the victim).
 46. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 422– 23 as modified (Oct. 1, 2008), opin-
ion modified on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
Revised Pages
Questioning the Modern Criminal Justice Focus on Possession | 163
 47. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759– 60 & n.10 (1982).
 48. “Abused children are often told not to disclose [the sex abuse] to anyone. . . . Se-
crecy is usually reinforced by violence, threats of violence or punishment. Sometimes we 
find a mixture of threats and bribery where the secondary gain of bribes and of special 
treatment maintains the secrecy, which is nonetheless basically founded on threats.” Til-
man Furniss, The Multi- professional Handbook of Child Sexual Abuse 24 
(1991); see also Carla van Dam, The Socially Skilled Child Molester: Differenti-
ating the Guilty from the Falsely Accused 84 (2006); Amy Hammel- Zabin, The 
Mind of a Child Molester, Psychol. Today, July 1, 2003, http://www.psychologytoday.
com/articles/200306/the-mind-child-molester.
 49. Corey Rayburn Yung has made a related observation with respect to the modern 
discussion of rape being a fate worse than death, that is, that “the rhetoric comparing 
death to rape contributes to a cultural norm built upon Victorian artifacts that elevates 
wom[e]n’s chastity to the very essence of their identity.” Corey Rayburn, Better Dead 
than R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital Rape Statutes, 78 St. John’s L. 
Rev. 1119, 1154 (2004).
 50. See Howard N. Snyder, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sexual Assault of 
Young Children as Reported to Law Enforcement: Victim, Incident, and Of-
fender Characteristics 11 (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/saycrle.pdf [hereinafter Sexual Assault of Young Children] (reporting a 27 per-
cent arrest rate); Tim Tate, Child Pornography: An Investigation 109– 10 (1990) 
(suggesting that only 1 percent of all child sex abusers are “caught and sentenced”).
 51. See Wolak et al., supra note 40, at 14 (reporting that 98 percent of sexual victim-
ization cases originated as a report to law enforcement by an individual, as compared to 
57 percent of child pornography possession cases).
 52. See Catherine Rylyk, Note, Lest We Regress to the Dark Ages: Holding Voluntary 
Surgical Castration Cruel and Unusual, Even for Child Molesters, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill 
Rts. J. 1305, 1305 n.5 (2008) (noting that “child molestation remains one of the most 
underreported crimes” and that one study reported that less than 11 percent of all inci-
dents are ever disclosed).
 53. See, e.g., Furniss, supra note 48, at 39.
 54. See Wolak et al., supra note 40, at 13– 14 (reporting that 43 percent of U.S. child 
pornography possession cases in 2000 “originated with investigations by law enforce-
ment” as compared to 2 percent of child sex abuse cases).
 55. For example, in 2006, federal prosecutors declined to prosecute more than half of 
the child sex abuse cases that were referred to them, as opposed to only a 38 percent 
declination rate for child pornography referrals, Federal Prosecution of Child Sex 
Exploitation Offenders, supra note 1, at tbl.2, and the reasons given for declining 
prosecution were more likely to be concerns about weak evidence in child sex abuse 
cases than in child pornography cases, id. at 3 (“More than half of sex abuse declinations 
were due to weak evidence. In comparison, weak evidence was stated as the reason for 
24 percent of declinations for child pornography.”).
 56. See William H. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1795, 1799, 
1819– 24 (1998) (explaining that the cost of different enforcement strategies and scarce 
resources is a factor that results in law enforcement targeting of the street- level crack 
trade instead of more upscale drug markets).
164 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
 57. Cf. Hamilton, supra note 31, at 1691– 92 (documenting dramatic increases in en-
forcement and noting that the “vast majority” of cases involve nonproduction child por-
nography offenses).
 58. See David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Justice Bulletin 6 
(2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204911.pdf (“Crimes involving 
pornography and juvenile victims . . . are relatively infrequent . . . . [T]he estimated 2,900 
incidents in 2000 are dwarfed by reports of overall sex crimes against juveniles, which 
can be roughly estimated at 269,000 for the same period.”).
 59. E.g., Federal Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation, supra note 1, at 1 (defin-
ing “[f]ederal child sex exploitation offenses” to include “child pornography, sex transpor-
tation, and sex abuse”); FAQ: Child Sexual Exploitation, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Ex-
ploited Children, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet? 
LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=2815 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) (defining term as in-
cluding “Possession, Manufacture, and Distribution of Child Pornography; Enticement of 
Children for Sexual Acts; Child Prostitution; Child Sex Tourism; Child Sexual Molesta-
tion”). There appears to be a movement within the child advocacy community to use the 
term “child sexual exploitation” as a substitute for “child pornography” because the latter 
term is thought to insufficiently “describe the true nature and extent of sexually exploitive 
images of child victims.” Wolak et al., supra note 40, at vii n.1.
 60. See, e.g., Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet Supporting State and Local Law En-
forcement Accomplishments 2001– 2008 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2008/psc08–993.htm (describing the Internet Crimes 
Against Children (ICAC) task force program, which “supports law enforcement’s efforts 
to prevent, investigate, and stop computer- facilitated child sexual exploitation” and dis-
cussing arrest rates); Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Project Safe Childhood (2008), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ newsroom/pressreleases/2008/doj08845.htm 
(describing arrest rates and funding amounts for the ICAC program in efforts to stop 
“sexual crimes against children”); Dan Miller, Child Exploitation Units Apprehend On-
line Predators, County News (Wash., D.C.), Feb. 14, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.
naco.org/newsroom/countynews/archives/ documents/2005/cnews-feb14–05.pdf.
 61. See, e.g., Deborah J. Daniels, Remarks at the Conference on Child and Family 
Maltreatment (Jan. 28, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/archives/
speeches/2004/ confonchildabuse.htm) (reporting arrest rates for “Internet- based child 
sexual exploitation” and noting that every “such arrest means that untold numbers of 
innocent children will be protected from abuse” at the hands of “pedophiles”); see also 
Miller, supra note 60, at 2 (describing a person who distributes child pornography as a 
“predator”).
 62. When individuals questioned these aggressive policies in the past, the Depart-
ment of Justice sought to undermine such criticism by stating that “[a]t its heart, the 
current criticism of child pornography sentences is not really about the sentence im-
posed on these defendants, but rather whether [this activity] . . . should be viewed as a 
crime at all.” Gelber, supra note 24, at 15. This response is troubling because it suggests 
that one cannot question the severity of punishment specifically, or the allocation of 




6 |  The Dignitary Harm of Child 
Pornography— From Producers  
to Possessors
Audrey Rogers
Human dignity is offended by the pornographer. American law 
does not protect all human dignity; legally, an adult can consent to 
its diminishment. When a child is made the target of the 
pornographer- photographer, the statute will not suffer the insult to 
the human spirit, that the child should be treated as a thing.1
This chapter addresses the harm inflicted by child pornographers on their 
victims. It discusses both the producers and nonproducers or downstream 
users of pornographic images, describing the different and similar harms 
their actions inflict. The chapter begins with definitions of the various ac-
tors involved in child pornography, because current law ties harm and 
punishment to these categories. It explains the historical development of 
the different categories of downstream actors in the child pornography 
market and their concomitant sentencing structure.
The chapter then identifies the ways technology has blurred the cat-
egories of pornographers so that different punishment among nonpro-
ducers has become difficult to support. In particular, it notes that child 
pornography possessors are no longer easily distinguished from those 
who receive or distribute child pornography. Thus while much scholarly 
and judicial criticism has been directed at sentences for possessors, this 
focus risks clouding a full discussion of appropriate punishment for 
nonproducing child pornographers. A better approach examines these 
downstream users as a whole and how they inflict injury on the child 
depicted in the images. Essentially, the thesis of this chapter is that harm 
166 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
is inherent in the images themselves since their very existence violates 
the privacy and dignity of the depicted child. Thus even if a downstream 
child pornographer does not inflict physical or emotional injuries in the 
creation of an image, he has nonetheless harmed the depicted child. The 
injury he causes by being an integral part of the image’s circulation is 
what merits his punishment.
A. Categorizing Pornographers
The federal child pornography statutes divide participants in child por-
nography into two main groups: producers and nonproducers or down-
stream users. Downstream users are distributors (which cover transport-
ers), receivers, and possessors.2 Producers are punished the most severely, 
with a mandatory minimum of fifteen years imprisonment.3 Distributors 
and receivers are subject to a mandatory five- year minimum; there is no 
mandatory minimum for possessors.4
Congress defines “producing” as “producing, directing, manufactur-
ing, issuing, publishing, or advertising.”5 The statutes do not define the 
other participants, but the federal sentencing guidelines provide some as-
sistance.6 For example, its commentary defines “distribution” for the pur-
pose of calculating sentences as any act “related to the transfer of material 
involving the sexual exploitation of a minor.”7 These acts include “posting 
material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor on a website for pub-
lic viewing but does not include the mere solicitation of such material.”8
With respect the definitions of “receipt” and “possession,” we need 
some background history to understand what they mean. In 1977, Con-
gress passed the first child pornography statutes to stop the trafficking of 
child pornography for commercial purposes by banning the producing, 
distributing, and receiving of obscene images.9 The Sentencing Commis-
sion, charged with establishing guidelines for calculating sentences within 
the statutory mandates, labeled transporting, receiving, or distributing of-
fenses as “trafficking” in child pornography.10
Congress later removed the obscenity and commercial purpose re-
quirements because it found them to be unnecessary limitations on the 
reach of the law.11 Congressional hearings also revealed that production of 
child pornography was so clandestine that between 1978 and 1984, only 
one person was convicted for producing child pornography.12 Thus stop-
ping the flow rather the production of child pornography became the fo-
cus of prosecutions.
Revised Pages
The Dignitary Harm of Child Pornography | 167
Congress did not ban possession until 1990, after the Supreme Court 
ruled it was constitutionally permissible to prohibit private possession.13 
Accordingly, the Sentencing Commission created a sentencing guideline 
for possession with a lower sentencing range than the other offenses. It 
also aligned the receipt offense guideline with the lower possession guide-
lines because it determined that “receipt is a logical predicate to posses-
sion.”14 This move was rejected by Congress on the ground that receipt 
was more akin to distribution.15 One member of Congress explained: 
“Virtually all enforcement of the child pornography laws is accomplished 
through sting operations through the mails. As a result, most offenders 
(even active distributors) are caught in the act of receiving child pornog-
raphy out of their mail box.  .  .  . Distributors who are apprehended are 
likely to be caught in the act of receipt.”16
Despite congressional opposition, the perceived similarity between re-
ceipt and possession has continued. In its 1996 report to Congress, the 
Commission detailed that some courts were sentencing receipt cases as 
possession cases because there was little difference in the perceived seri-
ousness of the offenses.17 In its 2012 report, the Commission unanimously 
recommended that receipt and possession offenses be punished the 
same.18 It explained that the law enforcement rationale was outmoded as 
most offenders are using the Internet and not the mail.19
The question remains: What does “possession” (and by extension “re-
ceipt”) mean? Courts have used a plain meaning definition that covers 
both physical and constructive possession.20 Constructive possession 
means typically to have “dominion and control” over an item.21 For ex-
ample, one can actually hold a picture of child pornography in his hand, 
or have it locked in a desk to which he has the key. He would be in posses-
sion of the image in either instance.22 Similarly, one constructively pos-
sesses a computer image when he exerts dominion and control over it, as 
evidenced by acts such as saving it, sending it, or manipulating it.23
With the vast increase in computer use to obtain and view child por-
nography, new issues have emerged over what it means to be a possessor, 
receiver, or distributor. Computer technology has made file sharing and 
on- line discussions increasingly popular.24 The number of computers that 
are networked has grown explosively, from one million in 199225 to more 
than two billion by 2011.26 A large proportion of personal computers regu-
larly connect to the Internet to communicate and receive information 
through no- cost, decentralized, peer- to- peer file sharing.27 The ability to 
seek, download, and share files has completely changed the landscape for 
many industries, notably the legitimate entertainment world. It has had 
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the same dramatic impact in the child pornography arena.28 One file- 
sharing network alone reported receiving 116,000 requests for child por-
nography in 2010.29
As file- sharing networks have proliferated, participants in the child 
pornography industry can no longer be defined by terms more suited for 
a bricks- and- mortar world. Forty years ago, when investigative reporters 
first exposed the child pornography market, it was clear who fell into the 
categories of transporters, distributors, and receivers. For example, the de-
fendant in New York v. Ferber was the owner of an adult bookstore who 
knowingly sold films of underage boys masturbating.30 Once sold, those 
films were no longer available for Ferber to resell.31 In contrast, consider 
the person today who uploads a child pornography video to a peer- to- 
peer network and then leaves his file open. The video is never depleted; 
even if someone downloads it, the original is still available for further 
downloads. The ramifications of this new technology are causing a col-
lapse of easily definable offenses, and with it the rationale behind charging 
and sentencing differences.
Prosecutors who find child pornography on a person’s computer often 
file receiving and possessing charges.32 Defendants convicted of both have 
increasingly claimed violations of their Fifth Amendment double jeop-
ardy right because the two statutory provisions proscribe the same con-
duct.33 As one defendant claimed, “[i]t is impossible to ‘receive’ something 
without, at least at the very instant of ‘receipt,’ also ‘possessing’ it.”34 Some 
courts agree that the multiple charges are duplicitous,35 but with defen-
dants using computers to obtain quantities of images via the Internet, it 
appears quite easy for the government to fashion a case that avoids the 
prohibition on double jeopardy by basing the receipt count on different 
images than the possession count.36
Yet it is questionable whether filing separate charges is appropriate 
when the statutes themselves no longer reflect clear divisions of activity. 
It is outmoded to find, as some courts have, that those who traffic in 
child pornography by receiving it “are more directly tied to the market 
for such products” and the abuse of children necessary for that market 
than are possessors.37 When a receiver and a possessor are one and the 
same person, and the actions he takes to obtain the images are also iden-
tical to the actions that constitute possession, this division is no longer 
appropriate.38 A child is harmed because the image is circulated, but the 
offender who uses technology to both receive and possess the image 
cannot be said to be more entrenched in the market by his receipt than 
by his possession of the image.
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Peer- to- peer networks are also blurring the distinction between dis-
tributing and receiving child pornography. In one case, a defendant down-
loaded images and videos from a peer- to- peer network and stored them in 
a shared folder on his computer that was accessible to others.39 Arguing 
that he merely left open his shared file, defendant sought to have his con-
viction for distribution set aside. The court rejected his contention, hold-
ing the knowing passive distribution of child pornography from a shared 
network was sufficient to sustain the conviction.40 It made an analogy to a 
self- serve gas station where the gas station owner who advertises his prod-
uct need not actively pump gas to be in the business of distributing it.
Other courts have begun to recognize the overlap between offenses 
caused by technology. The Third Circuit affirmed a sentence that substan-
tially deviated from the guidelines in a case where the defendant traded 
via the Internet a number of images of child pornography.41 Rejecting the 
government’s appeal of the sentence, the court found the deviation was 
appropriate because it agreed that the case “center[ed] on personal posses-
sion of illicit images obtained online, and involving no production or dis-
tribution other than noncommercial bartering,” notwithstanding the de-
fendant’s guilty plea on the transporting and receiving counts.42 Most 
recently, the Sentencing Commission has reported that not all distributors 
are the same; it distinguished those who traded images through active 
participation in child pornography communities via chats, e- mails and 
closed peer- to- peer networks from those who traded passively through 
open peer- to peer networks.43 Finding the former more culpable that the 
latter, the Commission recommended a new enhancement based on an 
offender’s “community involvement.”44
This area of the law is in a great state of flux and controversy. The once- 
clear divisions between distribution, transportation, and receipt are 
blurred in cyberspace. Whereas many courts and scholars have criticized 
sentences for possession of child pornography, it is no longer clear what 
differentiates a possessor from a receiver or distributor. Further compli-
cating the issue over the appropriate punishment for possessors is that 
multicount indictments often result in plea agreements solely for posses-
sion when the conduct included knowing receipt or distribution.45 Statis-
tics show that more than 92 percent of offenders convicted only of posses-
sion also knowingly received the materials, and more than 65 percent 
distributed child pornography.46 Receipt by peer- to- peer networks was 56 
percent in 2010, while distribution using this technology was more than 73 
percent; by early 2012 these numbers rose to 54.3 percent and 85.3 percent 
respectively.47 Thus, even without technological changes, critics of posses-
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sion sentences may be focusing too narrowly on end results rather than 
looking at the offender’s conduct in total. How nonproduction offenders 
should be punished, and whether they should be punished differently, 
needs to be tied to something more than their labels and final disposi-
tions.48 We must ground meaningful scrutiny in the rationale for the ban 
on child pornography: the harm to the children depicted.
B. the Harm of Child Pornography
1. Producers
Child pornography producers harm children by inflicting physical or psy-
chological injury. In New York v. Ferber, the seminal case banning child 
pornography, the Supreme Court stated that the “use of children as subjects 
of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and 
mental health of the child.”49 It stressed that the government interest in 
preventing the “sexual abuse and exploitation of children” is of the highest 
importance. In a counterfactual scenario, the Supreme Court ruled in Ash-
croft v. Free Speech Coalition that the ban on child pornography did not 
extend to computer- generated images because there were no real children 
harmed in its creation. As more fully discussed below, in addition to the 
physical or psychological injury a child suffers at the time of the making of 
the image, the Ferber Court explained that disseminating child pornogra-
phy was “intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children . . . the materi-
als produced are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the 
harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation.”50
Studies of victimized children support the rationale behind the ban on 
child pornography to stop sexual abuse and exploitation.51 As to sexual 
abuse, some children incur physical injuries such as genital bruising, cuts, 
lacerations, and sexually transmitted diseases.52 The children may suffer 
psychological injuries including depression, anger, withdrawal, low self- 
esteem, and feelings of worthlessness.53 As detailed below, they often en-
gage in self- destructive behavior including substance abuse, prostitution, 
depression, and suicide.54 The 2012 Sentencing Commission report reaf-
firmed the harm child pornography inflicts on its victims at all stages. 
Some images are of children clearly in pain or distress as they are being 
violently sexually abused.
However, many depictions do not show children in distress because the 
producers exploit the children to appear willing and happy to participate in 
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the sexual abuse.55 The groomer shows images of children apparently “en-
joying” themselves to coax other children into engaging in sex. Producers 
use a variety of methods to get children to participate in the production of 
pornographic images including threats, coercion, and payment of drugs, 
money, or alcohol.56 These means can cause psychological harm, because 
the children can feel guilty that they appear to be willing participants.57 
This harm, however, may only appear later when the child realizes he has 
been manipulated. No one suggests, of course, that grooming a child some-
how makes the child less of a victim of abuse or exploitation. A child can-
not legally consent to participating in the creation of child pornography; 
therefore, using trickery, grooming, deception or threats to obtain consent 
falls within the plain meaning of the word “exploitation.”
This leads to the issue of whether surreptitiously recorded images or 
images created by manipulating a picture of a child to make him or her 
appear to be engaging in sexually explicit conduct constitute child por-
nography. The Ashcroft Court left open the issue of whether “morphed” 
images created by combining real and computer- generated children was 
subject to the ban on producing child pornography, although it noted that 
“they implicate the interests of real children and are in that sense closer to 
the images in Ferber.”58 Lower courts have held that both constitute child 
pornography.59
Morphed or surreptitiously made images may not be the product of 
physical child abuse, but they are the product of sexual exploitation. The 
producer is using the child and the child is participating, albeit unknow-
ingly, in creating child pornography. Nevertheless, some of this book’s 
contributors suggest that such images should fall outside the definition of 
child pornography because they do not memorialize an act of sexual 
abuse.60 This stance would improperly limit protections against exploita-
tion. Consider the images banned in Ferber, that of boys masturbating. 
Why should it matter whether the boys were acting at the prompting of 
the producer or were taped without their knowledge? Their injury mani-
fests later in the form of harm to their emotional and psychological health 
when they realize they have been used, even if the victim does not suffer 
either physical or psychological injury at the time of production.
Moreover, if we exclude surreptitious taping as not constituting exploi-
tation because of lack of immediate psychological injury, could we not say 
the same for victims groomed by candy? They, too, are not aware they are 
being victimized at the time, although they are engaging in the act at the 
behest of the producer. Some judicial language suggests that the ban is 
meant to protect children from being “made to engage in sexual con-
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duct.”61 That language could imply some awareness by the child of the 
abuse. But it could equally mean protecting the child from being used in 
any sexually explicit image. For example, a child who is sexually molested 
while asleep is not “made to engage” in the conduct since he or she is un-
aware it is occurring; we would not say images of such molestation falls 
outside the definition of child pornography simply because the child was 
asleep. Thus we have a continuum from explicit threats and use of force, to 
grooming, to sleeping, to surreptitious taping. If the images meet the legal 
definition of child pornography,62 the producers’ methods of getting the 
images should be irrelevant since the child has been abused or exploited.
Professor Hessick suggests the term “exploitation” be limited to “force, 
coercion, or lack of consent.”63 She further limits lack of consent to sce-
narios where the child is prompted by another to engage in the activity, 
thereby excluding surreptitiously or self- created child pornography. 
Moreover, she requires that the exploitation or abuse exist independently 
of the recording itself. In other words, abusing or exploiting a child for the 
purpose of creating child pornography falls outside her definition of ex-
ploitation or abuse. This “independent purpose” limitation does not ap-
pear in any Supreme Court child pornography cases. More importantly, it 
leaves unprotected the multitude of children abused and exploited spe-
cifically created to meet the commercial and noncommercial market of 
child pornography.
The sexual abuse or exploitation inflicted by a producer is a traumatic 
event that is a “psychosocial stressor.”64 The effects of the trauma include 
“(1) a clustering of disturbing psychological phenomena of intrusive and 
repetitive imagery associated with memories of the traumatic event and (2) 
avoidance strategies employed to keep associations to the trauma out of 
awareness.”65 Furthermore “when the event is remembered, the attendant 
feelings are neutralized, and the anxiety generated by the event is con-
trolled.”66 In addition, “[w]hen a traumatic event is not resolved and either 
remains in active memory or becomes defended by a cognitive mechanism 
such as denial, dissociation, or splitting,” the diagnosis is generally post 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).67 A child who has symptoms of PTSD, 
may re- experience the event with “intrusive thoughts, nightmares, flash-
backs and vivid memories, and might engage in repetitive play.”68
In one report of sixty- six children and adolescents who had been sexu-
ally abused and exploited, it was found that the children exhibited symp-
tomatic behavior and were “troubled by feelings of anxiety, depression, 
guilt, and blame, and are vulnerable to further exploitation and victimiza-
tion.”69 The data from the sixty- six victims “indicate that clear symptoms 
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of distress are present during the period of sexual exploitation, at the time 
of disclosure, and in the posttraumatic phase.”70 Parents who discussed 
their observations of their children in the studies noted that while the 
sexual abuse was taking place, “the children complained of urinary infec-
tion, genital soreness, or anal irritation” as well as “headaches, loss of ap-
petite, stomachaches, short vomiting spells, difficulty sleeping, marked 
daydreaming and fantasizing.”71 Furthermore, the parents noticed changes 
in school behavior such as declining grades, withdrawal from peer activi-
ties, arguments with siblings, parents, and peers, mood swings, edginess, 
and refusal to participate in activities such as church functions.72 In addi-
tion, the parents stated the children acted out by stealing, setting fires, and 
having “sexually focused behaviors.”73 The study found that the children 
“essentially had no control over the intrusive imagery” and “reported re-
current memories and dreams of a frightening nature . . . increased ten-
sion, and general malaise.”74 Many children withdrew from their normal 
activities; one child was even unable to walk down the street where her 
offender lived.75 Furthermore, the children experienced recurring feelings 
of guilt and hopelessness for the future.76
Experts report difficulties in treating sex abuse victims because of bar-
riers put up the victims, their parents, lack of resources, and professional 
bias.77 Since children do not generally talk directly or explicitly about their 
sexual abuse or subsequent sexual exploitation, the most significant bar-
rier is from the guilt and secrecy surrounding the victimization and ex-
ploitation.78 The secrecy that has been demanded of them from the child’s 
abuser increases the child’s sense of guilt to the point that “[a]s they reach 
adolescence, the increased understanding of the nature of their activities 
provokes guilt.” Furthermore, as “[c]hildren often try to make sense of 
their experiences by deciding that they were acceptable and inevitable 
[they are] . . . entirely trapped and exiled by silence and secrecy.”79
Others have reported that “the psychological scarring and emotional 
stress deriving from the sexual exploitation of children in many cases 
leads to other significant problems including the child turning to illicit 
drugs and alcohol to deaden memories and desensitize present experi-
ences.”80 One study further found that child victims share the common 
feelings of “betrayal, guilt, rage, and worthlessness” and exhibit self- 
destructive or “aberrant social behavior” such as withdrawal, isolation, 
drug or alcohol abuse, juvenile delinquency, promiscuity, prostitution, 
and violence.81
Studies have also shown that there is a relationship between prior sex-
ual abuse and prostitution. One study found that “9 out of 10 female pros-
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titutes have been sexually assaulted during childhood.”82 In an investiga-
tion of a conspiracy to produce and distribute international films and 
other visual material of sexually explicit conduct of thirty young boys, 
twenty- five of whom were interviewed in depth, the majority of children 
were “permanently affected by these activities” and were still prostituting 
themselves or continuing in some errant behavior.83 Furthermore, a re-
port of twenty- eight young male prostitutes found that twenty- four of 
them reported “coercive sexual experience . . . prior to hustling.”84
2. Nonproduction Offenders
A 2011 study of child pornography possessors conducted by the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children found more than 80 percent of 
arrested child pornography possessors had images of prepubescent chil-
dren.85 In addition, 80 percent had images of children being sexually pen-
etrated.86 Twenty percent of the defendants had images of children endur-
ing sadistic sex and bondage87 and 39 percent had videos of children being 
abused.88 Thus the vast majority of possessors of child pornography are 
viewing hard- core child pornography involving young children. Accord-
ingly, there can be few legitimate claims that the possessor did not know 
he was viewing a child.89
Downstream users of child pornography inflict harm because it is 
traumatic for a child to know his image is being recirculated.90 The Ferber 
Court stated that:
[P]ornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than 
does sexual abuse or prostitution. Because the child’s actions are 
reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt him in future 
years, long after the original misdeed took place. A child who has 
posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the record-
ing is circulating within the mass distribution system for child 
pornography.91
The Supreme Court repeatedly has stressed that victims of child por-
nography suffer as “pornography’s continued existence causes the child 
victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.”92 It 
has also repeated that the harm child pornography causes to children is 
both in its creation and its circulation.93 We can prove the importance of 
both rationales by reconsidering the following example first raised above: 
A producer convinces a young child to pose in a manner that meets the 
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legal standard of a lewd and lascivious image. The child is given candy or 
treats and thus is not traumatized by the production, particularly if the 
producer is known to the child, as is often the case. Yet she has been ex-
ploited and she may later suffer emotionally and psychologically thinking 
of how she was manipulated to create the image. Then, when the child 
learns of the image’s circulation, she suffers new emotional and psycho-
logical pain.
As one circuit court described, the victim (who discovered her images 
were on the Internet by a notification by the NCMEC) was able to “‘func-
tion [ ] pretty well normally’ until she learned that her image was being 
traded on the internet, after which she experienced a fear ‘of being at par-
ties, fear of being in public gatherings,’ and had difficulty coping ‘with her 
life because of her sense of pervasive helplessness’ about the fact that 
people were viewing her image.”94 Furthermore, the expert in the case 
concluded that knowing that the victim’s images were being viewed by 
the defendant directly “caused emotional and psychological problems: 
she bit her nails to the point of bleeding, took to alcohol, and could not 
finish college.”95
The Eleventh Circuit stated in stark terms that “possessors of child 
pornography can constitute a ‘slow acid drip’ of trauma, which may be 
exacerbated ‘each time an individual views an image depicting her 
abuse.’”96 The court added that “[t]his slow drip resulted from the ‘extraor-
dinarily distressing and emotionally painful’ reaction suffered by the vic-
tim ‘each time an individual views an image depicting her abuse.’”97
The victimization lasts forever since the pictures can resurface at any 
time.98 As one expert explained, “The victim’s knowledge of publication of 
the visual material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by 
the child.”99 This humiliation is exacerbated by the Internet. As one court 
described, “The child victims suffer not only from the initial physical sex-
ual abuse of their tormentors, but also from the knowledge that their deg-
radation will be repeatedly viewed electronically into near perpetuity by a 
large audience.”100 When adult abuse survivors become aware that the im-
ages of them as children are circulating on the Internet they become even 
more mistrustful of people and have more of a sense of helplessness and 
hopelessness.101 As one psychologist explained, “In childhood, they knew 
that they were physically invaded and they couldn’t stop it. As adults, they 
know they’re visually invaded and they can’t stop it. . . . So, knowing that 
[the images] are out there just deepens the pathology that they’re already 
suffering from.”102
The Ferber Court declared that child pornography market inflicts harm 
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on their victims both in its creation and circulation. Nevertheless, some 
scholars sharply criticize the punishment of possessors by questioning 
whether possession inflicts its own, independent harm.103 They assert sup-
porters of punishment fail to recognize the derivative nature of nonpro-
duction child pornography offenses which, they claim, make the images 
unlawful only because they memorialize actual abuse.104 These scholars 
state the harm in circulation is not an independent harm, and if there is no 
abuse or exploitation in the image’s creation, the injury suffered by the 
victim when the image is circulated should not be covered by child por-
nography laws.105 Yet to get to the circulation alone argument, they seem 
to conflate the two separate mental harms that child pornographers may 
inflict: first in creating the image and second in disseminating it. Much 
like the producer who tricks a victim into posing for images or surrepti-
tiously records the victim, the child is harmed psychologically when she 
learns she has been manipulated to create the image, and then again when 
it is circulated.106
Critics further claim that part of the increase is based on an unproven 
preventative rationale that possessors of child pornography are more likely 
to abuse children.107 The link between downstream users of child pornogra-
phy and prior child sex abuse has been the focus of a number of studies, 
with conflicting results.108 The Sentencing Commission reviewed these 
studies and then conducted its own analysis on the danger that downstream 
users have or will abuse children. It made the following findings:
 1. The rate of prior “criminally sexual dangerous behavior” 
[CSDB]109 for downstream users is approximately 33 percent, 
although the Commission believes the percentage is greater based 
on studies that indicate underreporting of the actual rate.
 2. The offenders who engaged in “personal” distribution, such as 
through e- mails or closed peer- to- peer networks had a higher rate 
of prior CSDB (38.4 percent) than that of “impersonal” distri-
bution via open peer- to- peer networks (26.2 percent), though 
similar to those who did not distribute (37.2 percent).
This finding supports the thesis of this chapter that technology has blurred 
the categories of offenders. Passive distributors are much more like receiv-
ers/possessors than like other distributors.
 3. Rates of known general recidivism of downstream offenders was 
30 percent, and of known sexual recidivism was 7.4 percent, of 
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which a little less than half (3.6 percent) was for contact offens-
es.110 The general recidivism rate was comparable to the known 
rate for a comparable portion of all federal offenders.111
Thus, there appears to be a link between downstream child pornography 
use and prior sex crimes against children, although the rate of recidivism 
for sexual offenses is comparable to other offenders. In response to the 
proxy argument, the Commission noted that whether a downstream user 
has or will engage in sexual abuse of a child is a primary factor in impos-
ing sentences.112
3. Harm Inherent in the Images
Beyond physical and psychological injury, the depicted child suffers a 
more fundamental harm. Even if the child was unaware the image was 
made or circulated, those who create, trade, and view child pornography 
harm the child’s inherent right of human dignity not to be viewed in this 
fashion. This right is violated each and every time an image is made and 
circulated. The Supreme Court recognized these human dignity and pri-
vacy concerns from the outset of its child pornography jurisprudence. In 
Ferber, the Court stated that distribution of the material violates “the indi-
vidual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”113 Other courts 
agree; as one court noted “the mere existence of child pornography repre-
sents an invasion of the privacy of the child depicted.”114 Another court 
stated the images were an “affront to the dignity and privacy of the child 
and the exploitation of the child’s vulnerability.”115
The right of human dignity not to be depicted in a degrading fashion is 
recognized far beyond the child pornography arena. It is the harm in the 
image itself, separate from the portrayed act. Images are so powerful that 
in diverse settings, special rules apply to them. For example, the Geneva 
Convention requires prisoners of war be treated humanely, and this in-
cludes banning photographs of them that subject them to humiliation or 
public curiosity.116 Under Articles 13 and 14 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, POWs are also “are 
entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honor.”117 
Even non- POWs or so- called enemy combatants are entitled to protection 
against “outrages on personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment.”118 One need only think of the disgrace over the Abu 
Ghraib incident to see the impact of photographs. It was not just the hu-
miliating treatment itself; it was the taking and dissemination of photo-
178 | Refining Child Pornography Law
Revised Pages
graphs of the humiliation that was contemptible.119 The same criticism 
was made following the release of photographs of Saddam Hussein after 
his capture.120
Death scene and autopsy photographs are also subject to dissemina-
tion restrictions. In National Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, the 
Supreme Court ruled there is a “familial right of privacy over the death- 
scene images of a loved one.”121 The case involved death- scene photo-
graphs of Vincent Foster, Jr., deputy counsel to President Clinton, and re-
spondent’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the photos. In 
denying the FOIA request, the Court noted that FOIA exemption 7(C) 
excuses from disclosure information compiled by law enforcement if their 
production “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.”122 Foster’s sister opposed the disclosure of 
the disputed pictures because “[u]ndoubtedly, the photographs would be 
placed on the Internet for world consumption” and would renew media 
interest in her brother’s death.123
The Court agreed that FOIA exemption 7(C) extended beyond the per-
son depicted to his family members, and it banned release of the images 
unless the person requesting the information establishes a significant pub-
lic interest in the information sufficient to override the family’s privacy in-
terest in the images.124 It found the respondent failed to meet this bur-
den.125 The Court stated that Congress “intended to permit family members 
to assert their own privacy rights against public intrusions long deemed 
impermissible under the common law and in our cultural traditions.”126
Tort law also limits dissemination of non- newsworthy death and au-
topsy images.127 Courts have ruled that these images are inherently hu-
miliating and distressful for the family, and thus those who release the 
images may be subject to damages.128 Other courts ban the release of pri-
vate information even if identities are protected. For example, in North-
western Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft,129 the government sought medical 
records of patients who received late- term abortions to aid the govern-
ment’s constitutional challenge to the Partial- Birth Abortion Act of 
2003.130 In rejecting the government’s demand, the Seventh Circuit ruled 
it was an invasion of privacy even if there was no possibility that a patient’s 
identity might be learned from a redacted medical record.131 In doing so, 
the court made the following apt analogy:
Imagine if nude photos of a woman, uploaded to the Internet with-
out her consent though without identifying her by name, were 
downloaded in a foreign country by people who will never meet 
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her. She would still feel that her privacy had been invaded. The rev-
elation of the intimate details contained in the record of a late- term 
abortion may inflict a similar wound.”132
The common thread in the above cases is that dissemination of certain 
images for no worthy purpose inflicts harm on the depicted person. The 
absolute lack of any worthy reason to trade in child pornography estab-
lishes the inherent harm to the dignity of the child depicted. The person 
inflicting the abuse captured in a pornographic image is obviously deserv-
ing of substantial punishment as a child molester. The producer of the 
image is guilty of documenting the infliction of sexual abuse. The harm by 
possessors and other downstream users lacks physicality, but they too in-
flict distinct, actual harm on the child whose image is disseminated and 
collected.
Conclusion
The ban on child pornography is meant to stop sexual abuse and exploita-
tion. Sexual abuse is apparent when the images show children in pain and 
incurring physical injuries such as genital bruising, cuts, and lacerations. 
Yet even depictions that do not show children in physical pain are the 
product of exploitation. Pornographers may groom children to participate 
in the production of pornographic images through trickery, threats, coer-
cion, or gifts. This exploitation may cause psychological harm because the 
children can feel guilty that they appear to be willing participants. Since a 
child cannot legally consent to participating in the creation of child por-
nography, using trickery, grooming, deception, or threats to obtain con-
sent falls within the plain meaning of the word “exploitation.”
Nonproducers, such as possessors, victimize children because “por-
nography’s continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm 
by haunting the children in years to come.”133 The psychological injury 
caused by the circulation of the images is independent and separate from 
the physical or psychological harm often caused in the creation of the im-
age. The Internet has exacerbated this harm as millions of images are per-
manently circulating in cyberspace.
More essentially, producers and nonproducers alike inflict dignitary 
harm upon the children whose images are depicted in pornography. 
Plainly said, children have a right not to be seen in pornographic images, 
and offenders who get these images are an essential part of the pornogra-
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phy network that inflicts dignitary harm. As technology continues to ad-
vance the ways in which these nonproduction offenders get their images, 
the label “possessor” is losing its distinctiveness; as this trend continues, 
we should not single out the possessor for special consideration or treat-
ment. Instead, the focus needs to be on the manners in which victims are 
harmed.
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7 | Not Just “Kiddie Porn”
The Significant Harms from  
Child Pornography Possession
Paul G. Cassell, James R. Marsh, and  
Jeremy M. Christiansen
The severity of criminal penalties for possessing child pornography has 
recently come under attack. Both judges and academic commentators have 
been heard to complain that the prison sentences for child pornography 
possessors are too long. Implicit in these criticisms is often the claim that 
possessing child pornography is not a serious crime— that while those who 
create (or perhaps distribute) child pornography inflict severe harms on 
their child victims, those who merely possess images are not significantly 
blameworthy. Indeed, in a case that recently attracted national attention, a 
man who was convicted of child pornography possession (possessing im-
ages of children as young as two years old being sodomized and perform-
ing oral sex on adult men) was allowed to keep his pension because his 
felony crime was not deemed to even rise to the level of “moral turpitude.”1
In a series of federal cases involving restitution for child pornography 
victims, the authors of this chapter have encountered the misguided senti-
ment that possessors of child pornography cause little harm. We have rep-
resented such victims in many federal cases across the country, seeking to 
obtain restitution from those who commit child pornography crimes.2 
Much of that litigation has involved the proper interpretation of the Man-
datory Restitution for Sex Crimes provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act3 and specifically whether victims should receive full, some, or 
no restitution from convicted child pornography defendants. The authors’ 
efforts culminated in the recent United States Supreme Court case, Paroline 
v. United States.4 Unfortunately, a majority of the Court disagreed with the 
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position of child pornography victims: that Congress passed the Manda-
tory Restitution for Sex Crimes provision to guarantee full restitution for 
child pornography victims. However, the Paroline decision contains a silver 
lining: All the opinions in the case agreed the crime of possession of child 
pornography results in significant suffering on the part of the victims.
Despite the Court’s recognition of this suffering, the misguided view 
that child pornography possession is largely harmless persists. This chap-
ter demonstrates otherwise. In reality, possession of such images causes 
significant trauma to the victims depicted. The endless collecting and 
viewing of a victim’s child sex images subjects victims to continuous inva-
sions of privacy, producing lasting psychological injury and significant 
economic losses.
This chapter will detail the significant harms that child pornography 
possession causes to the children depicted in the images of abuse. The 
crime of child pornography possession inflicts substantial harm on its vic-
tims, through continually reminding the victims of the initial sexual 
abuse. We illustrate this point with a discussion of two young victims of 
child pornography possession— two young women we will refer to as 
“Amy” and “Vicky.” We then turn to the issue of quantifying those harms 
for purposes of restitution. Those who collect and view child pornography 
cause significant losses for which victims should receive significant com-
pensation. Moreover, each individual defendant should be held jointly 
and severally liable for all of the harms that child pornography possession 
causes. This conclusion is consistent with basic principles of tort law, 
which identify all who contribute to a single harm as being responsible for 
paying for the entire harm.
I. the Harms Victims of Child Pornography  
Possession endure
At the outset, a brief discussion of terminology is in order. The efforts to 
minimize the harm to child pornography victims begins even with the 
phrase used to describe the crime. Although the term “child pornography” 
is widely used,5 it carries misleading connotations. The term “pornogra-
phy” suggests that child pornography is akin to adult pornography,that is, 
erotic material appealing to the viewer’s interest in normal sexual activities 
involving consenting adults. An even more deficient term is “kiddie porn,” 
which some prominent and thoughtful commentators have used.6
“Pornography” and, worse yet, “porn” are neither the best nor the most 
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accurate terms to describe, for example, images and videos which often 
graphically record prepubescent children (including toddlers) being raped 
by adults.7 As one doctor who works closely with victims explained:
In the context of children . . . there can be no question of consent, 
and use of the word pornography may effectively allow us to dis-
tance ourselves from the material’s true nature. A preferred term is 
abuse images, and this term is increasingly gaining acceptance 
among professionals working in this area. Using the term abuse im-
ages accurately describes the process and product of taking inde-
cent and sexualized pictures of children, and its use is, on the whole, 
to be supported.8
Other terms that have been suggested as suitable substitutes include “child 
abuse material,” “child sexual abuse material,” “documented child sexual 
abuse,” and “depicted child sexual abuse.”9 Given the widespread use of the 
term “child pornography”— especially in the criminal context— we reluc-
tantly bow to convention in this chapter and will use that term here.
In discussing the harms to the victims of “child pornography” posses-
sion crimes, it is also important to understand the vast criminal machin-
ery that generates those harms. In enacting laws criminalizing all aspects 
of child pornography, Congress (for example) realized that it had to ad-
dress every stage of this sordid joint enterprise— countless criminals who 
together create, distribute, and possess child pornography. As the Su-
preme Court explained, “it is difficult, if not impossible to halt” the sex-
ual exploitation and abuse of children by pursuing only child pornogra-
phy producers.10 It was therefore reasonable for Congress to conclude 
that “the production of child pornography [will decrease] if it penalizes 
those who possess and view the product, thereby decreasing demand.”11 
Indeed, the Court explained that “[t]he most expeditious if not the only 
practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this 
material by imposing severe criminal penalties” on all persons in the dis-
tribution chain.12 Congress did just that by criminalizing child pornogra-
phy possession.13
Congress properly recognized that child pornography possessors are 
inextricably linked to child pornography producers. Congressional find-
ings concerning child pornography possession crimes explain that “pro-
hibiting the possession and viewing of child pornography will . . . [help] to 
eliminate the market for the sexual exploitative use of children. .  .  .”14 A 
recent Justice Department analysis reported that “the growing and thriv-
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ing market for child pornographic images is responsible for fresh child 
sexual abuse— because the high demand for child pornography drives 
some individuals to sexually abuse children and some to ‘commission’ the 
abuse for profit or status.”15
Once a child is sexually abused to produce digitized child pornogra-
phy, the images can be disseminated exponentially. Peer- to- peer file shar-
ing (commonly called “P2P”) is “widely used to download child pornog-
raphy.”16 Two recent law enforcement initiatives “identified over 20 million 
unique IP [Internet Protocol] addresses offering child pornography over 
P2P networks from 2006 to August 2010.”17 The ease with which child 
pornography can now be downloaded creates “an expanding market for 
child pornography [that] fuels greater demand for perverse sexual depic-
tions of children, making it more difficult for authorities to prevent their 
sexual exploitation and abuse.”18 In other words, those who possess child 
pornography become a cog in the vast machinery that sexually abuses and 
exploits children through child pornography.19
The machinery of child pornography leaves in its wake horrific human 
suffering. New York v. Ferber,20 the leading Supreme Court case on the 
subject, well articulates the serious long- term physiological, emotional, 
and mental harms to victims who are sexually exploited to produce such 
images. “[T]he use of children as . . . subjects of pornographic materials is 
very harmful to both the children and the society as a whole. It has been 
found that sexually exploited children are unable to develop healthy af-
fectionate relationships in later life, have sexual dysfunctions, and have a 
tendency to become sexual abusers as adults.”21 The Court has also recog-
nized that child pornography can pose “an even greater threat to the child 
victim than does sexual abuse or prostitution. Because the child’s actions 
are reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt [her] in future 
years, long after the original misdeed took place. A child who has posed 
for a camera must go through life knowing that the recording is circulat-
ing within the mass distribution system for child pornography.”22 And 
more recently, the Court has unanimously reaffirmed Ferber’s central 
premise: “[i]t is common ground that the victim suffers continuing and 
grievous harm as a result of her knowledge that a large, indeterminate 
number of individuals have viewed and will in the future view images of 
the sexual abuse she endured.”23
Ferber elucidates an unfortunate reality for victims of child pornogra-
phy crimes: the initial production of the videos and other images of their 
sexual abuse is only the beginning of a lifetime of trauma. Victims deal 
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with intense physical and emotional anguish for decades as a direct result 
of the distribution and possession of their child sex abuse images. The fol-
lowing brief accounts are illustrative of the harms they suffer on a daily 
basis. Two of the victims who are most active in attempting to secure res-
titution, “Amy” and “Vicky,”24 have detailed their experiences in their own 
words through victim impact statements and psychological reports.
A. The Harms Suffered By “Amy”25
Amy was just four years old when her uncle began sexually abusing her.26 
At a time when most girls her age were just learning about letters and 
numbers, Amy was forced to endure repeated rape, cunnilingus, fellatio, 
and digital penetration by her uncle, a trusted family member.27 Her uncle 
perpetrated some of the sexual assaults in order to produce child pornog-
raphy for a child molester living in the Seattle area. This illustrates what is 
often described as the “market creation” effect of child pornography 
possession— that those who want to possess child pornography often di-
rectly cause the sexual abuse of a child to produce those images.28
When Amy was nine years old, her uncle was apprehended, ending the 
direct sexual abuse. Amy then received psychological counseling to cope 
with the trauma caused by the abuse and the associated child pornogra-
phy production. When her treatment concluded in 1999, Amy’s therapist 
reported that Amy was “back to normal” and that she engaged in age- 
appropriate activities like dance.29 Although Amy always suspected her 
child sex abuse images were probably somewhere on the Internet, at age 
seventeen Amy discovered that countless individuals were in fact trading 
and collecting a vast catalog of her images.30 Amy’s use of a pseudonym 
reflects a painful irony: she seeks anonymity, but hers is among the most 
widely trafficked child pornography series in the world.31 Her own words 
describe her agony:
Every day of my life I live in constant fear that someone will see my 
pictures and recognize me and that I will be humiliated all over 
again. It hurts me to know someone is looking at them— at me— 
when I was just a little girl being abused for the camera. I did not 
choose to be there, but now I am there forever in pictures that peo-
ple are using to do sick things. I want it all erased. I want it all 
stopped. But I am powerless to stop it just like I was powerless to 
stop my uncle.32
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This knowledge of the ongoing distribution and possession of Amy’s 
child sex abuse images has had “long lasting and life changing impact[s] on 
her” that “are more resistant to treatment than those that would normally 
follow a time limited trauma, as her awareness of the continued existence 
of the pictures and their criminal use in a widespread way leads to an acti-
vation in [her posttraumatic] symptoms.”33 As a result, Amy will require 
counseling for the rest of her life— counseling that, of course, costs money.34 
Amy also has difficulty maintaining gainful employment in jobs that re-
quire even routine interaction with the public.35 Thus, she experiences not 
only ongoing psychological trauma but also substantial financial losses.
B. The Harms Suffered By “Vicky”36
“Vicky” suffered fate similar to Amy’s at the hands of her father when she 
was ten and eleven years old.37 As with Amy’s abuse, Vicky’s abuse was 
made to order. She was forced to perform scripted videos of rape, sodomy, 
and bondage based on requests placed with her abuser by child molesters 
and pedophiles, who later downloaded and traded her videos.38
Vicky also first learned that her images were in circulation when she 
was seventeen years old.39 As detailed in her victim impact statement, 
Vicky suffers ongoing serious psychological trauma because of the posses-
sion and distribution of her child sex abuse images and videos.40 Indeed, 
her condition deteriorated markedly in the years following her discovery of 
the widespread proliferation of the images of her childhood sexual abuse.41 
When she became aware of how many people around the world are “enter-
tained by [her] shame and pain,” Vicky started having nightmares about 
strangers staring at images of her naked body on their computer screens.42 
She is further burdened by the thought that her images “might be used to 
groom another child for abuse,” which is a seduction technique utilized by 
pedophiles that her own father used on her as a child.43
Here again, Vicky’s own words best describe her harm:
I had no idea the “Vicky” series, the child porn series taken of me, 
had been circulated at all, until I was 17. My world came crashing 
down that day, and now, two years later, not much has changed. 
These past years have only shown me the enormity of the circula-
tion of these images and added to my grief and pain. This knowl-
edge has given me a paranoia. I wonder if the people I know have 
seen these images. I wonder if the men I pass in the grocery store 
have seen them. Because the most intimate parts of me are being 
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viewed by thousands of strangers and traded around, I feel out of 
control. They are trading my trauma around like treats at a party, 
but it is far from innocent. It feels like I am being raped by each and 
every one of them. What are they doing when they watch those 
videos anyway? They are gaining sexual gratification from images 
of me at ages 10 and 11. It sickens me to the core and terrifies me. 
Just thinking about it now, I feel myself stiffen and I want to cry. So 
many nights I have cried myself to sleep thinking of a stranger 
somewhere staring at their computer with images of a naked me on 
the screen. I have nightmares about it.
My paranoia is not without just cause. Some of these perverts 
have tried to contact me. One tried to find me through my friends 
on MySpace. Another created a slide show of me on Youtube. I wish 
I could one day feel completely safe, but as long as these images are 
out there, I never will. Every time they are downloaded I am ex-
ploited again, my privacy is breeched, and my life feels less and less 
safe. I will never be able to have control over who sees me raped as 
a child. It’s all out there for the world to see and it can never be re-
moved from the internet.44
Vicky also suffers great anxiety that she will encounter individuals who 
have seen the worst moments of her life— a fear that, sadly, is not unjusti-
fied.45 Multiple child pornography users have contacted Vicky, even send-
ing her e- mails suggesting that she “mak[e] porn” with them.46 One so- 
called “end user” of her images and videos actually stalked her through a 
social media page and harassed her with pointed sexual questions.47 Un-
able to cope with the demands of college life while at the same time deal-
ing with her immense emotional suffering, Vicky returned home for 
counseling.48 Vicky also limits her employment to jobs that do not involve 
dealing with the public because of the difficulty she experiences when in-
teracting with unknown male adults.49 She left her job at an ice cream 
store, for example, because each encounter with a stranger, each smile 
from a man at the counter, struck at Vicky’s deepest fear: has he seen me 
in the most humiliating moments of my life?50
C. Translating the Harms to Economic Losses
Unsurprisingly, the knowledge that thousands of individuals possess im-
ages and video of a child victim being raped can inflict deep, life- lasting 
trauma that extends well beyond the initial sexual abuse. The Supreme 
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Court’s recent decision in Paroline agreed with this conclusion when it 
recognized that it was “common ground that the victim suffers continuing 
and grievous harm as a result of her knowledge that a large, indeterminate 
number of individuals have viewed and will in the future view images of 
the sexual abuse she endured.”51
This emotional trauma results in economic burdens, particularly for 
psychological counseling costs and lost income.52 Although each victim 
may suffer a baseline amount of harm as a result of such trauma, no two 
victims are exactly alike. Determining each victim’s losses requires a care-
ful analysis of how each victim’s life is damaged by child pornography.
For victims like Amy and Vicky, the economic losses are substantial. 
Both Amy and Vicky have enlisted experts who calculated their losses us-
ing standard econometric tools based on their individual circumstances.53 
These calculations serve as the basis for the restitution requests that Amy 
and Vicky made under federal law from possessors and distributors of 
their images— restitution that is vitally important to their recovery. The 
restitution payments have helped them secure not only psychological 
counseling, but also vocational and educational training to move forward 
with their lives.54
Consider the restitution request Vicky recently filed in a federal criminal 
case in Washington.55 In that request, Vicky documented “economic losses” 
totaling $1,327,166.56 The losses were comprised of $106,900 in future psy-
chological counseling expenses, $147,830 in educational and vocational 
counseling needs, $722,511 in lost earnings, $52,110 in expenses paid for such 
things as forensic evaluations and court costs, and $297,815 in attorneys’ 
fees.57 Supporting each request was an expert report or declaration.58
For example, concerning lost income— the largest item requested— 
Vicky submitted a forensic economic analysis by Stan V. Smith, an expert 
economist who isolated the lifetime loss to Vicky’s earnings due to the 
trauma associated with the worldwide circulation of her images and vid-
eos.59 In doing so, Dr. Smith quantified the losses attributable to Vicky’s 
difficulties both in pursuing a college degree and in maintaining employ-
ment following her identification as a victim of child pornography. Vicky 
entered college, but then had to withdraw to focus on therapy.60 While 
attempting to hold various jobs, she suffered panic attacks when interact-
ing with men who could have viewed her images.61 Dr. Smith calculated 
the economic consequences of a delayed completion of a college degree as 
well as the reduced employment opportunities that come from restricting 
her employment to situations where she does not have to interact with 
unknown men.62 Accounting for these variables and limitations, Dr. Smith 
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determined that Vicky’s net loss of earnings capacity attributable to her 
ongoing “psychological injuries” related to the worldwide circulation of 
her images is $722,511.63
The goal of the Mandatory Restitution for Sex Crimes provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act is to restore to victims the losses they suffer 
as a result of the child pornography crimes. In other words, its purpose is 
restorative, not punitive.64 Yet there often seems to be a misunderstanding 
about the nature of the losses sought by child pornography victims like 
Amy and Vicky. For example, one academic commentator, Professor 
Cortney Lollar, recently argued that restitution in such cases is being im-
posed “not as disgorgement of unlawful economic gains, but as a punitive 
mechanism of compensation for emotional, psychological, and hedonic 
losses in a manner resembling civil damages.”65 Professor Lollar then par-
adoxically argues that such restitution is actually harmful to child pornog-
raphy victims.66
Describing Amy’s and Vicky’s restitution requests as involving emo-
tional or hedonic losses is inaccurate. Amy and Vicky are only seeking 
restitution for the kinds of out- of- pocket pecuniary losses that are typi-
cally recoverable from convicted criminals in restitution actions.67 Indeed, 
Professor Lollar is ultimately forced to concede that “the restitution being 
requested and ordered is technically for future therapy and mental health 
treatment and sometimes future lost wages.”68 This is entirely consistent 
with federal law, which specifically enumerates pecuniary losses related to 
“psychological care” and “lost income” as those that are compensable in 
restitution.69
II. Allocating the Harms Caused by Child  
Pornography Crimes
Courts have tended to generally agree with the point that child pornogra-
phy possession crimes cause harm to their victims. The courts have varied 
widely, however, on the question of how much harm such crimes cause. 
Indeed, a number of courts have minimized the harm to the point where 
restitution awards become vanishingly small. In this section we critique 
these efforts at minimization. We advance the thesis that the proper way 
to assess the magnitude of harm is not to attempt to disaggregate the 
harms child pornography victims suffer, but rather to view them in the 
aggregate. On this view, each criminal who contributes to a child pornog-
raphy victim’s indivisible harm becomes jointly and several liable for the 
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full amount of that harm— the standard answer under conventional tort 
law principles. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Paroline v. United 
States, which requires disaggregation, misapprehends both the factual and 
legal predicates for full restitution.
A. The Problems from Disaggregation
Courts considering restitution requests from victims of child pornogra-
phy crimes have almost uniformly agreed that some harm exists. The gen-
erally accepted view is that each act of viewing a victim’s image is a gross 
invasion of privacy that causes additional suffering to a victim. The Ninth 
Circuit has articulated the conventional view of this point in a case involv-
ing restitution requests from both Amy and Vicky:
Amy and Vicky presented ample evidence that the viewing of their 
images caused them emotional and psychic pain, violated their pri-
vacy interests, and injured their reputation and well- being. Amy, 
for example, stated that her “privacy ha[d] been invaded” and that 
she felt like she was “being exploited and used every day and every 
night.” Vicky described having night terrors and panic attacks due 
to the knowledge that her images were being viewed online. Even 
without evidence that Amy and Vicky knew about [the defendant’s] 
conduct, the district court could reasonably conclude that Amy and 
Vicky were “harmed as a result of ” [the defendant’s] participation 
in the audience of individuals who viewed the images.70
Because viewing those images harms the children depicted, the children 
are properly considered victims of those who possess the images. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he full extent of [these victims’] 
suffering is hard to grasp.”71 Yet in a series of cases concerning the amount 
of restitution that child pornography victims may collect from child por-
nography possessors, federal courts have often struggled to determine 
how much harm possessors of child pornography cause their victims, 
sometimes minimizing the harm from each crime.
This minimization is especially visible in cases like Amy’s and Vicky’s, 
where the victim’s image has been viewed by thousands (or even tens of 
thousands) of criminals. In those cases, some courts seem to suggest that 
the harm caused by any one defendant who possesses child pornography 
is minimal. For example, in one case involving Amy, the D.C. Circuit ac-
knowledged that the “possession of child pornography causes harm to the 
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minors depicted.”72 But the court concluded that one criminal defendant 
who possessed and viewed Amy’s image only “added to her injuries”; “[s]
he would have suffered tremendously from her sexual abuse regardless of 
what [he] did.”73 Similarly, in a case involving Vicky, the Fourth Circuit 
stated that one child pornography possessor was not responsible for the 
losses Vicky has suffered; indeed, the court went so far as to state that 
Vicky’s financial losses are “wholly disproportionate to the harm inflicted 
by an individual defendant.”74
Unfortunately the Supreme Court’s recent Paroline decision went 
down this path. Paroline reversed the Fifth Circuit’s award of full restitu-
tion to Amy on the grounds that Mr. Paroline’s “contribution to the causal 
process underlying [Amy’s] losses was very minor, both compared to the 
combined acts of all other relevant offenders, and in comparison to the 
contributions of other individual offenders, particularly distributors (who 
may have caused hundreds or thousands of further viewings) and the ini-
tial producer of the child pornography.”75 Paroline ultimately concluded 
that any one defendant’s restitution obligation was to be based on “the 
significance of the individual defendant’s conduct in light of the broader 
causal process that produced the victim’s losses.”76
Paroline and similar lower court opinions are troubling because they 
almost seem to cavalierly invite additional victimization. Under such 
opinions, the larger the number of criminals who view a victim’s images, 
the less responsible any particular criminal is for the harm caused to the 
victim. In other words, “the more, the merrier.” This problem has been 
aptly named by one of the nation’s leading tort law scholars, Professor 
Richard Wright, as a “tortfest”: each criminal can reduce his restitution 
liability by encouraging other men to join in and abuse the victim.77 For 
example, if a rapist would cause a victim to suffer $10,000 in medical bills 
(a physical examination, etc.), a gang rapist who gets four of his friends to 
join in attacking the victim might be responsible for only $2,000, his “fair 
share” of the bill for the medical examination. Of course, such an approach 
unfairly and even perversely invites greater victimization. It also might 
leave the victim with uncompensated losses if the four friends are never 
apprehended or are insolvent.
Amy raised this point in her arguments to the Supreme Court in Paro-
line. The Court, however, found the point unpersuasive because unlike 
gang rapists, child pornography possessors do not act in concert.78 The 
Court, however, never explained why this should make a difference. The 
goal of restitution is to compensate victims, regardless of whether they 
suffered harm from defendants actually individually or in concert. More-
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over, as explained in the introduction to section I above, although child 
pornography defendants may not formally agree to act in concert, as a 
practical matter they are all part of a de facto joint criminal enterprise.
The obvious and conventional solution to concerns about how to allo-
cate responsibility is to bar a criminal from debating what fraction of the 
single loss he has caused a victim. A standard illustration is offered by 
Professors Harper and James, who give the example of “several ruffians 
[who] set upon a man and beat him, each inflicting separate wounds.” 
Under traditional tort doctrine, the ruffians— intentional tortfeasors— are 
each “liable for the whole injury.”79 Child pornography victims are the 
twenty- first- century victims of these hypothetical attackers. A victim like 
Amy, for instance, is essentially “set upon” by digital “ruffians” who are all 
harming her. Even if her psychological wounds can somehow be viewed as 
“separate,” conventional tort law demands that liability for her “whole in-
jury” be imposed on each and every one of the ruffians, that is, each and 
every child pornography distributor and possessor.
B. Child Pornography Possessors Contribute to  
All of a Victim’s Losses
Some courts— including the Supreme Court in Paroline— have taken the 
position that the losses suffered by child pornography victims should be 
allocated across countless defendants. Using what it described as “tradi-
tional principles” of tort law, an influential D.C. Circuit opinion, United 
States v. Monzel, rejected Amy’s argument that a child pornography pos-
sessor should be held jointly and severally liable for all of her losses.80 
Because Monzel’s possession of a “single image” was not independently 
sufficient to cause the entirety of Amy’s injury, the Circuit reasoned that 
he did not create a single, “indivisible” injury.81 Thus, because Amy suf-
fered separate injuries each time someone viewed her images, Monzel was 
obligated to pay restitution only for the separate injury for which he was 
individually responsible.82 With less extended analysis, Paroline reached 
essentially the same conclusion, limiting a defendant’s responsibility to 
pay restitution to his “relative role in the causal process that underlies the 
victim’s general losses.”83
Paroline and similar opinions conveniently duck the fundamental ques-
tion left by this approach: Just exactly how much restitution should a de-
fendant pay for injuring Amy? In Monzel, for example, the D.C. Circuit 
remanded to the district court for such a calculation. And the district court 
judge then threw up her hands, awarding Amy no restitution whatsoever 
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because she was unable to determine what fraction of Amy’s substantial 
losses could be specifically assigned to Monzel. In the wake of the Paroline 
decision, some district courts have had great difficulty in applying the Su-
preme Court’s instructions. A few months after the decision, one frustrated 
district court judge wrote, “It appears to this Court that some of the factors 
the Supreme Court suggests be considered are at best difficult, and at worst 
impossible to calculate in this case as in most similar cases.”84
But the more fundamental problem with this disaggregation approach 
is that it fails to recognize that the crime of one child pornography defen-
dant combines with that of other criminals to produce an aggregated harm 
to Amy. When these crimes are all combined, the collective conduct over-
determines, or is more than sufficient to cause the harm (i.e., the costs of 
counseling), because Amy will presumably need the same amount of 
counseling regardless of whether the number of defendants possessing her 
images was 69,999 (without a particular defendant) or 70,000 (with 
him).85 In such situations, the standard answer in tort law is not the one 
reached by the Supreme Court; instead, the standard answer is to hold all 
defendants jointly and severally liable for the entire injury.
The problem described by Paroline is a conundrum about factual cau-
sation that modern tort theory resolved long ago.86 As the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts describes the problem, “[i]n some cases, tortious conduct 
by one actor is insufficient, even with other background causes, to cause 
the plaintiff ’s harm. Nevertheless, when combined with conduct by other 
persons, the conduct overdetermines the harm, i.e., is more than sufficient 
to cause the harm.”87 The standard solution not to award the victims noth-
ing in such circumstances. Instead, the standard answer, as recounted in 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, is to treat each wrongdoer as being a con-
tributing cause to the entirety of the loss that is created.
The Restatement aptly recognizes that it is never possible to identify a 
single “cause” for an event. For example, an arsonist who uses a match to 
light a house ablaze is the cause of the house burning down only because 
of the existence of other conditions as well, such as a lack of rain at the 
time, the existence of oxygen in the atmosphere, the delay in the fire de-
partment responding to the fire, and so forth. It is all of the things— a 
causal set— that contributes to the ultimate harm.88
Reasoning from this insight, it is then possible to consider examples 
such as five people beating a sixth, who dies from the blows, any three of 
which would have been sufficient to kill the victim.89 This is an illustration 
of an overdetermined causal set causing harm; none of the five attackers is 
the but- for cause of death, as it is possible to eliminate one of the five at-
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tackers and death still results. But this would produce the anomalous and 
counterintuitive conclusion that the victim died from none of the attack-
ers! Instead of this bizarre result, at least for purposes of tort law,90 the 
solution is that all five of the attackers are responsible for the death. It is 
possible to construct a causal set of three of the attackers, which produces 
the death. And the mere fact that other causal sets could be constructed is 
no defense to tort liability. Under the Restatement, “[w]hen an actor’s tor-
tious conduct is not a factual cause of harm under the standard in § 26 
[i.e., independently sufficient or but- for causation] only because one or 
more other causal sets exist that are also sufficient to cause the harm at the 
same time, the actor’s tortious conduct is a factual cause of the harm.”91
The Restatement notes that well- established tort precedent (predating 
Congress’ 1994 enactment of the restitution statute) underlies this con-
tributing cause approach. The Restatement reporter explains that, for ex-
ample, “[s]ince the first asbestos case in which a plaintiff was successful, 
courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover from all defendants to whose 
asbestos products the plaintiff was exposed.”92 While numerous toxic tort 
cases illustrate the contributing cause approach, the Restatement identi-
fies much deeper roots: “Nuisance cases were the pre- toxic- substances 
equivalent of asbestos and other such cases, and courts resolved them 
similarly.”93 In other words, traditionally in American tort law, an 
“independent- sufficiency requirement is not followed by the courts. . . . 
[Instead], courts have allowed the plaintiff to recover from each defen-
dant who contributed to the . . . injury, even though none of the defen-
dants’ individual contributions were either necessary or sufficient by it-
self for the occurrence of the injury.”94
In their restitution applications, Amy and Vicky are seeking recovery 
for a single “injury,” their psychological counseling costs. Those counsel-
ing costs do not increase or decrease with the addition or subtraction of an 
additional criminal from the estimated tens of thousands of men who 
have viewed their rapes. In other words, the psychological counseling 
costs are “indivisible,” because the evidence fails to provide “a reasonable 
basis for the factfinder to determine . . . the amount of [those costs] sepa-
rately caused” by any particular child pornography possessor or distribu-
tor.95 Against that backdrop, it is not surprising the Congress directed that 
each convicted child pornography criminal who contributed to a victim’s 
psychological counseling costs must pay for the “full amount” of those 
costs in the child pornography restitution statute.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, Na-
tional Steel Corp.96 offers a good illustration of this point. In that case, 
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several air polluters argued that plaintiffs could not proceed with a nui-
sance action against them when their pollutants “mix[ed] in the air so that 
their separate effects in creating the individual injuries [were] impossible 
to analyze.”97 The Sixth Circuit rejected this approach, holding that Mich-
igan tort law allowed the polluters to be held liable as joint tortfeasors for 
the indivisible injuries caused.98 The court noted that “it is clear that there 
is a manifest unfairness in putting on the injured party the impossible 
burden of proving the specific shares of harm done by each.”99 The rule in 
such cases is that “[w]hen the triers of the facts decide that they cannot 
make a division of injuries we have, by their own finding, nothing more or 
less than an indivisible injury, and the precedents as to indivisible injuries 
will control.”100
The application of this principle to child pornography possession cases 
is obvious. Although it is possible that an individual tortfeasor’s action— 
such as polluting the air or possessing child pornography— is neither 
“necessary” nor “sufficient” by itself to cause all the injuries, the general 
approach in American tort law is to hold each tortfeasor fully liable for the 
entire injury caused.101 The injury to victims of child pornography due to 
possession or distribution manifests itself in the same way as other harms 
caused by multiple tortfeasors. And although some injuries may be theo-
retically divisible, where it is practically impossible to divide up the injury 
by causation, “the modern approach has been to hold each defendant . . . 
jointly and severally liable for all the injuries.”102 Thus, the appellate courts 
should have paid closer attention to one of the most compelling reasons to 
apply joint and several liability in analogous tort situations— that is, joint 
and several liability is applicable where “there is no reasonable basis for 
division” of the injury suffered.103
To this conclusion, it might be objected that each child pornography 
possessor contributes only a trivial amount to a victims’ ultimate harm 
and thus liability is improper. In support of such a conclusion, one could 
cite tort theory that there is no liability “where one defendant has made a 
clearly proved but quite insignificant contribution to the result, as where 
he throws a lighted match into a forest fire.”104 The Restatement, for ex-
ample, recognizes that a trivial cause can be excluded from tort liability.105 
The Restatement, however, specifically notes that this triviality limitation 
“is not applicable if the trivial contributing cause is necessary for the out-
come . . . ,”106 with a cross- reference back to the contributing cause cases 
that involve constructing a sufficient causal set. Put another way, if all 
causes would be regarded as trivial causes, then none of them can be re-
garded as trivial causes. Of course, child pornography possessors are part 
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of a causal set sufficient to produce Amy’s psychological harm. Thus, their 
crimes are not like tossing a match into an already raging fire. Instead, 
conceptually the proper hypothetical would be thousands of arsonists all 
collectively tossing matches into a forest to start the fire or, alternatively, 
sequentially tossing matches to keep a fire burning. Rather than allowing 
all of the wrongdoers to escape liability through an exercise in blame shift-
ing and finger pointing, standard tort principles hold all of them liable.
In any event, Congress itself has answered what is considered “trivial” 
in the context of restitution. Section 2259 mandates imposition of a resti-
tution award for the “full amount” of Amy’s losses in every case of a crim-
inal conviction for child pornography possession.107 By operation of law, 
the serious felony of possessing child pornography is never trivial.
Amy presented all these arguments to the Supreme Court in Paroline. 
And the majority acknowledged that tort law had, in some areas, applied 
the principle of “aggregate causation.”108 The majority, however, tersely 
held that such principles “can be taken too far.”109 Curiously, the majority 
seemed to agree that the “strict logic” of the recognized tort principles 
supported Amy.110 But the majority was simply unwilling to proceed logi-
cally because of the “the striking outcome of this reasoning— that each 
possessor of the victim’s images would bear the consequences of the acts 
of the many thousands who possessed those images.”111
“Striking” outcome or not, the Court should have simply followed the 
generally recognized tort principles. Criminal defendants like Paroline 
have a choice about whether to commit their crimes. The fact that they are 
part of a vast enterprise with thousands of other similar actors should be an 
aggravating factor, not a mitigating one. As Justice Sotomayor explained in 
her dissent, restitution statutes should offer “no safety- in- numbers excep-
tion for defendants who possess images of a child’s abuse in common with 
other offenders.”112 Justice Sotomayor went on to explain that “the injuries 
caused by child pornography possessors are impossible to apportion in any 
practical sense. It cannot be said, for example, that Paroline’s offense alone 
required Amy to attend five additional minutes of therapy, or that it caused 
some discrete portion of her lost income.”113 She concluded that the restitu-
tion statute should be interpreted to mandate “full restitution,” which “dis-
penses with this guesswork . . . and in doing so it harmonizes with the set-
tled tort law tradition concerning indivisible injuries.”114
Fortunately the Supreme Court does not have the last word on restitu-
tion in this country. The decision about how much restitution to award 
victims of child pornography crimes belongs to Congress. Congress 
should amend the statute to ensure that child pornography victims receive 
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“full” restitution. And Congress has a bill pending before it that would 
exactly that. Known as the Amy and Vicky Act,115 the bill should be en-
acted as soon as possible to ensure that victims will not be left without 
restitution for losses inflicted by criminals too numerous to count.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have attempted to provide some insight into the serious 
harms suffered by the victims of child pornography possession crimes. 
Possessing child pornography is not just looking at “kiddie porn.” Instead, 
such criminal acts scar real- world victims, who live in constant fear of be-
ing exposed and humiliated by those who are obtaining sexual gratifica-
tion through viewing images of their childhood rape. We have tried to il-
lustrate this point in describing the experience of two young victims of 
child pornography crimes, Amy and Vicky. Against the backdrop of the 
suffering of victims such as these, stiff criminal penalties unsurprisingly 
address, as one court aptly put it, “a tide of depravity that Congress, ex-
pressing the will of our nation, has condemned in the strongest terms.”116 
Without trying to identify the exact quantum of punishment appropriate 
for child pornography possession, it is clear that the crime produces real 
and quantifiable harms on its victims that should be reflected in signifi-
cant prison terms.
But in addition to punishing those who possess child pornography, it 
is equally important to compensate their victims. When awarding restitu-
tion for such aggregated crimes, some courts have minimized each defen-
dant’s culpability to the vanishing point. This concern is ironically most 
acute in cases (like Amy’s and Vicky’s) where the victim’s images have 
been most widely viewed. Trying to apportion the amount of financial loss 
among tens of thousands of criminals invariably neglects the very signifi-
cant psychological harm each crime causes. Those viewings represent 
continuous invasions of privacy that cause lasting psychological injury.
Traditional tort principles instruct instead that each defendant should 
be viewed as a contributing cause to the entirety of a victim’s injury. This 
approach properly recognizes that a defendant is part of a group of crimi-
nals who cause harm— a harm that is aggravated by the presence of many 
others working together. Acknowledging the seriousness of harm caused 
by each possessor is important not only for determining how to compen-
sate victims under federal restitution law, but also for calibrating the crim-
inal penalties imposed for and the enforcement resources devoted to the 
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possession of child pornography. Child pornography possessors should 
not be able to hide in a crowd. Instead, they are all jointly responsible for 
seriously harming victims— and should be held fully accountable through 
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 3. 18 U.S.C. § 2259.
 4. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014).
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from other types of victims, an injury that is “a result of the collective actions of a huge 
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phasis added)); id. at 1741 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Child pornography possessors 
are jointly liable  .  .  . for they act in concert as part of a global network of possessors, 
distributors, and producers who pursue the common purpose of trafficking in images of 
child sexual abuse. . . . By communally browsing and downloading Internet child por-
nography, offenders . . . fuel the process that allows the industry to flourish.”).
 24. These names are pseudonyms used in all court hearings to protect the victims’ 
privacy.
 25. The harms Amy suffers from child pornography are detailed in the expert evalu-
ations and her own victim impact statements that accompany her restitution requests in 
various cases. This part relies specifically on the reports and statements contained as 
attachments to one of Amy’s recent restitution requests, submitted in March 2013. See 
Letter from James R. Marsh, Counsel for “Amy,” Marsh Law Firm PLLC, to Camil Skip-
per, Appellate Chief, E.D. Cal. U.S. Attorney’s Office (Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter “Amy’s 
Restitution Request”] (on file with authors). Attachment 1 of this request contains Amy’s 
victim impact statement, hereinafter referred to as “Amy’s 2013 Impact Statement”; At-
tachment 2 contains Dr. Joyanna Silberg’s November 21, 2008, report of her psycho-
logical evaluation of Amy, hereinafter referred to as “Amy’s Psychological Evaluation”; 
and Attachment 6 contains Dr. Stan V. Smith’s September 15, 2008, report that calculates 
Amy’s lost income and other economic losses attributable to the distribution of her child 
sex abuse images, hereinafter referred to as “Amy’s Economic Loss Report.”
 26. Amy’s 2013 Impact Statement, supra note 25, at 1.
 27. See Amy’s Psychological Evaluation, supra note 25, at 2.
 28. See id.; see also Bazelon, The Price of a Stolen Childhood, http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/01/27/magazine/how-much-can-restitution-help-victims-of-child-pornog 
raphy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 at 25 (describing how Amy’s uncle forced her to per-
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form sexual poses for photographs in response to specific requests from anonymous 
Internet users).
 29. Amy’s Psychological Evaluation, supra note 25, at 2– 3 (quoting notes of Amy’s 
original therapist, Dr. Ruby Salazar).
 30. Id. at 3; Amy’s 2013 Impact Statement, supra note 25, at 1.
 31. Amy is the victim portrayed in what law enforcement officials have identified as 
the “Misty” series. As of July 2009, analysts at NCMEC had encountered more than 
35,570 separate images associated with the “Misty” series, received from law enforce-
ment officials around the world. NCMEC Brief, supra note 7, at 5.
 32. Amy’s 2013 Impact Statement, supra note 25, at 2.
 33. Amy’s Psychological Evaluation, supra note 25, at 8. Dr. Silberg explains that the 
feelings of shame and humiliation that are typically felt by victims of sexual abuse are 
“multiplied exponentially for victims of internet child pornography.” Id. at 9. With typi-
cal sexual abuse victims, therapists can offer “anonymity” along with the “acknowledg-
ment that they deserve this protection of privacy.” Id. Dr. Silberg explains, however, that 
“knowing one’s image is out there at all times is an invasion of privacy of the highest 
degree which makes the victim feel known, revealed and publically shamed, rather than 
anonymous.” Id. The course of treatment for these victims must account for the unique 
harms involved, as certain therapeutic techniques useful to survivors of sexual abuse 
might actually be “ineffective and potentially harmful” to victims of child pornography. 
See id. The “imagery technique,” for example, is used to help victims cope with flash-
backs of abuse and requires the victim to imagine herself “going back in time and stand-
ing up to the abuser to undo the experience of victimization in their imagination.” Id. 
But, as Dr. Silberg explains, “[f]or victims like Amy, such a technique would actually be 
harmful as she has to face [that] she can never erase the ongoing ‘evidence’ and ‘proof ’ 
of what she was forced to do. Such an exercise would add to her feelings [of] helpless-
ness.” Id.
 34. See Amy’s Economic Loss Report, supra note 25, at 3.
 35. See Amy’s 2013 Impact Statement, supra note 25, at 3.
 36. The facts about the harms Vicky suffers from child pornography come from the 
reports and statements contained within one of Vicky’s recent restitution requests, 
which is included as an unsealed exhibit (Exhibit B) to a government sentencing memo-
randum, which itself is still sealed. See Government’s Resentencing Memorandum Re-
garding Restitution at Exhibit B, United States v. Kennedy, No. 2:08- CR- 00354- RAJ- 1 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2012) [hereinafter “Vicky’s Restitution Request”]. The restitution 
request itself contains several relevant exhibits: Exhibit 1 contains an August 2012 letter 
from Vicky to a district court judge in Washington State regarding the sentencing of a 
defendant convicted of possessing her images, hereinafter referred to as “Vicky’s Letter 
to Sentencing Judge;” Exhibit 2 contains two victim impact statements written by Vicky, 
hereinafter referred to as “Vicky’s 2008 Impact Statement” and “Vicky’s 2011 Impact 
Statement,” respectively; Exhibit 4 contains two reports of her psychological evaluations 
conducted by Dr. Randall L. Green, which will be referred to hereinafter as “Vicky’s May 
2009 Psychological Evaluation” and “Vicky’s Dec. 2009 Psychological Evaluation” re-
spectively; and Exhibit 9 contains Dr. Stan V. Smith’s November 10, 2010, report calcu-
lating Vicky’s lost income and other economic losses attributable to the distribution of 
her child sex abuse images, hereinafter referred to as “Vicky’s Economic Loss Report.”
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 37. See Vicky’s May 2009 Psychological Evaluation, supra note 36, at 18– 21; see also 
Vicky’s 2008 Impact Statement, supra note 36, at 1.
 38. Vicky’s May 2009 Psychological Evaluation, supra note 36, at 20.
 39. Vicky’s 2008 Impact Statement, supra note 36, at 1.
 40. See Vicky’s 2011 Impact Statement, supra note 36, at 1 (“My world came crashing 
down the day I learned that pictures of me being sexually abused had been circulated on 
the internet. Since then, little has changed except my understanding that the distribu-
tion of these pictures grows bigger and bigger by the day and there is nothing I can do 
about it.”); see also Vicky’s May 2009 Psychological Evaluation, supra note 36, at 24– 29 
(detailing Vicky’s experiences following her discovery of the worldwide distribution of 
her images).
 41. See Vicky’s Dec. 2009 Psychological Evaluation, supra note 36, at 2– 8 (describing 
Vicky’s deteriorating emotional state in the wake of learning about the circulation of her 
images online). Dr. Green categorized the “knowledge of the dissemination and prolif-
eration of the images of [Vicky] at her times of greatest humiliation and degradation” as 
a Type II trauma, which represents a “chronic, toxic condition, the knowledge of which 
continuously works like corrosive acid on the psyche of the individual.” Vicky’s May 
2009 Psychological Evaluation, supra note 36, at 6. Other examples of stressors that con-
stitute Type II traumas include the “challenges endured by those who live near Cher-
nobyl, Three Mile Island or the Love Canal or a war zone.” Id. at 6– 7.
 42. Vicky’s 2011 Impact Statement, supra note 36, at 1.
 43. Vicky’s Letter to Sentencing Judge, supra note 36, at 2.
 44. Vicky’s 2011 Impact Statement, supra note 36, at 1.
 45. Id. at 1– 2.
 46. Id.
 47. Id.; see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Man Who Harassed and Stalked Victim 
of Child Pornography Series Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison (April 28, 2010), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nv/news/2010/04282010.html.
 48. Vicky’s 2011 Impact Statement, supra note 36, at 3; see also Vicky’s Dec. 2009 
Psychological Evaluation, supra note 36, at 4– 5 (“[Vicky] says that if there had been a 
way to afford to stay in college and seek therapy rather than return to her home town, 
she would have much preferred doing so. [Vicky] says, ‘Coming home is difficult be-
cause so many know and ask about [her depiction in child pornography].’ However, she 
says that she has learned that she can’t escape her issues by changing her geographical 
location, in view of the impact of the universal reach of the Internet. She explains, ‘They 
follow me.’”).
 49. Vicky’s Letter to Sentencing Judge, supra note 36, at 2.
 50. Vicky’s Dec. 2009 Psychological Evaluation, supra note 36, at 2, 4– 5, 8. Vicky of-
fered insight into this fear in a statement she wrote for the recent sentencing of defen-
dant Joshua Kennedy:
I understand that [Kennedy] had a good job, and that many people who are 
looked up to in the community came to make statements on his behalf at his first 
sentencing. This tells me that he blended into society and would have previously 
been seen as someone who was law- abiding and not someone who enjoyed 
looking at pictures of children being raped. This feeds my paranoia even more, 
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and confirms for me that I do need to be afraid of people that I see on an every-
day basis, because anyone I see is suspect of being a consumer of child pornog-
raphy. I could have walked past Joshua Kennedy on the street any time and he 
might have recognized me from those pictures he had of my sexual abuse. This 
chills me to the bone.
Vicky’s Letter to Sentencing Judge, supra note 36, at 2.
 51. Paroline v. United States, 134 W. Ct. 1710, 1726 (2014).
 52. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(A)– (F) (2012).
 53. See Amy’s Economic Loss Report, supra note 25; Vicky’s Economic Loss Report, 
supra note 36.
 54. See Bazelon, supra note 28, at 45– 47.
 55. See Vicky’s Restitution Request, supra note 36.
 56. Id. at 1.
 57. Id. at 1– 2.
 58. See id. at Exhibit 4 (original and updated psychological evaluation reports); id. at 
Exhibit 7 (vocational evaluation report); id. at Exhibit 9 (forensic economic analysis re-
port); id. at Exhibit 13 (declaration of attorneys’ fees and costs).
 59. See Vicky’s Economic Loss Report, supra note 36, at 2– 5. To assess her specific 
situation, Dr. Smith relied on the victim impact statements of Vicky and her mother, the 
reports of vocational and psychological experts who evaluated Vicky, and his own inter-
view of Vicky. Id. at 1.
 60. Id. Although she returned to school after taking a year off, her psychologist has 
recommended that due to her “reduced tolerance for stress,” she should take a reduced 
course load each semester, which will further delay her career. Id. at 4.
 61. Id.; see supra notes 49– 50 and accompanying text.
 62. Specifically, Dr. Smith determined that her net loss of earnings capacity is 
$722,511 to age sixty- seven for full- time employment, assuming a three- year delay of 
entry into the workforce and a 20 percent reduction in worklife, as she will likely experi-
ence more frequent job changes and time off from work than her peers. Vicky’s Eco-
nomic Loss Report, supra note 36, at 5.
 63. Id. at 1.
 64. Most federal courts have agreed that restitution is remedial in nature and there-
fore not subject to Eighth Amendment punishment or “excessive fine” limitations, but a 
circuit split exists on this issue. Compare, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 771– 
72 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding Eighth Amendment not applicable to § 2259 be-
cause the purpose of restitution “is remedial, not punitive”), with United States v. Du-
bose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[R]estitution under the [Mandatory Victim 
Restitution Act (“MVRA”)] is punishment” and subject to Eighth Amendment limita-
tions “because the MVRA has not only remedial, but also deterrent, rehabilitative, and 
retributive purposes.” (citation omitted)). We believe that restitution is nonpunitive for 
the reasons articulated in United States v. Visinaiz, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1318– 23 (D. 
Utah 2004) (Cassell, J.). See also Amicus Brief of Vicky and Andy, U.S. v. Paroline, No. 
12- 8561 (explaining why restitution is not punitive).
 65. Cortney Lollar, Child Pornography and the Restitution Revolution, 103 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 343, 346 (2013).
 66. Id. at 382. Federal law affords child pornography victims the right to receive (and 
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to opt out of receiving) notifications when a defendant is arrested or charged in connec-
tion with their images or videos. See Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3771(a) (2012); Crime Control Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 10607(b)– (c) (2006); see also 
Dep’t of Justice, Child Pornography Victims Assistance (CPVA) Program: A Ref-
erence for Victims and Parent/Guardian of Victims, available at http://www.fbi.
gov/stats-services/victim_assistance/brochures-handouts/cpva.pdf (describing victims’ 
opt- out rights). According to Professor Lollar, victims would be better off not being 
notified about the circulation of their images and not receiving restitution for the losses 
associated with their injuries because:
Money is not going to make the young women depicted in child pornography 
emotionally whole or restore what was lost. Yet by notifying child pornography 
victims of all known uses of their images and then ordering compensation, leg-
islators and courts are reinforcing the message that a young woman’s worth is in 
her body and is linked to the sexual acts in which she participates. . . . Notifica-
tion and restitution reaffirm the damaging messages the young women learned 
during their abuse.
 Lollar, supra note 65, at 382. Vicky herself has pointedly responded to such criticism in 
her victim impact statement, however, explaining:
I have a right to know who has my pictures and who is trading them. While it 
hurts to know, not knowing makes me feel more in danger. To be criticized for 
wanting to know what is going on with the humiliating pictures of me, to exer-
cise the few rights I have under the law, only makes the hurt that much worse. 
How can such people not understand, or care?
Vicky’s 2011 Impact Statement, supra note 36, at 1.
 67. In fact, Dr. Smith calculated hedonic damages (reduction in the value of life) for 
Vicky to be an additional $2,615,542 on top of the economic losses he calculated in light 
of her lost earnings. See Vicky’s Economic Loss Report, supra note 36, at 7. Vicky, how-
ever, has never requested restitution in a criminal case on the basis of such losses.
 68. Lollar, supra note 65, at 348 n.10. Notably, although they deny responsibility, even 
the defendants in these cases have not challenged the calculation of the losses. See, e.g., 
United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting defendant did not 
challenge the district judge’s calculation of Amy’s and Vicky’s losses, which were 
$3,367,854 and $1,224,697.04 respectively).
 69. See 18 U.S.C. §  2259(b)(3)(A)– (F) (2012) (specifying economic- based losses 
available to victims of child pornography).
 70. United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1263 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
 71. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (2014).
 72. United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
 73. Id. at 538.
 74. United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 458 (4th Cir. 2012).
 75. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1725.
 76. Id. at 1727– 28.
 77. See Richard W. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 
Memphis U.L. Rev. 45, 57 (1992).
 78. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1725.
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 79. 2 Fowler Harper & Fleming James, The Law of Torts 1124 (1956) (hereinafter 
Harper & James).
 80. United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
 81. Id. at 538– 39.
 82. Id. at 538.
 83. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1727.
 84. United States v. Crisostomi, CR 12- 166- M, 2014 WL 3510215 (D.R.I. July 16, 
2014).
 85. In Amy’s brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, she estimated that approximately 
70,000 men around the world had viewed her sexual abuse images, relying on 2009 data 
from NCMEC and the U.S. Justice Department. Brief for Respondent Amy, United States 
v. Paroline, No. 12- 8561, at 65. More current data from NCMEC would place the num-
ber of men at around 140,000. See Brief for Amicus National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children, United States v. Paroline, No. 12- 8561, at 11 (noting doubling of 
Amy’s images found at American crime scenes from 35,000 to 70,000 over the period 
2009 to 2013).
 86. See generally Eric A. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Loss of a Chance, 91 Iowa L. 
Rev. 59, 88– 92 (2005) (explaining development of the “multiple sufficient causal sets” 
rule which emerged as the “dominant theory of causation among tort scholars”).
 87. The American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm § 27 cmt. f (2000) (hereinafter cited as Restatement).
 88. See id., Restatement § 27 cmt. f, Rptrs. Note at 391 (collecting authorities discuss-
ing this point).
 89. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 267 n.25 
(5th ed. 1984).
 90. Cf. Burrage v. United States, No. 12- 7515 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2014) (concluding that for 
purposes of a mandatory minimum statute, death does not “result” from illegal distribu-
tion of heroin to a victim unless that death was the but- for cause of death).
 91. Restatement, supra note 87 at § 27 cmt. f at 381.
 92. Restatement, supra note 87 at § 27, cmt. g, Rptrs. Note at 392 (citing, e.g., Borel v. 
Fibreboard Paper Prods., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973); Ingram v. ACandS, Inc., 
977 F.2d 1332, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, 
Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Con-
cepts, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1001, 1073 & n.384 (1988) (collecting authorities)).
 93. Restatement § 27 cmt. g, Rptrs. Note at 393 (citing Bollinger v. Am. Asphalt Roof 
Corp., 19 S.W.2d 544, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (“If there was enough of smoke and 
fumes definitely found to have come from defendant’s plant to cause perceptible injury 
to plaintiffs, then the fact that another person or persons also joined in causing the in-
jury would be no defense; and it was not necessary for the jury to find how much smoke 
and fumes came from each place.”)); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 
205, 212 (5th Cir. 1951) (“According to the great weight of authority where the concur-
rent or successive acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting indepen-
dently of each other, are in combination, the direct or proximate cause of a single injury 
to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed 
to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might 
not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the act 
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of the other tortfeasor.” (quoting American Jurisprudence)); Northrup v. Eakes, 178 P. 
266, 268 (Okla. 1918) (where “separate and independent acts or negligence of several 
combine to produce directly a single injury, each is responsible for the entire result, even 
though his act or neglect alone might not have caused it”); The “Atlas,” 93 U.S. 302, 315 
(1876) (“Nothing is more clear than the right of a plaintiff, having suffered . . . a loss, to 
sue in a common- law action all the wrong- doers, or any one of them, at his election; and 
it is equally clear, that, if he did not contribute to the disaster, he is entitled to judgment 
in either case for the full amount of his loss.”).
 94. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735, 1792 (1985) 
(discussing various cases).
 95. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 26.
 96. Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat’l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974); see 
also Wright, supra note 94, at 1792 & n.239 (explaining that courts have allowed plain-
tiffs in pollution cases, including Michie, to recover from “each defendant who contrib-
uted to the pollution that caused the injury, even though none of the defendants’ indi-
vidual contributions was either necessary or sufficient by itself for the occurrence of the 
injury”).
 97. Michie, 495 F.2d at 215.
 98. Id. at 217.
 99. Id. at 216 (quoting Maddux v. Donaldson, 108 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Mich. 1961)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
 100. Maddux, 108 N.W.2d at 37; accord John Henry Wigmore, Joint- Tortfeasors and 
Severance of Damages, 17 Ill. L. Rev. 458, 459 (1923) (“Wherever two or more persons 
by culpable acts, whether concerted or not, cause a single general harm, not obviously 
assignable in parts to the respective wrongdoers, the injured party may recover from 
each for the whole.” (emphasis removed)).
 101. In his Seventh Circuit opinion, Judge Posner curiously recognized that this prin-
ciple applied to child pornography cases, but only if the defendant was convicted of 
distributing child pornography, not just possessing it. He explained:
The number of pornographic images of a child that are propagated across the 
Internet may be independent of the number of distributors. A recipient of the 
image may upload it to the Internet; dozens or hundreds of consumers of child 
pornography on the Internet may download the uploaded image and many of 
them may then upload it to their favorite child- pornography web sites; and the 
chain of downloading and uploading and thus distributing might continue in-
definitely. That would be like the [indivisible injury] case.
United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 992 (7th Cir. 2012).
 Judge Posner distinguished distribution from possession, explaining that if Laraneta did 
not upload any of Amy and Vicky’s images to the Internet, “then he didn’t contribute to 
those images ‘going viral.’” Id. at 991. He continued, “If we consider only [Laraneta] hav-
ing seen those images, and imagine his being the only person to have seen them, Amy’s 
and Vicky’s losses would not have been as great as they were.” Id. But this logic does not 
provide any clear reason to distinguish between distributors and possessors, especially 
because it is each act of possession that creates the harm to a child pornography victim. 
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Further, this misses the implication of what it means to “go viral.” A video, for example, 
can be “distributed” by being put on YouTube where the general public can view it, but 
it only “goes viral” once many people actually view it.
 102. Brief of American Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17, 
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003) (No. 01- 963), 2002 WL 1964118 
[hereinafter Brief of American Law Professors].
 103. 74 Am. Jur., 2d Torts § 65 (2013).
 104. W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 89, at 267– 68.
 105. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm § 36.
 106. Id. cmt. b at 599.
 107. 18 U.S.C. 2259(b)(4).
 108. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1723.
 109. Id. at 1724.
 110. Id.
 111. Id.
 112. Id. at 1737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
 113. Id. at 1740 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
 114. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
 115. S. 2301 (113th Cong., 2014).
 116. United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2007).
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8 |  Challenges in Investigations and 
Prosecutions of Child  
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The prosecution of child pornography possession and production has in-
creased in recent years, as the Internet has enhanced its availability and 
law enforcement has refined its techniques for its detection. Given the 
growth and complexity of child pornography crimes, it is critical to better 
understand the nature of these crimes as well as dilemmas and challenges 
law enforcement investigators and prosecutors encounter. Those dilem-
mas include the consistency of legal standards, problems with statutory 
frameworks, and the suitability of the punishments being sought. Law en-
forcement and prosecutors have also faced challenges related to the legal 
definition of child pornography. In particular, they have sometimes faced 
difficulty proving that a child depicted in a child pornography image is an 
actual child (rather than a computer- generated image) or that the child 
depicted is young enough for a specific law to apply. They have also strug-
gled with how to resolve cases involving sexting— sexually explicit images 
that minors create of themselves— given that those images fall within most 
legal definitions of child pornography.
This chapter will first explore the growth and complexity of child por-
nography possession and production crimes and will then explore changes 
and challenges faced by law enforcement investigators and prosecutors of 
child pornography crimes. The data presented here come from three 
waves of the National Juvenile Online Victimization (N- JOV) study, con-
ducted by the Crimes against Children Research Center at the University 
of New Hampshire. The N- JOV study collected information from a na-
tional sample of law enforcement agencies about the prevalence of arrests 
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for and characteristics of technology- facilitated child sexual exploitation 
crimes and a convenience sample1 of state prosecutors about challenges 
associated with such crimes.
The purpose of this chapter is to use the N- JOV study data to highlight 
important aspects of these investigations for law enforcement officers and 
prosecutors and to incorporate findings from other research studies in 
order to broaden our understanding of investigating and prosecuting 
these crimes. Specifically, we examine the nature of the law enforcement 
response, explore the tactics used to investigate these crimes, and explore 
the extent to which law enforcement investigations that begin as child 
pornography crimes identify offenders who commit child sexual assaults, 
that is, dual offenders. Understanding the law enforcement response to 
this type of crime relates to a number of important policy issues for law 
enforcement agencies. One issue is how much time and how many re-
sources should be allocated to this particular type of crime compared to 
other types of crimes against children. On one hand, given the hard evi-
dence available in these crimes, these cases could be considered relatively 
easy to investigate and prosecute. On the other hand, perhaps resources 
and investigations are focused on “easy offenders” compared to other 
types of offenders.
The issue of resources also extends to the nature of the prosecution re-
sponse. Given the resources required to perform the necessary computer 
forensics analysis, we examine the extent to which this causes difficulties 
for prosecutors. Another area of concern for prosecutors is the extent to 
which to involve victims with the investigation and how to display images 
during a trial. Given the strict federal sentences for these crimes, we next 
explore prosecutors’ experience deciding whether to refer a case for federal 
prosecution. Lastly, we explore how prosecutors are handling a relatively 
new type of child pornography case: youth- produced sexual images.
National Juvenile online Victimization (N- JoV) study
The N- JOV study is the first research to systematically collect data about 
the number and characteristics of offenders arrested for Internet- related 
sex crimes against minors, the dynamics of the crimes they commit, and 
changes over time. The study collected data pertaining to arrests for 
technology- facilitated crimes in 2000, 2006, and 2009. In each year of the 
study, mail surveys were sent to the same national sample of more than 
2,500 law enforcement agencies asking if they had made arrests for spe-
Revised Pages
Challenges in Investigations and Prosecutions | 217
cific types of online child sexual exploitation crimes during the study year. 
Then telephone interviews were conducted with law enforcement investi-
gators to collect details about a random sample of arrest cases.2 For the 
third N- JOV study, in addition to the interviews with law enforcement 
investigators, researchers also conducted telephone interviews with pros-
ecutors involved with technology- facilitated child sexual exploitation 
crimes.3 The study collected data on both child pornography possession 
and production crimes. The N- JOV study is the most comprehensive 
study to date on Internet- related sex crimes against minors.
Growth and Complexity of Child Pornography Crimes
Child pornography possession crimes involving the Internet often involve 
multiple child pornography images, which may be stored on individual 
computers, may be located on peer- to- peer file- sharing networks, and 
sometimes involve offenders who also commit contact child sexual abuse 
crimes. Not only is there tremendous variation in the characteristics of 
these crimes, but there has also been substantial growth in arrests for child 
pornography crimes involving the Internet4 that has likely impacted both 
the law enforcement investigation and prosecution of these crimes. Ar-
rests for crimes involving child pornography possession grew significantly 
between 2000 and 2006 and again in 2009.5 In 2009, U.S. law enforcement 
agencies made an estimated 4,901 arrests that included child pornography 
possession, almost three times as many as in 2000 and a 33 percent in-
crease over 2006 arrests. It is not possible to determine whether this is an 
increase in child pornography or an increase in the effectiveness of law 
enforcement mobilization. Some of these arrested offenders committed 
other sexual offenses against minors, such as child molestation, in addi-
tion to possessing child pornography. Others were arrested for child por-
nography possession only. Arrests that involved only child pornography 
possession increased almost fourfold between 2000 and 2009 and grew by 
about 50 percent between 2006 and 2009. In 2009, there were 3,719 arrests 
for child pornography possession only. In 2009, more arrested offenders 
had child pornography videos and a higher percentage of child pornogra-
phy possessors arrested also distributed child pornography compared to 
earlier years. There has also been a dramatic increase in arrests for crimes 
involving child pornography production, which more than quadrupled 
between 2000 and 2009.6 In 2009, U.S. law enforcement agencies made an 
estimated 1,910 arrests for crimes that included child pornography pro-
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duction. Growth in arrests likely impacts investigator and prosecutor de-
cisions about which cases to prioritize, how best to proceed, and issues 
related to having access to training and adequate resources.
Given the increase in these crimes, it is critical to understand changes 
and challenges that law enforcement officers and prosecutors encounter. 
The next section highlights ways in which the law enforcement response 
has changed over time, how changing definitions of child pornography 
impact the law enforcement response, and how the issue of dual offenders 
(offenders who access child pornography and have sexual contact offenses 
against children) has impacted law enforcement arrests. The Internet has 
also allowed law enforcement investigators to enhance investigations, 
such as by using novel technological investigative approaches as described 
in the following section.
Law enforcement Response
The N- JOV1 study collected data in 2001 on challenges related to defining 
child pornography in a sample of cases where there was no arrest.7 Those 
findings identified four primary categories of dilemmas for law enforce-
ment agencies: (1) definitional challenges, (2) difficulty identifying offend-
ers, (3) training and/or resource gaps, and (4) lack of collaboration with 
other agencies.8 While there continue to be investigative dilemmas in 
these child pornography possession cases, several innovations have facili-
tated arrests in the past decade. These include increased volume and so-
phistication in law enforcement agencies’ proactive or undercover investi-
gations. These proactive investigations include law enforcement agents 
posing online as traders, tracing suspects who transact business related to 
child pornography, and monitoring file- sharing or peer- to- peer (P2P) 
networks where a larger volume of images may be shared.9 The use of P2P 
file- sharing networks has dramatically changed the nature of these inves-
tigations. P2P file- sharing networks allow users to search for and down-
load electronic files directly from other computers. Participants download 
software that connects them to a network of users and they may upload 
files for sharing with others in the network. Media attention has focused 
on copyright violations when music and videos are exchanged in file- 
sharing networks, but users also share pornography, legal and illegal. In-
vestigations revolving around these P2P file- sharing networks may allow 
law enforcement agents opportunities to target offenders considered to be 
trading images with more graphic content.10 In 2000, only 4 percent of 
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arrested child pornography possessors used P2P sharing networks, com-
pared to 28 percent in 2006 and 61 percent in 2009.
Law enforcement agencies are actively engaging in these and other 
proactive online child pornography investigations, and arrests that began 
as proactive investigations more than doubled between 2006 and 2009. 
Moreover, in 2009, for the first time, more child pornography arrests be-
gan with proactive child pornography investigations than with individuals 
reporting child pornography possession or other sexual offenses to police. 
Thus the nature of how these investigations begin has dramatically 
changed over time.
Definitions of Child Pornography
Information collected in N- JOV1 illustrated that defining child pornogra-
phy could be challenging because law enforcement agencies were required 
to prove that images fit statutory definitions of child pornography and that 
they depicted minors.11 The content of child pornography images in cases 
ending in arrest has consistently included sexual penetration of a child, 
generally of girls aged six to twelve.12
Since 2000, however, a new type of child pornography producer 
emerged, youths who create sexual images that meet the legal definition of 
child pornography. Law enforcement officers saw a dramatic increase in 
these youth- produced types of cases in 2009. For example, the largest part 
of the increase in child pornography production arrests involved youth- 
produced sexual images, from an estimated 233 in 2006 to 1,198 in 2009. 
These cases are diverse, but many involved adult offenders who solicited 
sexual images from their underage victims.13 Youth- only incidents made 
up almost one- quarter of 2009 child pornography producer arrests, most 
of these for crimes involving serious criminal activity that included sexual 
abuse or blackmail or other malicious acts (16 percent of arrests). It was 
much more typical in cases ending in arrest, however, to have adults entice 
minors to produce the images (39 percent of arrests) or for adults to create 
images of minors (37 percent of arrests).
One definitional issue still in flux involves these sexual images that 
youth produce.14 Research suggests that youth- produced images can be 
classified into two categories: aggravated and experimental. Aggravated 
youth- produced incidents typically involve “adult- involved” situations 
where adults solicited sexual images from underage adolescent victims.15 
However, some of the arrests involved images that could be categorized as 
“sexting,” which is the commonly used term for images created by minors 
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in the context of romantic relationships or for sexual attention seeking 
among adolescents (7 percent of arrests).16
Dual Offenders
N- JOV1 identified a group of cases in which challenges in identifying of-
fenders made it impossible for law enforcement agencies to make an ar-
rest.17 In those cases where law enforcement agencies were not able to 
make an arrest, there was not enough information to identify an offender, 
there could have been multiple users on the same computer system, or too 
much time might have passed to retrieve digital evidence related to a spe-
cific allegation.18 In the past decade, there has been tremendous advance-
ment in the ability of law enforcement to detect and apprehend offenders. 
This is evidenced, in part, by the dramatic increase in arrests for child 
pornography possession and production cases between 2000 and 2009.
Currently, there is emphasis on assessing which child pornography of-
fenders can be identified as both accessing child pornography and sexu-
ally exploiting children. It is important to law enforcement agencies to 
identify these “dual offenders.”19 This term describes offenders who use 
the Internet to access child pornography and are also likely to commit, or 
have committed, conventional or online child sexual assaults. Between 
2000 and 2009, there was a decrease in the proportion of arrested child 
pornography possessors whose cases started with possession who were 
also dual offenders.20 Even though the proportion of dual offenders was 
smaller in 2009 than in previous years, the estimated number of arrests 
was similar to 2006 because there were more arrests overall. In 2000 and 
2006, about one in six cases that started with child pornography posses-
sion identified a dual offender, compared to one in ten cases in 2009. Ad-
ditional research is needed to explain this decrease, which may be related 
to law enforcement success in arresting known offenders, to challenges in 
identifying victims in images, or to other factors.
There has also been a decrease in the proportion of child pornography 
producers who also commit contact sexual offenses.21 In 2000, 63 percent 
of arrested child pornography producers committed contact sexual of-
fenses, in 2006 it was 69 percent of cases, and in 2009 53 percent of cases. 
Across all waves of the study, approximately half of the contact sexual of-
fenses were penetrative.
Produced child pornography continues to play an important role in 
the disclosure of child sexual exploitation crimes. In both 2006 and 2009, 
40 percent of cases started when someone found sexual pictures that child 
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pornography producers had taken of victims. A family member, for ex-
ample, found the pictures and reported offenders to police or police inves-
tigating possession of child pornography or other crimes found images of 
an offender abusing a child. Thus, the images themselves can be a critical 
type of evidence for investigators
Additional research is needed to assist in identifying these dual offend-
ers, with current research suggesting that online offenders were more 
likely to be Caucasian, young, more likely to be unemployed, and more 
likely to have greater sexual deviancy than offline offenders.22 Both online 
and offline child pornography offenders have been found to be more likely 
to report histories of childhood physical and sexual abuse than nonof-
fenders.23 Other research has been less definitive; there are mixed results 
related to whether or not the quantity of child pornography images an 
offender possesses is a clear predictor of being a dual offender.24 If child 
pornography cases do not begin with an allegation of sexual abuse, it may 
be challenging to assess whether or not the offender perpetuated such 
abuse in addition to possessing child pornography.25
Assets for Law Enforcement Investigations
Expert witness testimony, centralized databases of images, and Internet 
Crimes Against Children Task Forces are all assets in these investigations. 
Expert witnesses may be used in an effort to identify children in cases in-
volving dual offenders, as well as to ascertain the age of children who ap-
pear in pornographic images. Additionally, expert witness testimony can 
be a valuable resource to assist in building subjective and objective data to 
determine the age of children in images if those ages are ambiguous.26 For 
instance, expert witness testimony may assist in a determination that a 
child is under age twelve if there is no evidence of pubic hair or breast 
development in girls or pubic hair in boys.27 If the child has begun pu-
berty, the experts can examine tooth development and presence of adult 
teeth.28 However, there is also evidence that medical expert witness testi-
mony of developmental level may underestimate the age of individuals 
depicted in pornographic images.29 There is some indication that expert 
witnesses may vary in their predictions of girls’ ages once puberty has 
begun, especially given the inconsistent age of the onset of puberty.30
An additional resource for law enforcement agencies are centralized 
databases of images. Many of the images in these investigations are shared 
among child pornography offenders or are “known” to law enforcement 
agencies. Identification of known images, such as through the U.S. Immi-
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gration and Customs Enforcement’s National Child Victim Identification 
System (NCVIS) or the National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren’s Child Victim Identification program (CVIP), have likely facilitated 
the identification of some images. These databases are intended to help 
identify the victims of child pornography and include images of child por-
nography submitted by federal, local, state, and international law enforce-
ment agencies.
N- JOV1 identified a final category of law enforcement dilemmas in 
cases in which there was no arrest, which was related to challenges in mul-
tijurisdictional cooperation.31 These challenges may include differences in 
resources, training needs across jurisdictions, or differing protocols for 
specific types of cases. Existing protocols and best practice generally lead 
to collaborations with jurisdictions or task force units with specialization 
in child pornography. Formal affiliations with Internet Crimes Against 
Children (ICAC) Task Forces are likely also associated with increased 
likelihood of arrest in child pornography possession cases. Increasingly, 
state and local law enforcement agencies have such affiliations, and arrests 
by ICAC Task Forces increased from 14 percent in 2000 to 39 percent in 
2006 and 59 percent in 2009.32
Prosecution Response
Like law enforcement officers, prosecutors have enormous discretion 
about whether to prosecute a particular case, and both legal and extralegal 
factors are used when making decisions about sexual assault cases.33 Legal 
factors have to do with the extent of evidence available and extralegal fac-
tors have to do perceptions of victim credibility and whether the victim 
was engaged in risk- taking behaviors as well as suspect characteristics.
Prosecuting child pornography possession and production crimes has 
some advantage compared to other child sexual abuse crimes in that evi-
dence of a crime is readily available. Given that the crime of sexual abuse 
is often committed in private, there are rarely eyewitnesses, and the child’s 
testimony usually provides most of the information about the crime. Hav-
ing concrete evidence, such as child pornography images, can dramati-
cally change the nature of the investigation. For example, previous re-
search has found child sexual abuse cases resulting in charges filed tended 
to have at least two types of evidence, such as a corroborating witness or 
an additional report of abuse, compared to those without charges filed, 
regardless of whether there was a child disclosure or not.34 The most com-
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mon reason for not filing charges in these conventional child sexual abuse 
crimes was insufficient evidence. Obviously, child pornography crimes 
differ dramatically from conventional child abuse crimes in that hard evi-
dence of a crime is readily available.
Even though prosecutors may have evidence of a crime with child por-
nography cases, prosecutors need to make decisions regarding whether or 
not a conviction is likely given the legal and policy changes in the prosecu-
tion of computer child pornography.35 Prosecutors encounter a number of 
dilemmas and issues regarding what types of images are graphic or ex-
plicit enough to fit existing definitions of child pornography.36 Investiga-
tions of Internet child pornography possession also require specific re-
sources such as computer forensics experts with specialized training to 
retrieve evidence.37 It is critical to better understand how prosecutors are 
handling some of these issues because child pornography is a common 
type of computer crime prosecuted by local prosecutors. For example, the 
2005 National Prosecutors Survey38 found that 67 percent of all offices that 
reported prosecution of a computer crime in the previous year prosecuted 
child pornography cases. Full- time offices that served large (one million 
or more) or medium- sized populations were more likely to prosecute 
cases (90 percent and 82 percent respectively) compared to full- time of-
fices that served smaller populations (250,000 or less population, 69 per-
cent). Only 22 percent of part- time offices prosecuted these cases.
Not only does it appear that most offices are prosecuting these types of 
crimes, but the great majority of child pornography possession and pro-
duction cases end in conviction, with few cases dropped or dismissed.39 
Despite the likelihood of conviction, prosecutors may encounter a num-
ber of issues when prosecuting child pornography possession and produc-
tion cases. The following sections highlight some of these issues: handling 
computer forensic examinations and technology- related defenses, taking 
these cases to trial, deciding whether to file federal charges, and prosecut-
ing sexting cases. The findings are based upon telephone interviews with 
state prosecutors involved with technology- facilitated child sexual exploi-
tation crimes as part of the third N- JOV study (N- JOV3).
Computer Forensics
The detection and prosecution of child pornography requires technologi-
cal expertise, such as the ability to examine temporary Internet files and 
find secondary storage devices, as well as the continual training in the 
handling of electronic evidence.40 Prosecutors must continually develop 
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cases based on evidence that may be hidden and stored in microchips that 
are mobile and easily altered.41 Furthermore, given rapid technological 
advances, such as how images are created and stored, laws about computer 
crime may also change, which may result in legal challenges about the 
seizure of evidence in child pornography cases. There is also the possibil-
ity of legal challenges regarding definitions about what constitutes posses-
sion and viewing of child pornography online.42 Given the nature of com-
puter forensics and the need to secure digital evidence for child 
pornography cases, some legal scholars have expressed concerns about the 
preparedness of local prosecutors to handle this type of evidence.43
In order to explore some of these issues, N- JOV3 examined the extent 
to which prosecutors encountered difficulties with computer forensics, 
the police investigation, and formally raised defenses. Nearly two- thirds 
of prosecutors in the sample (62 percent) reported encountering difficul-
ties with computer forensics or the police investigation.44 These difficulties 
had to do with:
•	Timeliness of the forensic exam (33 percent)
•	Lack of equipment or training of officers (24 percent)
•	Search warrant issues (23 percent)
•	Chain of custody issues (8 percent)
•	P2P investigations (5 percent)
•	Credentials of forensic examination or lab (5 percent)
Yet when prosecutors reported having any of these difficulties, only 16 
percent reported that charges against the defendant were ultimately dis-
missed because of problems with the police investigation or computer fo-
rensic exam. And when this occurred, the vast majority of prosecutors (79 
percent) reported that this occurred in only one case. This suggests that 
although some difficulties exist with computer forensics or police investi-
gation, the consequences of these difficulties are not significant.
About half of prosecutors (56 percent) reported handling a case where 
the defense formally raised technology- related issues that required the 
prosecutor to explain technical details to a judge or jury. These types of 
cases include describing the computer search history, examining the time 
in which events took place, and describing the ways in which computer 
files are set up. Yet when this happened, 75 percent of prosecutors reported 
being mostly or very satisfied with resources their office had to explain 
technical evidence or rebutting technical defenses.
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As ways to store images expand and technology continues to change, 
child pornography crimes can become more difficult to prosecute because 
of the need to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed the images. 
The N- JOV3 study found that 77 percent of prosecutors had handled cases 
in which the defendant claimed to have downloaded child pornography 
unknowingly or claimed that someone else with physical access to the 
computer downloaded child pornography. Other types of formally raised 
defenses were much less common: 44 percent of prosecutors had handled 
a case in which the defendant claimed addiction or mental illness, 40 per-
cent of prosecutors had dealt with cases in which the defendant claimed 
the images were not child pornography, and 16 percent of prosecutors had 
cases in which the defendant claimed the child pornography was down-
loaded for research.
Although many prosecutors mentioned handling cases with these for-
mally raised defenses, only one- third of prosecutors reported that these 
defenses created real difficulty for them and resulted in a plea to signifi-
cantly reduced charges, dismissal of charges, or losing the case. Prosecu-
tors reported that the most effective strategy for countering formally 
raised defenses was to use computer forensics, such as using experts to 
show that the images did not unknowingly or unintentionally get on com-
puter because of a computer virus or using forensics to track actual 
searches or search history. Clearly having access to well- trained experts 
and adequate resources is essential when prosecuting these cases.
Trial Cases
Due to the nature of child pornography images, there are a number of 
special issues that can develop when child pornography cases are resolved 
at trial. One is the extent to which child pornography cases are resolved in 
front of juries, who may have difficulties viewing child pornography im-
ages. Another is the extent to which the defense objects to introducing 
child pornography images into evidence and whether the defense is suc-
cessful in keeping images away from the jury. Both of these issues could 
affect how child pornography cases are prosecuted. Another issue is the 
extent to which child pornography cases are resolved with reduced case 
outcomes, such as allowing a defendant to plea to a misdemeanor rather 
than a felony or not requiring sex offender registration when a defendant 
pleads guilty. In the interest of resolving as many cases as possible, prose-
cutors may be accepting these reduced case outcomes. The extent to which 
this occurs or in what types of circumstances it occurs are not known. 
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Another important issue is the methods used during trial to prove that the 
child pornography images depicted actual children.
Before examining these issues, it is first important to recognize that a 
very small percentage of child pornography cases are resolved at trial. Ac-
cording to data from the N- JOV3 law enforcement study in 2009, only 5 
percent of cases in which outcomes were known ended with convictions 
after trial.45 The vast majority (84 percent) of cases with an arrest ended 
with a guilty plea. Charges were dropped or dismissed in 7 percent of 
cases. There was some other outcome, such as the suspect died, or an un-
known outcome in 4 percent of cases. No cases ended in acquittals after 
trial.
N- JOV3 prosecutor data also found that a minority of prosecutors in 
the sample had a child pornography case go to trial: 33 percent of prosecu-
tors had a child pornography case go to trial in the past two years and 26 
percent of prosecutors in the sample had a child pornography case in front 
of a jury in the past two years.46 There was no predominant method of 
displaying images to the jury; instead images were displayed to the jury in 
a variety of ways.
•	Displayed on a large screen/TV that only the jury and judge 
could see (35 percent)
•	Displayed on a large screen/TV that the whole courtroom 
could see (30 percent)
•	Still images that were passed to the jury or described by experts 
(18 percent)
About half of prosecutors (55 percent) had the defense object to dis-
playing the images to the jury (claiming for example that the images were 
inflammatory). Although the majority of prosecutors (70 percent) said 
that defense attorneys were not successful in keeping images out of evi-
dence, 30 percent of prosecutors noted that this defense tactic succeeded. 
Another critical aspect of child pornography trial cases is the process used 
to prove that images depicted actual, not computer- generated, children. In 
2002, the Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional definition of child 
pornography includes only images depicting “real” children and that vir-
tual or computer- generated images were not considered “real” children.47 
The burden is on the government, therefore, to prove that an image of 
child pornography depicts actual children. The difficulty of determining 
the age of the victim often presents a problem for the prosecution, espe-
cially when the victim is postpubescent. Cattaneo et al. found that even 
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the experts (pediatricians and gynecologists) were often unable to deter-
mine whether the victim was a juvenile or not.48
The N- JOV3 study found that prosecutors used multiple methods to 
prove the age of children. These included testimony that the identities of 
children were known (43 percent); testimony, such as from a pediatrician, 
that images were not virtual or computer- generated (24 percent); or al-
lowing the jury or judge to decide for themselves if the images were actual 
(32 percent). A physician, for example, may be able to testify that charac-
teristics such as the proportions, body fat distribution, and skin tone of 
the children depicted are consistent with those of real children. Perhaps 
because trial cases are not common, there does not appear to be a consis-
tent way of displaying images to the jury or of proving the age of children 
in the images.
Deciding to Refer for Federal Investigation for Prosecution
Given the strict federal sentences, the global and complex nature of child 
pornography crimes, and that these crimes often require additional re-
sources for experts, state and local prosecutors may seek federal assistance 
in these cases.49 Additionally, federal law enforcement officers are more 
likely to be trained in the detection and arrest of child pornography traf-
ficking than are state or local officers. Another reason state and local pros-
ecutors may refer a case for federal prosecution is that federal penalties are 
sometimes more severe than state penalties. In federal cases, the manda-
tory minimum for downloading images is five years in prison without pa-
role, and those who download particularly images of young children, 
download images of especially heinous activity, or possess a large number 
of images often get sentences of fifteen to twenty years.50 Other issues may 
also affect the decision by local prosecutors whether to refer a case for 
federal prosecution. One is the extent to which particular courts make 
individualized assessments to arrive at sentences that diverge from the 
calculated guidelines.51 If, for example, a prosecutor knew that a court or 
particular judge is known to reduce sentences, that prosecutor could be 
more likely to refer the case for federal prosecution.
Given that few studies have identified reasons local prosecutors do not 
pursue child pornography cases and the extent to which prosecutors seek 
federal assistance in the prosecution of these cases,52 the N- JOV3 study 
explored some of these issues. N- JOV3 found that from 2009 to 2011, 48 
percent of prosecutors in the sample had referred a child pornography 
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case for federal prosecution.53 Of those who had not referred a case, 24 
percent of prosecutors said that their cases have not warranted it (e.g., the 
cases did not involve high number of images or multiple jurisdictions); 20 
percent of prosecutors said that their state has equal or stricter sentencing 
levels, so they like to keep the cases and do not refer to federal prosecu-
tors; 15 percent of prosecutors said that it generally works the other way 
around and the federal prosecutors will refer child pornography cases to 
them or federal prosecutors will take the child pornography cases they 
want to prosecute; 6 percent of prosecutors said it wouldn’t be helpful (i.e., 
it takes too long, federal prosecutors would end up giving the case back); 
and 5 percent of prosecutors mentioned that they split cases (e.g., federal 
will take the child pornography portion and local prosecutors will take 
contact offenses) or use the option of referring to federal prosecutors in 
order to help get the offender to plea to state charges.
About half of prosecutors in the N- JOV3 sample (56 percent) reported 
that all their cases were accepted and not declined for federal prosecution, 
28 percent of prosecutors reported a mix of cases accepted and declined, 
and 13 percent of prosecutors reported that all their cases had been de-
clined for federal prosecution. Of those prosecutors with cases declined 
for federal prosecution (n = 72), only 29 percent (n = 21) reported that this 
caused real difficulty. The majority of prosecutors said the difficulty was 
that the federal prosecutors took too long with the case, with eighteen 
months or three years sometimes going by with nothing happening, and 
then state prosecutors would then have to start the case again.
In order to better understand referral for federal prosecution, the N- 
JOV3 study also examined whether prosecutors had a clear understanding 
of what types of child pornography cases would be accepted. A third of 
prosecutors (37 percent) reported that it was not at all clear which child 
pornography cases would be accepted for federal prosecution, 21 percent 
reported it was somewhat clear, 23 percent reported it was reasonably 
clear, and 19 percent reported that it was very clear which child pornogra-
phy cases would be accepted. Just over half of prosecutors (52 percent) 
wished to see guidelines on which child pornography cases would be ac-
cepted for federal prosecution. When asked what type of guidelines pros-
ecutors would like to see concerning federal prosecution, 57 percent of 
prosecutors said that they need to know the general criteria and that they 
have never seen any guidelines. Other prosecutors mentioned specifically 
that they would like to know the number of images needed, what specific 
acts are necessary, or what prior offender history is required, or that they 
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believed interstate commerce or multijurisdiction cases should always be 
accepted. Clearly, the decision to refer these cases for federal prosecution 
is complex and needs more clarification.
Prosecuting sexting Cases
Another issue prosecutors encounter is whether to prosecute sexting 
cases. Sexting refers to cases with sexual images produced by juveniles 
(with no adult involvement) and may include creating or distributing such 
images. Sexting often falls within states’ legal definitions of child pornog-
raphy: images depicting sexually explicit activity involving minors. Since 
the National Conference of State Legislatures began tracking sexting leg-
islation in 2009, twenty states have enacted bills to address youth sex-
ting.54 Generally the legislation aims to educate young people about the 
risks of sexting, deter them from engaging in it, and impose appropriate 
penalties by protecting youths from harsh sentences under child pornog-
raphy statutes, which were created to protect youths from sexual exploita-
tion by adults.
A number of reviews have explored why many current laws are prob-
lematic and pose challenges for prosecutors.55 Yet no studies have exam-
ined how these types of cases are resolved once they reach prosecutors’ 
offices. The N- JOV3 study found that the majority of state prosecutors in 
the sample (62 percent) that had worked on technology- facilitated crimes 
against children had handled a sexting case involving juveniles, and 36 
percent of prosecutors in the sample reported that they had, at least on 
one occasion, filed charges in these cases.56 When prosecutors handled 
these cases, they presented minors with a wide range of alternatives to be-
ing charged: 59 percent of prosecutors in the sample had offered education 
classes or counseling, 42 percent had offered community service, 31 per-
cent had offered loss of cell phone or computer, and 16 percent had offered 
the teen to write an essay or letter.
Of those prosecutors interviewed in the N- JOV3 study who had filed 
charges, 62 percent had charged at least one juvenile with a felony related 
to a sexting case. In the majority of those cases (84 percent), the prosecu-
tors had charged the juvenile with a child pornography production felony. 
This charging sometimes occurred even in cases where images did not 
show sexually explicit conduct or exhibition of genitals, according to 17 
percent of prosecutors who had filed charges. And 16 percent of prosecu-
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tors who had filed charges in these cases had, at least on one occasion, a 
sexting case that resulted in the defendant being sentenced to sex offender 
registration. It is important to keep in mind that this sample of prosecu-
tors is a convenience sample and does not reflect national estimates about 
how often prosecutors handle these cases. The range of outcomes found in 
the N- JOV3 prosecutor study (alternatives to charging, not filing charges, 
charging with child pornography felony, requiring sex offender registra-
tion) mirrors the wide range of types of cases seen by law enforcement. 
Prosecutors are handling these types of cases, seeking alternatives in some 
cases, but also charging minors with felonies in other situations.
Conclusion
Although there is increasing sophistication in techniques used to identify 
and charge child pornography offenders, child pornography crimes pose 
unique investigative challenges for law enforcement and prosecutors. In 
many parts of the United States, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors 
have technological advantages in terms of identifying, arresting, and pros-
ecuting these offenders. Clearly there is an expectation that these cases will 
facilitate identification of child victims and generate valuable evidence of 
sexual exploitation crimes against children. Additional assessment and re-
search is needed to ascertain to what extent these child pornography pos-
session offenders are also exploiting identified children offline.
The data from the three waves of the N- JOV study demonstrate that 
child pornography crimes are diverse and increasing, although it is not 
possible to say whether this reflects a growth in the population accessing 
child pornography or an increase in law enforcement mobilization 
around this issue. As technology continues to change, it is likely that 
child pornography crimes will continue to evolve and law enforcement 
investigators and prosecutors will need to continue to adapt. But the 
data also suggest a growing, more sophisticated, and informed law en-
forcement response to the problem. In 2009, proactive investigation of 
online child pornography trading generated more arrests than reports 
from the public. Law enforcement agencies were aggressively pursuing 
the online child pornography trade by proactively targeting offenders. 
Also, the number of law enforcement agencies trained to respond to 
technology- facilitated child sexual exploitation crimes has increased. 
About 45 percent of child pornography production arrests were made by 
Internet Crimes against Children Task Forces and affiliates, which re-
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ceive specialized training in technology- facilitated crimes. Having ade-
quate resources is clearly a critical tool in the response to child pornog-
raphy crimes. Budget resources to hire experts and to access computer 
forensic specialists appear to matter when prosecuting child pornogra-
phy.57 One important policy question is how many resources to allocate 
to this type of crime and how much of a priority this type of crime 
should be for investigative agencies.
Although the vast majority of these crimes were prosecuted, with the 
federal government involved with the prosecution of about one- third of 
child pornography possession arrests, these cases often pose challenges 
for prosecutors, including practical challenges, lack of clarity of the role of 
federal prosecutors, and definitional challenges. The N- JOV3 study indi-
cated that practical challenges include the lack of timeliness of the com-
puter forensics exam, lack of equipment or training of officers, and issues 
with search warrants. This suggests the need for continual investments in 
laboratories, equipment, technicians, and training of police in child por-
nography investigation. Another challenge concerns the lack of clarity 
surrounding the role of federal prosecutors. Although many state prose-
cutors have referred cases to federal officials, many prosecutors nonethe-
less want guidelines about what cases will be accepted. Prosecutors are 
often not at all clear which cases federal prosecutors are willing to accept. 
To ensure that prosecutors are consistent when filing charges in these 
types of crimes, more attention is warranted on the distinction between 
charging locally or federally.
The largest definitional challenge is in sexting cases. Both law enforce-
ment investigators and prosecutors reported handling sexting cases. In 
this sample of prosecutors that had worked on technology- facilitated 
crimes against children, one- third had filed charges in sexting cases. Given 
the diverse nature of sexting cases, it is likely beneficial to have a range of 
outcomes available to investigators. On the other hand, in order to ensure 
some consistency in investigations, it is likely beneficial to have specific 
statutes that clarify nuances and definitions. With the changing defini-
tions and dynamics of child pornography, research needs to continue to 
help law enforcement investigators and prosecutors develop tools and 
strategies to most effectively handle the types of cases they encounter.
Law enforcement investigators and prosecutors are a crucial link in 
efforts to discourage the creation and dissemination of child pornography. 
As technology and criminal behavior changes, research needs to continue 
to help law enforcement investigators and prosecutors develop tools and 
strategies to deal with these complex crimes.
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9 |  A Critical Evaluation of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines for Child 
Pornography Offenses
Troy Stabenow
Federal law requires each judge to give careful consideration to something 
called the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. On the surface, these guidelines 
appear to sort child pornography offenders into clear categories based on 
the type of crime each committed and the various circumstances sur-
rounding their crimes. In reality however, the guidelines result in dubious 
distinctions between similar offenders, resulting in enormously different 
sentences for defendants with comparable levels of culpability. The vari-
ous circumstances the guidelines use to increase punishment apply to 
nearly all defendants, but even worse, they are largely unsupported by em-
pirical study or common sense. This chapter will highlight the problems of 
a guideline sentencing by walking you through an imaginary, but typical 
case, as if you were the federal judge for that case.
the Facts of Mr. smith’s Case
Imagine you are a federal district court judge. Today you will sentence a 
young man caught with child pornography; we’ll call that young man Mr. 
Smith. Like 97.1 percent of federal defendants nationwide,1 Mr. Smith pled 
guilty without a trial. Like 82.5 percent of these defendants, Mr. Smith has 
no criminal history.2 A federal magistrate judge handles your plea hear-
ings, so this afternoon will be the first time you have ever laid eyes on Mr. 
Smith. Everything you know about this case will come from either the 
thin Presentence Investigation Report (PSIR), prepared for you by the 
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probation officer, or from the arguments you will hear during today’s 
hearing. As you sit down to lunch, you open the ten- to- fifteen- page re-
port. You skim the procedural pages, and then, over the next twenty min-
utes, you read and reread several pages about Mr. Smith’s life, the range of 
sentencing options available to you by statute, and a summary of the facts 
of the case.
According to the report:
In November of last year, Mr. Smith decided to purchase a single, 
thirty- minute DVD entitled “12 Year Old Loves Showing Off ” from 
two undercover postal investigators. The DVD’s cover describes the 
movie as “a coming- of- age movie in which a blossoming young 
teen discovers her own sexuality.” According to investigators, the 
DVD depicts thirty minutes of a young girl posing for the camera, 
stripping naked, and then masturbating.
Mr. Smith sent a $20 certified check for the film to the sting 
postal address with a note requesting that the video ship in a plain 
envelope. A week later, one of the investigators, wearing a fake 
“Fed- Ex” outfit, delivered the package to Mr. Smith’s door. Mr. 
Smith opened the door, commented, “I’ve been waiting for this,” 
and signed for the package. He then closed the door. Two minutes 
later, agents knocked and immediately entered the house. As they 
entered, Mr. Smith was standing in his living room, about halfway 
between his 55″ television and the 13″ laptop computer he had sit-
ting by his lazy- boy recliner. The investigators caught Mr. Smith 
just after he had opened the package, but just before he had started 
to watch the movie on either machine.
In indeterminate sentencing systems, such as those used in the United 
States military and in many (but not all) of our state courts, today’s hear-
ing might take a full day. Neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney 
would know what sentence you are considering for Mr. Smith, so both 
sides would feverishly prepare a host of possible evidence and arguments 
to sway your judgment. With the full possibility that the accused could get 
twenty years in prison or no prison, the pressure would fall on both the 
prosecutor and the defense attorney to justify any sentencing recommen-
dation with specific facts from the case. You would then decide an appro-
priate sentence based upon the evidence of the case.
As you might suspect, in indeterminate systems of that type, both sides 
closely evaluate the evidence to search for any possibly aggravating and 
mitigating facts. Does the accused have ten pictures of child pornography 
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and one hundred thousand pictures of adult pornography, or vice versa? 
Are there any trends in the collection? For instance, did the defendant 
start with pictures of teens, then move on to picture of young children, 
and then progress to pictures exclusively of infants and child abduction? 
Or, conversely, does the collection appear random, where on any given 
day the defendant might have looked at any type of adult or child pornog-
raphy by whim? In state or military courts, these facts matter; in federal 
court, facts like these are often undiscovered.
Because you are in federal court, you are part of a “semideterminate” 
system. Your system gives you some latitude in sentencing, but everyone 
at the hearing will tend to focus on a short checklist of approved sentenc-
ing factors. The facts you are supposed to consider relevant are listed for 
you in each case, and you are often discouraged from giving too much 
weight to other facts. Frequently, neither party will have looked at the fo-
rensic evidence any more than was necessary to “check off ” the presence 
or absence of each established factor.
Although the statute may authorize you to impose a sentence of zero to 
twenty years, your actual sentence will tend to be “anchored” to whatever 
the United States sentencing guideline suggests as a “model” sentence for 
a generic case of this type. The United States Attorney’s Office will almost 
always recommend a “guideline” sentence, and will tend to appeal any 
below- guideline sentence.3 If you choose not to follow that recommended 
guideline, especially if you vary to any significant degree, you will have to 
explain yourself on the record. If the sentence you impose is considered 
too lenient by the prosecutor, or the reasons you give for the sentence are 
not standard factors, the government will likely appeal. Historically, cir-
cuit courts have more frequently overturned “lenient” sentences, and 
while above- guideline sentences tend to be overturned less often, within- 
guideline sentences are very rarely disturbed because they are presump-
tively reasonable.4
What then, is the single most significant sentencing factor for you to 
consider at today’s hearing? What will likely drive Mr. Smith’s sentence? 
What is the issue that the attorneys will devote the lion’s share of their 
preparation and arguments to resolving? According to your probation of-
ficer, the most important disputed fact in this case is whether Mr. Smith 
intended to watch the movie on his 55″ television screen or on his 13″ 
laptop. You see, if Mr. Smith intended to use the TV, then the sentencing 
guidelines will recommend one sentence, but if Mr. Smith intended to 
watch the movie on his smaller, 13″ laptop screen, then the guidelines will 
probably suggest that you add two to three years to his prison term.
As you walk into the courtroom, you prepare to hear arguments about 
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whether the defendant was actually closer to his TV or his laptop. You 
know that whichever way you decide, you will need to immediately explain 
to the defendant, his family, and the public why that fact should add or 
subtract several years to the amount of time Mr. Smith will serve in prison.
This is the type of dilemma federal judges face each time they impose 
a sentence for someone who possessed, received, or redistributed child 
pornography. Issues like these leave many judges feeling frustrated. While 
85 percent of federal judges agree that the guideline system generally sug-
gests an appropriate sentence for someone who makes child pornography, 
fewer than 30 percent have any faith that a guideline sentence is rational in 
the cases of possession or receipt (the lowest satisfaction rate of any guide-
line in the entire federal system).5 But it isn’t just the judges who are wor-
ried. The Sentencing Commission’s Practice Group recently noted that 
“the marked propensity of our district judges to deliver sentences not 
within the guidelines . . . suggests that there’s something wrong with the 
guideline, something seriously wrong.”6
Even the Department of Justice has expressed these concerns, writing 
to the Sentencing Commission to explain:
We think the report to Congress ought to recommend legislation 
that permits the Sentencing Commission to revise the sentencing 
guidelines for child pornography offenses . . . the changes in the use 
of technology and in the way these crimes are regularly carried out 
today suggest that the time is ripe for evaluating the current guide-
lines” and reforming the guidelines to “better calibrate the severity 
and culpability of defendant’s criminal conduct.7
So why does everyone doubt the guideline range for these particular 
crimes? Why is it that while judges imposed a below- guideline sentence in 
just 1.9 percent of 2010 drug possession cases, they gave a below- guideline 
sentence in almost 60 percent of child pornography cases that same year?8 
As we shall see, there are compelling, logical reasons why this has become 
the least respected guideline in the entire federal system.
the Guideline in theory
As a federal judge, your sentencing guidance comes from two sources, the 
first of which is a statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) instructs each judge to con-
sider certain factors in every sentencing hearing. These factors include the 
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nature and circumstances of the offense, the need for a sentence to reflect 
the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect the public from further 
crimes, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need to pro-
mote respect for the law, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among defendants with similar records who commit similar 
crimes. As you can imagine, a judge may struggle to keep aware of how 
similar offenders are treated on the other side of the country. The sentenc-
ing guidelines represent the federal solution to this problem.
In principle, the sentencing guidelines serve as your second source of 
guidance by keeping you informed of developments around the country. 
As judges issue written judgments, the Sentencing Commission engages 
in an ongoing study of these decisions. The Commission should then ad-
just the applicable guidelines whenever research identifies a better method 
for evaluating the seriousness of a given case. In theory, any guideline en-
dorsed by the Commission is based upon a review of thousands of pre-
guidelines cases and correctly identifies the factors most judges find useful 
at sentencing for that type of offense. The presumption of an empirical 
basis to the guidelines may hold true for many offenses, but not for child 
pornography.
A guideline based on Commission research does not require a given 
sentence, but it should help you quickly identify the most important facts 
of the case. The guidelines should also suggest to you how much weight to 
give each aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Using the guidelines, a 
judge handling his or her first bank robbery case should theoretically tend 
to impose a sentence that is approximately consistent with what a more 
experienced judge in another state might impose. For example, all judges 
would start by determining that a bank robbery scores as an offense level 
22 and that any injury to a teller or customer will add two to six levels 
based upon whether the injury was minor, serious, or life- threatening. 
Thus both new and experienced judges will be guided toward a similarly 
small range of sentencing options within the broad range of statutorily 
possible sentences.
The guidelines system works as follows: First, the manual establishes a 
“Base Offense Level” for different types of crimes. As the judge, you then 
add to that Base Offense Level based on various factors in the case (such 
as whether the defendant shot a teller during a bank robbery). You may 
also deduct based on recognized factors such as whether the accused pled 
guilty or was a minor player in the crime. You plot the final score on the 
“Y” axis of a sentencing chart. This is the Total Offense Level. Next, you 
rank the accused’s prior criminal activity based on the nature and severity 
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of the defendant’s prior offenses. This produces the accused’s Criminal 
History Category, which translates into a score of I- VI, which you plot on 
the “X” axis of the standard sentencing chart. Wherever the X and Y points 
intersect on the sentencing chart provides you with a recommended 
“guideline” sentence. So, assuming a first- time offender commits a bank 
robbery and shoots but luckily doesn’t kill a teller, the Total Offense Level 
might be 25, the Criminal History Category would be I, and the corre-
sponding Guideline range would be 57– 51 months’ incarceration.
The problem for child pornography cases is that the sentencing vari-
ables used to differentiate cases do not make sense and do not work. The 
Sentencing Commission had no significant body of historical cases to use 
as a baseline for determining important sentencing factors. As a result, the 
Commission had to invent sentencing levels without reference to a body 
of empirical data. The Commission was also not allowed to take the time 
to develop its own empirical approach that would meaningfully distin-
guish the severity of each case. Instead, Congress simply invented criteria 
and told the Commission to implement those ideas. Although these crite-
ria are “objectively” measured and applied, they have proven largely use-
less when sorting and comparing relatively criminality. As things stand, 
the guideline criteria do not seem to correspond to the severity of the of-
fense. Many of the criteria apply to the typical offender, and in such arbi-
trary ways that the worst offenders frequently score the same as, or even 
lower than, average defendants.
Guideline 2G2.2 in Practice
Mr. Smith’s case demonstrates several (of the many) ways the guidelines’ 
treatment of possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography 
(Guideline § 2G2.2) actually obstructs a court’s ability to fashion a rational 
sentence. As we shall see, the district where Mr. Smith lives, as well as 
minor differences in labeling the evidence in his case, will radically sway 
the sentence Mr. Smith faces for his misdeed.
1. Setting the Base Offense Level
First, you need to understand that you, the judge, do not control the Base 
Offense Level in Mr. Smith’s case. Surprisingly, the Sentencing Commis-
sion does not exert much control on today’s Base Offense Level either. 
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Instead, Congress granted the prosecutor the option to choose the Base 
Offense Level. The means by which the prosecutor exercises this discre-
tion is to choose whether to charge Mr. Smith for the receipt of the DVD 
at his front door or for the possession of the DVD in his living room. The 
prosecutor’s choice will then constrain your options at sentencing. This is 
the first flaw in the guidelines for child pornography cases. While 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) directs you to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary,” for the facts of this case, Guideline § 2G2.2 assumes that 
with identical facts, labeling a case as either receipt or possession neces-
sarily changes what a “sufficient” sentence should be.
As you might guess, prosecutors can readily charge either possession 
or receipt in nearly every child pornography case. In 1996, the Sentencing 
Commission concluded an investigation of sex offenses with a report to 
Congress. As one of the recommendations, the Commission specifically 
requested permission to treat receipt and possession as equally serious of-
fenses. The Commission explained that based upon a study of actual cases:
There appears to be little difference in the offense seriousness be-
tween typical receipt cases and typical possession cases. Indeed, all 
the material that is possessed must at some point have been re-
ceived (unless it was produced, in which case the defendant would 
be sentenced under the more severe production guideline).9
These findings came five years after the Commission first objected to a bill 
directing the Commission to treat receipt as a more serious offense than 
possession. At the time the rule was introduced in 1991, the Commission 
warned:
Recognizing that receipt is the logical predicate to possession, the 
Commission concluded that the guideline sentence should not turn 
on the timing or nature of law enforcement intervention, but rather 
on the gravity of the underlying conduct. . . . Senate Amendment 
780, unfortunately, would negate the Commission’s carefully struc-
tured efforts to treat similar conduct similarly and to provide pro-
portionality among different grades of seriousness of these offenses 
in a manner that will reintroduce the sentencing disparity among 
similar defendants and render the guideline susceptible to plea bar-
gaining manipulation. . .  . One primary reasons Congress created 
the Sentencing Commission was to devise guidelines that avoid 
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these unwarranted variances in sentencing for similar conduct. 
Amendment 780 will reintroduce the very problems the guidelines 
now prevent.10
If we recall that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) specifically directs federal judges to 
issue sentences limiting unwarranted sentencing disparities, then we can 
easily understand why the Commission argued to make receipt and pos-
session equivalent under the guidelines. Nevertheless, to this day, Con-
gress has forbidden the Sentencing Commission from adopting a more 
rational guidelines structure in which receipt and possession would yield 
similar sentences.
The 1991 prediction that this disparity would cause plea bargaining 
manipulation has proven prescient. While the guidelines were supposed 
to standardize punishments across the United States, what Guideline § 
2G2.2 actually did was transfer arbitrariness into the hands of the prosecu-
tor and into the background where it is difficult to observe or measure. 
Over the years, each district has adopted different charging practices, with 
some districts aggressively charging the more serious label of receipt, 
other districts using the threat of a receipt charge to force a defendant to 
waive certain sentencing arguments, and yet other districts opting to 
charge the lower offense unless the defendant proceeds to trial.
As a practical matter, the prosecutor’s charging decision alters your 
sentencing options in two ways. First, the statutory range of punishment 
differs between the two charges. Both charges authorize a punishment of 
up to twenty years in prison. But while you can impose any punishment 
from zero to twenty years in a possession case, you must impose at least 
the mandatory minimum of five years for any conviction for the receipt of 
child pornography. As contrary as it sounds, if you know where a defen-
dant got his or her child pornography from, then you must punish the 
recipient more harshly. On the other hand, if the defendant succeeds in 
hiding or shielding his or her source from law enforcement, that defen-
dant may get a lower sentence. Not every case results from a sting like Mr. 
Smith’s, so the result tends to be that defendants who confess and admit 
their source face a harsher mandatory minimum punishment (five years 
instead of none) than defendants who refused to talk.
Second, this bizarre system carries over to the guidelines’ Base Offense 
Level as well. While the Base Offense Level for possession is 18, the Base 
Offense Level for receipt is 22. Although defendants who can prove they 
never intended to redistribute the images may get a two- level reduction 
(more on this later), at best they still face a Base Offense Level of 20. Again, 
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defendants who hide their activities tend to receive an offense level two to 
four levels lower than those who confess and provide full disclosure.
Let us return then to the prediction about charge bargaining. As the 
Sentencing Commission warned in 1991, many prosecutors today use 
their arbitrary power to “charge bargain,” or pressure defendant to plead 
guilty at the risk of facing much higher guidelines ranges. In fact, the 
Commission has discovered that although 97.5 percent of cases involved 
knowing receipt and/or redistribution, only 46.9 percent involved a con-
viction for receipt or distribution; 53.1 percent of cases were resolved as 
possession counts.11 One judge described the behind- the- scenes dynam-
ics of charge bargaining as it applied to a defendant named David Grober:
This Court knows from its own experience about the problematic 
nature of charging discretion. . . . This year, the Court sentenced an 
offender under a plea agreement similar to the one offered to David 
Grober [which Grober did not accept]. . . . It is a chilling exercise to 
take an earlier defendant’s plea deal and apply it to David Grober’s 
case. His original indictment charged him with the same two of-
fenses the government charged against an earlier defendant.  .  .  . 
This court knows enough of the fact behind the earlier defendant’s 
offense to be unpersuaded that there is an intellectually honest ba-
sis to distinguish what the earlier defendant did from what David 
Grober did.12
You might hope that the difference between possession and receipt 
could not prove that great and that behind- the- scenes posturing will not 
affect the sentence you will impose as a judge. But let us again consider 
Mr. Grober’s case, where the court was fully aware of the facts in his par-
ticular case and where Mr. Grober refused to charge bargain his case and 
instead chose to go to trial (thereby losing an adjustment for pleading 
guilty and subjecting himself to the more seriously labeled charges). The 
court compared Mr. Grober’s case to another similar case from the same 
time and noted, “What valid sentencing function transforms David Grob-
er’s conduct from warranting a sentencing range of 51 to 63 months to 
warranting a sentencing range of 292 to 365 months merely because he did 
not plead guilty?”13
In summary, the first step in this case is dictated for you; before you 
were even assigned this case the prosecutor chose how to set the Base Of-
fense Level for Mr. Smith for reasons that you may never hear. At this 
point, you cannot appreciate the full effect of that charging decision until 
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you calculate all of the enhancements, because the higher the initial of-
fense level, the more a two- or four- level enhancement matters. For ex-
ample, while a two- level enhancement onto a Base Offense Level of 18 
might add six months to the prison sentence, the same two- level enhance-
ment onto a Base Offense Level 32 might add thirty months. Whatever the 
Base Offense Level, though, it is a sure bet that number will rise rapidly as 
you begin to apply enhancements.
2. Applying Enhancements
Your next step is to consider each of the factors that § 2G2.2 claims will 
contextualize the offense and segregate run- of- the- mill offenders from 
those who are more dangerous or extreme. When applying the guidelines, 
your task as a judge is to do a simple, checklist- style review of the facts of 
the case. You answer yes or no as to whether each factor is present in this 
case and then score the case accordingly. In determining the guidelines 
enhancements, it does not matter whether the fact is only marginally pres-
ent or is instead the defining fact in a case. For example, when determin-
ing if a sadistic or masochist conduct enhancement applies, a person who 
has one image of someone wearing a blindfold will score the same as 
someone who has a hundred thousand images of extreme bondage and 
torture of infants.
a. The “Use of a Computer” Enhancement
The first enhancement to consider is whether Mr. Smith used a computer. 
Guideline § 2G2.2 instructs you to increase the Total Offense Level by two 
levels if the defendant used a computer during the commission of the 
child pornography offense.14 In effect, §2G2.2 directs you to treat the 
watching of a movie on a 55″ television as a much less serious crime than 
the watching of the same video on a 13″ laptop. Why?
In answering that question, you should keep in mind the friction be-
tween the desires of certain congressional leaders to look tough on crime 
and your need, as a judge, for some rational sentencing guidance. The “use 
of a computer” enhancement traces back to 1995, when Congress deter-
mined that mass producers and distributors of child pornography had 
created “lucrative businesses that reward people who would abuse chil-
dren.”15 Congress directed the Commission to increase the punishments 
for those who use computers to mass- distribute child pornography and 
who use sophisticated computer technology to circumvent detection by 
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postal investigators. These are both laudable goals. As it played out, how-
ever, by the time the bill became law Congress had decided to have the 
enhancement to apply to everyone, treating all computer use the same. 
The Commission warned the very next year:
This adjustment does not distinguish between persons who email 
images to a single, voluntary recipient, and those who establish a 
BBS and distribute child pornography to large numbers of sub-
scribers. .  .  . Not all computer use is equal, and sentencing policy 
should be sensitive to these differences in culpability so that pun-
ishments are tailored to fit the circumstances of each individual’s 
case . . . the difference between print and computerized porn is not 
in the content of the images, but in the means of distribution. The 
seriousness of a crime involving computerized trafficking in child 
pornography depends in part on 1) The degree to which the com-
puter use facilitates the widespread and instantaneous distribution 
of images, and 2) the degree to which it increases the likelihood that 
children will be exposed to the images. Different types of computer 
use have different effects on these two harms.16
Unfortunately, while the Commission warned that “what seems apparent 
is that a person’s culpability depends on how they use a computer,” Con-
gress would not allow the Commission to change the application of the 
enhancement. Today, as in 1995, “the current statutory directive is aimed 
broadly at all persons who use a computer.”17
Of course, the world has changed in many ways since 1995. Among the 
most profound changes is the fact that just about everything we do today 
involves a computer in some way. If two people exchange a picture of child 
pornography, they probably do so online. If not, they probably “met” or 
talked in a chat group using a computer, texted each other using a com-
puterized cell phone, or checked the status of the package’s projected de-
livery date using an online website. For that reason, 96.3 percent of offend-
ers receive an enhancement for use of a computer.18 Unfortunately, any of 
these activities result in the same “use of a computer” enhancement that 
would apply to a mass distributor who runs a commercial child pornogra-
phy website.
While the number of people assessed this penalty has increased, evi-
dence has emerged that use of a computer is not an aggravating factor in 
most cases.19 Law enforcement agencies now find it much easier to dis-
cover child pornography online than in real life. Investigators can log on 
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to public networks, spot a suspicious- sounding file, and use special soft-
ware to examine the contents of the person’s shared files without ever go-
ing into their home or seeking a search warrant. The online evidence is 
also easy to process, almost impossible to contest, and results in shorter 
investigations and faster pleas. There is even a growing body of evidence, 
recognized by the Department of Justice, linking access to offline, hard- 
copy child pornography with increased culpability and dangerousness.20 
The current thinking is that while people may “wander” into child por-
nography online, it takes far more forethought and planning to attempt to 
secure hard copies of child pornography, and such efforts are often de-
signed to conceal the transactions from later investigation and scrutiny.
Suppose you knew this information as you prepared to sentence Mr. 
Smith. Knowing that the “use of a computer” enhancement is not just il-
logical as applied in this case, but that it applies to virtually all cases, and it 
tends to punish more harshly the least dangerous offenders, would you 
feel comfortable using this as a metric in your courtroom? No matter. 
Whatever your feelings, you must rule on the issue of whether Mr. Smith 
used a computer. If he was charged with possession and intended to use 
his 55″ TV, he will still face a Base Offense Level of 18. If he is charged with 
receipt and intended to use his 13″ laptop, you must start at an adjusted 
Offense Level of 24 (22 +2).
b. The “Number of Images” Enhancement
You must also apply an enhancement based upon how the DVD was for-
matted by the postal inspectors. Both the postal investigators and the Pro-
bation Office conducted a thorough investigation and determined that 
this single DVD is the only child pornography attributable to Mr. Smith. 
He has no history of child pornography offenses, so this sounds like an 
easy “collection” to evaluate. However, during the hearing, your probation 
officer approaches the bench and instructs you that she just recognized a 
tricky sentencing issue. Because of that sentencing issue, the guidelines 
sentence in this case will also hinge on your findings about how someone 
else formatted the DVD that Mr. Smith bought.
Under the current system, offenders receive an enhancement based 
upon the number of images they possessed, received, or redistributed. The 
enhancement ranges from a two- level to a five- level enhancement; the 
maximum enhancement applies if a defendant possessed more than six 
hundred images. The guidelines direct that each “video- clip, movie, or 
similar visual depiction shall be considered to have 75 images.”21 If the 
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DVD in this case consists of one thirty- minute- long movie file, then it 
counts as seventy- five images and gets a two- level enhancement. On the 
other hand, if the DVD consists of one “movie,” subdivided into internal 
chapters that allow a user to select to watch portions of the movie, then 
each subchapter counts as seventy- five images. In other words, your find-
ing on whether the DVD has been formatted with subchapters will deter-
mine whether the defendant receives only a two- level enhancement, or 
whether he will receive as much as a five- level enhancement.
You may ask why six hundred images warrants a five- level enhance-
ment. The short answer is that there is no answer; literally no logical ex-
planation or empirical evidence supports scoring offenses this way. The 
longer explanation is that it is difficult to articulate bright- line factors that 
will always make one child pornography case more serious than another. 
That is not to say that practitioners and judges cannot readily assess which 
cases are more serious. When faced with particular facts from particular 
cases, they can. The problem is that while it is easy to say what is particu-
larly aggravating or mitigating about each case, it is much harder to write 
a bright- line rule that will apply in all cases. And without such a bright- 
line rule, it is difficult to declare that two cases, one in Oregon and one in 
Florida, are “the same.”
During the 1980s and 1990s, the federal system tried to identify objec-
tive criteria for determining how significant a role a person played in a 
given criminal network, for any type of case. Quantity became the pre-
ferred method for comparing offenders in all criminal contexts. For ex-
ample, a person who conspires to distribute one kilogram of marijuana is 
now treated as a low- level offender, while a person caught conspiring to 
distribute thirty thousand kilograms of marijuana is presumed to possess 
significant ties to major organized drug operations. Although this type of 
quantity calculus has come under repeated scrutiny, it quickly became a 
familiar component of federal sentencing.
In 2003, a young congressional aide decided that child pornographers 
needed to face more severe sentences. He wrote up a provision that would 
increase sentences based on the number of images, up to six hundred, that 
a defendant possessed. He conducted no research on whether that arbi-
trary number was tied to criminality or would usefully distinguish defen-
dants. For all anyone knows, he chose the low number of six hundred with 
the specific intent that it would apply to most defendants.22
In short order, this aide convinced a first- term representative to attach 
the provision to a popular Amber Alert bill, and it became law. One prob-
lem was that neither the Sentencing Commission nor the courts nor the 
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scientific community had any advance notice of the provision, and none 
had a chance to provide any input on the matter. No one studied the idea 
to determine whether the number of images really captures criminal cul-
pability. Furthermore, there was no empirical basis for setting the tiered 
offense enhancements (+2 to +5) so that, for example, 149 images is con-
sidered significantly less serious than 151 images.
Another problem concerns the “market” for child pornography. Our 
gut tells us that there is a profound difference between someone who has 
ten images of child pornography and someone who has 150,000. As we 
consider other federal crimes, we might even think, isn’t this similar to a 
drug defendant who is punished more for distributing 30,000 kilograms 
of marijuana than for one kilogram? The flaw in this logic is that such a 
comparison disregards an important feature of child pornography 
offenses— most defendants did not pay for the child pornography they 
possessed.
Defendants who acquire 30,000 kilograms of marijuana must utilize 
major drug networks, and they pump significant sums of money into the 
drug “market.” We can presume that before they could buy drugs in that 
quantity, they had to build up relationships and earn the millions of dol-
lars necessary to operate on such as a scale, presumably by first conduct-
ing smaller- level drug transactions. This type of logic fails utterly when 
applied to digital pictures and videos.
Today the Internet contains more free pornography, of all types, than a 
person could ever view in a lifetime. In addition, modern software makes 
such materials ever more readily available. Using a peer- to- peer program, 
a defendant can easily find and download hundreds, or even hundreds of 
thousands, of images in one thirty- minute session, at no cost. (Not coinci-
dentally, the same method for finding and downloading files is used by 
law enforcement to discover and arrest many defendants).23 Thus a defen-
dant can acquire a large collection of images on his or her first day of ac-
tivity, and the quantity of images collected often provides us no insight 
into his or her level of involvement, if any, in the child pornography com-
munity. At the very least, using six hundred images as a threshold for 
identifying “high- level” offenders is absurd.
Proof of this issue can be found in courtrooms around the United 
States. The untested and unverified enhancement for number of images 
now applies in 96.3 percent of cases.24 As one judge who held hearings on 
the matter discovered when she questioned an experienced detective:
Special Agent Chase recognized that that every one of her 180 inves-
tigations involved a possessor with 600 or more images. SA Chase 
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testified that every one of the cases she had worked on ‘100 percent’ 
– involved the use of a computer and of interactive computer ser-
vice. Further, according to SA Chase, ‘all’ of the cases she has worked 
on involved images of prepubescent minors under age 12.25
The fundamental change in the nature of these crimes cannot be over-
stated. Thirty years ago, acquiring child pornography involved signifi-
cant premeditation, planning, and expense. Child pornography was “dif-
ficult to find, .  .  .  expensive to duplicate, and required a secure and 
private storage area.”26 In the 1970s, the size of a collection was a definite 
indicator of the scope of a defendant’s involvement with other pornog-
raphers. Furthermore, because each image required both planning and 
payment, collectors tended to acquire images most representing their 
personal preferences.
Now it takes only marginally more time to download ten thousand im-
ages than it does to order a pizza, and the cost of acquiring ten or ten 
thousand images is likely the same: nothing. The nature of collecting has 
changed. As courts and research scientists have discovered, “because the 
internet is now the primary vehicle for delivering or consuming pornog-
raphy (legal and illegal) and the number and type of images received is 
frequently accidental, it is thus a poor indicator of culpability. Most obvi-
ously this means of distribution facilitates the easy collection of a large 
number of images (triggering the enhancement for quantity).”27 As a re-
sult of these dynamics, the size of a collection is now a poor indicator of 
criminality.
In my experience as a federal defender, the only defendants who don’t 
receive the “number of image” enhancement today are the particularly 
savvy defendants. These defendants often use a variety of computer tech-
niques to ensure that they minimize their digital “footprint,” regularly 
clearing data off of their computers. They also use foreign servers and 
“cloud” data to obscure their connection to remotely accessible files. In 
other words, the defendants who do not receive enhancements are often 
the most capable defendants, who took the most time to plan their crimes 
in order to avoid detection. While these defendants may pose more of a 
threat to the community, these are the offenders least likely to face an en-
hancement for number of images.
At this point, we might remember that the smart “consumer” who hid 
his source and cleared his cache daily may now face only an adjusted Of-
fense Level of 18, where the dumb consumer who talks to authorities and/
or left a clear trail could now face an adjusted Offense Level of 29 (22 + 2 
for the computer, + 5 for number of images). In our case, Mr. Smith may 
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receive a two- level or the full five- level enhancement based upon posses-
sion of a single DVD. Again, the guideline system would instruct us that 
we have just used meaningful, objective criteria to distinguish the most 
serious offenders from the least serious offenders. Do you agree? Does Mr. 
Smith’s case require a higher or lower sentence based upon how someone 
else formatted the DVD he never watched?
c. Enhancements for Sadistic or Masochistic Conduct and 
Depiction of a Prepubescent Child
While almost 97 percent of offenders receive enhanced sentences based on 
the number of images, so too do 96.3 percent of cases include at least one 
image of a prepubescent minor.28 Again, this is due in large part to the 
changing nature of technology.
A study comparing child pornography offenders in 2000 to those in 
2006 determined that the nature of acquiring pornography had changed 
by 2006. Over time, more and more users acquired child pornography us-
ing peer- to- peer (P2P) networks. Researchers discovered that with rela-
tively little effort, P2P users acquired larger collections that also tended to 
“capture [violent or extreme] files even if offenders were not specifically 
looking for violent content” and despite “no evidence that P2P users were 
more deviant or criminal than other offenders” arrested for possession.29 
As one judge described the situation, using this new technology to free- 
download images results in situation in which “a defendant generally has 
very little control over the quantity of images he receives or the content of 
those images.”30
It is entirely reasonable for citizens to worry most about defendants 
whose taste in child pornography involves particularly young children or 
children subjected to particularly cruel treatment. It therefore seems rea-
sonable to add enhancements for any case that includes a file of sadistic or 
masochistic conduct or a file of a prepubescent child under the age of 
twelve. In practice, however, we must remember that § 2G2.2 is a simple 
checklist. Although a comparison of the focus and nature of a defendant’s 
collection would tend to help you distinguish cases, that is not what you 
will do at this sentencing hearing. Instead, you will simply determine if 
any one image meets the criteria. In fact, the guidelines direct you to apply 
this enhancement “regardless of whether the defendant specifically in-
tended to possess, access with the intent to view, receive, or distribute” 
these types of images. Thus, even if you find just one image, and even if 
you find conclusive proof that the defendant was completely unaware of 
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the sadistic or prepubescent content, this is a strict liability provision you 
must apply to Mr. Smith.31
Suppose, then, that the DVD Mr. Smith ordered included an unex-
pected advertisement at the end of the movie. This thirty- second ad in-
vites the viewer to buy a video called “Daddy Loves 11 Y.O. Daughter.” In 
the advertisement clip, an adult man is seen rubbing his finger along the 
vagina of a smiling young girl who could indeed be eleven years old. If you 
find the existence of such an advertisement in the video, then you must 
apply a two- level enhancement based upon evidence that a file contained 
a depiction of a prepubescent minor or a minor under the age of twelve.
In addition, you must immediately consider applying an enhancement 
for sadism. The Sentencing Commission has never defined this term, but 
the appellate courts have consistently held that the enhancement applies 
whenever the creation of an image is likely to have caused physical or 
emotional pain.32 As applied to a child under twelve, the courts have con-
sistently determined that any sexual act involving an adult will necessarily 
cause emotional harm or distress to a young child, and thus the enhance-
ment should apply.33 Again, Application Note 2 of § 2G2.2 directs you to 
apply this enhancement regardless of whether Mr. Smith had any reason 
to know the advertisement was in the DVD he had yet to watch. Finally, if 
you are in the Ninth Circuit, you must also consider a two- level additional 
enhancement because the child was a “vulnerable victim.” A single photo 
can trigger and require the application of three enhancements.34
d. Intermediate Tally
Now is a useful time for us to pause and compare the preliminary range of 
“guidelines” sentences resulting from the seemingly minor differences in 
the facts and our interpretations of the facts:
 (i) If the prosecutor charged possession, Mr. Smith was standing 
closer to his television, and his one movie did not include an ad-
vertisement, then Mr. Smith’s Base Offense Level is 18. One video 
file counts as seventy- five images, so he gets a two- level enhance-
ment for having more than ten but fewer than one hundred im-
ages. We deduct three levels based on his plea, and the guideline 
range for a Total Offense Level 17, Criminal History Category I is 
24 to 30 months in prison.
 (ii) On the other hand, if the prosecutor charged receipt, you find 
Mr. Smith stood closer to his laptop, and the DVD was internally 
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subdivided into four- minute “chapters” (that also contained an 
unseen ad), then Mr. Smith starts at a Base Offense Level 20, 
gets a two- level enhancement for use of a computer, a five- level 
enhancement for number of images, a two- level enhancement for 
a minor under twelve, and a four- level enhancement for sadis-
tic conduct. He still gets three levels off for pleading guilty, but 
his Total Offense Level is 32 and his Guideline range is 121 to 151 
months in prison.
Are you satisfied that the extra 97 to 121 months you would add due to 
these enhancements still expresses a sentence that is sufficient but not 
greater than necessary for the facts and circumstances of this case?
e. Enhancements for Intended Distribution
Although that is the end of Mr. Smith’s case, the guideline checklist will 
score a typical defendant even higher than Mr. Smith. Remember that 97.4 
percent of offenders use a computer and that in a great many cases, the 
way defendant used the computer was to download a picture off the Inter-
net using some sort of filing sharing software such as Kazaa, Limewire, etc. 
These peer- to- peer (P2P) programs generally allow free and unrestricted 
access to search and download the content of other users. These programs 
also, as a default, set the computer to list and “share” any downloaded files 
with any other users looking for the same file. In internal testing, federal 
defender teams have found that even if a user turns off this function, the 
software still “shares” file that are in the process of downloading before 
putting the finished file into an “unshared” location on the computer.35
The guidelines mandate a distribution enhancement for “any act” that 
evinces intent to distribute, including “possession with the intent to dis-
tribute.” Put another way, the distribution enhancement applies even if a 
defendant did not intend to distribute, so long as he possessed knowledge 
that by participating in a P2P file- sharing program whereby he could access 
other user’s files, he was making his child pornography files accessible to 
others. Almost every federal court has concluded that the mere presence of 
file- sharing software on a computer automatically requires at least the two- 
level enhancement for possession with a willingness to allow redistribution 
of downloaded child pornography.36 Unless the defendant can affirmatively 
prove he did not install the software or understand it was a file- sharing 
program, the courts will apply at least a two- level enhancement for un-
specified distribution. Furthermore, every court will also consider apply-
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ing the five- level enhancement for distribution “for the receipt, or expecta-
tion of receipt of a thing of value” if there was any evidence that the 
defendant used the file- sharing program and let his files be accessible to 
others specifically in order to gain access to more files or to faster connec-
tion speeds. Although “most offenders used open P2P file sharing pro-
grams that did not require the offenders to trade images in order to receive 
new images or videos from another,”37 the five- level enhancement can still 
apply if there was any idea in the defendant’s mind that leaving the default 
setting to “share” might result in easier access to other files. These enhance-
ments do not require that any affirmative act of distribution occurred.
f. Final Tally
So, let us compare Mr. Smith with a typical offender:
 (i) Mr. Smith talked to other child pornographers, sought secret 
sources of child pornography, arranged for a certified check, and 
then ordered child pornography from abroad (actually a fake, 
sting business). If he had been caught without us knowing his 
source, and if he had refused to talk to authorities, he would face 
a guideline sentence of 24 to 30 months. At worst, if law enforce-
ment discovered his source and the prosecutor played “hardball,” 
Mr. Smith could face a guideline sentence of 121 to 151 months in 
prison.
Meanwhile,
 (ii) Mr. Jones, a typical offender, did not engage in any advanced 
planning, didn’t know any child pornographers, and simply used 
a P2P program to download the exact same video as Mr. Smith 
from a shared folder he saw online. Mr. Jones was discovered by 
the authorities as the file downloaded to his computer. He con-
fessed his wrongdoing. Mr. Jones automatically faces the same 
“use of computer,” “number of images,” “prepubescent,” and 
“sadistic” enhancements as Mr. Smith. He should also expect to 
receive at least a two- level, if not a five- level, enhancement for dis-
tribution. If Mr. Jones is lucky, his guideline range will be as low 
as 151 to 188 months, but if the court concludes that he understood 
his computer might be sharing files, then his guideline range will 
be 210 to 262 months.38 Mr. Jones is representative of the typical 
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offender;39 more than 65 percent of defendants receive a “distribu-
tion” enhancement.40
These child pornography guideline ranges are very long when com-
pared to the average sentence for other sexual offenses. The average guide-
line sentence for fondling a child is 44 months, the average guideline for 
statutory rape is 32 months, the average guideline range for prostituting a 
child is 171 months, and the average guideline range for raping a child 
under twelve is 176 months.41 In other words, according to the guidelines, 
Mr. Y deserves at least 34 months more in prison for swapping one video 
clip over the Internet than he would have deserved if he had targeted and 
actually raped a young child or if he had “pimped” his neighbor’s child 
into prostitution.
You may now understand why judges complain that Guideline § 2G2.2 
has failed its purpose.
g. Adding a Term of Supervised Release
In addition to a term of incarceration, you must also impose a period of 
supervised release. Supervised release is similar to probation or parole, 
but it follows after prison. It allows you and your probation officer to 
closely supervise and monitor all defendants after their release. If the de-
fendant screws up, even if the problem is minor, you can send him to back 
to prison again and again until he stops causing problems. While the stat-
ute allows you to impose as little as five years or as much as a lifetime of 
supervised release,42 the guidelines offer you no guidance when determin-
ing who needs more or less supervision. The guidelines recommend life-
time supervised release for all sex offenders “blindly and without careful 
consideration of the specific facts and circumstances of the case before 
it.”43 Does it make sense to supervise all offenders the same way?
Can Variances from the Guidelines Correct  
for empirical Failures?
At this point, you may feel that Mr. Smith or Mr. Jones deserves to join the 
62.2 percent of 2010 defendants44 who received a below- guideline sen-
tence. After all, you take very seriously the “parsimony” provision of 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) requiring you to impose the lower of any two sentences 
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that would both serve the statutory sentencing purposes. Unfortunately, 
the guidelines do not work the same way in each circuit.
If you are a sentencing judge that works in the Second or Third Cir-
cuits, you enjoy full authority to disagree with Guideline § 2G2.2 on policy 
grounds. For example, in the Second Circuit case of United States v. Dor-
vee, the appellate court agreed that § 2G2.2 was seriously flawed, noting 
that “the 2G2.2 sentencing enhancements cobbled together through this 
process routinely result in Guidelines projections near or exceeding the 
statutory maximum, even in run of the mill cases” and thus “an ordinary 
first- time offender is therefore likely to qualify for a sentence” approach-
ing the statutory maximum sentence “based solely on sentencing en-
hancements that are all but inherent to the crime of conviction.”45 That the 
guideline enhancements routinely resulted in such high sentences for all 
offenders led the court to conclude that “2G2.2 eviscerates the fundamen-
tal statutory requirement in 3553(a) that district courts consider the ‘na-
ture and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant’ and violates the principle, reinforced in Gall, that court 
must guard against unwarranted similarities among sentences for defen-
dants who have been found guilty of dissimilar conduct.”46 The court went 
on to state not only that sentencing courts may sentence outside the guide-
line range for child pornography defendants based on policy disagree-
ments with the guidelines, but it also encouraged courts “to take seriously 
the broad discretion they possess in fashioning sentences . . . bearing in 
mind that they are dealing with an eccentric guideline of highly unusual 
provenance, which, unless carefully applied, can easily generate unreason-
able results.”47
On the other hand, if you work in the Fifth, Sixth, or Eleventh circuits, 
you may not sentence Mr. Smith or Mr. Jones below that guideline range 
simply because you disagree with the policies underlying the guideline. 
Those appellate courts have decided that it is irrelevant that the congres-
sional directives to the Sentencing Commission to change § 2G2.2 were 
not supported by empirical data or seem illogical. The fact that the guide-
lines policies originated with Congress, according to these courts, means 
that you must give them special weight. As one of these courts explained, 
“it is normally considered a constitutional virtue, rather than a vice, that 
Congress exercises power directly.”48 The court went on to explain: “It is 
true that the Commission did not act in its usual institutional role with 
respect to the relevant amendments to 2G2.2. But that is because Congress 
was the relevant actor. . . . It is Congress’ prerogative to dictate sentencing 
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enhancement based on retributive judgment.”49 In other words, if you 
think that Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones should not serve more time in prison 
than child rapists, you will struggle to be able to alter their sentences un-
less you work in a certain circuit. Your location, as much as any particular 
fact, affects your ability to disagree on policy grounds with the problem-
atic guidelines provisions we have identified during the hearing.
A Final Word on Failures in the system
If you as a judge are frustrated by the guidelines’ approach, you may de-
cide to conduct your own sentencing hearing and form your own judg-
ment about the appropriate sentence in this case based the facts presented 
by both sides and based on arguments about the relevance and relative 
importance of those facts. This is the process that would occur in a state or 
military sentencing hearing. Unfortunately, there are a number of obsta-
cles to holding such a hearing in the federal system, obstacles created by 
the obsession with guidelines checklists.
In particular, neither party will be able to provide you with the com-
prehensive facts you will need for such a hearing. While FBI agents often 
devote hundreds and even thousands of hours to evaluating evidence in a 
simple social security fraud case, the formula for investigating child por-
nography is to “checklist” the enhancement factors, then close the case. 
For that reason, few agents know much about the facts of their case. The 
evidence is also held at offsite locations, often far removed from the court-
house. In most districts, the defense must make an advance appointment 
to review any of the evidence. The defense attorney and his or her forensic 
computer specialist can only look at the evidence when government agents 
are present. These government agents watch every keystroke, so the gov-
ernment will immediately learn of any unfavorable discoveries made by 
the defense attorney. In this context, the defense is often unwilling to con-
duct a close review of the evidence for fear of the unknown or because 
they are unable to arrange access on a timely basis.
Two examples from this author’s own experience highlight the scope of 
the problem: In the first case, the prosecution contacted defense counsel 
late on the Friday afternoon before a Monday morning sentencing. The 
prosecutor indicated she intended to introduce several images “sampled” 
from the defendant’s collection. The computer lab was three hours away 
and was already closed for the weekend. When the sentencing hearing 
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began that next Monday, the prosecution introduced four heinous images 
and one picture of a young child in her underwear. The FBI agent testified 
that the child in the final picture was the defendant’s daughter. The impli-
cation was that the defendant was not merely a passive possessor but was 
in fact inclined to make child pornography of his daughter.
By stalling the hearing, counsel was barely able to get enough time for 
his in- house forensic analyst to go to the lab. The analyst conducted a fo-
rensic review while the sentencing hearing was in progress. The analyst 
then entered the courtroom. Counsel called him to the stand, not know-
ing what answer might emerge. The analyst then testified that the child’s 
mother took the photo of the girl, after the defendant was arrested, and 
that the photo was from an entirely different location. It was one of a series 
of photos showing the child preparing for her first day at school. The sen-
tencing judge scolded the government, and the defendant did not receive 
a sentence based on the misperception that he posed a risk to his own 
daughter. If defense counsel had not been fortunate enough to have a tal-
ented forensic analyst in house, however, counsel— and the judge— would 
never have discovered the truth.
In another case, local inspectors discovered a man who had sent a 
nude video of himself to a teenage girl. Investigators conducted a search of 
the man’s home and reported the following evidence to the federal prose-
cutor and the probation officer:
“Agents found hundreds of adult pornographic magazines, hun-
dreds of sexually oriented advertisements for movies; and sex toys 
and aids, several of which advertised child oriented material such 
as Barely Legal . . . approximately 329 video tapes and DVDs con-
taining thousands of pornographic movies, many depicting horror 
themes with violent sex, S&M, voyeurism, stalking, forced sex with 
prison/police themes, nearly all depicting females with shaved/par-
tially shaved pubic hair, several depicting females portrayed as 
teens, dressed in school clothes, with braces or virgins.”
It was only after counsel spent an entire day driving round- trip to a re-
mote site in another state that everyone in the federal case learned that 
ALL of the “barely legal” materials were thumbnail- sized advertisements 
in the back of the defendant’s subscriptions to the magazines “Juggs,” 
“Playboy’s Voluptuous Vixens,” and “Hooters.” Furthermore, all the “vio-
lent” sex scenes were fantasy movies involving vampires bought on Ama-
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zon.com, and all the females with shaved pubic areas and dressed in school 
clothes were clearly voluptuous, adult porn stars wearing “slutty” Hallow-
een costumes such as a cheerleader outfits and pom- poms.
So long as many circuits continue to endorse the flawed policies im-
posed by Congress and contradicted by reality, and so long as the evidence 
is treated as so vile that it is not even worth examining in order to contex-
tualize the offense conduct, your ability as a judge to get to the true facts 
of the case will remain in doubt. The current federal system discourages 
actual investigation and analysis.
A Way Forward
As the examples of Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones illustrate, there is much wrong 
with the federal law surrounding child pornography. The Sentencing 
Commission agrees that the statutory and guidelines sentencing scheme 
for child pornography “should be updated to better reflect the technologi-
cal changes and new expert knowledge and also to account for current 
offenders’ varying degrees of culpability.”50 With that starting point, this 
author hopes that Congress will eventually authorize some modifications 
to the system.
The first step in modifying the guidelines will be to build on scientific 
research about this subgroup of offenders. Until recently, studies of con-
tact offenders— individuals who had physical contact with victims— were 
applied to this noncontact group. A growing body of evidence supports 
the proposition that people who possess and view child pornography are 
often quite different than contact offenders. They are also quite compliant 
under supervision. Studies also suggest that many, if not most, of these 
offenders would never “progress” to any “hands- on” offenses.51
At this point, it appears that the greatest predictor of danger to the 
community is not the size of viewed materials, or whether a person used 
P2P software, but is instead their past history of criminal behavior. For 
that reason, the Base Offense Level for these offenses might be better tied 
to past history than to whether a prosecutor arbitrarily charges “posses-
sion,” “receipt,” or “distribution.”
Also, instead of applying dubious distribution enhancements to a ma-
jority of offenders, particular care should be given to those who directly 
encourage the creation of new images. The Department of Justice recog-
nizes that “an offender who purchases child pornography from a commer-
cial website . . . is not necessarily high- risk, and may even be an entry- level 
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offender.” These offenders often lack sophistication or ties to any pornog-
raphy producers; they often buy images that are decades old.52 Similarly, 
offenders using P2P technology signal a lesser risk than offenders who 
combine P2P file- sharing with the group activity with like- minded of-
fenders. Enhancements could and should apply to offenders who partici-
pate in commercial or barter networks that directly target and solicit the 
creation of new “content.”
Ultimately, our public deserves a sentencing system in which all mis-
conduct is dealt with appropriately, one that makes sense. Rationale sen-
tences, more than anything else, will promote respect for the law and tend 
to diminish unwarranted sentencing disparities.
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10 |  Political and Empirical Controversies 
Threaten the Federal Child Pornography 
Guidelines
Melissa Hamilton
The moral panic over sexual predators targeting young children is often 
expressed in the punishment of child pornography offenders. The federal 
government’s involvement began with its seminal statute criminalizing 
the commercial production of child pornography in the Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.1 Since then, Congress 
has continued to express concern that child pornography remains a na-
tional problem that harms children and society.2 To that end, Congress 
has enacted numerous additional criminal statutes to cover nonproduc-
tion acts such as transportation, distribution, receipt, and possession of 
child pornography.3 Leveraging its constitutional power to regulate inter-
state commerce, the federal criminal justice system has expanded its juris-
dictional grasp over these crimes, which now are largely accomplished 
using online technologies and computer resources. The number of non-
production child pornography offenders sentenced in the federal system 
has increased exponentially, from six dozen in the year 19924 to almost 
1,800 in 2013.5
This book has outlined many areas in law and society in which crimes 
involving child pornography operate in special and usually contested man-
ners. This observation remains true in sentencing, in which the punish-
ment for child pornography represents perhaps the most controversial sen-
tencing scheme in the federal criminal system today. The dispute has pitted 
several robust institutions against each other. Congress and the federal ju-
diciary are vying for control over sentencing, and the agency created to 
foster mutual respect and uniform sentencing practices is struggling to 
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maintain its authority. Congress created that agency, the United States Sen-
tencing Commission (the “Commission”), almost thirty years ago. While 
Congress delegated significant policy authority to it and expected the 
agency to act as an independent expert body, Congress has since reminded 
everyone that the Commission is a subordinate operation.6 The legislature 
and the judiciary have a different, though equally complex, relationship in 
which each operates as a check against the authority of the other, with nei-
ther obtaining primary authority in sentencing law. The question about 
whether sentences should be founded upon empirical study— meaning the 
result of skillfully calculating actual sentencing practices— is also eliciting 
debate in legal circles. This chapter explores these political and empirical 
controversies, points out differences in ideologies and legal conclusions 
that underlie them, and provides descriptive information about recent fed-
eral child pornography offending and resulting sentences. The overall in-
consistency in sentencing across federal courts and, as will briefly be ad-
dressed, state sentencing schemes reflects differing definitional suppositions 
concerning the dangers child pornography viewers pose and the harms 
suffered by children and thus lead to differences in determining the appro-
priate proportionality of just punishments.
Federal sentencing Basics
Three important governmental organizations are at odds over the power 
to manage sentencing practices in the federal criminal justice system. 
Congress, the United States Sentencing Commission, and the federal judi-
ciary is each convinced of its own unique abilities to best judge culpability 
and to determine just punishments. As shall be addressed below, the de-
bate is at a head with respect to nonproduction child pornography crimes.7 
To begin, though, a summary of the history of federal sentencing is neces-
sary to set up the reasons for the recent controversy.
In the federal system, child pornography offenses have the potential to 
elicit long- term prison sentences. Transportation, distribution, and receipt 
offenses each trigger five- year mandatory minimum sentences and twenty- 
year maximums.8 Possession of child pornography does not trigger a man-
datory minimum but carries a maximum of ten years; if the material in-
volves a prepubescent child or a minor under the age of twelve, the 
maximum increases to twenty years.9 These sentences ratchet upward fur-
ther if the defendant has a history of criminal sexual abuse. The selection of 
a particular federal defendant’s sentence within those ranges is determined 
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by a district judge subject to the constraints of statutory sentencing goals, 
the Commission’s sentencing policies and guidelines, and constitutional 
law. All these provide standards that are designed to assist district judges in 
determining reasonable sentences to impose upon offenders.
The current federal sentencing system was established by legislation 
aptly named the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which overhauled what 
was an indeterminate system in which judges had great discretion to a 
more determinative system limiting such flexibility. This law created the 
United States Sentencing Commission, an agency to be staffed with pro-
fessionals who would use their special expertise to craft uniform sentenc-
ing policies and guidelines. District court judges, essentially trial judges in 
the federal system,10 would retain the authority to assign sentences in in-
dividual cases, but they were to be substantially influenced by guidelines 
issued by the Commission concerning the severity of the appropriate pun-
ishment for the relevant crime. To this end, the Commission crafted 
guidelines intended to encompass a reasonable sentencing range based on 
the idea that not all crimes are committed alike. For example, not all rob-
beries are the same for the purpose of determining an appropriate punish-
ment to match the level of the resulting harm and the offender’s relative 
culpability. The goal was for the Commission to craft discrete sentencing 
ranges based on the offense committed, as modified by relevant facts or 
circumstances which the Commission determined either aggravated or 
mitigated culpability. These offense- related facts or circumstances are 
called specific offense characteristics (“SOCs”). Thus, under the guidelines 
the sentence calculation begins with a numeric base offense level for each 
type of crime (essentially a starting number), which represents the typical 
crime. Then points are added or subtracted for applicable SOCs, which 
increase or reduce the offense level based on facts related to the severity of 
the offense or the culpability of the offender. Basically, guidelines provide 
precise numerical methods for calculating final point totals, which are 
then matched against the defendant’s criminal history score on a guideline 
table to determine the relevant sentencing range. Thus, the guidelines are 
expected to normalize sentencing practices by offering a regimented pro-
cess to determine a recommended range of sentence. For example, the 
guidelines might indicate that a sentencing range of 100 to 125 months’ 
imprisonment (approximately 8 to 10 years) was proper for a defendant 
who committed a certain type of robbery; it would arrive at that calcula-
tion by adjusting the base offense level for robbery using relevant SOCs, 
and then matching the final offense level with the defendant’s criminal 
past on the guideline table.
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Originally, Congress intended that the Commission’s policies and 
guidelines would be presumptively binding on the courts. Yet the reform 
legislation itself contained two provisions that gave judges some flexibility. 
First, the law provided that federal judges retained some discretion to vary 
from a guidelines’ recommended range for a fact or circumstance that had 
not already been considered by the Commission.11 Second, the Commis-
sion’s policies and guidelines would not embody the only criteria to be 
considered. Another statutory provision instructed that in determining a 
reasonable sentence, the sentencing judge must consider not only the 
guideline range, but also the nature and circumstances of the offense; the 
history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence im-
posed considering the seriousness of the offense, retribution, deterrence, 
and protecting the public; and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among like offenders (collectively, “sentencing factors”).12 This 
flexibility notwithstanding, federal judges complied with guidelines’ rec-
ommendations and abided by Commission policies a substantial majority 
of the time for nearly twenty years. Then, in 2005, the United States Su-
preme Court dealt the guidelines system a significant blow.13
In the landmark case of United States v. Booker, the United States Su-
preme Court rendered the guidelines advisory in nature, rather than pre-
sumptive, in order to remedy a constitutional issue with the mandatory 
nature of the federal guidelines structure.14 Pursuant to Booker, a district 
judge now can now deviate from a guideline’s recommended sentencing 
range if she determines that a different sentence is justified after consider-
ation of the sentencing factors. The Supreme Court in the Booker decision 
clearly permitted a sentencing judge to vary for a reason related to the 
particular facts and circumstances in the individual case. A couple years 
thereafter, the Supreme Court went a step further when it approved the 
ability of a district judge to vary from a guideline’s recommended range 
not due to any particular fact or circumstance relevant to the case at hand, 
but if the individual judge has a disagreement with a policy underlying 
that guideline.15 For example, the Supreme Court allowed a sentencing 
judge in Kimbrough v. United States to categorically disagree with the 
guideline for crack cocaine trafficking, which was far more punitive than 
the guidelines for other drugs, including powder cocaine.
Together, Booker and Kimbrough might be construed to render the 
Commission itself, as well as its policies and guidelines, largely irrelevant. 
To the contrary, in a series of cases since then, the Supreme Court has reaf-
firmed that federal judges remain significantly circumscribed by the Com-
mission’s policies and guidelines, though the ability to vary for the reasons 
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just mentioned survive.16 Thus a district judge is still required in the first 
instance to correctly calculate the guidelines’ range and also to consider 
Commission policies before considering whether to diverge from them 
after considering all of the sentencing factors.
As a result of Booker and Kimbrough, the compliance rate of issuing 
within- guideline sentences has continued to decrease in federal courts. 
The overall rate for within- range sentences fell from 72 percent to 51 per-
cent from 2004 to 2013.17 Notably, within- guideline sentences have de-
creased dramatically for child pornography offenses. The percentage of 
within- range sentences for child pornography offenses fell much farther, 
from 82 percent in 200418 to 31 percent in 2013.19 The direction of vari-
ances for child pornography sentencing is decidedly in one direction: 
downward variances in issuing sentences (often, very far) lower than 
guidelines recommendations. The rate of below- guideline penalties in 
child pornography cases was 13 percent in 200420 and increased substan-
tially to 68 percent in 2013.21
The current debate about child pornography sentencing has attracted 
widespread attention from various constituencies. In the last few decades 
Congress has regularly increased statutory maximum sentences and es-
tablished higher mandatory minimums specifically for child pornography 
crimes.22 Yet even with such numerical increases, Congress continues to 
be unsatisfied with the reduced sentences imposed by the judiciary in 
many cases. Thus, Congress has, on several occasions, statutorily required 
the Commission to make modifications specifically to the child pornogra-
phy guideline. These have included mandates of specific offense level in-
creases and changes to particular SOCs to enhance punishment.23 Sen-
tencing experts claim this is an unfortunate legislative intrusion into the 
operation of a purportedly independent agency and its expertise, an en-
croachment unique to child pornography crimes.24
The Commission itself is equally frustrated with the practices of 
courts and Congress in this regard. It has indicated its displeasure both 
with congressional edicts, which have changed the child pornography 
guideline, and with federal judges disregarding its mastery, which is ex-
emplified by both the decreasing rate of within- guideline sentences and 
the criticism expressed in sentencing opinions. For their part, numerous 
federal judges regularly balk at the increasing length of sentences that 
the child pornography guideline has produced over the years; many now 
perceive this guideline as glaringly unhelpful in guiding the judge in 
determining a reasonable sentence.25 To understand the judges’ frustra-
tion, it is necessary to outline the common reasons among the judiciary 
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and others for finding that the child pornography guideline’s recom-
mendations have become untenable.
Challenges to the Child Pornography Guideline
The controversies concerning the validity of the child pornography guide-
line converge upon several criticisms that are now oft repeated, at least by 
those who find fault. The discussion here will outline these common cri-
tiques, supplemented by certain numerical information derived from sta-
tistical analyses of the Commission data files for fiscal 2012 sentences.26 
First, the source of the child pornography guideline is at the heart of per-
haps the most visible complaint. Judges who have varied downward often 
criticize the guideline as not resulting from the Commission’s normal role 
as an independent agency conducting empirical study. Therefore, the ar-
gument continues, it cannot provide normative information about rea-
sonable and consistent sentences.27 Instead, the starting offense level and 
several of the SOCs were forced on the Commission by Congress.28 In-
deed, the Commission concisely describes this history in a comprehensive 
report on the evolution of the child pornography guideline:
Congress has repeatedly expressed its will regarding appropriate 
penalties for child pornography offenders. Congress has specifi-
cally expressed an intent to raise penalties associated with certain 
child pornography offenses several times through directives to the 
Commission and statutory changes aimed at increasing the guide-
line penalties and reducing the incidence of downward departures 
for such offenses.29
Congress’ penchant over the years to enact laws requiring fundamental 
changes to a specific offense guideline is virtually unprecedented. Its fixa-
tion on child pornography, a crime that has never made up more than 3 
percent of the federal system’s sentencing docket, is remarkable. Perhaps 
the allure of sex and violence involving the most protected segment of 
society— children— offers political advantage to support increasing sanc-
tions for people perceived as child sex offenders. Even though such direct 
congressional influence over the guidelines is unusual, the fact that nu-
merous judges eschew a guideline because of Congress’ role in its develop-
ment is not uncontroversial. That is because, as will be discussed further 
below, others believe that the ultimate authority over sentencing policy 
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ought to be reserved to Congress, whose judgments should overrule any 
contrary views of the Commission or individual judges.
The second dispute concerns adjustments to the child pornography of-
fense level. The current guidelines for child pornography offenses contain 
six categories of SOCs, which, if applied, can substantially increase the 
recommended length of imprisonment. Significantly, all the SOCs in this 
guideline are enhancements (rather than reductions). They include addi-
tional points for material involving prepubescent children or minors un-
der age twelve; the use of a computer; sadistic or violent content; distribu-
tion activity; the number of images; and a history of prior sexual abuse. 
One of the most common complaints among critics is that several of the 
SOCs apply in virtually every case.30 This is because most child pornogra-
phy offenders use a computer to download and trade images, and the ad-
vancement of technology permits the collection of a large trove of mate-
rial that likely will include very young children and violent content— even 
if the individual does not necessarily intend to collect those types of im-
ages. One problem with the high rate of applicability for multiple SOCs is 
that instead of acting as aggravating factors that isolate more heinous 
criminals, they merely represent the typical offender in contemporary 
times. Thus, the guideline fails to differentiate between more and less cul-
pable offenders.31
The observation that some of the SOCs are almost universally applied 
is borne out by 2012 sentencing statistics.32 At least 96 percent of defen-
dants received points related to the enhancements for the material involv-
ing a minor, the use of a computer, and the number of images. Four out of 
five defendants received an enhancement for the sadistic or violent con-
tent of the images. Just over half of defendants were assigned a distribution- 
related enhancement. However, just one in ten received points for a pat-
tern of activity of sexual abuse with children.
The problems associated with the SOCs exemplify the political and 
empirical focus of this chapter. Those SOCs that derive from Congress are 
not supported by any empirical study of actual sentencing practices. Fur-
ther, as the Commission’s report on the development of the child pornog-
raphy guideline attests, even those SOCs not required directly by Con-
gress are likewise not based upon any empirical analysis.33 Instead, the 
Commission appears open to embracing SOCs that derive merely from 
various commentators’ proposals. For example, the first two SOCs ad-
opted in the child pornography guideline, involving material depicting a 
minor under twelve and distribution activity (which remain in existence 
today), evidently were made simply at the request of a Department of Jus-
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tice representative. Another SOC change made shortly thereafter to trig-
ger an enhancement for material involving a prepubescent minor came 
from a suggestion by a lawyer for an antipornography interest group, 
without debate or discussion.
Third, a related problem with many of the SOCs commonly invoked is 
that they act to ratchet up sentencing ranges significantly. This leads to 
recommendations for lengthy sentences, which many judges find to be 
unreasonably high. It has been observed that the resulting ranges tend 
toward statutory maximums, meaning that the guideline fails to ade-
quately cover the full spectrum of potential minimum and maximum 
penalties, which again results in a failure to distinguish between various 
kinds of offending behavior.34 Some say it seems illogical that Congress 
would provide a statutory range of five to twenty years for most child por-
nography offenses, yet the guideline routinely leans toward recommenda-
tions around the maximum.35 Another method of articulating this criti-
cism is that the child pornography guideline results in unwarranted 
similarity (i.e., extremely harsh penalties) for dissimilar cases and, as 
mentioned earlier, fails to adequately distinguish the worst (justifying 
twenty years) from the least culpable offenders (deserving five years).36
The final category of complaint is that, overall, the child pornography 
guideline tends to yield recommendations that are higher than other 
guidelines would provide for actual sexual molestation of children.37 
Judges adopting this view argue that it is senseless to punish offenses in-
volving visual material more severely than actual contact crimes against 
children.38 They also often believe that the child pornography guideline is 
disproportionate with guidelines’ recommendations for other offenses. 
The guideline ranges tend to be longer for child pornography offenses 
than for such crimes as homicide, drug trafficking, and bank robbery.39
Individually and collectively, these criticisms have caused many federal 
judges to lose respect for this particular guideline, and the 2012 dataset 
analyses illustrate the problematic results. The 2012 sentencing data high-
light the practice of varying from guideline recommendations, while also 
showing the result of disparities nationwide. Overall, 35 percent of child 
pornography sentences in 2012 were within guideline range. Almost two- 
thirds of child pornography sentences actually issued (approximately 62 
percent) were below range. At the other extreme, slightly less than 3 per-
cent were above range. While the sentencing guideline itself would seem 
to assure similar sentences across all types of offenders, Booker and Kim-
brough have disrupted that result. Both decisions allow judges to reject the 
application of otherwise applicable SOCs and to vary from final ranges.
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Several additional statistical measures highlight the result of vari-
ances. The mean prison sentence of for child pornography crimes in 
2012 was ten years, which is not insignificantly lower than the mean 
guideline minimum sentence of over twelve years.40 Yet there was great 
variation in individual sentences, ranging from a low of probation to a 
maximum of a life sentence. On the low end of this punishment spec-
trum, one- third of defendants in 2012 were sentenced to five years or 
less. Three percent received one year or less of prison time, with 2 per-
cent receiving sentences of probation only. On the other end of the spec-
trum, 13 percent received sentences of at least twenty years. Separate 
regression analyses, not presented herein, also provide evidence of wide-
spread disparities across the country even after controlling for relevant 
factors. Thus, perhaps because of the criticisms that the guideline im-
properly tends toward maximum penalties across the board, federal 
judges are using their newfound powers to achieve gradations in culpa-
bility and sentencing.
There are further statistics suggesting that many sentencing judges— 
but not all— find that the guideline produces punishments that are rou-
tinely too high. Even for the 35 percent of sentences in 2012 that complied 
with the guideline recommendation, most were oriented toward the lower 
end of the range. Of those sentences that were within range, 70 percent 
were exactly at the absolute guideline minimum sentence, while another 
12 percent were within the lower half of the ranges. The combination of 
these statistical measures reveals two competing conclusions: First, there 
is a trend of deviating downward from this guideline. Second, there is also 
a lack of uniformity nationwide in complying with the guideline and, pos-
sibly, with the length of sentences actually issued.
Based usually on one or more of the foregoing complaints, judges often 
explain the basis of their downward variances as justified when consider-
ing all of the sentencing factors and the greater discretion afforded by the 
Booker ruling. The other common legal justification is that the child por-
nography guideline specifically deserves less deference and ought to be 
rejected as a matter of policy. This argument is tied to the Kimbrough deci-
sion referenced earlier. But whether Kimbrough legally permits such a 
policy rejection has resulted in inconsistent, indeed contradictory, conclu-
sions by district judges across the country. Many, but certainly not all, 
judges find that the child pornography guideline is faulty and therefore 
unreliable. To make matters worse, the circuit courts of appeal are divided 
on the relevant legal issue, which partly explains the lack of uniformity in 
sentencing.
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A Disputed Legal Question
Significant disparities in child pornography sentences may be related to an 
important legal disagreement among the federal courts that has emerged. 
The question is whether it is lawful for a district judge to vary from the 
guideline range based on a policy disagreement with the child pornogra-
phy guideline. This legal question arose after the Kimbrough decision, in 
which the Supreme Court permitted a district judge to disregard the 
guideline for crack cocaine offenses because the judge disagreed with the 
principal policy on which that guideline was based. The sentencing judge 
in Kimbrough thought that the Commission’s policy was unfounded be-
cause it was based not on any empirical study but on a highly questionable 
generic metric based on the weight of the drug. The Supreme Court’s Kim-
brough decision did not resolve two major issues that are now at the heart 
of the legal dispute in child pornography sentencing. One was whether a 
Kimbrough- type policy rejection is permissible for any other guideline 
that is not the product of the Commission’s own policy conclusion. More 
specifically, the question is whether a court may reject a guideline policy 
when the disputed policy was mandated by Congress itself. The other is-
sue is whether courts may reject only those guidelines that have not ben-
efited from the Commission’s empirical analysis. The reference to empiri-
cal analysis here refers to the expectation that the Commission would 
derive policies and guidelines only after undertaking statistical compila-
tions of average sentencing practices across the country for the offense or 
SOC at issue. To be sure, the formative legislation did not compel the 
Commission to write guidelines that merely replicated past practices; the 
agency was also tasked with considering whether such sentences properly 
reflected the culpability and harm caused by the relevant offense. Still, 
many believe the Commission ought to at least study judges’ decisions. To 
state this issue another way, the question is whether the ability to reject a 
guideline based on a categorical policy disagreement is limited to guide-
lines that do not reflect the Commission’s study of normative experiences.
Legal rulings about the legal authority for a sentencing judge to reject 
the child pornography guideline for a policy- based reason have varied 
across the country.41 Significantly, the federal courts of appeal have ad-
dressed this issue, resolving the question in three different ways. In one 
group, four circuits have explicitly denied lower courts the legal ability to 
reject the child pornography guideline for policy reasons.42 These courts 
have offered several reasons for their denials. They tend to view Congress’ 
involvement in the child pornography guideline as a reason to be respect-
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ful of the legislature’s view that such crimes are serious and ought to be 
severely punished.43 One appellate court clearly believes that the fact the 
child pornography guideline represents congressional will is a reason to 
consider Kimbrough as distinguishable and therefore inapplicable.44 That 
court explained that it is not legally permissible to reject the child pornog-
raphy guideline based on legislative influence because Congress maintains 
ultimate authority in setting sentencing policy.45 For three circuit courts 
in this group, the argument that sentencing policies ought to be based on 
empirical studies is unpersuasive, with the appellate judges noting that 
determinations of reasonable sentences never necessitated a statistical 
analysis.46 Another appellate court in this group concludes that the child 
pornography guideline cannot be rejected, but it offers a somewhat con-
flicting perspective, asserting this guideline actually was the subject of 
empirical support, though the court is unclear about the foundation for 
such assertion.47
On the other end of the spectrum is the group of appellate courts, also 
numbering four, that have explicitly condoned a policy- based rejection of 
the child pornography guideline.48 One appellate circuit construes Con-
gress’ involvement in directly and indirectly amending the child pornog-
raphy guideline as problematic because it undermines the Commission’s 
normal empirical study, leading the court to conclude that this guideline 
lacks credibility in guiding reasonable sentencing practices. Indeed, this 
court refers to the child pornography guideline as “eccentric,” of “highly 
unusual provenance, and “fundamentally different” than other guide-
lines.49 Another circuit is in substantial agreement. It points out that when 
a guideline fails to represent the Commission’s deliberative process and 
instead is substantively influenced by congressional directive, it deserves 
even less respect.50
The third group in the dispute on the legal authority to reject the child 
pornography guideline for policy reasons includes three circuits that have 
taken an equivocal stance.51 These courts theoretically accept the ability of 
a district judge to reject a guideline for policy reasons but at the same time 
they have expressed serious reservations about the prospect of rejecting 
the child pornography guideline. These circuits appear unwilling to adopt 
a definitive stance on the institutional clash, though they seem inclined to 
defer to Congress and the Commission. For instance, one court in this 
group opines that arguments that the child pornography guideline recom-
mends overly harsh sentences ought best to be addressed to the Commis-
sion or Congress, rather than the judiciary.52 Another circuit has expressed 
discomfort with the notion of rejecting a guideline that represents Con-
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gress’ clear policy choices.53 The last circuit’s position, while not preclud-
ing or condoning a policy rejection of the child pornography guideline, 
expresses a generic deferential stance to congressional choices on punish-
ments, while also opining that legislative preferences need not be empiri-
cally based.54
Statistical analyses of the Commission’s 2012 dataset indicate that this 
circuit split is correlated with the length of sentences being imposed. The 
mean sentence in the circuits supporting a policy rejection of the child 
pornography guideline was about eight years, while in the other circuits it 
was eleven years. These numbers suggest that the dispute over whether a 
court may reject the child pornography guideline is related to the lack of 
national uniformity. Widespread disparities have caused conflict among 
various institutions in the federal justice system.
Institutional Conflicts
To be clear, some of the conflicts discussed in this chapter are not necessar-
ily limited to child pornography sentencing. There is an ongoing, broader 
discussion about which federal sentencing institutions may engage in poli-
cymaking and, more specifically, whether one of those institutions may 
trump the others if there is a conflict. Some believe that Congress, as the 
elected representative body of the people, naturally holds the overriding 
power.55 Others prefer the Sentencing Commission, pointing to its institu-
tional advantages for empirical analysis and professional judgment, though 
not necessarily eschewing congressional oversight.56 If the guidelines are 
more akin to mere “sentencing suggestions,” as some have suggested is the 
current state of affairs, then perhaps the Commission should be abol-
ished.57 Still other experts insist that sentences are most just when judges 
are able not only to consider the Commission’s expertise, but also to gather 
relevant information and engage in individualized sentencing.58
Notwithstanding the larger debate over federal sentencing, child por-
nography sentencing presents its own singular tensions. Congress contin-
ues to press for increases in penalties for child pornography crimes, as 
well as for decreased judicial discretion. The federal judiciary pushes in 
the opposite direction by varying downward from guideline recommen-
dations in a significant portion of cases. In a politically charged hearing on 
the state of federal sentencing after Booker, the then- chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee remarked that “[a] criminal committing a federal 
crime should receive similar punishment regardless of whether the crime 
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was committed in Richmond, Virginia, or Richmond, California. And 
that’s why I am deeply concerned about what’s happening in federal sen-
tencing.”59 He focused not just on regional differences in sentences gener-
ally, but on high disparity rates for particular crimes, singling out child 
pornography sentencing as having the most extreme downward variance 
rate among federal judges. The conflict has caught the attention of the 
media, with numerous newspapers, magazines, radio shows, and other 
news outlets reporting on it. For example, legal reporters have recognized 
that Congress has micromanaged sentencing policy to an exceptional de-
gree with child pornography penalties.60
Other constituencies interested in the debate and in its resolution are 
obvious: prosecutors, victims, the defense bar, and defendants themselves, 
all with sometimes conflicting interests. The American Bar Association 
has called for an overhaul of the child pornography guideline, claiming 
that its sentences are too severe and disproportionate considering they 
yield sentences longer than drug trafficking, white- collar crime, and some 
offenses involving luring children into sexual acts.61 At a recent congres-
sional hearing, an American Bar Association representative further 
opined that federal judges and the Commission ought to have a more 
symbiotic relationship; if the judiciary is consistently varying from a 
guideline, that fact should be considered significant in convincing the 
Commission that changes are required.62 The Department of Justice also 
seeks an overhaul of the relevant guidelines, believing them to be out-
moded, though it is not necessarily supporting the downward variance 
rate or a reduction in sentence severity overall.63
For its part, the United States Sentencing Commission appears torn 
between the constituencies it was designed to serve.64 On the one hand, 
the Commission seeks to provide relevant guidance to federal judges in 
crafting sentences and thereby fostering national uniformity. It clearly rec-
ognizes the high variance rate and is displeased with it. A comprehensive 
review of the validity of the child pornography guideline has been a listed 
priority of the Commission since 2009, and the agency in 2013 officially 
expressed its continuing investigation into possible changes. On the other 
hand, the Commission was created by Congress. Although Congress del-
egated significant authority to the Commission, the Commission recog-
nizes that Congress retains ultimate authority over sentencing policies 
and guidelines.65 In its recent lengthy report specifically addressing the 
child pornography guideline, the agency reminds Congress that one of the 
Commission’s legal duties is to examine sentencing data and to make 
modifications in light of feedback from the judiciary, including from their 
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sentencing decisions, which in the area of child pornography have been 
dominated by a high variance rate in recent years.66 Because the Commis-
sion evidently believes that prior congressional action in this area con-
strains it from overhauling the child pornography guideline on its own, it 
politely asks Congress for official approval to do so. Curiously, the Com-
mission seems to have taken a conciliatory position in this respect. In-
stead of providing specific recommendations regarding discrete offense 
levels and SOC point adjustments, it vaguely refers to potential changes. 
Further, instead of offering modifications that would not infringe upon 
prior congressional dictates, the report seems to invite legislative approval 
before any official action is taken. In sum, the situation seems at a stand-
still, with the agency awaiting some clear congressional response.
Unfortunately, the Commission’s ambivalent position in its recent re-
port means that a significant variance rate and sentencing disparities will 
continue in the meantime. Indeed, the Commission’s stance may actually 
create further trouble. Jurists who find fault with the guideline may seize 
upon the Commission’s suggestions and experiment in implementing 
them in actual cases, creating even greater discrepancies in sentences na-
tionwide for similarly situated offenders. The fact that there is a circuit 
level conflict on a major legal issue only muddies the situation.
Overall, this chapter provides reasoning, empirical data, and legal ar-
guments that substantiate wide disparities in sentencing for federal child 
pornography offenses. Clearly, the various sentencing institutions in the 
criminal justice system are divided in judgments on culpability, which will 
lead to continuing differences in opinion on sentencing policy between 
and within institutions. In addition to the political controversies and em-
pirical questions discussed, two further perspectives may be useful in as-
sessing the current conflict over federal sentencing of child pornography 
offenders: a comparative analysis of criminal sentencing from other 
American jurisdictions and competing ideological perspectives.
Comparative Perspectives
Comparing sentences across jurisdictions creates a fuller understanding of 
the various political and empirical positions of punishment in our federal-
ist system. The U.S. Sentencing Commission is generous in making avail-
able much of its data for researchers to analyze, including the statistical 
analyses in this chapter. Other sentencing agencies are not as transparent, 
which unfortunately makes it difficult to conduct a comparative analysis of 
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sentences across multiple American jurisdictions. But there are alternative, 
albeit weak, methods, to ferret out where the federal system stands in com-
parison to other jurisdictions. One potential comparator is within the fed-
eral government itself: the military. The military justice system operates 
substantially autonomously from the criminal system for civilians. For the 
limited purposes needed here, the most relevant distinction is that military 
sentencers are not bound by the Commission’s policies and guidelines. 
Though there is no publicly available database of sentences in the armed 
forces, much anecdotal evidence suggests that sentences in the military for 
child pornography offenses deviate from the civilian regime. A review of 
available case law in the past few years indicates that sentences for child 
pornography crimes in the military system are relatively minimal— 
generally far less severe than in the civilian system. Across the case opin-
ions, sentences of less than two years appear to be the most common (e.g., 
ninety days,67 four months,68 five months69). The case law review suggests 
that sentences greater than that rarely are present unless additional crimes 
were involved, such as actual child molestation.70
No database exists, either, that permits an easy comparison of actual 
sentences imposed for child pornography offending in the various states. 
Two reporters have investigated potential differences in their geographic 
areas. Comparing federal sentences with Pennsylvania state sentences for 
federal and state child pornography offenses, one reporter found that half 
of those sentenced in Pennsylvania state court for child pornography of-
fenses in 2009 did not receive any sentence involving incarceration, while 
of those that did receive some prison term the longest sentence was ap-
proximately eight years. The reporter compared these results to the aver-
age seven- and- a- half- year sentence in federal courts during the same time 
period.71 A journalist for a Louisville, Kentucky, paper compiled years of 
statistics to compare sentences for federal child pornography offenders 
adjudicated in the local federal district court, not with state child pornog-
raphy defendants, but with child sexual molestation defendants sentenced 
by the local state court.72 He concluded that the average sentence for child 
pornography offenders in the area’s federal district (from 2006 to 2011) 
was almost four times as long as the sentence received by offenders in the 
local court for sexually assaulting children.
This author’s own analysis of Texas data for the offenses of possession 
and promotion of child pornography offenses yielded an average sentence 
of almost ten years, though with a range of six months to life. Yet this sta-
tistic is not exactly comparable considering it was a dataset of all offenders 
incarcerated in Texas state prisons as of February 2013. It included prison-
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ers who were sentenced from 1997 onward and did not include probation- 
only sentences or those no longer in prison, and the dataset thus may have 
overrepresented lengthy sentences. A better comparison may be the aver-
age sentence imposed: The fiscal 2012 federal average was ten years. The 
average sentence imposed in Texas for child pornography offenses from 
January 1, 2012, through February 5, 2013, was about seven years. Again, 
though, this figure does not include probation- only sentences or those 
who were already released or for some other reason not then incarcerated 
in Texas’ prisons despite being sentenced during that time period.
In sum, these small- scale and simplistic comparisons yield different 
conclusions. Comparing federal and state child pornography offending 
sentences, the Texas experience appears to be closer to the federal one, 
while the Pennsylvania sentencing system appears to impose far more le-
nient sentences. The local Kentucky review showed that federal child por-
nography defendants received sentences on average about four times as 
long as state defendants did for contact molestation crimes, suggesting the 
federal system is much more punitive for noncontact child sexual exploi-
tation offenses.
An alternative, though admittedly also somewhat lax, method for a 
comparative analysis is to consider statutory sentencing schemes across 
state systems. Recall that the penalties in the federal system generally 
range from probation to ten years for possession and five to twenty years 
for receipt, distribution, and transportation (not including increases for 
prior sexual offending). A review of the fifty states’ sentencing schemes for 
nonproduction child pornography crimes shows that there are widespread 
inconsistencies— some to a dramatic degree— in potential punishments 
across the country for child pornography crimes.73 The comparative anal-
ysis herein focuses on distribution- type offenses, though many states gra-
date sentences for possession offenses much lower.
Overall, minimums and maximums vary to large degrees. In many in-
stances, the ranges of punishments between different states do not even 
overlap. Many states permit sentences for distribution of no term of incar-
ceration, including, among others, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Other states appear to require 
some period of incarceration. For example, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
New Jersey have five- year minimum thresholds, while the minimum in 
Massachusetts is ten years. In contrast, the maximum statutory penalty for 
possession and distribution in California is only one year, two years in 
West Virginia, and three years in Kentucky. Notwithstanding, several 
states permit more extreme punishments. Montana law allows sentences 
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up to one hundred years, Alaska up to ninety- nine years, and Wisconsin 
and Mississippi each sanction forty- year sentences.
The range of possible terms of incarceration in any state varies greatly 
as well. Montana and Alaska offer the widest sentencing schemes with 
ranges of zero to one hundred and zero to ninety- nine years, respectively. 
A few other states provide wide ranges of punishment as well. Idaho’s per-
mitted sentence ranges from zero to thirty years, Mississippi from five to 
forty years, Illinois from six to thirty years. To the contrary, a handful of 
states dictate very refined sentencing options, notably New Mexico with a 
fixed six- year sentence and, at even lower levels, North Carolina provides 
for twenty- to twenty- five months and Kansas dictates thirty- one to thirty- 
four months. In general, all of this evidence indicates substantial varia-
tions in statutory declarations of culpability for child pornography offend-
ers, as well as significant variations in sentencing, across the country for 
similar offenses based on both geographical and jurisdictional criteria.
Still, there is some evidence that the discrepancies in a guidelines- 
based system with sentences actually imposed may be unique to the fed-
eral system, at least in the child pornography area. In a recent survey of a 
representative sample of prosecutors nationwide who pursued child por-
nography cases, almost 80 percent reported that in their experience judges 
abided by state sentencing guidelines for child pornography possessors 
almost all the time.74
The foregoing reflects tensions among officials in defining appropriate 
punishments for child pornography offenders. Discrepancies in legal 
opinions between and within federal institutions and in sentencing laws 
across jurisdictions highlight the troubling results that otherwise similarly 
situated defendants may face differing sentences depending on the juris-
diction, region, and judge involved. Perhaps ideological contrast may help 
explain them as well.
Ideological Perspectives
Notwithstanding the importance of legal and empirical debates in ex-
plaining variations, the disparities in sentencing for child pornography 
offenders appear also to be founded upon fundamental differences in so-
ciopolitical perspectives. It appears that the diversity of opinions in sen-
tencing, which inherently also imbeds various judgments of culpability, is 
regularly tied to whether one concentrates upon depictions of sexual 
abuse of young victims or, instead, on the defendants and their behav-
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iors.75 Those who reiterate that the images depict the horrific sexual ex-
ploitation of the very young likely favor more severe punishments to ap-
propriately account for the tremendous suffering of the children. In this 
view, the consumption of the images operates to victimize the children 
over and over again. A lens focusing upon the minor victims seems often 
to embrace the market thesis, that consumption fuels a market for further 
production and the search for new bodies, necessarily leading to addi-
tional incidents of sexual abuse of children. Under this thesis, strong pun-
ishment is considered necessary to deter even the casual possessor. More-
over, the market thesis posits that the availability and consumption of 
material involving child victims creates a greater risk of harm to society in 
general by normalizing adult- child sexual relations or, even more broadly, 
normalizing a view of children as appropriate objects, perhaps also hold-
ers, of sexual desire. Thus, even outside the area of illegal pornographic 
materials, the proliferation of these images is thought to beget more sexual 
activity involving minors. Notably, in this society, the mere idea of chil-
dren engaging in sex is culturally abhorred. A victim- oriented focus can 
more easily ignore the offenders themselves. Because their crimes are re-
lated to the sexual exploitation of the most protected members of our so-
ciety, child pornography viewers are universally reviled and therefore un-
deserving of empathetic concern.
On the other hand, supporters of reduced punishment oftentimes ori-
ent more towards the offenders. For example, federal judges often describe 
individual defendants as good family men with decent jobs, positive com-
munity ties, and no prior offenses.76 Again, statistical runs using the Com-
mission’s 2012 dataset supports the observation that federal child pornog-
raphy offenders as a group are far different than other federal defendants 
on certain risk- relevant measures. The vast majority of them are white 
males, American citizens, highly educated, and with no criminal history. 
Even the demographic characteristic of age indicates a less risky group; 
the mean age of child pornography defendants is forty- one years, and over 
one- quarter were age fifty and above. An additional explanation given 
why these defendants fail to pose a substantial risk to children is that the 
conduct is not necessarily indicative of deviant sexual interest in children; 
other, less nefarious motivations are in play. These alternative motivations 
include an original interest in adult pornography that led to collecting 
child pornography, in part because of technological advances in modern 
times.77 The Internet offers what has been called the “triple A engine”— 
anonymity, availability, and affordability— that has fueled addictive be-
haviors in online activity, including cybersex.78 Ease of access and efficient 
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downloading capabilities offered by new technologies mean that individu-
als online do not always control all the materials that are available to them 
or that become part of their digital collections. This perspective down-
plays the market thesis because the defendant’s individual collection is 
seen as contributing little to the global market for child pornography ma-
terials. It also reflects a judgment that there are gradations of culpability 
among downloaders.79 Evaluations about culpability variations essentially 
involve findings that possession is a lesser crime than distribution and that 
distribution is a more serious crime when it is done for profit than when 
no financial consideration is involved.80
Ideological divides occur, as well, in how to conceptualize the risks and 
the harms of child pornography. It is possible that proponents of harsh 
sentences are using child pornography consumption as a proxy to punish 
undetected child molestation. To the extent child pornography is plainly 
being used as a substitute, critics argue that child pornography crimes 
should not be embraced as a sort of inchoate crime, and that it is unjust to 
punish what a person has not done (here, child sexual assault) or may in 
some merely speculative sense do in the future.81 It may also be that the 
distinction between child pornography and child sexual assault has been 
negated by the new conceptualization of a broader umbrella of “child sex-
ual exploitation crimes” that consolidate contact crimes together with 
child pornography offenses in a single category. This umbrella widens the 
lens to defining all those who engage in child sexual exploitation crimes as 
directly responsible for the harms caused to child victims, whether or not 
the offenders had physical contact with them. Indeed, child pornogra-
phers may even be characterized as having greater culpability considering 
that their crimes likely involve not one but many victims.82
Conclusions
As long as the Commission and the guideline structure remain intact, per-
haps the preferred philosophy is to value the advantages that can be ob-
tained. The Commission’s data analysis can still foster coherent standards 
reflecting national uniformity. At the same time, the decisions of individ-
ual judges can act as checks on Congress and the Commission, while, in 
turn, Congress’ ability to enact mandatory minimums that are generally 
enforceable on all institutions constitutes a substantial check.83 Indeed, 
experts worry there might be a causative link— that if district judges exer-
cise their Booker discretion and/or Kimbrough- style policy rejection to 
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vary in a high rate of cases, it may lead Congress to react by implementing 
mandatory minimum sentences84 or even abolishing the Commission 
and/or the guidelines entirely.85 Such fears reflect what has already hap-
pened in the area of child pornography sentences.86 This struggle over 
power between the sentencing practices of judges and the potential for 
Congress’ corresponding backlash, while theoretically applicable to the 
entirety of federal sentencing, is at its zenith with the child pornography 
guideline. The sheer magnitude of the downward variance rate, together 
with Congress’ unique and repeated attempts to counteract judicial dis-
cretion, is most striking with this guideline today. This makes the child 
pornography guideline important for the various reasons discussed 
herein, but also means it is at the cutting edge of federal sentencing policy 
for the future. At its core, the debate is about defining just punishment for 
a crime in which legal and ideological opinions are in direct conflict.
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